Transcriber’s Notes: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_.
References to same-page footnotes are alphameric, e.g., [1-A].
The number is the Chapter number; the letter is the sequence
within the chapter.
References to endnotes (near the end of the book) are numeric,
e.g., [1-1]. The first number is the Chapter number; the second
number is the sequence within the chapter.
Additional notes will be found near the end of this ebook.
U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM
THE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA
1954–1964
_by_
Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR
[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS]
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1977
Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051
PCN 190 003064 00
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)
Stock Number 008-055-00094-7
Foreword
This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being
prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the
entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This
particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine
Corps history--the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and
1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a
one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina
War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some
700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the
series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish
a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the
subsequent histories can be developed.
The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and
Museums Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to
major soon after his return to inactive duty, he is now working for the
Kentucky State Government. A native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor
of Arts degree from Morehead State College (1965) and a Master of Arts
degree in American History from the University of Kentucky (1972).
Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon
commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine
Division in Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer
Candidate School, Quantico. For services in the Republic of Vietnam
during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and
26 awards of the Air Medal.
[Illustration: (Signature of) _E. H. Simmons_]
E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Reviewed and Approved:
15 September 1976
Preface
_U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1964_ is a narrative account of the
initial decade of Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The
monograph had two immediate forerunners, both classified studies
prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical Branch, G-3
Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major James M.
Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the
first of these was entitled “United States Marine Corps Activities in
Vietnam, 1954–1963.” The second, entitled “United States Marine Corps
Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1964,” was authored by Major
Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished, these studies served as
important sources for the material contained in this text. Otherwise,
this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records,
the Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the
comment files of the division, and appropriate historical works. Of
particular value in its compilation have been the command diaries of
the various Marine organizations involved.
Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early
Marine advisory program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese
Marine Corps still exist. Therefore, that portion of the text which
deals with those areas has been reconstructed from interviews with
various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance,
however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources.
Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited
to submit pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.
This monograph has not been the product of a single individual’s labor.
A comment draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons,
most of whom were directly associated with the described events. (A
list of these contributors appears as Appendix E.) Their remarks have
been of immense value in reconstructing with accuracy the origin,
nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript
was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,
Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and
the preparation of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the
Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript
typist for the division, performed valuable services in typing and
proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul
A. Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and
Museums Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts.
Unless otherwise credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps
files.
[Illustration: (Signature of) _Robert Whitlow_]
ROBERT H. WHITLOW
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Table of Contents
_Page_
Foreword iii
Preface v
Table of Contents vii
PART I THE WATERSHED 1
Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance 3
The Geographic Setting 3
The People 6
Vietnam’s Recent History 9
Post-Geneva South Vietnam 12
The American Response 14
Chapter 2 The Formative Years 15
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 15
Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance 16
Political Stabilization and Its Effects 18
Reorganization and Progress 20
Summing Up Developments 25
Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency 26
Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency 26
Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps 31
Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands 39
American Decisions at the Close of 1961 42
Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962 44
The War’s New Context 44
Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division 46
The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962 49
Some Conclusions 53
PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR 55
Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang 57
The Decision 57
Deployment to Soc Trang 59
Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations 65
Preparations and Redeployment 73
Accomplishments 74
Chapter 6 SHUFLY Moves North 75
Arrival at Da Nang 75
I Corps Tactical Zone 76
Military Situation, September 1962 79
Initial Helicopter Operations 80
Marine People-to-People Program 85
SHUFLY Operations in I Corps 85
Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962 86
Genesis of the Problem 86
The American Response 88
The Marine Corps Role 88
Marine Participation: A Summary 94
PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963 97
Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort 99
The Political Climate 99
The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations 100
Accomplishments 110
Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations 111
Development of the Compound Continues 111
Combat Support Operations 113
The Situation in Vietnam 121
PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 125
Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge 127
New American Decisions 127
A Restructured Military Assistance Command 130
Changes in Marine Leadership 130
Redesignation and Reorganization 131
The Vietnamese Marine Brigade 132
Additional Marine Activities 138
Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting 144
The Monsoons 144
The Weather Breaks 148
Sure Wind 202 152
Operations Elsewhere in I Corps 154
Changing the Watch 156
Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations 157
Dry Weather Fighting 157
Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations 159
Changes and Improvements 162
Action as the Year Ends 164
Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation 166
NOTES 169
APPENDICES 175
A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964 175
B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964 176
C. Glossary of Acronyms 178
D. Chronology 179
E. List of Reviewers 182
INDEX 184
PART I
THE WATERSHED
CHAPTER 1
Background to Military Assistance
_The Geographic Setting--The People--Vietnam’s Recent
History--Post-Geneva South Vietnam--The American Response_
_The Geographic Setting_
Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China’s southern border, the
Southeast Asian land mass projects itself southward to within 100 miles
of the equator. Often referred to as the Indochinese Peninsula, this
land mass is contained by the Andaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of
Siam on the south, and the South China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf on the
east. Along with the extensive Indonesian island chain which lies to
the immediate south, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the key water
routes between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. So positioned, the
Indochinese Peninsula and the offshore islands resemble the Middle East
in that they traditionally have been recognized as a “crossroads of
commerce and history.”[1-1]
Seven sovereign states currently make up the Indochinese Peninsula.
Burma and Thailand occupy what is roughly the western two-thirds of
the entire peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state of Malaysia
occupies the southern third of the rugged, southward-reaching Malaysian
Peninsula. East of Thailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a relatively
abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam, and Laos, a landlocked
country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which
borders to the north on China, and the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam) form the eastern rim of the Indochinese Peninsula.
Vietnamese have often described the area currently administered by the
two separate Vietnamese states as resembling “two rice baskets at the
ends of their carrying poles.”[1-2] This description is derived from
the position of extensive rice producing river deltas at the northern
and southern extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coastline
and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civilization originated in the
northernmost of these so-called “rice baskets,” the Red River Delta,
centuries before the birth of Christ. Pressured at various stages in
their history by the vastly more powerful Chinese and by increasingly
crowded conditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese gradually
pushed southward down the narrow coastal plain in search of new rice
lands. Eventually their migration displaced several rival cultures and
carried them into every arable corner of the Mekong Delta, the more
extensive river delta located at the southern end of the proverbial
“carrying pole.” Although unified since the eighteenth century under
the Vietnamese, the area between the Chinese border and the Gulf of
Siam came to be divided into three more or less different regions:
Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta; Cochinchina, centered on the
Mekong Delta; and Annam, the intervening coastal region.
[Illustration:
MAINLAND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
]
[Illustration:
FRENCH
INDOCHINA
1954
]
Since mid-1954 the area known collectively as Vietnam has been divided
into northern and southern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956 as
the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliest U.S. military activities
were focused, came to include all of former Cochinchina and the
southern half of Annam. The geography of this small state, described
in general terms, is rugged and difficult. The lengthy country shares
often ill-defined jungle boundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the west
and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the north. Its
land borders total almost 1,000 miles--600 with Cambodia, 300 with
Laos, and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approximately 1,500 miles
of irregular coastline on the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea
complete the enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area.
South Vietnam is divided into four relatively distinct physiographic
regions--the Mekong Delta, the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains,
and the forested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive and fertile
lowland centered on the Mekong River, covers roughly the southern
quarter of the country. This region is essentially a marshy flat
land well suited for rice growing and is recognized as one of Asia’s
richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam’s second physiographic
region, the coastal plain, is similar to the Mekong Delta in that it is
predominantly flat and generally well suited for rice growing. Properly
known as the coastal lowland, this region extends from the country’s
northern border to the Mekong Delta. Its width is never constant, being
defined on the west by the rugged Annamite Mountains--the region which
dominates the northern two thirds of South Vietnam. The jungle-covered
mountains, whose highest elevations measure over 8,000 feet, stand in
sharp contrast to the low and flat coastal plain. The eastern slopes of
the mountains normally rise from the lowlands at a distance of five or
10 miles from the sea. At several points along the coast, however, the
emerald mountains crowd to the water’s edge, dividing the coastal plain
into compartments and creating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty.
At other locations the mountain chain recedes from the coast, allowing
the lowlands to extend inland as far as 40 miles. An extensive upland
plateau sprawls over the central portion of South Vietnam’s mountain
region.
This important subregion, known as the Central Highlands, possesses
relatively fertile soil and has great potential for agricultural
development. The highest elevations in the Annamite chain are recorded
south of the Central Highlands. From heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet,
the mountains dissolve southward into the forested plain, a hilly
transition zone which forms a strip between the Mekong lowlands and the
southernmost mountains.
South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic of Cancer. Its climate
is best described as hot and humid. Because the country is situated
within Southeast Asia’s twin tropical monsoon belt, it experiences two
distinct rainy seasons. The southwest (or summer) monsoon settles over
the Mekong Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May and
lasts until early October. In the northern reaches, the northeast (or
winter) monsoon season begins in November and continues through most of
March. Unlike the rainy season in the south, fog, wind, and noticeably
lower temperatures characterize the wet season in the north. While
the reversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance of water for rice
growing throughout the Mekong Delta and most of the long coastal plain,
rainfall is not distributed uniformly. Parts of the central coast
record only about 28 inches of annual precipitation. In contrast, other
areas along the northern coast receive as much as 126 inches of rain
during the course of a year. Even worse, a percentage of this rainfall
can be expected to occur as a result of typhoons. The tropical storms
usually lash the Annamese coast between July and November. Almost
always they cause extensive flooding along normally sluggish rivers
which dissect the coastal plain.
_The People_
Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabit South Vietnam. Of
these, over 13 million are ethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers
and fishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to compress themselves into
the country’s most productive agricultural areas--the Mekong Delta and
the coastal plain. Chinese, numbering around one million, form South
Vietnam’s largest ethnic minority. Concentrated for the most part in
the major cities, the Chinese traditionally have played a leading role
in Vietnam’s commerce. About 700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered
across the upland plateau and the rugged northern mountains, constitute
South Vietnam’s second largest minority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely
akin to the dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit the lowlands
along the Cambodian border. Roughly 35,000 Chams, remnants of a once
powerful kingdom that blocked the southern migration of the Vietnamese
until the late 1400s, form the country’s smallest and least influential
ethnic minority. The Chams, whose ancestors once controlled most of
the central and southern Annamese coast, are confined to a few small
villages on the central coast near Phan Rang.
[Illustration:
TERRAIN FEATURES
SOUTH VIETNAM
]
South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range of religions. Between 70
and 80 percent of the country’s 16 million people are classified as
Buddhist. It is estimated, however, that a much smaller percentage are
actually practitioners. Roman Catholics comprise roughly 10 percent
of the total population. Usually found in and around the country’s
urban centers, the Catholics are products of Vietnam’s contacts with
Europeans. Two so-called politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and
the Hoa Hao, have attracted large segments of the rural population,
particularly in the Mekong Delta.[1-A] For the most part, the scattered
Montagnard tribes worship animal forms and have no organized religion,
although many have been converted to Christianity.
[1-A] Founded just after World War I, the Cao Dai claims
more than one and a half million faithful in South
Vietnam. The religion incorporates elements of Taoism,
Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and large doses
of spiritualism. Its clergy, headed by a “pope,” is
organized in a hierarchy modelled on that of the Roman
Catholic Church. The extent of its borrowing is suggested
by the fact that adherents count the French author
Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the
Cao Dai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism
during the 1940s, organized its own army, and fought
sporadic actions against the French and the subsequent
French-controlled government of Emperor Bao Dai until
suppressed by the Diem government in 1954.
Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. In
the late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a
“protestant” movement within the worldly, easy-going
Buddhist faith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks
grew rapidly, called themselves Hoa Hao after the village
where Phu So began his crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful
and Catholics, they tended to live apart in their own
villages and hamlets concentrated in the very south and
west of Vietnam, primarily along the Cambodian border.
Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic, they were under
constant attack from the French, Japanese, and Viet Minh,
and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militia
which was subsequently disbanded. Today their overall
membership stands at about one million.
Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society is rural and agrarian. Over
the centuries the Vietnamese have tended to cluster in tiny hamlets
strewn down the coastal plain and across the Mekong Delta. Usually
composed of a handful of closely knit families whose ancestors settled
the surrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet is South Vietnam’s
basic community unit. Next larger is the village which resembles the
American township in function in that it encompasses a number of
adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamese people have naturally developed strong
emotional ties with their native villages. “To the Vietnamese,” it has
been said without exaggeration, “the village is his land’s heart,
mind, and soul.”[1-3] Given the rural nature of the country it is
understandable that the inhabitants of the villages and hamlets have
retained a large degree of self-government. “The laws of the emperor,”
states an ancient Vietnamese proverb, “are less than the customs of the
village.”[1-4]
Overlaying this rural mosaic are two intermediate governmental
echelons--the districts and the provinces, The district, the smaller
of these political and geographic subdivisions, first appeared in
Vietnamese history following the earliest annexation of Tonkin by
the Chinese in 111 B.C. It remained in use and was extended down the
Annamese coast and into Cochinchina by the successive Vietnamese
dynasties which came to power in the ensuing centuries. Provinces,
larger geographic subdivisions, eventually were superimposed over
groups of contiguous districts, thus adding another echelon between
the reigning central government and the villages. This structure
remained in existence under the French after they took control of all
Vietnam in the late 19th century. In order to make their administration
more efficient French colonial authorities modernized the cumbersome
administrative machinery and adjusted provincial boundaries. It is
essentially this French-influenced structure that exists in South
Vietnam today. Still, after years of use and modification, the system
seems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule of the villages
tends to nullify the efforts of provinces and districts to govern rural
areas. Often the central government’s influence is unable to seep lower
than the district headquarters, particularly in more remote areas.
While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, it does possess several
important urban centers. As might be expected, these are found
primarily in the densely populated Mekong Delta and along the coastal
lowland. Saigon, the nation’s capital and largest city, presently has
a population estimated at 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the
Mekong River complex and inland from the coast, the city dominates the
country in both an economic and political sense. Saigon has excellent
port facilities for ocean-going ships, although such traffic must
first negotiate the tangled Saigon River which leads inland from the
South China Sea. Da Nang, located on the Annamese coast 84 miles
below the northern border, is the country’s second largest city.
With a population of roughly 500,000 and a protected harbor, Da Nang
constitutes the principal economic center in northern South Vietnam.
The old imperial capital of Hue (population of roughly 200,000),
situated about 50 miles north of Da Nang, historically has exerted a
strong cultural influence over the Annamese coast.[1-B] Scores of large
towns, such as Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang Ngai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long,
extend down the coast and across the Mekong Delta. Often these serve as
provincial capitals. A few lesser population centers, notably Pleiku,
Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot, are situated in the Central Highlands.
[1-B] The population of most of South Vietnam’s cities and
towns has been swollen by the influx of refugees which
occurred as the Vietnam War intensified in the middle
1960s. In 1965, for example, refugee population estimates
for the three major cities were as follows: Saigon--1.5
million; Da Nang--144,000; Hue--105,000.
Most of South Vietnam’s major towns and cities are connected by one
highway--Route 1. Constructed by the French during the early 20th
century, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi, the principal city
of Tonkin in northern Vietnam, down the coast and inland to Saigon.
While Route 1 and a French-built railroad which parallels it helped
unify South Vietnam’s most densely populated areas, the country’s
road network is otherwise underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads do
twist westward from Route 1 into the mountains to reach the remote
towns there. Of these the most noteworthy are Route 19, built to serve
Pleiku in the Central Highlands, and Route 9, which extends westward
into Laos from Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost town. A number
of roads radiate outward from Saigon to the population centers of
the Mekong Delta. For the most part, however, the Vietnamese people
traditionally have depended on trail networks, inland waterways, and
the sea to satisfy their transportation needs. The location of the bulk
of the population in the watery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast has
encouraged their reliance on waterborne transportation.
_Vietnam’s Recent History_
Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland Southeast Asia now occupied
by South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to
France. Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina
over which the French had exercised political control in one form
or another, with one exception, since the last quarter of the 19th
century. The only interruption occurred following the capitulation of
France in June 1940. Exploiting the disrupted power balance in Europe,
and attracted by the natural resources and strategic value of the
area, Japan moved into northern French-Indochina less than four months
after France had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French government agreed
to Japanese occupation of southern French-Indochina. Soon Japanese
forces controlled every airfield and major port in Indochina. Under
this arrangement the Japanese permitted French colonial authorities
to maintain their administrative responsibilities. But as the tide of
war began to turn against the Japanese, the French became increasingly
defiant. The Japanese terminated this relationship on 9 March 1945
when, without warning, they arrested colonial officials throughout
Indochina and brutally seized control of all governmental functions.
Six months after the dissolution of the French colonial apparatus in
Indochina, World War II ended. The grip which Japan had held on most
of Southeast Asia for nearly half a decade was broken on 2 September
1945 when her foreign minister signed the instrument of unconditional
surrender on board the battleship USS _Missouri_. Shortly thereafter,
in accordance with a previously reached Allied agreement, Chinese
Nationalist forces moved into Tonkin and northern Annam to accept the
surrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16th parallel, British units
arrived from India to disarm the defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150
men from a small French Expeditionary Corps arrived by air in Saigon
on the 12th to assist the British, who had included them only as a
courtesy since France was not among the powers slated to receive the
surrender of the Japanese in Indochina.
But the end of World War II and the arrival of Allied forces did not
end the struggle for control of French-Indochina. Instead, it signalled
the beginning of a new conflict in which the contestants were, in many
respects, more formidable. One of these, the French, moved quickly to
restore their former presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Reinforced with
additional units, they occupied most major towns between the Mekong
Delta and the 16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months later
French negotiators secured an agreement with the Chinese Nationalists
whereby French units would replace the Chinese occupation forces north
of the 16th parallel.
[Illustration:
MAJOR CITIES OF
SOUTH VIETNAM
]
Wartime developments in French-Indochina, however, had brought about
profound political changes which eventually would doom the French
effort to re-establish political and economic influence in the region.
During World War II, Ho Chi Minh, an avowed Communist, had transformed
a relatively feeble political party into a sizable guerrilla
organization. Known as the Viet Minh, the Communist guerrillas had been
organized, trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher
from Annam. During the latter stages of the war, the United States had
supplied the Viet Minh with limited quantities of military supplies.
In return, Ho’s guerrillas had assisted downed American pilots and
occasionally had clashed with small Japanese units. But the Viet Minh
had wasted few men on costly major actions against the Japanese.
Conserving their forces, Ho and Giap had concentrated on organization
and had managed to extend their strength into the densely populated Red
River Delta and along the Annamese coast. In Cochinchina, where their
numbers were considerably smaller, the Communists had limited their
activities almost entirely to organization and recruitment. Thus, by
the end of the war Ho’s organization was able to emerge as a definite
military-political force in northern French-Indochina.
Following the Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the Chinese
Nationalist occupation forces, the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi,
the capital of Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. At Ho’s direction the Viet Minh promptly shifted from their
anti-Japanese posture and prepared to contest the French return.
Confronted with this situation in northern Indochina, the French were
forced to bargain with the Communists. A preliminary agreement was
reached on 6 March 1946 whereby the French agreed to recognize the
newly founded but relatively weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as
a “free state within the French Union.” In return, Ho’s government
declared itself “ready to welcome in friendly fashion the French Army,
when in conformance with international agreement, it would relieve
the Chinese forces” which had accepted the Japanese surrender in
Tonkin.[1-5] Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, French
forces began reoccupying Tonkin and northern Annam. Within six months
they controlled every major strategic position from the Chinese border
to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina’s southern tip.
The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946 after Viet Minh and French
negotiators failed to reach a final agreement on actual political
control of Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted, Ho withdrew
the bulk of his military forces into mountainous sanctuaries along
the Chinese border, but left small groups of guerrillas scattered
throughout the heavily populated Red River Delta. Reinforced with
contingents from Europe and Africa, the French Expeditionary Corps
initially managed to hold its own and, in some cases, even extend its
control. But, drawing strength from its natural appeal to Vietnamese
nationalism, the Communist movement began gaining momentum in the late
1940s. Gradually the war intensified and spread into central Annam and
Cochinchina.
In January 1950, the French moved to undercut the Viet Minh’s appeal
to non-Communist nationalists by granting nominal independence to its
Indochina possessions. Under the terms of a formal treaty, all of
Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) was brought together under a
Saigon-based government headed by Emperor Bao Dai. Laos and Cambodia
likewise formed their own governments, whereupon all three countries
became known as the Associated States of Indochina.
This new arrangement, however, had little effect on the ongoing war
with the Viet Minh. In accordance with the treaties, the Associated
States became members of the French Union and agreed to prosecute
the war under French direction. Moreover, French political dominance
in the region continued, virtually undiluted by the existence of the
Associated States.
In related developments, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist armies seized
control of mainland China in 1949 and Communist North Korean forces
invaded the pro-Western Republic of Korea in 1950. These events added
new meaning to the French struggle in Indochina as American policy
makers came to view the war on the Southeast Asian mainland within the
context of a larger design to bring Asia entirely under Communist
domination. Following the invasion of South Korea, President Truman
immediately announced his intention to step up U.S. military aid to
the French in Indochina. Congress responded quickly by adding four
billion dollars to existing military assistance funds. Of this, $303
million was earmarked for Korea, the Philippines, and “the general area
of China.”[1-6][1-C] Thus, the Truman Administration, now confronted
by the possibility that Communism might engulf all of mainland Asia,
extended its containment policy to Indochina.
[1-C] The following year would see a half billion U.S. dollars
allocated to support French operations in Indochina.
By 1954 that figure would climb to an even one billion
dollars.
Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S. material assistance,
the French proved unable to wrest the initiative from Giap’s growing
armies. Although national armies drawn from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
were now fighting alongside the French, the Expeditionary Corps was
over-extended. Moreover, the French cause was extremely vulnerable
to Communist propaganda. On the home front, public support for the
so-called _sale guerre_ (dirty war) eroded steadily during the early
1950s as the Expeditionary Corps’ failures and casualties mounted.
Finally, on 7 May 1954, the besieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien
Bien Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shattering what remained
of French determination to prosecute the war in Indochina. In Geneva,
where Communist and Free World diplomats had gathered to consider a
formal peace in Korea along with the Indochina problem, French and Viet
Minh representatives signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 July which
ended the eight-year conflict.
The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantially altered the map of the
Indochinese Peninsula. France agreed to relinquish political control
throughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam all gained full
independence. The most controversial provision of the 20 July agreement
divided Vietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed a demilitarized
zone over the partition line. This division, intended to facilitate
the disengagement of the opposing forces, was to be temporary pending
a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956. In accordance with
the agreement, France immediately turned over political control of the
northern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of Annam) to the Communist
Viet Minh. Ho promptly re-established the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi.
Other provisions of the Geneva Agreement called for the opposing armies
to regroup in their respective zones within 300 days. Following their
regroupment, the French military forces were to be completely withdrawn
from the North within 300 days and from the South by mid-1956.
Civilians living both north and south of the partition line were to
be allowed to emigrate to the opposite zone in accordance with their
political convictions. It was anticipated that thousands of Catholics
living in Tonkin would seek refuge in the non-Communist South. Other
articles of the agreement dealt with the creation and responsibilities
of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the
cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Polish delegations were to comprise
this commission.
On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agreement, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos
joined France and the Viet Minh in endorsing a “Final Declaration”
which sanctioned the previously reached cease-fire agreement. The
United States refused to endorse this declaration, but issued a
statement to the effect that it would not use force to disturb the
cease-fire.
_Post-Geneva South Vietnam_
The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrust that area of Vietnam
south of the partition line into a period of profound confusion and
instability. Even worse, the colonial period had done little to
prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamese for the tremendous problems
at hand. No real apparatus for central government existed. Likewise,
the long colonial period left the area with few experienced political
leaders capable of establishing and managing the required governmental
machinery. Political control passed nominally to the French-sponsored
emperor, Bao Dai, who was living in France at the time. For all
practical purposes, leadership in the South devolved upon Bao Dai’s
recently appointed pro-Western premier, Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a
prosperous and well-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diem had served
the French briefly as a province chief prior to World War II. Always a
strong nationalist but staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unable to
reconcile his anti-French attitudes with the Viet Minh movement during
the Indochina War. As a result Diem had left his homeland in the early
1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in the United States. There he
remained until his appointment as premier in mid-June of 1954.
The months immediately following the Geneva agreement found Ngo Dinh
Diem struggling to create the necessary governmental machinery in
Saigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best, however, his hold
on the feeble institutions was tenuous. A serious confrontation was
developing between the premier and the absent Bao Dai, still residing
in France. Further complicating the political scene was the presence of
Hoa Hao and Cao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding the capital,
and the existence in Saigon of an underworld organization named the
Binh Xuyen.[1-D] As 1955 opened the leaders of these three politically
oriented factions were pressing demands for concessions from the new
central government. Among these were permission to maintain their
private armies, and the authority to exercise political control over
large, heavily populated areas.
[1-D] The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps south
of the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon.
Controlling the vice and crime of the city, by 1954 they
had gained control of the police under circumstances that
reeked of bribery. A year later the organization was
brutally crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem.
The outcome of the embryonic power struggle in Saigon hinged largely
on control of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Although not
considered an efficient military organization by even the most liberal
estimates, the 210,000-man National Army was the principal source
of organized power available to the quarreling leaders of southern
Vietnam. Originally created by the French in 1950 to supplement their
Expeditionary Corps, the VNA had since suffered from structural
deficiencies. It actually had no organizational echelon between the
French-controlled General Staff and the 160 separate battalions. Tied
to no regiments or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally
were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for operational
instructions and logistical support.[1-E]
[1-E] Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized
into _groupes mobiles_ (mobile groups) by the French for
specific offensive operations. But these groups, which
were roughly equivalent to a regimental combat team,
were never composed entirely of VNA battalions under a
Vietnamese command group.
A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a degree of inattention
on the part of the French compounded the problems which stemmed from
the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of these shortcomings
the morale of the VNA had deteriorated sharply in the waning stages of
the French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire agreement, high
desertion rates were reported in almost every Vietnamese battalion.
Still, it was evident that he who controlled the National Army would
most likely control the government in the area south of the partition
line.
The danger that the pro-Western zone might become the victim of a
sudden Communist attack from the north, as had been the case on the
Korean Peninsula, injected another element of uncertainty into the
overall situation in southern Vietnam. The conditions which settled
over the area in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement
suggested this possibility since they were alarmingly similar to the
conditions which had prevailed in Korea prior to the North Korean
invasion of 1950. Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographically
and ideologically: the North clearly within the orbit of the Soviet
Union and Communist China, and the South under the influence of the
Western powers. As in Korea in 1950, there also existed a very real
armed threat to the weaker pro-Western southern state. Immediately
after the Geneva cease-fire, the Viet Minh army regrouped north of the
17th parallel and was redesignated the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
American intelligence reported that the PAVN, which numbered roughly
240,000 disciplined veterans, was being reorganized and re-equipped
with Soviet and Chinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agreement.
At the same time Western intelligence sources estimated that the Viet
Minh had intentionally left between 5,000 and 10,000 men south of the
partition line following their withdrawal. Also done in violation of
the cease-fire agreement, this meant that Communist guerrillas could be
expected to surface throughout the South in the event of an outright
invasion.
A related condition heightened fears that a Korea-type invasion might
occur in Vietnam. In South Korea a military vacuum had been allowed to
form in 1949 when American units withdrew from the area. Apparently
that vacuum, coupled with a statement by the American Secretary of
State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific
did not include South Korea, had encouraged Communist aggression.
Now, with the scheduled evacuation of French armies from Indochina by
mid-1956, there emerged the distinct possibility that such a military
vacuum would recur, this time in southern Vietnam. “Vietnam,” warned
one American scholar familiar with the region, “may very soon become
either a dam against aggression from the north or a bridge serving the
communist block to transform the countries of the Indochinese peninsula
into satellites of China.”[1-7]
_The American Response_
It was in the face of this uncertain situation on the Southeast Asian
mainland that the Eisenhower administration moved to discourage renewed
Communist military activity. First, the United States sought to create
a regional international organization to promote collective military
action under the threat of aggression. This was obtained on 8 September
1954 when eight nations--the United States, Great Britain, France, New
Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand--signed the
Manila Pact. The treaty area encompassed by the pact included Southeast
Asia, the Southwest Pacific below 21°31′ north latitude, and Pakistan.
Two weeks later the pact was transformed into the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO). In a separate protocol, the member nations agreed
that Cambodia, Laos, and the “Free Territory under the jurisdiction of
the State of Vietnam” all resided within their defense sphere.[1-8]
Next, after several months of hesitation, the United States settled
on a policy of comprehensive assistance to South Vietnam, as the
area south of the 1954 partition line was already being called. As
conceived, the immediate objective of the new American policy was
to bring political stability to South Vietnam. The longer range
goal was the creation of a bulwark to discourage renewed Communist
expansion down the Indochinese Peninsula. In this scheme, military
assistance was to play a key role. “One of the most efficient means
of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong,” explained
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, “is to assist it
in reorganizing the National Army and in training that Army.”[1-9]
In short, the State Department’s position was that a stronger, more
responsive Vietnamese National Army would help Premier Diem consolidate
his political power. Later that same force would serve as a shield
behind which South Vietnam would attempt to recover from the ravages of
the French-Indochina War and the after effects of the Geneva Agreement.
So by early 1955 a combination of circumstances--South Vietnam’s
position adjacent to a Communist state, the unsavory memories of
the Korean invasion, and the impending withdrawal of the French
Expeditionary Corps--had influenced the United States to adopt a policy
of military support for Premier Diem’s struggling government.
CHAPTER 2
The Formative Years
_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam--Origins of U.S. Marine
Assistance--Political Stabilization and Its Effects--Reorganization and
Progress--Summing Up Developments_
_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam_
When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in the late summer of 1954,
the machinery for implementing the military phase of the American
assistance program for South Vietnam already existed. President
Truman had ordered the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group (USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in mid-1950 as
one of several reactions to the North Korean invasion of the Republic
of Korea. Established to provide materiel support to the French
Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little more than a logistical
funnel through which U.S. military aid had been poured.
Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had
been assigned to command the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s
selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more active U.S. role in
training of the Vietnamese National Army. He had been chosen for the
assignment largely on the basis of his successful role in creating
and supervising the training programs which had transformed the South
Korean Army into an effective fighting force during the Korean War.
Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement, he and his 342-man
group began preparing for the immense task of rebuilding South
Vietnam’s armed forces.
The entire American project to assist the South Vietnamese in the
construction of a viable state was delayed during the fall of 1954
while the necessary diplomatic agreements were negotiated among
American, French, and South Vietnamese officials. President Eisenhower
dispatched General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon
in November to complete the details of the triangular arrangements.
Collins carried with him the broad powers which would be required to
expedite the negotiations.
By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy had paved the
way for the transfer of responsibility for training, equipping, and
advising the Vietnamese National Army from the French to the USMAAG.
He and General Paul Ely, the officer appointed by the Paris government
to oversee the French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed a
“Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with this document, the
United States agreed to provide financial assistance to the French
military in Vietnam in exchange for two important concessions. First,
the French pledged to conduct a gradual military withdrawal from South
Vietnam in order to prevent the development of a military vacuum
which might precipitate a North Vietnamese invasion. Secondly, they
accepted an American plan to assist in a transition stage during which
the responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military could be
transferred to the MAAG in an orderly fashion. General Collins, in
addition to engineering the understanding with General Ely, had advised
Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man military and naval forces to a
level of 100,000, a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the
United States could realistically support and train.
The American plan to begin assisting South Vietnam encountered further
delay even after the Ely-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely’s
government, arguing that the United States had agreed to provide only
one-third of the amount France had requested to finance its Indochina
forces, refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock was finally
resolved on 11 February 1955 when French officials accepted the terms
of the Ely-Collins arrangement in a revised form.
A combined Franco-American training command, designated the Training
Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM), became operational in Saigon
the day following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins
understanding.[2-A] Headed by Lieutenant General O’Daniel but under
the “overall authority” of General Ely, TRIM was structured to prevent
domination by either French or Americans. The training mission was
composed of four divisions, Army, Navy, Air Force, and National
Security, each of which was headed alternately by either an American
or a French officer. The chief of each division had as his deputy an
officer of the opposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headed the
divisions considered by MAAG officials as the most important--Army and
National Security. Operating through TRIM and assisted by the French
military, the USMAAG was tasked with implementing the U.S. Military
Assistance Program in a manner that would help shape the Vietnamese
national forces into a cohesive defense establishment prior to the
withdrawal of French forces.
[2-A] The combined training mission originally was designated
the Allied Training Operations Mission. This designation
was changed prior to the time the mission became
operational.
_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_
Only one U.S. Marine was serving with the USMAAG in Saigon when
TRIM became operational--Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat.[2-B]
Croizat’s assignment to the U.S. advisory group had resulted when
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps,
nominated him to fill a newly created billet as liaison officer between
the MAAG and the French High Command during the latter stages of the
Indochina War. Largely because of his French language fluency and his
former association with many French officers while attending their war
college in 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment.
[2-B] Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at
the time. They were those assigned to the American
Embassy. One officer was serving as Assistant Naval
Attache/Assistant Naval Attache for Air, and 12 other
Marines were serving as security guards.
Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did not arrive in Vietnam until 2
August 1954. By then the cease-fire agreement had been signed at Geneva
and the need for a liaison officer with the French High Command no
longer existed. General O’Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrived
Marine officer to serve on the General Commission for Refugees which
had been created by the South Vietnamese Government immediately after
the cease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directly involved in
the construction of refugee reception centers and the selection and
development of resettlement areas in the South. When U.S. naval forces
began assisting in the evacuation of North Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel
Croizat was sent to Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin. There
he headed the MAAG detachment and was responsible for coordinating
U.S. operations in the area with those of the French and Vietnamese.
When the so-called “Passage to Freedom” concluded in May 1955, 807,000
people, 469,000 tons of equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicles
had been evacuated from Communist North Vietnam.[2-C] It was not until
February 1955 that the Marine returned to Saigon.
[2-C] The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of
equipment and supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S.
Navy moved the balance.
During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s absence, Premier Diem had acted on
a long-standing proposal to create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps.
The issue of a separate Marine force composed of Vietnamese national
troops had surfaced frequently since the birth of the Vietnamese Navy
in the early 1950s. Although the proposal had been heartily endorsed
by a number of senior French Navy officers, the downward spiral of the
French war effort had intervened to prevent the subject from being
advanced beyond a conceptual stage. Largely as a result of earlier
discussions with Croizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on 13
October when he signed a decree which included the following articles:
ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created within the
Naval Establishment a corps of infantry specializing in the
surveillance of waterways and amphibious operations on the coast
and rivers, to be designated as:
‘THE MARINE CORPS’
* * * * *
ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various type units
suited to their functions and either already existing in the Army
or Naval forces or to be created in accordance with the development
plan for the armed forces.[2-1]
In accordance with this decree a miscellaneous collection of
commando-type units was transferred from the Vietnamese National Army
and Navy to the Marine Corps. Except for a naval commando unit, which
had conducted amphibious raids along the coastal plains, these forces
had operated in the Red River Delta with the French and Vietnamese
Navy _dinassauts_ (river assault divisions). First employed in 1946,
the _dinassauts_ had evolved into relatively effective naval commands
capable of landing light infantry companies along Indochina’s tangled
riverbanks. Normally the _dinassaut_ was composed of about a dozen
armored and armed landing craft, patrol boats, and command vessels.
An Army commando unit, consisting of approximately 100 men, would
be attached to such naval commands for specific operations. Thus
organized, the _dinassauts_ could transport light infantry units
into otherwise inaccessible areas and support landings with heavy
caliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Such operations had been
particularly successful in the sprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin
where navigable estuaries and Viet Minh abounded.[2-D] Later in the
war, as the concept was refined, the French created a number of
Vietnamese National Army commando units for specific service with the
_dinassauts_. Still attached to the Navy commands these units were
sometimes responsible for security around the _dinassaut_ bases when
not involved in preplanned operations. A number of these rather elite
Vietnamese units, variously designated light support companies, river
boat companies, and commandos, were now transferred to the newly
decreed Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).
[2-D] Of the _dinassaut_ Bernard Fall wrote: “[It] may well
have been one of the few worthwhile contributions
of the Indochina war to military knowledge.” (Fall,
_Street Without Joy_, p. 39) A more thorough analysis
of _dinassaut_ operations is included in Croizat, _A
Translation From The French Lessons of the War_, pp.
348–351.
By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returned to Saigon in early
1955 these units, which totalled approximately 2,400 officers and men,
had been evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of the commandos had
been assembled at Nha Trang on South Vietnam’s central coast where
the French still maintained an extensive naval training facility.
There, under the supervision of a junior French commando officer,
several former commandos had been organized into the 1st Marine
Landing Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion). The balance of the newly
designated Marine units, however, were scattered in small, widely
separated garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta. These units included
six river boat companies, five combat support light companies, and
a small training flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Vietnamese
National Army officer, Major Le Quang Trong, as Senior Marine Officer.
But because no formal headquarters had been created and because no real
command structure existed, Major Trong remained relatively isolated
from his far-flung Marine infantry units.
Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assigned to the MAAG’s Naval
Section and subsequently to TRIM’S Naval Division as the senior U.S.
advisor to the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps. In this capacity
the Marine officer quickly determined that the small Vietnamese
amphibious force was faced with several serious problems. First, and
perhaps its most critical, was that despite Premier Diem’s decree,
the Marine Corps continued to exist essentially on an informal basis.
“The Marine Corps itself had no real identity,” its U.S. advisor later
explained. “It was a scattering of dissimilar units extending from Hue
to the Mekong Delta area.”[2-2] The fact that its widespread units
were still dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for logistical
support underscored the weakness inherent in the VNMC’s initial status.
Other problems arose from the continuation of French officers in
command billets throughout the Vietnamese naval forces. Under the
Franco-American agreement which had created TRIM, a French Navy captain
doubled as chief of the combined training missions’ Naval Division
and as commanding officer of the Vietnamese naval forces. This placed
the French in a position to review any proposals advanced by the U.S.
Marine advisor. Complicating the situation even further, a French
Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually commanded the 1st Landing
Battalion at Nha Trang.[2-E]
[2-E] Delayen, described by Croizat as “an exceptionally
qualified French Commando officer,” later attended the
U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico.
(Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 3.)
Demobilization presented another potential difficulty for the
Vietnamese Marine Corps in early 1955. Under the U.S.-Vietnamese
force level agreements, the Vietnamese naval forces were limited to
3,000 men. The Marine Corps, which alone totalled a disproportionate
2,400 men, had been instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137 men
and officers. With no effective centralized command structure and
so many widely separated units, even the relatively simple task of
mustering out troops assumed the dimensions of a complex administrative
undertaking.
In short, the very existence of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was
threatened in a number of inter-related situations. The continuation
of a separate and distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, of course,
on the overall reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and their
support structure. Essentially it would be necessary to establish a
requirement for such an organization within South Vietnam’s future
military-naval structure. Croizat personally sensed that this would
be the pivotal issue in determining the VNMC’s future. “There were
numerous representatives of the three military services from each of
the three countries concerned with the fate of the Vietnamese Army,
Navy, and Air Force,” he pointed out. “But, there was no champion
from within the Vietnamese Marine Corps since no Corps existed except
on paper.”[2-3] Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, a
Vietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel to keep alive
the idea that South Vietnam’s defense establishment needed a separate
Marine Corps.
_Political Stabilization and Its Effects_
During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamese government was engulfed
by a crisis which threatened to disrupt the American plans to help
build a viable anti-Communist country. The crisis occurred not in the
form of an overt North Vietnamese attack but rather as a result of
the South’s political instability. In February the leaders of the Hoa
Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen, dissatisfied with Premier Diem’s
refusal to accede to their various demands, formed the United Front of
National Forces.
By mid-March the disaffected leaders of these organizations felt
strong enough to test the premier’s strength. Trouble began late that
month when the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type activities
against Diem’s National Army units in the sect’s stronghold southwest
of Saigon. On 28 March Diem ordered a company of paratroops to seize
the Saigon Central Police Headquarters which the French had allowed
the Binh Xuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughout the capital the
next day as Binh Xuyen units clashed with loyal government forces. A
truce was arranged finally in the city on 31 March after three days of
intermittent but fierce fighting. That same day the Cao Dai broke with
the United Front and accepted a government offer to integrate some of
its troops into the National Army.
An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnam until 28 April when new
fighting broke out. By the middle of May, government forces had driven
the Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing their organization.
Remnants of the bandit group, however, escaped into the extensive
Rung Sat swamps south of the capital where they continued fighting
individually and in small groups. In the countryside south of Saigon,
30 of Diem’s battalions, including the 1st Landing Battalion, took the
offensive against the Hoa Hao regular and guerrilla forces.
The national crisis, for all practical purposes, ended in the last
week of June when a Hoa Hao leader surrendered 8,000 regulars and
ordered his followers to cease all anti-government activities. Sporadic
fighting continued, however, as Diem’s forces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao
splinter groups fighting in the western Mekong Delta and Binh Xuyen
elements still resisting in the rugged mangrove swamps south of the
capital. In August the Marine Landing Battalion fought a decisive
action against the remaining Hoa Hao in Kien Giang Province about 120
miles southwest of Saigon, destroying the rebel headquarters. Later
in the year the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by several river boat
companies, reduced one of the last pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance
in the Rung Sat. As a result of these and similar actions being fought
simultaneously by loyal Army units, organized resistance to Premier
Diem gradually collapsed.[2-F]
[2-F] Some sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Hao and Cao
Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Viet Cong
guerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in
the late 1950s. (Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. in Vietnam_,
p. 111.)
The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turning point in Diem’s
political fortunes. At the height of the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai
attempted to remove Diem as premier by ordering him to France for
“consultations.” Electing to remain in Saigon and direct his government
efforts to quell the rebellion, the premier declined Bao Dai’s summons.
The Vietnamese military forces proved loyal to the premier, having
faithfully executed Diem’s commands throughout the emergency. Having
successfully met the armed challenge of the sects and the Binh Xuyen
and having openly repudiated Bao Dai’s authority, Premier Diem had
imposed at least a measure of political stability on South Vietnam.
An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on 23 October when a
nationwide referendum was held in South Vietnam to settle the issue of
national leadership. In the balloting, since criticized as having been
rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2 percent of the total vote against
Bao Dai. Three days later, on 26 October, South Vietnam’s new president
proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
The Vietnamese Marine Corps benefited greatly from Premier Diem’s
successful confrontation with his political rivals. On 1 May, in
preparation for the 1st Landing Battalion’s deployment to combat, Major
Trong had established a small Marine Corps headquarters in Saigon.
Shortly thereafter, Diem had appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain
Bui Pho Chi, to replace Captain Delayen as commander of the landing
battalion. The French commando officer, who was a member of TRIM,
remained at Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then, on the last
day of June, Diem removed the remaining French officers from command
positions throughout South Vietnam’s naval forces. The combined effect
of these actions was to reduce French influence throughout the nation’s
naval establishment while making the Vietnamese Marine Corps more
responsive to the central government.
The burdens of demobilization also were lightened somewhat as a result
of the sect crisis when a new force level was approved by the United
States in mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement, dictated in part by
the requirement to integrate portions of the sects’ armies into the
national forces, raised the force level to 150,000 men and placed the
personnel ceiling of the Vietnamese naval forces at 4,000 men. This
revision enhanced the prospects for a corresponding increase in the
authorized strength of the VNMC.
The 1st Landing Battalion’s performance against the sect forces in the
Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat, moreover, tempered much of the previous
opposition to a separate VNMC. Heretofore, U.S. and Vietnamese Army
officers had opposed the existence of a Vietnamese amphibious force
apart from the National Army. Until the sect uprising, Lieutenant
Colonel Croizat had used the influence afforded by his position as
naval advisor to the general staff to advocate the continuation of the
VNMC. But during the sect battles the Vietnamese Marines had firmly
established their value to the new government. By displaying loyalty,
discipline, and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out in their own
behalf at a critical juncture in their corp’s existence.
Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion deployed to fight the
rebellious sect forces, two additional U.S. Marine advisors--an officer
and a noncommissioned officer--arrived in South Vietnam for duty with
the MAAG. Both Marines were assigned to TRIM. Croizat dispatched the
officer, Captain James T. Breckinridge, to Nha Trang where he soon
replaced Captain Delayen as advisor to the 1st Landing Battalion.
As State Department policy prohibited U.S. military personnel from
participating in combat activities with indigenous forces, Breckinridge
was forced to await the battalion’s return from the field. During
its absence he divided his time between Nha Trang and Saigon where
he assisted Colonel Croizat with planning and logistics matters. The
noncommissioned officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E. Tracy, initially
remained in Saigon but later moved to Nha Trang. There, serving
principally as a small unit tactics instructor to the Vietnamese
Marines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a “first-rate Marine
‘NCO’--one who could carry out the most complex assignment with little
or no supervision.”[2-4]
[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, first U.S. Marine
Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates during discussions
between Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, Chief,
USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. (Photo courtesy of Colonel
Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.))._]
Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointed a new officer to head
the Vietnamese Marine Corps. On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed
command of the VNMC, and thereby became the second Senior Marine
Officer.
_Reorganization and Progress_
The 1st Landing Battalion remained in action against the Binh Xuyen
remnants until February 1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel
Croizat reviewed the entire organizational structure of the Vietnamese
Marine Corps. By now the size of the service had been reduced to
roughly 1,800 officers and men although it retained its original
organization of six river boat companies, five light support companies,
a landing battalion, a training flotilla, and a small headquarters.
This organization, with so many dissimilar units existing on one
echelon, influenced Croizat to suggest that Major Lieu restructure
the service. Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, and Technical
Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staff spent several months
developing and refining plans for the comprehensive reorganization
of the Marine Corps. Lieu submitted this package to the Vietnamese
Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 December 1955. The salient feature
of the plan was to create an additional landing battalion without
increasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then governed the size of
the VNMC. Significantly, the plan contained a clause proposing that
the Vietnamese Marine Corps be expanded to regimental size in the
future.[2-5]
[Illustration: VNMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1,837]
[Illustration: LANDING BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18
FEBRUARY 1956
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 728]
The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approved the new structure, and
reorganization of the VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalion
finally returned to Nha Trang in February. The old river boat and
light support companies were disbanded and three new units--a 4.2-inch
mortar company, a headquarters and service company, and a new landing
battalion--were formed. Designated the 2d Landing Battalion, this new
unit formed about 25 miles south of Nha Trang at Cam Ranh Bay where the
French had trained amphibious forces during the latter stages of the
Indochina War.
As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, the tables of
organization and tables of equipment for the Vietnamese Marine
battalions were completely revised. Three infantry companies, a heavy
weapons company, and a headquarters and service company now comprised
a landing battalion.[2-G] Each infantry company was organized into
three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn, the rifle platoons
each consisted of three 10-man squads (three 3-man fire teams and a
squad leader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifleman was armed
with the .30 caliber M-1 carbine, a weapon formerly carried by many
French and Vietnamese commandos. It had been retained for use within
the VNMC because it was substantially shorter and lighter than the
standard U.S. infantry weapon, the M-1 rifle, and was therefore better
suited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. The automatic rifleman in
each Vietnamese Marine fire team carried the Browning automatic rifle
(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon. The weapons platoon
of the rifle company was built around six .30 caliber light machine
guns. Within the heavy weapons company of the landing battalions was a
mortar platoon, equipped with four 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle
platoon.
[2-G] Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated
by letters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine
infantry companies were given number designations.
While this reorganization was underway, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat
initiated a search for acceptable means of expanding the Vietnamese
Marine Corps to regimental size. A staff study produced by the Senior
Marine Advisor a month before the first phase of the reorganization
effort had begun included several important recommendations. Croizat
proposed to General O’Daniel that authorization be granted to raise the
ceiling on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers and men. This, the
Marine advisor pointed out, could be accomplished without affecting
the overall ceiling on all South Vietnamese military and naval forces.
By reassigning to the Vietnamese Marine Corps an amphibious battalion
still organized within the National Army, the 150,000-man force level
would not be altered. This would transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps
into a three battalion regiment and would unify all South Vietnamese
amphibious forces under a single command. Croizat’s study further
recommended that the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designated part of the
general reserve of the nation’s armed forces and that it be controlled
directly by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although no immediate
action was taken on these recommendations, they were to serve as a
blueprint for the future expansion of the VNMC. Equally important, they
bore the seed that would eventually make the Vietnamese Marine Corps a
fully integrated component of South Vietnam’s defense establishment.
During the ensuing three years, several apparently unrelated
occurrences impacted either directly or indirectly on the U.S. Marine
advisory effort in South Vietnam. The French completed their military
withdrawal from South Vietnam and dissolved their High Command in April
1956, slightly ahead of schedule.[2-H] In conjunction with this final
phase of the French withdrawal, the Training Relations Instructions
Mission was abolished. Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAG
programs to be executed through the combined training mission.
[2-H] A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officers
remained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957.
Shortly after the departure of the last French troops, Lieutenant
Colonel Croizat ended his assignment as Senior Marine Advisor. He was
replaced by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes, Jr., in June 1956.
A veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from
Washington, D.C. where he had recently completed a French language
course. Like his predecessor, the new Senior Marine Advisor was
scheduled to serve in Vietnam for two years.
In August, less than two months after Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes’
arrival, President Diem appointed a new officer to head his Marine
Corps. This time Bui Pho Chi, the captain who had commanded the 1st
Landing Battalion during the sect uprising, was selected for the
assignment. Chi’s appointment was only temporary, however, for in
October Diem ordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume command of the Marine
Corps. Major Hung, who became the VNMC’s fourth Senior Officer, was to
hold the position for four years.
An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese Marine Corps coincided with the
series of changes in its leadership and the departure of Lieutenant
Colonel Croizat. During the summer months, the Vietnamese Minister of
Defense proposed that the VNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam’s
Army. Fortunately, the recent combat record of the 1st Landing
Battalion outweighed the minister’s influence and the effort to
disestablish the Vietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted.
Another noteworthy incident in the record of the early relations
between the U.S. and Vietnamese Marines occurred when the Marine
noncommissioned officer billet within the MAAG was upgraded to an
officer position. This adjustment, which anticipated the creation
of the 2d Landing Battalion, had the effect of making a U.S. Marine
officer available to advise individual VNMC battalions on a permanent
basis. Thus originated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officer would
advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion--a concept abandoned only
temporarily between 1959 and 1962.
The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as a two-battalion regiment
under the command of Major Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through 1959.
During this period Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes and his successor,
Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who had served
as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, instituted a variety
of programs intended to provide the Vietnamese Marines with a common
base of experience and training.[2-I] Perhaps the most important of
these was one implemented in 1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers
began attending basic and intermediate level schools at Marine Corps
Schools, Quantico. Other formal schools for noncommissioned officers
were established by the Vietnamese Marine Corps in South Vietnam. In
an effort to build _esprit de corps_ among the lower ranking Vietnamese
Marines, the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlistments. They
also persuaded their Vietnamese counterparts to adopt a corps-wide
marksmanship training program similar to the one then in use by the
U.S. Marine Corps.
[2-I] See Appendix A for complete listings of VNMC Commandants
and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC during the
1954–1964 period.
In conjunction with the reorganization of the VNMC and the stress
being placed upon small unit and individual training, much of the
U.S. advisory effort during this period was devoted to logistics. The
Marine advisors soon discovered that the Vietnamese officers, who had
not been directly concerned with supply matters under the French,
tended to ignore this important area. “The real problem,” explained
Captain Breckinridge, “was the newness of it all. The Vietnamese
officers simply possessed no base of experience or training in logistic
matters.”[2-6] This shortcoming dictated that the American advisors
not only design a workable logistics system but closely supervise its
operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkinson instituted intensive schooling
of supply and maintenance personnel and emphasized the value of command
supervision to the Vietnamese leaders. The Marine advisors, for
example, taught their counterparts that equipment shortages could often
be prevented if command attention were given to requisitions. Still,
even with constant supervision and formal schooling, the Vietnamese
Marine Corps continued to experience problems in this area throughout
the 1950s and well into the next decade. Breckinridge, who returned to
serve with the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenant colonel in the
late 1960s, recalled shortages of such vital and common items as small
arms ammunition even then.
The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw the Marine advisors working
to overcome a potentially more serious problem, one that also dated
from the French-Indochina War. From the outset of their experience
with the Vietnamese Marine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived that
a strong defensive orientation seemed to pervade every echelon of the
small service. Most Americans, including U.S. Army advisors who were
encountering similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army, agreed that
this “defensive psychology” was a by-product of the long subordination
of the Vietnamese National forces to the French High Command. Indeed,
a criticism frequently voiced by USMAAG officials during the Indochina
War had been that the French tended to frustrate the development of
the Vietnamese military forces by assigning them static security tasks
rather than offensive missions. Even though the forerunners of the
Vietnamese Marine battalions had operated as commando units, they too
had seen extensive duty protecting _dinassaut_ bases and other French
installations. Now this defensive thinking was affecting the attitude
of the Vietnamese Marine toward training. Moreover, it was threatening
the American effort to transform the service into an aggressive
amphibious strike force.
[Illustration: _First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend
U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose with
Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and
Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). At the extreme left is Captain Le
Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To
his immediate left is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC.
(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC)._]
By nature this particular problem defied quick, simple solutions. The
Marine advisors, therefore, undertook to adjust the orientation of
the entire Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged period through
continuous emphasis on offensive training. The advisors consistently
encouraged their Vietnamese counterparts to develop training schedules
which stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and maneuver, and night
movement. In this same connection the Marine advisors translated U.S.
Marine small unit tactics manuals into French, whereupon the same
manuals were further translated by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese.
This process assured that adequate training literature was made
available to the individual Marine and his small unit leaders. The
offensively oriented training programs and the translation project
complemented one another, and combined with continuous supervision by
the U.S. advisors and the return of young Vietnamese officers from
Quantico, gradually helped impart a more aggressive offensive spirit
to the entire Marine Corps.
_Summing Up Developments_
The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute perhaps the most critical
and challenging span in the chronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
Born out of the confusion which dominated South Vietnam in the
aftermath of the Geneva Agreement, the embryonic Marine Corps had
survived against heavy odds. Even before its scattered components
could be drawn together under a centralized command, the Corps had
been hurled into combat against the rebellious sects. Over the course
of their commitment the Vietnamese Marines had strengthened their own
cause through demonstrations of their fighting capability and loyalty.
In terms of the VNMC’s continued existence, equally critical battles
were being waged in Saigon where the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and
the Vietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain support for
the infant service. It was there, ironically, that the destiny of the
Vietnamese Marine Corps ultimately had been decided.
On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959 was characterized by
uncertainty, transition, and problem solving. Never sure of the Marine
Corps’ future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and a handful of
U.S. Marine advisors had carried forward their efforts to transform
scattered French-inspired river commando units into a coherent and
responsive American-style amphibious force. While this transformation
was only partially realized, definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese
officers had replaced French commanders, and with American guidance,
had given their service a strong interim structure. Many of the more
serious problems which had plagued the struggling organization since
its inception had been identified. With American assistance, solutions
to those problems were being developed and tested. So, despite a stormy
beginning and a threatened early childhood, the Vietnamese Marine Corps
lived.
CHAPTER 3
Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency
_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency--Insurgency and the Vietnamese
Marine Corps--Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands--American
Decisions at the Close of 1961_
_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency_
South Vietnam gave every outward indication that it had achieved a
measure of overall stability in the two-year period following President
Diem’s election in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diem felt strong
enough politically to announce his government’s refusal to participate
in the reunification elections scheduled for midyear. He based this
position upon the argument that free elections were impossible in
Communist North Vietnam. The proposed July election deadline passed
without a serious reaction by North Vietnam. Equally encouraging was
the fact that there had been no noticeable resurgence in the armed
power of either the politico-religious sects or the Binh Xuyen. At the
same time the American-backed South Vietnamese economy appeared to be
gaining considerable strength.
[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Commander,
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. (USA Photo SC494954)._]
The threat of invasion from the North had also been tempered somewhat
by 1958. The MAAG, now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams,
U.S. Army, a commander respected as a tough disciplinarian, was
beginning to reshape the former Vietnamese national forces.[3-A]
Renamed the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army now
consisted of four field divisions (8,500 men each), six light divisions
(5,000 men each), 13 territorial regiments (whose strength varied), and
a parachute regiment. Although General Williams viewed this as merely
an interim organization, it had provided the South Vietnamese army with
a unified command structure based on sound organizational principles.
The arrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
(TERM) in 1956, moreover, had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment
to each ARVN regiment. American officers were likewise reorganizing
and helping train the small Vietnamese Navy (2,160 officers and
men) and Air Force (4,000 officers and men). The Vietnamese Marine
Corps continued to exist as a two-battalion amphibious force within
the nation’s naval establishment. General Williams felt confident
that by 1958 South Vietnam’s regular military establishment had been
strengthened enough to discourage North Vietnamese leaders from
seriously considering an outright invasion.[3-1]
[3-A] General Williams would head the MAAG until his retirement
in 1960.
Backing these developing regular forces, at least on paper, were two
generally feeble paramilitary organizations--the Civil Guard (CG)
and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). The larger of these, the
Civil Guard, existed within the Ministry of Interior and was funded
and advised by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its 48,000 men,
therefore, were not charged against the 150,000-man force level ceiling
that regulated the size of Diem’s regular forces. Nor were the 47,000
members of the Self Defense Corps, even though this organization
received limited amounts of U.S. military assistance funds for payroll
purposes. In any case, serious shortcomings were evident in both the CG
and the SDC. Organized into provincial companies directly responsible
to the various province chiefs, the Civil Guard was entirely separate
from the ARVN chain of command. Furthermore, American civilians under
government contract had armed and trained the CG for police-type as
opposed to military missions. The SDC, essentially a scattering of
local militia units, was even weaker, having been organized at the
village level into squads and an occasional platoon. Although the SDC
units were subordinate to the respective village chief, the ARVN bore
the responsibility for providing them with arms and training. More
often than not the Vietnamese Army units gave their obsolete weapons
to the SDC and showed little genuine interest in training the small
units.[3-2]
Although a measure of stability was obviously returning to South
Vietnam by 1958, one of the country’s more serious problems remained
unsolved--the threat of subversion by Communist Viet Minh agents
who had remained south of the 17th parallel following the Geneva
cease-fire. Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955,
Diem turned to neutralize this potential threat. Initially his army
experienced some success with pacification operations conducted in
former Viet Minh strongholds. While they did help extend government
control into the rural areas of several provinces, such operations were
discontinued in 1956.
Another policy initiated that same year seems to have nullified the
moderate gains produced by the pacification campaigns. Acting both
to eliminate Viet Minh sympathizers from positions of leadership at
the local level and to extend his own grip downward to the rural
population, Diem replaced elected village officials with appointed
chiefs. The new policy, which threatened the traditional autonomy of
the individual Vietnamese village, was immediately unpopular.
So was another government program which Diem implemented to undercut
Communist strength throughout the country--the Anti-Communist
Denunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 to discredit former Viet
Minh, the denunciation campaign evolved into something of a witch
hunt. By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietnamese with only minimal
Communist connections were allegedly being confined in political
re-education camps. Like the appointment of village leaders, the
denunciation campaign served to alienate Vietnamese who might otherwise
have supported the central government in its struggle for control of
the rural regions.
Forced underground by the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, Viet
Minh agents concentrated on strengthening their political posture for
the proposed general election in the period immediately following the
Geneva Agreement. When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passed
in mid-1956, the so-called “stay behinds” began rebuilding clandestine
political cells in their former strongholds. Having retained their
aptitude for the adroit manipulation of local grievances, the
Communists gradually won support from rural Vietnamese who saw
themselves threatened by the new government policies. In mid-1957,
the Communists, who were now being labelled “Viet Cong” by the Diem
government (a derogatory but accurate term which, literally translated,
meant “Vietnamese Communist”) began assassinating government officials
in several of the country’s rural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village
chiefs, rural police, district officials, and school teachers, the Viet
Cong’s assassination campaign was undertaken to erode the government’s
contacts with the local populace and thereby enhance their own
organizational efforts.
Still faced with the possibility of a conventional attack across
the demilitarized zone, President Diem was reluctant to commit his
regular military units to a problem which seemed to demand police-type
operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, he relied on the Village Self
Defense Corps and the Civil Guard to maintain order in the provinces.
Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily in urban police methods,
the paramilitary forces proved unable to prevent the diffuse terrorist
attacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957 and July 1958, for
example, some 700 more South Vietnamese officials reportedly died at
the hands of Communist terrorists.[3-3]
The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaigns continued apace throughout
1958. The occurrence of the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon
and the initiation of an anti-American propaganda campaign near the end
of that year, moreover, indicated that the Communists were broadening
the scope of their activities. By this time, the internal disturbances
were beginning to assume the dimensions of a concerted guerrilla
movement in several of the country’s more heavily populated regions,
including parts of the important Mekong Delta. Near the close of 1958
President Diem finally began ordering regular military units into the
provinces with instructions to eliminate the Viet Cong and restore
government control.
The very nature of the enemy, however, tended to render such government
operations ineffective. Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their
strength from the clandestine political structure which agents had
established in portions of the countryside. Interwoven into the social
fabric of the hamlets and villages, this political infrastructure, as
it later came to be called, served a dual purpose. It was both the
machinery by which the Communists exercised control over the population
and a vital base of support for the growing guerrilla forces, providing
the Viet Cong with men, food, intelligence information, and refuge.
As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited from and lived among the
local populace, outsiders found it virtually impossible to identify
them. Their familiarity with the local terrain, their methods of
operating in small groups, and massing for attacks mostly at night made
locating them equally difficult. Even their patience seemed to enhance
their ability to survive. Unwilling to engage a stronger military force
and realizing that a specific government operation could not continue
indefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would melt into their environment
with the arrival of regular units. When the operation terminated
and the regular government forces withdrew, the Communists would
re-emerge, often stronger than before. In many cases the guerrillas
could give real meaning to their anti-government propaganda once the
local population had felt the weight of military operations in their
particular community. Operating in this manner, the Viet Cong were
able to husband their strength while simultaneously expanding their
influence.
There was ample indication that the Communist movement was not wholly
indigenous to South Vietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing North
Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becoming apparent near the
end of the decade. In May 1959, the Central Committee of the North
Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention “to smash”
the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.[3-4] By the summer of that year
the Viet Cong were being reinforced with men and limited quantities
of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam. Many of the Communist
infiltrators, who at this early stage were entering Diem’s country
across the DMZ and by sea, were southerners who had gone North with the
Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained in political and military operations,
these returnees added substantially to the Viet Cong’s discipline and
technical capabilities.[3-B]
[3-B] A State Department publication released in 1965 placed
the number of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators
for the years 1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that
an additional 2,700 North Vietnamese were estimated to
have been infiltrated during this two-year period. The
vast majority of these were thought to have been former
residents of southern Vietnam. (Department of State,
_Aggression from the North_, p. 33.)
So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas reportedly were operating
in battalion strength (300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by
mid-1959. Throughout the country they had expanded their activities
to include hit-and-run attacks on paramilitary posts, district
headquarters, hospitals, schools, and agricultural stations. Like the
assassination campaign which was underway concurrently in areas still
controlled by the GVN, these attacks were conceived with political
considerations in mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended
facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass the central government
while demonstrating their own strength to the local population. The
raids, furthermore, produced weapons which enabled the guerrillas to
operate without total dependence on the North.
By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic of Vietnam had
deteriorated to the point that much of the optimism formerly voiced
by American and South Vietnamese officials had begun to disappear.
The National Intelligence Estimate released in Washington during
August accurately described the conditions which were settling over
South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the nation’s economy was
beginning to falter noticeably and that President Diem’s government was
growing increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate warned that
harassment by the Viet Cong could be expected to intensify.[3-5]
As predicted, security conditions in South Vietnam did grow worse
in the period following the August intelligence estimate. In the
last four months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were reported. In
January 1960 another 96 civilians were killed by the Communists and
in the following month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960 the
Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing regular ARVN units
in several provinces. Like their raids on fixed installations, their
ambush tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing defeats for
the government. Like the raids, they were also providing weapons and
ammunition for the growing guerrilla forces.
By 1960 the government’s inability to contain the disturbing malaise
was beginning to produce political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a
group of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures, including a
number of former cabinet members, issued a public demand for President
Diem’s resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the arrest of all
who signed the manifesto.
A more serious effort to bring down the central government occurred in
November when a group of military officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh
Thi, the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVN airborne brigade,
staged an abortive coup d’etat in Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese
Marines joined Thi’s rebellious paratroops.[3-C] But the power
struggle, which began in the early morning hours of 11 November, ended
when units loyal to President Diem converged on the capital. Realizing
that the balance had been tipped against them, the coup leaders fled
the country and the incident was closed. While it had failed to
bring down the Diem government, Thi’s attempted coup had revived the
possibility of efforts by military leaders to seize control of the
government and had injected a new element of uncertainty into South
Vietnam’s already unstable internal situation.
[3-C] Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of
10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere
in this chapter.
Two other danger signals flashed across Southeast Asia shortly after
the abortive coup. In January 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi
announced that the National Liberation Front (NLF) had been founded
in the South on 20 December 1960 with the stated purpose of closely
uniting the “various classes of the South Vietnamese patriotic
population in the struggle against the Americans and Diem....”[3-6]
In truth, the NLF emerged as a fully developed Communist political
organization imported from North Vietnam for the purpose of
controlling, directing, and coordinating the insurgency south of the
17th parallel. For American officials, the announced establishment
of the NLF signified that Ho Chi Minh’s government had opted for the
forceful reunification of North and South.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event led to further speculation
that the war in Vietnam was about to enter a new phase. Backed by the
North Vietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forces seized control
of the southeastern portion of the Laotian panhandle. Thus, the
North Vietnamese obtained a protected corridor along South Vietnam’s
northwestern border through which men and materiel could be infiltrated
to the South.
The establishment of the NLF and the Communist takeover in southern
Laos coincided roughly with approval in Washington of a comprehensive
plan designed to help President Diem restore internal order. Designated
the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP), this study had been ordered by
President Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed by Lieutenant General
Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army, the officer who had relieved General
Williams as MAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the White House
shortly after President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961.
Significantly, its arrival came at a time when the Soviet Premier,
Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledging his country’s support for
“wars of national liberation.”
The plan presented for the new president’s consideration drew clear
connections between the military and political aspects of the war
in Vietnam. It included a conditional offer of U.S. support for a
20,000-man increase in the regular South Vietnamese military forces and
a 32,000-man increase in the size of the Civil Guard. These military
and paramilitary increases were to be dependent upon President Diem’s
agreement to effect major reforms in his military and political
apparatus--measures which American officials in Saigon considered
necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency effort.
President Kennedy approved the main provisions of the
Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961 and negotiations on the
package opened with Diem two weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked
on the issue of political and military reforms. Meanwhile, with the
discussions in Saigon dragging on inconclusively, the situation in
the provinces continued to worsen. A National Intelligence Estimate
released in March estimated that Viet Cong military strength had
reached 10,000 men. Furthermore, the number of violent incidents
reported in the country had risen to 650 per month. Even worse, it was
estimated that 58 percent of South Vietnam was under some degree of
Communist control.[3-7]
Convinced that the situation was becoming critical and fearing that it
might soon become hopeless, President Kennedy approved a new program
of military assistance to the Diem government on 29 April. Inspired in
part by Kennedy’s desire to increase Diem’s confidence in the new U.S.
administration, the 29 April program did not require concrete pledges
of reform from the South Vietnamese. In its specifics, however, the new
package was similar to the CIP. It contained provisions for supporting
a 20,000 man increase in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF)--a move which would raise the ceiling on the South Vietnamese
regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000. Another provision approved
the use of Military Assistance Program appropriations for the Civil
Guard and Self Defense Corps and expanded the MAAG’s responsibility to
include training and equipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan,
the paramilitary forces were to be transferred from Diem’s Ministry of
the Interior to his Ministry of Defense. In order to meet its increased
advisory responsibilities, authorization was given to increase the size
of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of 785. This provision allowed the
first enlargement of the group since the introduction of the Temporary
Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.[3-D]
[3-D] With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the
International Control Commission had granted permission
for the MAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. When the
logistics personnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets
were created within the MAAG’s table of organization.
General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing President Kennedy’s
29 April program during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the
government’s regular and paramilitary establishments and in the size
of the MAAG failed to arrest the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s
battlefields. The remainder of 1961 was characterized by increasingly
aggressive guerrilla operations and the steady growth of Viet Cong
military forces. In August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major
armed attacks on its units. The following month brought 450 Viet
Cong-initiated incidents, including several involving multi-battalion
forces of over 1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an
estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the capital of Phuoc
Thuan Province, and held the town for an entire day before escaping
unmolested into the countryside.[3-8]
Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the Viet Cong’s overall
strength. Increasing numbers of Communist troops were now being
infiltrated over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving
southwestward out of the North Vietnamese panhandle, these infiltration
routes enabled the Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone which
separated the two Vietnamese states and continue their southward
movement down the length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries
within these countries the North Vietnamese could easily infiltrate
into South Vietnam by using trails through the rugged mountains.
Relying primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese
infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam during 1961. Successful
recruiting in the South served as another source of manpower for
the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady cadence of victories
greatly enhanced the Viet Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment
less difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the North and
recruitment in the South had swollen the Viet Cong regular military
forces to an estimated 25,000 men.
_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_
At the end of 1958, when President Diem began ordering his regular
military forces into action against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese
Marine Corps was a two-battalion infantry force organized within South
Vietnam’s naval establishment. The 1,837-man corps was still commanded
by Major Le Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquarters at the Cuu Long
Navy Yard, an installation situated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia
Dinh boundary. Although they continued to maintain barracks at Nha
Trang and Cam Ranh Bay respectively, the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions
were now being rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa, a town
located about 20 miles northeast of the capital. Lieutenant Colonel
Wilkinson, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as Senior
Marine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of the MAAG headquarters in
Saigon but maintained an office in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long.
Wilkinson’s two assistants, Captains Gary Wilder and Dale N. Davis,
lived with their battalions.
Elements of Hung’s Marine Corps were among the first regular government
units committed to the counterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing
Battalion was ordered into action by the Joint General Staff in the
closing weeks of 1958. After deploying from Bien Hoa, the battalion
spent nearly two months searching for Viet Cong in a mosquito-infested
region of An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province. Primarily,
the Vietnamese Marines conducted company and platoon-sized patrols
through rugged mangrove swamps in search of guerrillas. When the
operation ended in late January 1959, the Vietnamese commanders
reported that their units had killed and captured several Communist
guerrillas and political leaders. Their troops had also reported
finding a suspected guerrilla training camp which contained small
quantities of food and some weapons. The Vietnamese Marines suffered
no casualties during their deployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAG
policy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompany the unit into
combat. Unable to observe the operation, the American advisors could
not accurately assess the battalion’s tactical proficiency.
[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC,
Senior Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A229373)._]
A few months after this initial operation, both VNMC battalions were
deployed against the Viet Cong--the 1st again to An Xuyen Province
and the 2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on the seacoast.
So deployed, both units came under the operational control of the
respective province chiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought during
May, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unit claimed to have inflicted
over 200 casualties on the Viet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one
company of the 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18 guerrillas and
capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S. Marine advisors were not present
and therefore could not assess the accuracy of these reports. In any
case, these were the final combat operations for the Vietnamese Marine
Corps as a two-battalion force.
Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities in Saigon were giving
increased attention to the growing internal threat. Still, they
had yet to initiate any sweeping changes in the orientation of the
RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entire ARVN was in the final phase
of a reorganization program which would culminate by midyear in the
formation of seven divisions of uniform size (10,500 men each), five
territorial regiments, and an airborne brigade (formed from the old
Army parachute regiment). Under the new organization the seven standard
divisions were to be deployed in or near population centers throughout
the country and were to be organized under two corps headquarters,
one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, and the other (II Corps) located at
Pleiku in the Central Highlands. A third provisional corps headquarters
had also been formed in Saigon for activation in the event of a
national emergency.[3-E]
[3-E] By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated
and geographic boundaries of all three corps would
be delineated to facilitate the coordination of the
government’s military efforts against the Viet Cong.
These military-geographic subdivisions were termed corps
tactical zones (CTZ).
One of the MAAG’s reactions to the emerging guerrilla threat was to
urge that President Diem transfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of
Defense. This adjustment, General Williams pointed out, would permit
the MAAG to train and equip the CG for a mobile counterguerrilla
mission. But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man force level
ceiling. When both the Diem government and the U.S. Embassy objected
to the proposed transfer, the MAAG turned to another alternative:
the strengthening and use of the regular units whose assignment to
counterguerrilla operations would not seriously disturb the country’s
counterinvasion potential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whose infantry
battalions had already participated in several operations against the
Viet Cong, fell into this category of units to be bolstered for the
counterguerrilla role.
It was against this background that the VNMC was enlarged again
in mid-1959. This latest expansion was generally accomplished in
accordance with the staff study prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Croizat
some three years earlier. On 1 June, after both Marine battalions
had returned from their combat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3d
Landing Battalion was formed at a camp just outside the Cuu Long
Navy Yard. This new unit, manned primarily by troops transferred from
amphibious elements then being phased out of the reorganized ARVN,
was built around a small nucleus of seasoned Marine officers and
noncommissioned officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2d Battalions,
most of these Marines had seen combat against the Viet Minh, the sects,
and the Viet Cong.
Another development saw a fourth rifle company added to each Marine
infantry battalion. In turn, the old heavy weapons companies were
abolished. The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles were reorganized
into platoons within the battalions’ headquarters and service
companies. New weapons, two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man them
were added to each Marine rifle company. These adjustments raised the
strength of the infantry battalions to around 900 officers and men
and provided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with a basic organizational
structure which its infantry battalions would retain throughout the
coming decade.[3-F]
[3-F] A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification
of the VNMC’s table of equipment. The most important
change saw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their
M-1 carbines for the heavier M-1 rifle, the weapon with
which the ARVN infantry forces were equipped.
Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Battalion and the modification
of the organizational tables, the VNMC was formally designated the
“Marine Corps Group.” Now numbering 2,276 officers and men, the
Vietnamese Marines were formed into a group headquarters, a group
headquarters and service company, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and the
three infantry battalions.[3-G]
[3-G] The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known as the
Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formal
redesignation.
As important as the VNMC’s expansion, reorganization, and redesignation
was the dramatic change in its role within the Vietnamese armed forces.
On 1 June the Joint General Staff directed the Vietnamese Marine Corps
and the newly formed ARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission of the
general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. So assigned, the Vietnamese
Marine Corps became a “force in readiness”--a service directly
responsible to the Joint General Staff for any assigned ground warfare
mission.[3-9]
[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JUNE
1959
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 2,276]
The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elements of the ARVN airborne
brigade (also garrisoned near Saigon) were ordered into action against
the Viet Cong with increasing frequency after being designated the
RVNAF general reserve. Usually, the Marine battalions, like their
airborne counterparts, were assigned to operate in a particular
province for a specified time period. In such assignments the battalion
commander was directly responsible to the province chief who, in most
cases, was a military officer. The province chiefs sometimes utilized
the Marines in conjunction with their Civil Guard units. It was not
uncommon for the Vietnamese Marines to find themselves conducting
operations in the most rugged and inaccessible regions of the province
to which they were assigned. In such deployments the Marine battalions
often bore the brunt of hostile action or suffered the physical
hardships associated with living and fighting in the most adverse
swamps and jungles.
[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested
swamps of the Ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation. (Photo
courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC.)_]
In connection with their continuing campaign to transform the
Vietnamese Marine Corps into a truly elite fighting organization, the
U.S. Marine Advisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecks to take
pride in the difficult and dangerous missions now being assigned. In a
related effort intended to generate _esprit de corps_ throughout the
service, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that the Marine Corps
adopt an official emblem and a distinctive uniform. These suggestions
produced results when a board of Vietnamese officers selected an emblem
design similar to that of the U.S. Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC
adopted a light weight, black and green “tiger stripe” camouflaged
utility uniform similar to that formerly worn in Indochina by French
commando units. Although designed and procured primarily for use in
steamy tropical jungles, the colorful uniform came to be worn in
garrison with a dark green beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem,
which was worn as a patch over the left breast pocket, this uniform
became the distinguishing mark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S.
Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblem did much to set the
VNMC apart from the other South Vietnamese armed services.[3-10]
Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated another change during this
same period which did much to improve the effectiveness of the Marine
advisory program. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 American policy had
prohibited all U.S. military personnel from participating in combat
with South Vietnamese forces. Because the prevailing restrictions
prevented his assistants from accurately assessing the combat
capabilities of the Vietnamese Marine battalions, Wilkinson requested
that they be allowed to accompany their units into action. After some
study, General Williams, still the MAAG Chief, approved this request
with the stipulation that the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as
non-participating observers.[3-11] This privilege was not extended to
other MAAG personnel. Wilkinson and his assistants, therefore, became
the first American servicemen to witness actual combat operations
against the Viet Cong. So through an informal and relatively unknown
arrangement, a handful of Marine advisors were able to insure that
principles being stressed in training were being applied in combat.
Now operating alongside the Vietnamese Marines in action, the advisors
were also able to obtain a better appreciation of the terrain and enemy
and a more thorough understanding of the frustrating problems being
encountered by the VNMC units.
The first half of 1960 brought changes in both the leadership of the
Vietnamese Marine Corps and the U.S. Marine advisory program. In May
President Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior Marine Officer. His
replacement was Major Le Nguyen Khang, an officer who spoke fluent
English and who had been the first Vietnamese Marine graduated from
the U.S. Marine Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. A capable and
inspiring officer who had formerly commanded a landing battalion
in combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to head the VNMC for
over three years. The following month Lieutenant Colonel Clifford
J. Robichaud relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as Senior Marine
Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seen combat previously. A former
master sergeant, he had been commissioned during World War II and had
fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadalcanal and later in Korea.
Like all U.S. Marines assigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960,
Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one year tour in South Vietnam.
[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine Corps Emblem._]
Combat assignments against the Viet Cong continued to dominate the
VNMC’s activities during the remainder of 1960. With Communist forces
now capable of battalion-sized operations in some areas, the Joint
General Staff began deploying government forces to the provinces
in multi-battalion strength. By late 1960 the Vietnamese Marines
were conducting two-battalion operations controlled by a task force
headquarters. Khang, now a lieutenant colonel, normally commanded these
Marine task forces.
[Illustration: _Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior Marine
Advisor. (USMC Photo A25342)._]
It was during one such operation, in which the 1st and 2d VNMC
Battalions were operating together in the provinces south of Saigon,
that elements of the 3d Battalion became involved in the abortive
coup of November 1960. The power struggle began in the early morning
hours of the 11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attending an
informal celebration of the Marine Corps birthday at Lieutenant Colonel
Robichaud’s quarters in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi’s
rebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3d VNMC battalion commander
and two Marine companies from Cuu Long, moved into the capital on
trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Headquarters. The remainder
of the 3d battalion, led by the battalion executive officer, who was
unaware of his superior’s intentions, moved to the presidential palace
and established protection for Diem. Word of the coup, meanwhile,
had reached Khang at his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Led
by the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2d Battalions returned to
Saigon by truck convoy and immediately joined the two Marine companies
already around the palace. For several hours the possibility existed
that Khang’s Marines might clash with Thi’s paratroops or even with
the two rebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion. But pro-Diem
units soon began converging on Saigon in such numbers that the coup
collapsed. Thi and his associates fled the country, whereupon Diem
appointed new officers to command the insubordinate units. With
loyalists in charge throughout South Vietnam’s military and naval
services, the incident was closed. Both the airborne brigade and the
VNMC resumed their functions as the RVNAF general reserve.[3-12]
By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, now headed by General McGarr, was
ready to implement the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF as authorized
in the package approved by President Kennedy the previous spring.
Included in this U.S. program were plans to increase the size of the
Vietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. This expansion got underway
in July when the initial steps were taken to form a fourth infantry
battalion and a 75mm pack-howitzer battery--additions which were to
raise the authorized strength of the VNMC to 3,321 officers and men.
The transfer of ARVN artillerymen provided the personnel necessary to
man the pack-howitzer unit, which formed near Thu Duc, a small town
about 13 miles north of the capital. Officers and noncommissioned
officers were drawn from the three existing VNMC battalions to form
a nucleus for the new infantry battalion while its ranks were filled
gradually by recruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized at Vung
Tau, a coastal resort town situated on Cape St. Jacques about 40 miles
southeast of Saigon. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a World War II
veteran who replaced Robichaud as Senior Marine Advisor in August, was
on hand to assist with this latest reorganization of the VNMC.
While the new Marine units were forming the JGS ordered the Vietnamese
Navy and Marine Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a
suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s southern tip.
The objective area was a portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive
inundated region located along the western coast of the Ca Mau
Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible by land, the forest had served
as Communist base area since the French Indochina War. The concept
of operation called for the Marines to land at daybreak, move inland
through the mangrove swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements into
ARVN units which would have established a blocking force inland from
the beach. Captains Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S.
Marine advisors, embarked on board two World War II vintage Vietnamese
Navy LCIs (landing craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d
Battalions respectively.
[Illustration: _Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the
Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese
officers. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
USMC)._]
A series of problems arose on the morning of the operation to delay the
landing for several hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late
in the morning they failed to locate any enemy forces. Captain Gott,
who accompanied the 1st Battalion for the duration of the operations
ashore, later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for instance, that
no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked on board the Vietnamese ships. As
a result, the relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered
technical difficulties with their navigational aids, and the ships
arrived at the objective area late. Inexperience on the part of the
Vietnamese Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques compounded
the delay. Once ashore, outdated French maps and dense mangrove jungle
combined to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing the
Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott concluded that some of the
difficulties encountered after the landing phase of the operation might
have been offset by the presence of observation aircraft. As it was,
the Marines’ visibility was restricted throughout the operation by
thick mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of unforeseen factors had
rendered this particular operation ineffective.[3-13]
[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST
1961
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321]
A similar landing was repeated in the same area the following month.
Again the participating Marine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces.
Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complained that there were no
enemy troops in the area and that the government’s intelligence was
inaccurate. Whatever the reason, the results of these two unsuccessful
offensives typified the problems which plagued most South Vietnamese
ground forces throughout the country during the 1960–1961 period. The
Communist guerrillas, aided by difficult terrain, a well-developed
intelligence network, and sometimes by the local population, could
usually evade government units whenever escape was desirable. Because
the Marines normally operated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet
Cong political apparatus was strong, their units were particularly
frustrated. In regions such as the U Minh Forest intelligence
information simply did not flow upward from the people. Instead, in
such Communist-controlled environments, the local Vietnamese served
the Viet Cong, warning them of strengths, locations, and movements of
Marine units.
While combat deployments such as the Ca Mau landings highlighted
the remainder of 1961, the Marine battalions nevertheless spent the
majority of their time in non-combat assignments. During such periods
the battalions occupied their respective base camps around Saigon and
Vung Tau, awaiting orders from the Joint General Staff. Even though
held in reserve, they frequently were called upon to provide security
detachments for vital points such as bridges, naval facilities,
and communications installations. Most U.S. Marine advisors tended
to oppose such assignments, contending that they detracted from
the overall readiness of the battalions and disrupted much needed
training. The utilization of the VNMC units in static security roles
also conflicted with the advisor’s continuing efforts to convince the
Vietnamese Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensively oriented
strike force. Still, despite the protestations of the American
advisors, the JGS persisted in dispersing VNMC detachments in and
around the capital.
Although its battalions were sometimes being frustrated, both in
their attempts to accomplish unit training and in their attempts to
fix Communist troop formations, the VNMC’s involvement in the war
effort was forcing improvement of the service in other areas. Frequent
inspections by U.S. advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placing
more emphasis on the care of individual equipment and weapons.
Replacement items were being requisitioned with more promptness and
unit commanders were beginning to show increasing concern about the
slow receipt of requested supply items. The replacement of worn-out
World War II trucks with new vehicles removed a long-standing source
of trouble in that it greatly reduced the time consumed in performing
major mechanical repairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequent
deployments of the VNMC battalions were helping to improve the overall
combat readiness of the service by preparing a solid core of small unit
leaders and troops for operations against the Viet Cong.
_Ancillary Effects of Marine Pacific Commands_
At the same time the intensified conflict in South Vietnam was
forcing improvement on the VNMC, it was having a similar but less
direct effect on U.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961
Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific (FMFPac), approved a plan to assign individual Marines
from his scattered commands to temporary duty in Vietnam. The purpose
of this program, which became known as On-The-Job Training (OJT),
was to allow Marine officers and noncommissioned officers to obtain
first-hand knowledge of the complex nature of the conflict being waged
in South Vietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups of officers and
noncommissioned officers from various FMFPac commands were sent each
month to observe the counterguerrilla techniques being developed and
employed in Vietnam. Although the OJTs were normally “in country” for
only a two-week period, the program was gradually producing a pool
of small unit leaders somewhat acquainted with the situation in the
Republic of Vietnam by the end of 1961.[3-H]
[3-H] The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the end
of 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of
1963.
[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese
Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet Cong on the Ca Mau
Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
USMC)._]
The major Marine command to feel the impact of the war in Southeast
Asia during the early 1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-man
combat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. In addition to its
participation in the OJT program, the 3d Marine Division began altering
its conventional amphibious orientation. Major General Donald M.
Weller, the division commander, provided the initial impetus for this
shift away from a purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early
1961 had commanded a task force headquarters formed in response to
the deteriorating military situation in Laos, anticipated that his
command might be committed to combat somewhere on the Southeast Asian
mainland. He therefore instructed his staff to begin studying possible
counterinsurgency training programs which would help “turn the entire
orientation of the division toward the type of intervention [which] we
would be faced with in Southeast Asia.”[3-14]
[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during
search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of
Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC)._]
Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of a Navy Cross and a future
Commandant of the Marine Corps, assumed command of the 3d Marine
Division in September 1961 before General Weller’s objectives could
be fully realized. The new commanding general immediately convened a
Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group to consider the problem. This
study group framed a set of recommendations for Cushman in late 1961.
His approval of their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry Unit
Training Course and a Command and Staff Training Course early the next
year.
Conducted in Okinawa’s rugged Northern Training Area, the infantry
course prepared rifle companies from the various infantry battalions
for participation in counterguerrilla warfare. The instructors,
graduates of either the Jungle Warfare School in Johore, Malaya, or the
new Army Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, placed
much emphasis on the origins and nature of guerrilla movements, small
units tactics, and night operations. The training syllabus for this
course included several live firing exercises designed for individual
Marines and fire teams. Some of these exercises required the Marines to
negotiate “jungle lanes” equipped with pop-up targets. The week-long
infantry course culminated with a two and one-half day field operation
for the individual infantry platoons.
The Command and Staff Training course was somewhat less rigorous,
being designed primarily to prepare battalion staffs to support their
companies in a counterinsurgency environment. Less than 10 hours in
length, this course was based primarily on lectures and map exercises.
At General Cushman’s direction, the division G-3 (Operations Section)
began stressing the significance of counterinsurgency training at all
echelons of the division. Unconventional warfare training soon became
an integral part of the training schedules at every echelon. Under this
program the various infantry battalions were required to conduct an
extended battalion-sized counterguerrilla operation, and to report to
the G-3 on the progress of their efforts.[3-15]
The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program and the 3d Marine Division’s
new approach to training complemented each other in several ways.
Whereas the OJT program helped create an awareness of counterguerrilla
operations among individual Marine officers and noncommissioned
officers, the division’s training programs achieved the same results at
the staff and battalion level. At points the two programs overlapped
to the further benefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to the
nature of guerrilla warfare and the problems involved in countering
the guerrilla, the officers and noncommissioned officers who returned
from OJT assignments in Vietnam provided assistance in planning and
supervising the division’s counterinsurgency training programs. Short
of actual commitment to combat in a guerrilla-type environment, it
is doubtful that any other combination of training could have better
prepared the 3d Marine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam.
_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_
The progressive erosion of the government’s strength and the steady
growth of the Viet Cong during 1961 prompted President Kennedy to
dispatch his special military advisor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to
Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor, who had retired in the late 1950s after
having served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried the following
instructions from the president:
I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose of
appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as it
concerns the threat to the internal security and defense of
that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferred with
the appropriate United States and South Vietnamese authorities,
including the Commander in Chief, Pacific, I would like your views
on the courses of action which our Government might take at this
juncture to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South
Vietnam; and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its
independence.[3-16]
Like other American officials who had visited Diem’s republic during
the course of the year, General Taylor returned to Washington convinced
that South Vietnam was in grave danger. In a report delivered to
President Kennedy in November, the general outlined his formula for
salvaging the situation. This included the broad recommendation that
the United States abandon its existing policy of strict military
advice and begin cooperating with the Vietnamese in a form of “limited
partnership.” The American role in such a partnership, Taylor
explained, would be to provide “working” advisors and “working”
military units to aid South Vietnam’s military forces.
General Taylor’s report offered several specific proposals for
implementing such a program. Among these were recommendations that
three U.S. Army helicopter companies and approximately 6,000–8,000
American ground troops be deployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam.
The helicopter units would support the government’s ground operations
but the American ground forces were to be used only in a defensive
posture. Taylor believed that their presence would underscore the
United States’ determination to stand by South Vietnam. A side-effect
of this display of determination would be to stimulate the morale of
the republic’s armed forces. He added that in order to support such a
build-up, it would be necessary to restructure and increase the size of
the USMAAG.
President Kennedy’s consideration of Taylor’s proposals resulted in a
compromise decision which cleared the way for more intense American
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem’s approval in
early December, Kennedy authorized the Department of Defense to expand
its advisory and assistance programs. To enhance the effectiveness of
the advisory program, he removed some of the official restrictions
under which most U.S. military advisors had operated since 1955. One
important change would allow all advisors to accompany their Vietnamese
units into combat. At the same time President Kennedy decided against
ordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone; however, he instructed
the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such
a contingency. He also approved General Taylor’s recommendation that
American helicopter units be sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of
the first of these reinforcements just before 1961 ended, signalled
the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase of American military
participation in the struggle to preserve the independence of South
Vietnam.
CHAPTER 4
An Expanding War, 1962
_The War’s New Context--Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory
Division--The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962--Some Conclusions_
_The War’s New Context_
More than any previous year, 1962 was to be a period of deepened
commitment for all participants in the continuing struggle for control
of South Vietnam. On the American side plans already set in motion by
President Kennedy’s recent decisions promised to loosen the flow of
dollars, equipment, advisors, and combat support personnel to South
Vietnam. Administration officials envisioned that this sharp influx of
assistance would stimulate a redoubled war effort on the part of the
Diem government.
Viet Cong strength and operational capabilities likewise were on the
upswing as 1962 opened. U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placing
total Viet Cong military strength at roughly 25,000 men. Backing these
military forces was a far greater number of sympathizers. American
agencies tended to divide the Communist military forces into three
rough categories according to function and composition--main forces,
local forces, and village activists. Thought to total around 9,000 men
at the beginning of the year, the main forces constituted the pillar
of Communist military strength in the South. They were organized into
approximately 20 small (200– to 400-man) and highly mobile battalions
and a number of independent companies. Main force units as a rule
were cadred by North Vietnamese (or returnees trained in the North)
and were capable of conducting operations on an interprovincial
scale. (They often were referred to as interprovincial battalions and
companies. Later in the war Americans came to call the main forces
“hard core” units.) Next in terms of operational capabilities were the
Viet Cong local forces whose aggregate strength stood at around 8,000
part-time but well-trained soldiers. The local forces were organized
into platoons and companies which operated independently within
their respective districts. Finally, there were some 8,000 village
activists. Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of the term, the
activists commonly worked in the paddies by day and engaged in military
pursuits at night. For the most part their ranks were filled with men
considered either too young or too old for service with organized Viet
Cong military units. Nevertheless, they played an important role in the
struggle for South Vietnam’s rural areas by providing various forms
of support for larger Viet Cong formations. Living and working within
the rural hamlets and villages as they did, the activists were a ready
source of intelligence information for the Viet Cong. Often they served
as porters and guides for main force units which had been assigned to
operate within their locale. Otherwise, the activists were responsible
for defending their particular villages against the government’s
military and police forces--a defense which normally took the form of
harassment with mines and sniper fire.[4-A]
[4-A] The three-way division was the most commonly used method
of categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army,
_The Viet Cong_, p. I:52.) A USMAAG document published
during this period, however, divided the Viet Cong
into two somewhat broader categories--main forces and
guerrillas. Both local force units and village activists
were classified as guerrillas under this system. (USMAAG,
Vietnam, _Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent
Operations_, p. II-5.) Other sources tended to make more
elaborate divisions. (See Pike, _Viet Cong_.)
After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Cong military and
paramilitary forces were carefully coordinated with Communist political
activities on the national level by a Central Office for South Vietnam
(COSVN).[4-B] From its headquarters, believed to have been located
northeast of Saigon in Binh Duong Province, COSVN exercised direct
control over six military regions (MRs). Designated MR-5 through MR-9
(arranged in a north to south pattern) with an additional Saigon-Gia
Dinh Special Zone, the Communist military regions served essentially
the same purpose as the government’s corps tactical zones. Within
these six regions COSVN utilized a province and district structure
only slightly different from that of the Diem government to exercise
administrative and military control. At each level within this
organization a small, disciplined Communist political committee
orchestrated the activities of its subordinate military units with the
actions of its political apparatus.
[4-B] COSVN apparently was established in March. Prior to this
the NLF had functioned through two separate geographic
headquarters--Interzone V, responsible for roughly the
northern three-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO
Interzone, responsible for the area roughly described by
the forested hills and Mekong Delta physiographic regions.
To counter the strengthened NLF organization and to satisfy American
demands that he adopt some form of national strategy, President Diem
launched one of the most controversial large-scale undertakings of the
war--the Strategic Hamlet Program. Instituted on an informal basis
in the closing stages of 1961, the program became fully operative in
mid-1962. Although heralded as a new concept, the campaign actually
grew out of an existing program whose broad objective had been to bring
improved economic and social conditions to South Vietnam’s rural areas.
Named the Agroville Program, this effort had been in effect since late
1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s brother and
principal advisor. Since its institution, however, the program had
achieved little aside from the resettlement of many rural families
into government constructed communities. Few meaningful reforms,
either social or economic, had been realized. During the early 1960s,
moreover, many of the Agrovilles had been victimized by the Viet Cong,
who saw the developments as symbols of the government’s presence in
contested areas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the more remote
Agrovilles, authorities in several provinces had begun fortifying the
otherwise helpless population centers.
Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovilles into fortified
communities, Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, the head of a newly formed
British Advisory Mission in Saigon, suggested that President Diem
consider adopting a similar scheme with broader strategic objectives.
Thompson, who had helped implement such an effort in Malaya in
the 1950s during the struggle there against Communist insurgents,
specifically proposed that the South Vietnamese integrate various
economic and social programs into an effective campaign to reestablish
its influence in the heavily populated Mekong Delta. This campaign,
Thompson advised, “should lead by stages to a reorganization of the
government machinery for directing and coordinating all action against
the communists and the production of an overall strategic operational
plan for the country as a whole....”[4-1]
Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to develop some sort of national
strategy for countering the insurgency, President Diem accepted the
concept of Thompson’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diem named Ngo
Dinh Nhu to head a campaign formally designated the Strategic Hamlet
Program. Nhu was instructed to plan the program and to create a
combined agency that would insure its coordination within the various
government ministries. These instructions resulted in the creation (in
February) of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets. A
counterpart American organization, the U.S. Interagency Committee for
Province Rehabilitation, was formed in April to provide assistance to
Nhu’s agency.
With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Embassy, the Vietnamese
formulated a program which in theory was to evolve in several rather
distinct phases. First it would be necessary to select specific
geographic areas wherein the Strategic Hamlet Program would be
implemented. Once specific objective areas had been established,
regular military units would initiate operations to clear those areas
of Viet Cong formations. Following the completion of these operations
RVNAF units would resettle the inhabitants of the area in fortified
hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to be defended by Civil Guard
units while regular forces continued screening operations in the
surrounding countryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corps units
would assume responsibility for local security while regular units
continued to screen Viet Cong forces from the developments. During this
phase district civil authorities would initiate economic and social
programs within the newly formed communities in an effort to recapture
the allegiance of the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, it was
expected that the Communist political infrastructure would be broken.
Following the pacification of a few contiguous hamlets, the same
process was to be repeated over and over, in an expanding pattern.
In this manner Diem hoped to expand the GVN’s control progressively
outward from the initial secure hamlets over large areas of the
countryside. Ultimately the GVN intended to construct nearly 11,000
such protected communities in several of the country’s most critical
rural areas.
A principal shortcoming of this method of pacification was that the
success of the entire program within a specific area depended on the
successful completion of virtually every developmental phase in every
strategic hamlet. Should the Communist infrastructure remain intact
in even one hamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapse of the
entire campaign by contaminating the surrounding communities in a
geometric progression.
Given this critical requirement that all phases be accomplished in a
deliberate and orderly manner, it was unfortunate that Nhu initiated
the program in an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of the year,
months before the appropriate American and South Vietnamese agencies
had been formed to guide the program, the construction of hamlets
had begun on a scale which already suggested a nationwide campaign.
Furthermore, the government failed to test the plan in a pilot project
such as Thompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recommended. Instead,
it launched rather extensive campaigns simultaneously in several
traditional Communist strongholds during the spring of 1962.
Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Strategic Hamlet Program
constituted the government’s first real effort to implement a concerted
counterinsurgency strategy on a national scale. Regardless of its
weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start, the program would serve
as the context within which the Diem government would wage its battle
with the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963. From this military
standpoint, moreover, Diem’s adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program
marked somewhat of a watershed in the evolution of ground strategy in
the Vietnam war. Inherent in its selection was the decision to opt for
a “clear-and-hold” as opposed to a “search-and-destroy” strategy. In
accordance with the dictates of the pacification campaign, RVNAF ground
forces would focus primarily during the next two years on operations
to clear Communist military formations from the more densely populated
rural areas.
_The Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_
The American military build-up called for by the Washington decisions
of December 1961 was well underway as the new year opened. Several
U.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961 had already
begun operations by January. These included two U.S. Army transport
helicopter companies and a composite U.S. Air Force detachment.
Designated FARM GATE and composed initially of 151 officers and
men, the Air Force detachment had a dual mission of training VNAF
elements and conducting attack sorties in support of President Diem’s
forces. The arrival of another U.S. Air Force unit, a C-123 transport
squadron, another Army helicopter company, and an Army communications
organization, the 3d Radio Research Unit, just after the first of
the year raised the number of American military personnel serving on
permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000. Assigned to the Army’s
radio unit, which immediately began operations from Pleiku in II
Corps Tactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1st Radio Company, FMF.
Designated Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S.
Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up.
Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving in Vietnam were for combat
support rather than advisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honolulu
in mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the ranking
American military officials concerned with Vietnam to make substantial
increases in the number of advisors serving with the Vietnamese armed
forces.
Less than a month after the Honolulu conference, a new U.S. command was
created in Saigon to manage the expected influx of advisors and the
intensified military assistance effort more efficiently. On 8 February,
the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV)
supplanted the MAAG as the senior American command in the Republic
of Vietnam. Its commander, Army General Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV),
assumed direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations,
and assistance to President Diem’s government. Harkins was directly
subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt,
whose headquarters was in Hawaii.
The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV’s staff indicated that
they would play an important role in its operations. In all, 21 staff
billets in the new command were allocated to the Marine Corps. The
most important of these was the chief of staff billet. This assignment
went to Major General Richard G. Weede, a veteran who had commanded
an artillery battalion during the campaigns for Saipan and Okinawa
during World War II. Later, in Korea, he had distinguished himself
as the commander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived in Saigon from
Hawaii where he had commanded the 1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other
Marines joined General Harkins’ command as Deputy Chief of Staff, J-2
and as branch chiefs for the J-3 through J-6 divisions. Two other
positions assigned to Marine officers were the project officer for
a Joint Operations Evaluation Group and a research and development
project officer for a Department of Defense agency. Both of these were
operationally controlled by the newly organized Military Assistance
Command.
[Illustration: _Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of Staff,
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (USMC Photo A150562)._]
Under the new U.S. command arrangement, the old Military Assistance
Advisory Group became subordinate to General Harkins’ command.
Headed by Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army, the MAAG was
now responsible primarily for the advisory aspect of the assistance
program. To accommodate the impending increases in the number of
advisors, the MAAG’s staff was restructured. Under its new table of
organization, Marine officers were to serve as deputy chief of staff
and head of the plans branch of the J-3 division. Later, in 1963, the
MAAG’s table of distribution would be modified with the effect that
the chief of staff billet would be held by a Marine colonel. The first
Marine to serve as General Timmes’ chief of staff would be Colonel Earl
E. Anderson, a much-decorated aviator who eventually would become the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The reorganization of the MAAG brought about a dramatic change in
the size and scope of the U.S. Marine advisory effort. The new table
of organization included a provision for an 18-man Marine Advisory
Division within the MAAG’s Naval Section. The organizational charts
for this division included advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel,
a major, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and four staff sergeants.
Administrative positions were to make up the balance of the new
organization.
As had been the case previous to this expansion, the lieutenant colonel
was to serve as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine
Corps. The inclusion of the major’s billet was expected to enhance the
overall effectiveness of the advisory division as he was to double as
Assistant Senior Advisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gunnery
sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisory duties. Of the six
captains, four were to be assigned as advisors to VNMC infantry
battalions while the two others were slated to advise on engineer and
supply matters. The four logistics-trained staff sergeants were to be
assigned as assistant infantry battalion advisors and were expected to
free the officer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming
supply matters.
Marines required to man this enlarged advisory unit began arriving in
Vietnam as early as February. All of the new officer advisors were
graduates of either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico or
the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Following their assignments, but before departing for Vietnam, many
advisors received schooling in military assistance operations. This
normally included a five-month course of instruction in the French
language, a requirement which more and more Marine advisors were
beginning to question as a result of the Vietnamese desire to converse
in their own language rather than French. Upon arrival in Saigon,
the Marines were given two days of orientation briefings at MACV
headquarters before assuming their jobs in the Marine Advisory Division.
Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve as the Senior Marine
Advisor and headed the new advisory division throughout the summer of
1962. In October he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G.
Moody, Jr., a veteran who held the Navy Cross for heroism as a company
commander during the Korean War. Having served with the British Royal
Marines following Korea, Moody was somewhat familiar with the problems
involved in dealing with foreign military services.
[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC, Senior
Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A412981)._]
Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S. Marine advisors
participated in every combat operation undertaken by the VNMC during
1962. Prior to planned operations they helped their Vietnamese
counterparts coordinate the more sophisticated means of support which
became available as the American military build-up took hold. During
planning phases, for example, they assisted with the development of
detailed orders and helped plan for employing artillery fire and air
support. If the impending operation was to be amphibious in nature, the
Marine officers coordinated with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to
the supporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insuring that planning
for embarkation had been accomplished. On occasion the advisors were
required to coordinate helicopter support for the VNMC units--a task
sometimes complicated by the Vietnamese Marines’ lack of experience
in heliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almost constant combat
assignments being drawn by the handful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter
units available in Vietnam made training in such operations impossible.
Even more difficult were the advisor’s responsibilities after their
units deployed to combat. The U.S. Marines were experiencing the often
frustrating task of actually searching out the elusive Viet Cong on a
continuing daily basis. Additionally, the Americans found themselves
faced with the unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers, who,
in some cases, had been fighting Communist guerrillas since the
French-Indochina War. These circumstances presented a unique set of
challenges for the advisors. For American officers with relatively
little actual experience in this brand of warfare to offer tactical
advice in a form acceptable to their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a
combination of tact, patience, and subtle persuasive powers.
The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned that success in this peculiar
assignment depended largely on the degree of respect they commanded
among the Vietnamese Marines. To help build this intangible yet vital
foundation of mutual understanding and confidence, the Marine advisors
stayed with their units in combat, sharing with the Vietnamese Marine
the same foods, the same dangers, the same discomforts, and the same
routines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S. bachelor quarters in Saigon
when their respective battalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they
spent much of this time at the Marine base camps, inspecting troops
and equipment and making preparations for the battalion’s next combat
assignment. Among others, Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Moody viewed
this continuous association with the Vietnamese Marines as the single
most essential ingredient to a successful advisory program.
_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_
For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 was characterized by expansion,
redesignation, and continued combat operations against the Viet Cong.
On 1 January the former Vietnamese Marine Group was redesignated the
Vietnamese Marine Brigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men.
Under its new table of organization, the number of infantry battalions
remained at four but two new battalions were added. One battery of
eight 105mm howitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm pack howitzers, and
a headquarters and service battery comprised an artillery battalion
which was created to provide artillery fire support to the infantry
units. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038 officers and men was
also formed. This unit contained the personnel necessary to provide
the entire Marine brigade with reconnaissance, communications, motor
transport, medical, engineer, and training support. Lieutenant Colonel
Khang continued in his position as Commandant of the expanded and
restructured Vietnamese Marine Corps.
The infantry battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Brigade performed
a variety of combat missions ranging from security duty around key
government installations to helicopter landings in suspected Viet Cong
redoubts during 1962. The four infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion
became available for combat assignment at midyear) participated in
23 combat operations which involved 404 days in the field. These
operations included 12 amphibious landings and eight heliborne
assaults. With the exception of two howitzer batteries which saw
some combat, the artillery battalion devoted the year to training.
Supervised by Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant William A.
Loyko, their new Marine advisors, the Vietnamese artillerymen learned
their skills in a number of field firing exercises conducted on ARVN
artillery ranges.
In terms of casualties the VNMC battalions fought no major engagements
with the Communists during the year. A typical operation was one
conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province, early in
the year. The 2d Battalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyen province
chief for the period between 18 February and 26 April, conducted one
helicopter landing, provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys,
and fought several minor engagements with the Viet Cong. Although the
Vietnamese commander reported 112 enemy killed and another 40 wounded
during the two-month assignment, the figures contradicted those of
Captain Evan L. Parker, the Marine advisor, which placed the Viet Cong
casualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. This difference, which was
not uncommon, stemmed largely from the fact that the Marine advisors
limited their reports to enemy dead and wounded actually sighted.
Still, the conflicting reports sometimes led to tensions between the
Vietnamese commander and the Marine advisor.
In other instances the Vietnamese Marine battalions were ordered to
serve as the reserve force for one of the three corps tactical zones.
The 1st Battalion, for example, accompanied by Captain Bradley S.
Snell, assumed the mission as II Corps reserve on 16 May and remained
in that role until mid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in the
Central Highlands, the battalion provided security for government
installations while remaining ready to react to enemy threats. As
the corps reserve it conducted one heliborne operation and several
search-type missions. In one of these searches the Vietnamese Marines
uncovered and destroyed a Viet Cong small arms factory. During its
assignment in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted for only four Viet
Cong dead and one wounded while suffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These
statistics attested both to the grim effectiveness of enemy sniper fire
and mines and to the enemy’s elusiveness.
[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1
JANUARY 1962
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 5,483]
The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Don R.
Christensen, entered combat for the first time during an operation in
Binh Thuan Province in the first week in August. Supported by Battery
A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of the artillery battalion, it joined the 43d
ARVN Infantry Regiment in an attempt to locate and destroy Viet Cong
forces operating around Phan Thiet, the provincial capital, located on
the coast 95 miles east of Saigon. Following the conclusion of this
operation on 22 August, the Marine units reverted to the control of the
Binh Thuan province chief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing
and resettlement operations being conducted in conjunction with the
Strategic Hamlet Program. Between 4 August and 15 October, when its
assignment in the province ended, the 4th Battalion reported 12 Viet
Cong killed and seven captured. Vietnamese Marine casualties were one
killed and five wounded. During the assignment the Marines resettled
some 600 civilians in fortified hamlets.[4-2][4-C]
[4-C] Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor during
this period, later recalled that province chiefs tended
to misuse the Marine units by assigning them unproductive
missions such as static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft,
Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “Marine Activities in
Vietnam, 1954–1964,” hereafter _Croft Comments_.)
[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines search dense jungle for Viet Cong
base areas. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
USMC)._]
In the last week of September General David M. Shoup, Commandant of
the U.S. Marine Corps, arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of
South Vietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor for his actions as
a regimental commander on Tarawa in World War II, was recognized as
one of President Kennedy’s most trusted military advisors. Acting in
his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant was
scheduled to visit a number of U.S. and South Vietnamese installations,
including several strategic hamlets.
[Illustration:
CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
1962
]
After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAG headquarters in Saigon,
the Commandant and his party journeyed by automobile to the base camp
of the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Duc on the outskirts
of the capital. There, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonels Brown and
Khang, Shoup reviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard and inspected
the 3d Battalion. Impressed with the units he had seen, General Shoup
commended President Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade. “From my
observation,” he wrote from Washington, “the Vietnamese Marine Corps
is in an excellent state of readiness from the standpoint of equipment
as well as the degree of training of its members.” “Indeed,” he added,
“your Corps of Marines seemed to be a splendid and competent fighting
organization.”[4-3]
The Commandant was less complimentary of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
After visiting several of the developments, he concluded that the
government’s effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civilians into
defended communities was counter-productive to the program’s stated
objective of winning the allegiance of the rural population. As Shoup
reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his return to Washington,
the forced resettlement of the peasants from their native hamlets and
villages into what amounted to fortified camps seemed to be generating
antagonism rather than good will.[4-4]
At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine commanders reported a total of
192 Viet Cong killed, 77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S.
Marine advisors felt that even these moderate figures were inflated.
They estimated that only about 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27
wounded, and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong captured as had
been reported by their Vietnamese Marine counterparts. The Vietnamese
Marines also had failed to inflict any serious damage on the enemy’s
logistic system, capturing only 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition,
45 grenades, 31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printing press, two
typewriters, several motors, and an assortment of medical supplies.[4-5]
_Some Conclusions_
In retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an important watershed in the
chronicle of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam. As the year began only
three Marine advisors and a handful of embassy guards were serving
in the Republic. The initial months, however, brought a dramatic
expansion of that role, both in terms of numbers and responsibilities.
By March Marines were functioning on MAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon,
in U.S. Army communications facilities in the Central Highlands, and
throughout the provinces where Vietnamese Marine units operated.
Their contributions to the war effort, therefore, were broad and
varied, ranging from high level planning to infantry advisory duties.
The Marine role had expanded in rough proportion to the broad-based
expansion of the overall U.S. military assistance program. In this
connection, Marine contributions tended to be concealed within the
context of the American assistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could
be said that the Marines in Vietnam were leaving the impact of their
service on virtually every stage of the ground war.
PART II
MARINE HELICOPTERS
GO TO WAR
CHAPTER 5
SHUFLY at Soc Trang
_The Decision--Deployment to Soc Trang--Mekong Delta Combat Support
Operations--Preparations and Redeployment--Accomplishments_
One of the most important developments in the chronicle of U.S.
Marine activities in South Vietnam during the early 1960s occurred
shortly after the creation of MACV. In mid-April 1962, a Marine medium
helicopter squadron was deployed to the Mekong Delta to provide support
for the Government of Vietnam forces in their battle with the Communist
guerrillas. The significance of the squadron’s arrival went beyond the
added mobility that it afforded those Vietnamese units attempting to
hold the rice producing delta region. Coinciding as it did with the
increases in the number of Marines serving on the MACV staff and under
the MAAG, its arrival indicated that the Marine role would expand in
direct proportion to the widening U.S. effort to defend the Republic of
Vietnam.
_The Decision_
The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unit to the combat zone
originated in the immediate aftermath of General Taylor’s report to
President Kennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), Admiral Harry
D. Felt, to prepare for increased operations in South Vietnam. This
order implied that the Pacific command should stand ready to deploy
additional helicopter units to Diem’s republic in the event that it
became necessary to augment the Army companies already operating there.
(By now the number of Army helicopter companies in South Vietnam stood
at three.) CinCPac was also instructed to explore South Vietnam’s
requirements for additional helicopter units beyond the Army companies
already present.[5-1]
Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
a valid requirement for additional helicopter support did exist in the
Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. He recommended that a fourth U.S.
Army light helicopter company be deployed to the area. Included in the
admiral’s recommendation was a proposal to support the aviation unit
with a composite maintenance, avionics, and medical group.[5-2]
Admiral Felt’s recommendations were approved by the Secretary of
Defense on 6 March. The Joint Chiefs immediately assigned the
responsibility for providing the support package and helicopter unit
to the Army. In turn, Army authorities alerted the 33d Transportation
Light Helicopter Company at Fort Ord, California for the move. Its
departure date was set for 18 April.[5-3]
Unknown to the officers and men of the alerted unit, the plans for its
deployment to combat were being reconsidered at the time the orders
were received. Two days before Admiral Felt’s recommendation reached
the joint Chiefs, a proposal to augment Army helicopter units with
Marine pilots had been advanced by General Timmes, the MAAG chief. This
proposal triggered a brief but eventful debate within U.S. military
circles. With General Harkins’ concurrence, Timmes recommended that
nine Marine helicopter pilots be assigned to the Army aviation units in
Vietnam for periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, he pointed out,
would enable the Marine pilots to become familiar with the nature of
the combat support operations in South Vietnam and would provide them
with transitional training in the Army’s Piasecki-built tandem-rotored
H-21 helicopter (nicknamed the “Flying Banana”).[5-4]
Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific (FMFPac), Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, for his comments
on the MAAG chief’s plan. Shapley in turn instructed Major General
Carson A. Roberts, the Commanding General, Aircraft, FMFPac to study
the proposal and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts, who had
been selected for promotion to lieutenant general and was scheduled to
relieve Shapley as Commanding General, FMFPac, found the prospect of
Marine aviators participating in combat support operations in Vietnam
appealing but felt that the proposal under review had some definite
disadvantages. He pointed out that under Timmes’ plan the Marine pilots
would be flying a type of helicopter unfamiliar to them instead of the
ones they would operate if the Marine squadrons were later deployed
to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Roberts warned that the piecemeal
assignment of his pilots would reduce the combat readiness of the unit
from which they would be drawn.[5-5]
At Roberts’ suggestion, General Shapley offered CinCPac a
counterproposal which he believed would benefit both the South
Vietnamese government and the Marine Corps. He suggested that a
complete Marine medium helicopter squadron from Marine Aircraft Group
16 (MAG-16), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elements
be moved from Okinawa to the war zone. The Marine squadron, operating
24 HUS-1s (a single-rotor, Sikorsky-built transport helicopter later
known as the UH-34D) would replace the Army helicopter company at Da
Nang in the northernmost corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unit
would then be freed for redeployment southward into either II or III
Corps Tactical Zones.
General Shapley emphasized several advantages which he saw in this
plan. First, it would provide additional helicopter support for the
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces while concurrently providing an entire
Marine helicopter squadron with an opportunity to gain first-hand
experience in a counterguerrilla environment. It would also provide
Marine Corps units with operational experience in I Corps, the area
to which they would be committed if standing contingency plans were
later executed. Finally, Shapley explained that his proposal offered an
almost entirely self-sufficient aviation unit which could be supported
administratively and logistically by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The
unit would require only minimal support from the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam.[5-6]
On the same day that he had heard the Marine commander’s proposal,
Admiral Felt received a message from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advised that Roberts’ plan
be implemented.[5-7] Admiral Felt then solicited General Harkins’
opinion on the matter. He reminded the MACV commander that the proposed
deployment would provide the Marines with operational experience in
an area where they might some day be committed. The admiral further
pointed out that the location of a Marine helicopter unit at Da Nang
would enable the Army aviation companies to move south into one of the
other corps tactical zones--a move that would facilitate the logistical
support of those units by shortening their supply lines.[5-8]
Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt’s viewpoint. He noted
that the more powerful Marine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could be
expected to out perform the Army’s H-21 in the higher elevations around
Da Nang. He also felt that the Marines, with their seaborne supply
network, were better equipped to cope with the logistics problems in
the more isolated northern reaches of South Vietnam. But he objected
to the deployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on the basis that
the relocation of the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company from I Corps
in the immediate future would disrupt a series of operations which
were already underway in I Corps. As an alternative, General Harkins
proposed that the Marine helicopters be located initially at Soc
Trang in the Mekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operations in the
northern corps tactical zone permitted, it could exchange places with
the Army unit at Da Nang.[5-9]
One Army general raised a specific objection to the proposal that the
Marine squadron be deployed from Okinawa. General James F. Collins, the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CinCUSArPac) argued that the
presence of the Marine helicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet
“another supply and maintenance feature into the III Corps area.”[5-10]
This argument was followed by the recommendation that the Army’s 81st
Light Helicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, be ordered to the
Mekong Delta. The 81st, General Collins contended, was already trained
in troop transportation operations in jungle terrain.
General David M. Shoup, the Marine Corps Commandant, who approved the
FMFPac plan in concept, harbored one reservation regarding General
Roberts’ proposals. His concern stemmed from the possibility that the
Marine Corps might be required to replace the squadron from Okinawa
with another in order to maintain the level of operational forces
available to CinCPac--an eventuality which would upset long-range
Marine Corps deployment schedules. General Shoup indicated that he,
too, would oppose the deployment of a Marine helicopter squadron to
South Vietnam if this proved to be the case.[5-11]
At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Felt journeyed to Saigon to
discuss the matter more thoroughly with General Harkins. Following
consultations, the two commanders jointly communicated their
recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised
that it would be more desirable to deploy one of the Marine helicopter
squadrons from Okinawa than either the Army unit already on alert
in California or the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt and Harkins
informed the Joint Chiefs, was influenced heavily by the readiness
posture of the various units under consideration. A Marine squadron,
they pointed out, could be on station and ready for combat operations
by 15 April--three days before the company already alerted by the Army
could depart California.[5-12]
Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt with the CinCUSARPac
contention that additional supply problems would be created by the
deployment of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. The Pacific commanders
advised that, in their opinion, the logistical support “can be handled
relatively easily by [the] Marines.”[5-13] They added that should
requirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise in South Vietnam, the
Army’s 81st Helicopter Company would be selected for the assignment. It
would be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Transportation Light Helicopter
Company from Fort Ord. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkins
recommended that the Marine squadron be deployed initially to the
Mekong Delta area of III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, when
operational conditions in I Corps were more favorable, the Marines
could replace the Army helicopter unit there.
After meeting to discuss the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved
the entire package of recommendations on 16 March. Admiral Felt
immediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploy a Marine helicopter
squadron to South Vietnam and authorized direct liaison between the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing and ComUSMACV. In turn, Admiral Sides, the
Commander of the Pacific Fleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decision and directed him to
take appropriate action.[5-14]
_Deployment to Soc Trang_
The Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Major General
John P. Condon, a Michigan native who had earned a Distinguished Flying
Cross and three Legions of Merit for service during World War II and
Korea, was informed of the impending deployment on 22 March. At the
time, Condon, his staff, and elements of his command were participating
in SEATO exercise TULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of the
orders proved timely for most of the affected units were in close
proximity to the wing commander. As the Marine helicopter squadron and
its supporting elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam just two
weeks after the SEATO exercise ended, preparations for the move were
begun immediately. General Condon quickly dispatched several officers
to Saigon to establish liaison with USMACV.
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunately possessed a background which
facilitated the rapid preparations for the movement. Since August of
the previous year General Condon’s command regularly had deployed a
medium helicopter squadron (HMM) and its supporting elements with the
Special Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-ground team embarked on board
the Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this naval
task force had cruised Southeast Asian waters ready to implement U.S.
contingency plans. These deployments had given the Marines of the wing
a reservoir of experience which enabled them to make maximum use of the
short period of time available for planning.
By 30 March, the wing’s planning had progressed to the stage that
General Condon could provide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet with
specific recommendations for the entire operation. The general concept
of the plan was that Task Unit 79.3.5, under the command of a Marine
colonel, was to be built around a Marine medium helicopter squadron
which was participating in Operation TULUNGAN. This task unit, code
named SHUFLY, was to occupy an old Japanese-built landing strip near
Soc Trang, a small town located about 85 miles southwest of Saigon in
Ba Xuyen Province. Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trang
possessed one of the few hard surfaced runways in the area. Condon
informed the Seventh Fleet commander of the arrangements which his
liaison officers had made during their trip to Saigon. An ARVN infantry
battalion and two 4.2-inch mortar companies were to assume the defense
of the air strip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marines began
landing.
[Illustration: _Major General John P. Condon, USMC, Commanding General,
1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (USMC Photo A420792)._]
The Marine general then proceeded to outline the chain of command and
method of support which he considered best for the Marine task unit.
SHUFLY, he suggested, should be under the operational control of
ComUSMACV but should remain under the administrative control of the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wing commander
thought, could come through normal Marine and Navy channels with fuels,
lubricant oils, rations, and ammunition, being the exceptions. Rations
and ammunition were to be provided by MACV, while fuels would be
supplied by private Vietnamese distributers operating under contracts
with the U.S. government.
Next, General Condon explained to Admiral Schoech his desires for the
organization of the task unit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best
if organized into three distinct task elements. First, he proposed
that a headquarters be formed under the command of Colonel John F.
Carey, a veteran Marine aviator who had been awarded the Navy Cross
for heroism during the battle for Midway. Carey was currently serving
as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters,
General Condon advised, should consist of eight officers and six
enlisted men. The second element of the task unit, the wing commander
continued, would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362),
reinforced, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp.
The squadron, whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196 enlisted
Marines, was to be augmented by 50 additional maintenance personnel.
Its equipment would include 24 HUS helicopters (which under normal
operating conditions could lift eight to 12 combat-loaded Vietnamese
troops), three Cessna single-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one
R4D transport aircraft, and supplemental maintenance equipment.
Prior to its deployment, HMM-362 would exchange its helicopters for
recently overhauled aircraft in order to reduce maintenance problems
once operations in Vietnam began. SHUFLY’s third element would be a
sub unit of Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16). Designated Task
Element 79.3.5.2, it would be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William
W. Eldridge. Navy medical, dental, and chaplain personnel would be
included in the sub unit’s 193 enlisted men and 18 officers.
The wing commander intended to provide the MABS-16 sub unit with
a Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine
Airfield Traffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic control unit would
be equipped with Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) and Ground Control
Approach (GCA) systems which would enable the helicopter squadron to
conduct landings during periods of reduced visibility.[5-15]
Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, was to be assigned
responsibility for liaison with MACV and military authorities in
III Corps, the tactical zone which encompassed the entire Mekong
Delta and the transition zone between the delta and the highlands.
All operational planning, security, external communications, and
administrative matters also were to fall under his cognizance. This
arrangement would allow Lieutenant Colonel Clapp and his squadron
to concentrate on daily flight operations and aircraft maintenance.
Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 sub unit would be responsible for
all normal base support and airfield operations.[5-16]
General Condon’s report to Admiral Schoech concluded with a rough
outline of the schedule for the task unit’s deployment. On 9
April--only eight days after the termination of the SEATO exercise in
the Philippines--Marine transport aircraft from the 1st MAW, augmented
by three transports from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), would
begin airlifting the task unit headquarters and the MABS-16 detachment
from Okinawa. The Marine general anticipated that all “housekeeping”
facilities would be in position at Soc Trang within five days.
Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s HMM-362 would fly into Soc Trang from the
amphibious assault ship (helicopter carrier) USS _Princeton_ (LPH-5)
on the morning of 15 April. The proposal that the helicopters be flown
ashore satisfied a Department of Defense requirement that conspicuous
unloading activities were to be avoided in the Saigon area.
Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW’s proposed plan on 3 April and
ordered Task Unit 79.3.5 to be transferred to General Harkins’ command
on 15 April. He then instructed the Commander, Task Group 76.5 (the
Amphibious Ready Group) to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply and
administrative support it might require for the movement. At the same
time the fleet commander ordered appropriate subordinate commanders
to provide an escort of destroyers for the USS _Princeton_ and an
inconspicuous air cover when the LPH arrived and began unloading
HMM-362. Accordingly, the covering aircraft were instructed not to
approach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unless the situation around
Soc Trang endangered the Marine helicopters.[5-17]
The day following Schoech’s approval of the Marine plan, the carrier
task unit was formed to transport HMM-362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLY was
activated simultaneously and given orders which reflected General
Condon’s planning. Colonel Carey was instructed to establish his
headquarters at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, in order
to prepare for the deployment. The task unit commander was advised that
he would receive more detailed instructions relative to administration
and logistics at a later date.
Colonel Carey’s task group headquarters in Japan had only one week in
which to complete preparations for the move to the Republic of Vietnam.
His staff’s responsibility for coordinating between units located at
Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa, made this task even more difficult.
Carey’s officers worked out the details of the airlift with the staff
of Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), the
GV-1[5-A] unit assigned to carry the MABS-16 sub unit and the task unit
headquarters to Soc Trang.
[5-A] The GV-1 (later KC-130), a four-engine, turbo-prop
refueler-transport built by Lockheed, is the Marine
refueling version of the Air Force C-130.
The airlift portion of the movement began as scheduled on 9 April with
the MABS-16 detachment being transported from Futema directly to Soc
Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of his staff landed at Soc Trang
in a twin-engine Douglas R4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVN
battalion had already established a perimeter around the airfield.
Using the R4D’s radio, the crew provided landing instructions for the
GV-1s of VMGR-152 and VMGR-352 which began landing and unloading their
cargoes at half hour intervals. Several key American and Vietnamese
military officers were on hand to watch the lead elements of SHUFLY
arrive. Major General Condon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the first
GV-1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircraft had been unloaded.
General Harkins and Brigadier General Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese
commander of III Corps, also made appearances at the airstrip to
welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines.
Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 detachment began readying the
airfield for HMM-362’s arrival shortly after the first transport
aircraft had unloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marines raised
75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks. They set up a water
purification system and began trucking water from the town of Soc
Trang, about two and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000 gallons
of water had been purified. Other conveniences improved the camp’s
living conditions. A field laundry and a mess hall were set up and by
12 April, hot meals were being served to the Marines. A post office
began operations and telephones were installed to connect living and
working areas.
By 14 April, the day before HMM-362 was scheduled to arrive at Soc
Trang, most of the airfield facilities were ready to support flight
operations. An old hangar, which had been constructed by the Japanese
during their World War II occupation of Indochina, had been repaired
to house some of the squadron’s aircraft and equipment. The MABS-16
communications section was operational and had established radio and
teletype links with MACV in Saigon and MAG-16 on Okinawa. The TAFDS
had been assembled and filled with aviation fuel and MATCU-68, the air
traffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, was prepared to control flight
operations.
The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5) steamed from Okinawa on 10 April
with HMM-362, its reinforcements, and HMM-261 embarked on the USS
_Princeton_. The task group arrived off the coast of South Vietnam
in the early morning hours of 15 April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel
Clapp, who had seen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jima and
Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led the first flight of helicopters
from the deck of the _Princeton_. The operation proceeded smoothly
with aircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM-362’s equipment inland
to the Soc Trang airstrip. Far out at sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet
orbited, ready to provide protection to the Marine helicopters. They
were not needed, however, as the Viet Cong made no effort to oppose
the movement. By mid-afternoon the airlift of HMM-362’s personnel
and equipment to the Soc Trang airfield had been completed. HMM-261
returned to the _Princeton_ where it continued to function as the
helicopter element of the Special Landing Force.
The day after arriving at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s
squadron, nicknamed “Archie’s Angels,” was prepared to support the
ARVN. Since the squadron’s combat support was not required immediately,
the pilots and crews began flying missions to familiarize themselves
with their new surroundings. They learned that their operations were to
be conducted over the vast expanse of South Vietnam which stretched
from just north and east of Saigon to the nation’s southernmost tip,
the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South China Sea westward to the
Cambodian border. Their initial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed
a predominantly flat and monotonous landscape. Parched by the long dry
season, the dusty brown rice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the
verdant mangrove swamps which abounded near major streams and along
the coast. Numerous hamlets, most enclosed by dense hedgerows and
treelines, were scattered across the countryside. Thousands of canals
and trails and a few crude roads completed the rural landscape in which
the Viet Cong guerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang, Can
Tho (located about 80 miles southwest of Saigon), and My Tho (located
about half way between the capital and Can Tho) were under the control
of the Government of Vietnam.
While the pilots and crews of HMM-362 were acquainting themselves
with the geography of the Mekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff
met in Saigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from the MACV and
III Corps headquarters. There, they established liaison with the
three ARVN divisions subordinate to General Nhgiem’s III Corps--the
21st, the 7th, and the 5th--and discussed operational matters. After
several conferences, the final details of the command arrangements
were completed. It was agreed that all Marine missions would require
the approval of MACV, III Corps, and the task unit commander. This
arrangement would enable General Harkins’ command to retain actual
operational control of the Marine helicopters even though they would
be supporting III Corps exclusively. Final approval of all mission
requests for Marine support would rest with the Joint Operations Center
(JOC) at JGS headquarters in Saigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air
Force, ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part of a recently
instituted Tactical Air Support System, the purpose of which was to
provide positive control over all military aircraft in South Vietnam.
To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons, Marine liaison
officers were assigned to the corps headquarters and to the 21st ARVN
Division. It was anticipated that this division, headquartered at Can
Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang, would require more Marine
helicopter support than the other divisions that were operating within
the corps tactical zone.[5-B]
[5-B] I and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps
headquarters for control of air assets whereas III CTZ
relied directly on the JOC. Under this arrangement, I
Corps and II Corps were required to pass mission requests
for air support on to the JOC.
[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp (second from left),
HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John Condon (fourth from
left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Colonel John
Carey (extreme right), task unit commander, confer briefly after
arriving at Soc Trang. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P.
Kizer, USMC)._]
While operational planning was underway, the MABS-16 Marines set about
to improve the newly occupied compound. Two diesel-powered generators
were put into operation and began furnishing electrical power for the
camp. The utilities section, which maintained the generators, then
began installing electrical wiring throughout the compound. Toilet and
shower facilities were constructed to accommodate the Marines.
Measures were also taken during this interlude to strengthen the
airfield’s defenses. Expecting that the Viet Cong might attempt
to infiltrate the Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-man
security unit to protect the inner camp and flight lines. This unit,
composed of men from MABS-16 and HMM-362 and responsible to a permanent
sergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrols and security posts
during hours of darkness. A network of concertina wire, trip flares,
and machine gun emplacements provided additional protection around the
helicopters and living area. Attack alerts were conducted periodically
to coordinate the ARVN’s outer defenses and the Marine guard within the
perimeter.
[Illustration:
III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE
1962
]
Within less than two weeks after the first Marines had arrived at Soc
Trang, the camp had been adequately prepared to support sustained
combat helicopter operations. In addition, defenses had been
established and the lines of logistical support from MACV had been
opened. Food and water were readily available. All necessary liaison
with the Vietnamese units to be supported had been accomplished. Pilots
and crews had gained a rudimentary knowledge of the area in which they
would fly and SHUFLY’s entire command structure had undergone a one
week “shake down” in which it had proven sound.
_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_
Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron began combat operations on Easter
Sunday, 22 April, exactly one week after arriving in the Republic of
Vietnam. The unit’s first combat assignment was to assist the Army’s
Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Company in an operation code named
LOCKJAW. The American helicopters were to support the ARVN 7th Division
which was headquartered at My Tho, 53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The
Marine helicopters, which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29 sorties
and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers without incident during the course
of their first operation.
Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operating in other parts
of South Vietnam, the Marine HUS-1s were not armed with machine
guns during their initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior to their
deployment, the Marine commanders had reasoned that weapons mounted
in the cargo hatch would hinder loading and unloading during critical
periods while the helicopters were in landing zones. Additionally,
armed aircraft would tend to present a more hostile appearance to
Vietnamese civilians, thereby providing the Viet Cong ready-made
material for their anti-American propaganda themes. The only weapons
on board the helicopters, therefore, were the individual side arms and
two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine guns carried by the crew members. The
automatic weapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men to return fire
at short ranges and would also enhance their survival capabilities in
the event an aircraft was forced down in unsecure territory.[5-C]
[5-C] By the summer the new light weight AR-15, the forerunner
of the M-16, would replace the M3A1 “greaseguns.” Near
the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crews were
carrying M-14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantry
weapon of this period.
Once HMM-362 began combat flight operations the tempo of activities
at Soc Trang quickened. The same day that SHUFLY helicopters
participated in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, an HUS was
called upon to evacuate an American advisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles
north of Soc Trang. The following day the first combined operation
involving Vietnamese Marine ground forces and U.S. Marine helicopters
was conducted. A company of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted into a
threatened government outpost south of the town of Ca Mau, located near
the southern tip of South Vietnam, to provide security while HMM-362’s
helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison.
On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the 21st ARVN Division in
Operation NIGHTINGALE conducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591
ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zones along two canals where
a large group of Viet Cong had been reported. Shortly after the first
wave of the assault force landed, a vicious small arms fight erupted.
HMM-362 suffered its first combat damage when a helicopter was forced
down after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire. An accompanying
HUS quickly landed and retrieved the crew. Four other helicopters
proceeded to the forward loading site, picked up a Marine repair
team and enough ARVN troops to protect the team while it worked, and
returned to the downed aircraft. The mechanics completed their repairs
in two hours after which the crew returned the helicopter to Soc Trang.
The security force was then lifted out of the area.
Despite the damage suffered by the Marine aircraft, the Can Tho
operation apparently achieved some success. The Viet Cong reportedly
suffered 70 dead and lost three prisoners to the South Vietnamese while
the ARVN units lost only three killed and six wounded. The Marines of
HMM-362, moreover, had responded to a new challenge by demonstrating
that they could recover helicopters which had been forced to land in
insecure territory. Although the principle of providing security while
accomplishing field repairs had been employed previously by the Army
helicopter companies, the Can Tho operation of 24 April marked the
first time the Marines had been required to use the technique.
[Illustration: _Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (Photo courtesy of
Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._]
HMM-362 again joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company for a
coordinated troop lift on 25 April. This time the objective was the
small town of Chau Doc on the Bassac River near the Cambodian
border which had been raided and burned by a force whose identity was
undetermined. Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troops from
the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of the incident while two other
squadron aircraft lifted the Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21st
Division Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisor in III Corps, Colonel
Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S. Army, to the village. The landing was
uncontested as the marauding band had fled across the international
border into Cambodia.
The conditions which confronted HMM-362 in the Mekong Delta during its
first weeks of combat operations encouraged the squadron’s pilots to
experiment with new tactics. One such instance occurred in the first
week of May in Ba Xuyen Province when the province chief requested
that the Marine helicopters support his Civil Guard company in a
raid on a fortified Viet Cong village about 12 miles southwest of
Soc Trang. Because the objective was located so near the Soc Trang
airfield, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusual technique used
for approaching the landing zone. The flight would rendezvous over Soc
Trang at tree-top level and proceed to the objective with the flight
leader slightly to the rear and above the formation. From this vantage
point the flight leader could keep the other aircraft in sight and
exercise better control over each element of the flight. The success of
the new procedure led Lieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that the
technique was similar to “calling the plays from the grandstand.”[5-18]
It became another tactic available for the squadron’s future use.
In terms of lessons learned, HMM-362’s most significant operation
during its initial month of combat support came on 9 May. Twenty-three
helicopters and two OE-1 observation aircraft launched from Ca Mau at
1100 for an assault on Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21
miles to the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landing the ARVN
troops in six landing zones which had been attacked only five minutes
earlier by Vietnamese Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke out even
before the Vietnamese troops could jump from the helicopters. During
this clash eight of the Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fire
and two Vietnamese troops were wounded while still on board. One HUS,
struck in the oil return line, was forced to land a few miles from
the objective. Troops were flown in quickly to establish a perimeter
around the downed aircraft while repairs were made. After the temporary
repairs had been completed, its crew flew the helicopter to Ca Mau,
where it remained until more extensive work could be accomplished. The
other aircraft, including an OE-1, suffered only superficial damage and
continued to support the ARVN operation.
From this encounter with the Viet Cong, the Marine pilots learned that
air strikes conducted just prior to a helicopter landing in the heavily
populated delta country tended to disclose the location of the landing
zone to the enemy. In this instance the Communists had been able to
reach the landing zone in the few minutes which elapsed between the
last air strike and the arrival of the Marine helicopters. Following
this experience, the Marines would no longer allow VNAF air strikes on
landing zones prior to operations in the flat delta region.[5-D]
[5-D] The development of helicopter tactics and techniques in
Vietnam will be covered in detail in a separate monograph
being prepared for publication by the History and Museums
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soon learned to use fixed-wing
aircraft to support helicopter operations in another manner. By
mid-June, FARM GATE T-28 Trojans (a single-engine two-seat trainer
built by North American) modified to carry bombs, rockets, and machine
guns were flying escort missions for the Marine helicopter squadron.
This particular aircraft could fly slowly enough to cruise with the HUS
yet fast enough to deliver an air strike en route to the objective and
then catch up with the helicopter formation. Normally an element of two
T-28s accompanied the helicopters and were used primarily to attack
targets near the landing zone after the ARVN troops were on the ground.
The placement of an American pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese student
in the T-28, a requirement imposed by MACV, helped avert language
problems which invariably developed when coordinating ARVN ground
operations and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness of the escort
tactic increased as the Marine and Air Force pilots became accustomed
to planning, coordinating, and executing the missions.
The Marines quickly learned the value of utilizing the OE-1 in
conjunction with their helicopter operations. Three single-engine,
two-man aircraft, a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron 2
(VMO-2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day operations over the
delta. Primarily, they were used in daylight visual reconnaissance,
usually to study objective areas and the approach routes which the
helicopters would later use. Sometimes their crews were called upon
to photograph proposed landing zones for briefing purposes. Often the
aircraft’s radios were used to relay messages between various ARVN
ground units which were operating beyond the range of their radios.
Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM) radios for work with ground
stations and one ultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicating
with other aircraft, the OE-1 was perfectly suited for controlling
helicopter landings. The Marine aviators also found that, unlike
their helicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse suspicion
in the area over which it flew. This advantage was due probably to
several factors. First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinely
operated similar aircraft over the entire region; secondly, the enemy
could not readily determine whether the OE-1 was on a reconnaissance
mission or merely flying from one point to another; and finally, the
small aircraft made little noise. Given these characteristics it was
no accident that the helicopter squadron relied on the observation
aircraft more and more as the pattern of operations unfolded.
[Illustration: _Vietnamese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362
helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopter
assault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the Mekong Delta.
(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._]
Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, the Marines of HMM-362 began
experimenting with one of the more imaginative techniques developed in
the early stages of the intensified U.S.-GVN counterinsurgency effort.
Marine air crews had noticed that the enemy often managed to elude the
larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations area in small groups. Even
the smallest breach between ARVN units seemed to allow large numbers
of guerrillas to escape into covered or heavily populated areas where
they became impossible to find. Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel
Clapp devised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature. Their idea was
to have a flight of four Marine helicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN
soldiers circle above the contested area. This so-called “Eagle Flight”
would be on the alert for any Viet Cong attempting to evade the ground
forces. Once the enemy was located, often by the OE-1 observation
aircraft, the helicopters would land the Vietnamese soldiers at a
position where they could block his escape. The Marine commanders felt
that the adoption of such a tactic would increase the effectiveness of
the ARVN’s helicopter assault operations.
After several weeks of planning by HMM-362 and the affected III Corps
commands, the concept was put into practice. The Eagle Flight was first
tested in a large operation on 18 June when HMM-362 helilifted ARVN
troops into 16 different landing zones. Heavy monsoon rains made the
enemy particularly difficult to pin down, but the Marine pilots managed
to sight 10 Viet Cong near the main landing zone. After landing near
the enemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communist soldiers and wounded
one other. Shortly after this incident another Eagle Flight made two
eventful contacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopters landed their
small force and the ARVN promptly killed four Viet Cong and captured
another. Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the helicopters, the
South Vietnamese swept down upon a new prey, this time capturing four
prisoners.
The novel concept was employed successfully again on 10 July. While
HMM-362 aircraft lifted 968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an Eagle
Flight spotted a sampan moving northward from the operations area. The
flight leader landed the troops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the
craft. Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the Eagle Flight clashed
twice with an estimated platoon of Viet Cong. In the first encounter
seven enemy were killed and several weapons were captured. In the
second skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead and lost more weapons. All
four Marine helicopters, however, were hit by small arms fire during
the two brief fights.
By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight had become a proven combat
tactic. By reducing the enemy’s opportunity to escape when the
government forces possessed the advantage on the battlefield, it had
favorably influenced the tactical situation when used in the Mekong
Delta. Equally important, SHUFLY’s commanders had demonstrated their
ability to adapt their technological resources to the Viet Cong’s
methods of operations. Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under
different names such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk, Pacifier, and Quick
Reaction Force, would be used by the Marines throughout the Vietnam war.
The Marines were quick to apply their technological knowhow to other
problems which were to confront them during their early operations in
the III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was their adaptation of the
TAFDS to the problem which arose when the helicopters were called upon
to operate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM-362 helicopters
would airlift a TAFDS unit, complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder,
pumps, and MABS-16 personnel, to the site where the ARVN troops were
to be loaded. The fuel bladders were filled by gasoline trucks which
travelled from the nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopters could
then use the TAFDS as a temporary base of operations, refueling between
troop pick-ups when necessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed the
operating radius of the helicopters to be extended to support even the
most distant South Vietnamese operation.
While the Marines were learning to adapt their technology to the
guerrilla war environment, the enemy was applying his ingenuity in
attempts to frustrate the American and South Vietnamese helicopter
operations. The Viet Cong quickly learned to capitalize on the presence
of large crowds of civilians who sometimes gathered near helicopter
landing zones to watch the strange aircraft. One such incident occurred
in June when Communist soldiers mingled with a crowd and delivered
fire on helicopters which were lifting elements of the 21st ARVN
Division. Two aircraft were hit by enemy fire although the damage was
not extensive enough to force them to land. The Marines, who refused
to return fire with their individual weapons unless the Viet Cong
could be separated from the civilian populace, found no effective
method of countering this tactic. Later in June, the Marines of HMM-362
encountered another tactic when they found that hundreds of upright
bamboo stakes had been prepositioned in the intended landing zone. The
perpendicular spikes, each four or five feet high, not only prevented
the helicopters from landing but also made it impossible to disembark
the ARVN troops while hovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landing
zones in the delta region tended to make this particular tactic
ineffective.[5-E]
[5-E] The German army had used a similar technique (upright
poles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops
at Normandy during World War II. (Taylor, _Swords and
Plowshares_, p. 80.)
On 20 July, HMM-362 added a new dimension to the counterguerrilla
capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces when it executed the first
night helicopter assault of the war. The mission, which began at 0415
at Soc Trang, involved lifting three waves of ARVN troops into an
objective on the Plain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of Ben Tre.
The ARVN force intended to encircle a suspected Viet Cong village
before dawn and then attack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of the
airlift was completed 10 minutes before daylight after which the Army’s
57th Helicopter Company joined the operation. Although the night troop
lift was executed without incident, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp attributed
its success at least partially to the near perfect conditions. The
moonlight, reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies, had aided the
Marine pilots in the tricky operation.[5-19]
Prior to SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang, General Roberts’ staff at
FMFPac had developed a policy for the periodic rotation of the task
unit’s Marines for which the Commandant’s approval had been gained.
The helicopter squadron would be replaced by a similar unit after
approximately four months of operations in the combat zone. But
rather than being drawn from the 1st MAW on Okinawa, the replacement
squadron was to be provided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in
California. Officers and men serving with the supporting headquarters
and MABS-16 elements, however, were to be replaced by Marines from
MAG-16 at approximately four-month intervals. So as not to disrupt the
operational efficiency of the task unit, individual replacements would
be made in increments.
In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM-163, the HUS unit
scheduled to relieve HMM-362, began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July.
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a veteran fighter
pilot of World War II and Korea, the squadron continued to arrive
during the last week of July. Airlifted by GV-1s from the Marine Corps
Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, the new squadron brought neither
helicopters nor maintenance equipment. The squadron commander had
orders to continue operations with HMM-362’s aircraft and equipment.
Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron maintained a steady operational
pace even after the new unit’s appearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM-362’s
helicopters participated in an operation about 30 miles northeast
of Soc Trang. The next day the task unit commander committed 21
helicopters and OE-1s to a 21st ARVN Division operation near Ca Mau.
The Eagle Flight was committed on four different occasions during this
operation.
Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s “Ridge Runners” officially relieved
“Archie’s Angels” on 1 August after a week of orientation flying with
HMM-362’s crews. The men of the departing squadron could reflect
on their tour in South Vietnam with a sense of satisfaction and
accomplishment. Since their arrival in mid-April, they had executed
50 combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties, and had
amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time, all in unarmed aircraft.
During the course of these missions they had made approximately 130
different landings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeen of their
24 helicopters and two of the three OE-1 aircraft had received battle
damage. To the credit of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and
aircrews, HMM-362 had not lost a single aircraft during its operations
in the Republic of Vietnam. Miraculously the squadron had suffered no
casualties while testing the Marine Corps’ vertical envelopment concept
in the guerrilla war situation.[5-20]
During their three and a half months at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel
Clapp’s men had contributed significantly to another facet of the war
effort--one usually considered unrelated to normal combat operations.
Sensing the unique links between the political and military aspects
of the struggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had initiated a
“People-to-People-Program,” the objective of which was to assist the
Government of Vietnam in winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese
people. Within a few days after occupying the Soc Trang airfield,
Colonel Carey had ordered the task unit’s medical facilities made
available to Vietnamese civilians requiring emergency medical
treatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen began visiting nearby
villages to hold “sick call” for the local inhabitants. On an average
visit these medical teams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of all
ages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, and aspirin--commodities
which some rural Vietnamese had never seen. Gradually, the medical
teams expanded their operations until by mid-June they were being flown
by helicopter as far away as Ca Mau.
HMM-362’s departure from Vietnam coincided roughly with the departure
of most of the Marine task unit’s senior officers--the men who had
directed the efforts to win the “other war” for the allegiance of the
Vietnamese people. On 30 July, Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another
Marine aviator who had seen combat in two previous wars, relieved
Colonel Carey as the task unit commander. The new commander was one of
few Marines who had been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 he had
landed at Da Nang (then known by its French name, Tourane) as squadron
commander of Marine Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) and delivered 25
F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French who were in desperate
need of attack aircraft to support Dien Bien Phu. Five days after
Ireland assumed command of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph
R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge as commanding officer of
the MABS-16 sub unit. On 13 August another change occurred when the
executive officer of the Marine task unit, Lieutenant Colonel Harry C.
Dees, was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Except that
it left few original members of the task unit, the departure of these
Marines for new duty stations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States
did not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thoroughly briefed on their
responsibilities, the new officers would continue to direct Marine
support of the Vietnamese government on both the battlefield and the
psychological front.
HMM-163 participated in its first combat mission as a squadron on
1 August when it joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company in a
coordinated troop lift. Like their predecessors, “Rathbun’s Ridge
Runners” maintained a brisk pace of operations during the weeks
following their initial assignment. Shortly after its first troop
lift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-man South Vietnamese
spoiling operation in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province.
Anticipating a major Viet Cong offensive in the four southern
provinces, III Corps authorities moved their headquarters to Soc Trang
and established a forward command post at Ca Mau. The Vietnamese Air
Force then positioned a composite detachment of four AD-6 Skyraiders
(single-engine, propeller-driven attack bombers built by Douglas), two
T-28s, and a number of H-34 helicopters (the U.S. Army, Air Force, and
VNAF version of the HUS) at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined
by the VNAF H-34s, the Marine squadron conducted numerous troop lifts
during the week-long operation. At the end of the action the ARVN
reported 84 Viet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and the confiscation
of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms, ammunition, and explosives. The first
Marine helicopter loss in Vietnam occurred during the operation when
a VNAF fighter careened off the runway and damaged a parked HUS to
the extent that it could not be repaired. Marine mechanics stripped
undamaged parts from the helicopter for use as replacements.[5-F]
[5-F] Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962–1964
period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa
by U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster transports. By
replacing aircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task
unit was able to maintain a level of 24 helicopters
except for brief periods.
HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage as a result of combat a few
day’s later on 18 August during a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel
Rathbun. Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pickup point to
rendezvous with an ARVN infantry force but the Marine pilots discovered
that the unit had not appeared. One crewman then reported having seen
some ARVN troops about a half mile away from the landing zone. At this
juncture, a white smoke signal appeared at approximately the same
location that the Marine had observed the South Vietnamese troops.
Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun and his wingmate, assuming that the smoke
marked the actual pickup point, took off to investigate the area. While
making a low pass over the smoke signal, the squadron commander’s
helicopter was hit several times by small arms fire which severed the
rudder control cable and punctured the main rotor transmission. The
loss of oil required Rathbun to make a forced landing on a nearby road.
After mechanics had been flown in and repairs had been accomplished,
the helicopter was flown to a secure area.
[Illustration: _Marine officers visit Father Phuoc’s village. Left
to right: Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; Colonel John F. Carey;
Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius W. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major
General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter Gilles H. Rocheleau; and
three unidentified Marine officers. (USMC Photo A420824)._]
An investigation of the incident later revealed that the confusion had
begun when the ARVN unit scheduled to be helilifted became involved in
a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile from the pick up point. A
VNAF Forward Air Controller (FAC) in an observation aircraft had then
marked the Viet Cong position for an air strike with a white smoke
grenade rather than red smoke, as was normally used. This was the smoke
which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted to identify when his
aircraft was hit.
From this incident the pilots of HMM-163 learned several valuable
lessons about helicopter support in conjunction with ARVN ground
operations. First, helilifts of government forces from the field at
prearranged times required thorough last minute coordination. Secondly,
helicopters could not be used safely on low-level reconnaissance or
identification passes. Finally, prearranged colored smoke signals were
easily confused and when used routinely were subject to enemy attempts
at deception. Such signalling methods were most effective when used in
conjunction with radio communications between air and ground units.
A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident took place later in the
day when Rathbun learned that he had been selected for promotion to
colonel. The timing of the notification prompted one squadron wit to
quip: “Lost a bird, gained a bird.”[5-21]
“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” continued intensive support operations in
III Corps Tactical Zone throughout the month of August. Their daily
missions normally included both scheduled troop lifts and unscheduled
medical evacuations. During the week of 19–25 August HMM-163
helicopters logged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. A squadron
record for a single day was established on 24 August when 197.6
helicopter hours were flown. Flight time for the helicopters during
the entire month totalled 2,543 hours--a new Marine Corps record for
an HUS squadron. The OE-1 aircraft added 63 missions and 212 hours to
this total. Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron’s pilots
logged over 100 hours of combat flying time during August.[5-22] This
record was even more impressive considering that flight operations were
hampered by the monsoon season which reached its peak during August in
the Mekong Delta.
In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s men made a significant
modification to their helicopters when they began mounting M-60
machine guns inside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct the hatch
during loading and unloading phases, the squadron’s metalsmiths
designed a flexible mount which allowed the crew chiefs to swing the
belt-fed, 7.62mm automatic weapon back into the cabin when necessary.
The addition of the machine gun enabled the crew chief to protect
the otherwise defenseless helicopter during critical landing and
take off phases. Still, the Marine gunners were restricted in their
action by MACV’s “rules of engagement” which at this time stipulated
that American servicemen could fire only after being fired upon and
then only at clearly identified enemy. Intended to prevent offensive
combat action by U.S. military personnel operating in Vietnam, these
regulations prevented Americans from returning fire except when
the enemy was clearly identified.[5-G] Primarily because of these
restrictions the Marines seldom employed their M-60s in the heavily
populated Mekong Delta.
[5-G] The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as
well as aviation crews. Although they underwent several
modifications during the course of the war, the above
definition was virtually unaltered during the period
between 1962 and 1964.
_Preparations and Redeployment_
In early September General Harkins directed that Colonel Ireland begin
planning for the redeployment of his helicopter task unit northward
to Da Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had been the subject of
much debate prior to SHUFLY’s assignment at Soc Trang, came as no
surprise. Shortly after the task unit’s arrival in the Mekong Delta,
Colonel Carey accompanied General Condon on a visit to the Army’s 93d
Helicopter Company at Da Nang. There they discussed details of the
relocation with Army officers. In early July General Harkins set 1
August as the date on which the Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter
Company would switch locations. But personal appeals by General Nghiem,
the III Corps commander and his senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter,
that the Marine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang caused Harkins to
postpone the date for the exchange until 15 September.
In that the airlift was executed in phases, the Marines’ movement to
Da Nang was accomplished in much the same manner as had been the task
unit’s initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 September Colonel Ireland
dispatched the task unit’s assistant communications officer and an
advance party to Da Nang to assess the communications requirements
there and to prepare for the arrival of the remainder of the Marines
and their equipment. Four days later Marine wiremen, message center
personnel, and radio operators began preparing a communications center
at their new home. The next day the advance party established radio
contact with SHUFLY headquarters in order to help coordinate the move.
By 9 September MABS-16 technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the Da Nang
airfield. This facility would enable the GV-1 transports participating
in the airlift to refuel for the 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang
after unloading their cargoes at Da Nang.
While the advance party readied the facilities at Da Nang for its
unit’s arrival, combat support operations and preparations for the move
northward continued simultaneously at Soc Trang. During an operation on
5 September, three of HMM-163’s helicopters were hit by several rounds
of enemy small arms fire. Although all three aircraft returned safely
to base, the Marines suffered their first casualty to Viet Cong fire
when Corporal Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightly wounded.
Troop lifts from Soc Trang continued until 1740 on 13 September when
helicopter support operations were ended and the final preparations for
the move to Da Nang began.
On the evening of 14 September, the first of the Marine GV-1s slated
to transport the task unit arrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn
the next morning, the refueler-transports began shuttling Marines and
their equipment to Da Nang and the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company to Soc
Trang. By the end of the day much of the airlift had been completed.
The crews and helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s squadron,
however, did not begin displacing northward until the 16th when 12 HUSs
made the seven-hour flight to Da Nang with three en route refueling
stops. The 12 remaining helicopters arrived at SHUFLY’s new base of
operations the next day. The move was completed on 20 September when
the last cargo carrying GV-1 landed at Da Nang.
_Accomplishments_
As SHUFLY’s Marines began preparing for their impending operations
in the northern provinces they could look with pride on their
accomplishments at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in the Mekong Delta
in April the Leathernecks had clearly demonstrated their ability to
conduct sustained and effective helicopter operations in support of
non-English-speaking ground forces. While it could not be said that
their presence had completely transformed the complexion of the GVN’s
struggle to control the critical Mekong Delta region, the Marine
helicopters had provided the ARVN units operating there with a degree
of mobility they had not previously possessed. This new-found mobility
in turn had helped generate a new offensive spirit within government
units assigned to southern III Corps. In his letter to ComUSMACV
requesting the retention of the task unit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter,
the Senior U.S. Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: “Now
they [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory and for the first time are
beginning to believe there is a possibility of defeating the Viet
Cong.”[5-23]
During the course of their operations throughout South Vietnam’s
southern provinces, the SHUFLY Marines displayed an instinct for
recognizing and coping with the challenges of unconventional warfare.
Confronted by a war without front lines in which an elusive, highly
mobile enemy blended readily with the local populace, the task unit’s
leaders devised new and successful helicopter tactics. Likewise,
SHUFLY’s Marine and Navy personnel moved to prevent a possible
conflict of cultures and to discredit Communist propaganda through the
initiation of the People-to-People Program. Although only an informal
beginning, this program would serve as a foundation upon which the U.S.
Marine Corps would later build a doctrine defining the relationship
between Marines on duty in Vietnam and the Vietnamese people.
Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders, much of SHUFLY’s success
in III Corps was produced by hard work on a sustained basis. For this
the individual Marines, particularly the maintenance crews which
often worked around the clock in primitive surroundings to keep the
helicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit. Although unglamorous,
their daily contributions underwrote the success of the combat support
operations. So, functioning as a team, the task unit’s members blended
innovation, hard work, and technical expertise with perseverance and
courage to carve out a reputation for themselves in the faraway rice
lands of the Mekong Delta.
CHAPTER 6
SHUFLY Moves North
_Arrival at Da Nang--I Corps Tactical Zone--Military Situation,
September 1962--Initial Helicopter Operations--Marine People-to-People
Program--SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_
_Arrival at Da Nang_
Da Nang retained many characteristics of an old French colonial port
city when the Marines arrived there in mid-September 1962. With its
thriving market place, its throngs of bicycles, and a noticeable dearth
of automobile traffic, the city was certainly more Asian than European
in appearance. Still, the former French presence was evident in the
architecture of public buildings, electric and telephone lines, paved
streets, built-up waterfront, and an airfield. Although the French
influence seemed not to have disturbed the traditional Vietnamese
culture, it had imparted a picturesque charm to South Vietnam’s second
largest city.
Virtually surrounded by the city itself, Da Nang’s airfield was to
serve as SHUFLY’s new base of operations. Having been rebuilt as
a military base by the French following World War II, the Da Nang
facility was relatively modern. Understandably, it differed in many
ways from the crude little airfield the Marines had left behind in the
steamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example, was considerably longer,
having 8,000 feet of paved surface. The Da Nang base was also busier,
having already been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force units.
Furthermore, it served the city as a commercial airport.
Scattered around the long north-south runway were numerous clusters of
French-built masonry structures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walled
buildings, located about one half mile west of the runway, had been
designated as living quarters for the newly arrived Marines. Although
the actual living spaces were somewhat crowded and in need of much
repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceiling fans, and fluorescent
lights (none of which functioned properly) were welcomed by the men
who had experienced the discomforts of life in Soc Trang’s “tent
city.” Once the Marines had moved in, their compound would include a
chapel, medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie, a barber
shop, a laundry, and a mess hall.
While many of the problems encountered initially by the Marines at
Da Nang were similar to those that had greeted their predecessors at
Soc Trang, there were also some new ones to be resolved. The two most
imposing of these stemmed from the distance between the living compound
and working areas. Located along the southeast side of the airstrip,
the flight line and hangar were nearly three miles from the Marine
quarters by road. Located still farther away, about a quarter mile
south of the hangar, were the motor pool and communications facility.
In addition to creating a new requirement for transportation, the
distances between the various areas necessitated adjustments in the
security arrangements which had been used at Soc Trang.
Fortunately SHUFLY’s first commander, Colonel Carey, had foreseen
the requirement for transportation between the living area and the
flight line during his visit to the Da Nang installation in April. The
problem was solved by the purchase of three used American school buses
which were already on hand when the Marines arrived from Soc Trang.
The security situation proved somewhat more perplexing. Initially
Colonel Ireland handled the problem in much the same manner as it had
been at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard was detailed to
supervise a security force composed of men from the MABS-16 sub unit
and HMM-163. Guard posts were established around the helicopter flight
line, the hangar, the TAFDS, the motor pool-communications area, and
the billeting compound. But this arrangement, while serving the
intended purpose, was not ideal. Frequently the Marines who served
on security watch at night were called upon to perform long hours
of work the following day. This prompted Colonel Ireland to request
that a permanent security force be assigned to his command in order
that the overworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, electricians, and
communicators could concentrate on their particular jobs. The request
was placed under consideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPac authorities but
was not approved immediately.[6-A]
[6-A] General Weede explained that, because such increases
could not be made without the approval of the Department
of Defense, such requests were forwarded first to MACV
Headquarters for approval. (_Weede Interview._)
[Illustration: _A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (Official
USMC Photo)._]
At Da Nang Colonel Ireland’s task unit was not responsible for every
facet of airfield operations as had been the case previously at Soc
Trang. The U.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control approach,
tactical air navigation, and meteorological services at the new
installation while the Vietnamese operated the control tower. These
conveniences allowed Ireland to make a small reduction in the overall
size of the Marine task unit. Those MABS-16 specialists who had
operated these systems at Soc Trang were returned to their parent
organizations on Okinawa.
_I Corps Tactical Zone_
At the time the Marine task unit arrived in Da Nang, I Corps Tactical
Zone encompassed South Vietnam’s five northern provinces. Quang Tri
Province, located immediately south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ)
topped this tier of political subdivisions. Below Quang Tri Province
lay Thua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin (recently created),
and Quang Ngai Provinces. All are coastal provinces and, with the
exception of Quang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast to the Laotian
border, a distance which varies between 30 and 70 miles. Together, they
occupy the central portion of the region formerly known as Annam and
extend 225 miles to the south of the DMZ.
[Illustration:
I CORPS 1962
]
The climatic pattern in the northern provinces is the exact reverse
of that which affects the southern portion of the nation. In I Corps
the dry season occurs in the summer months while the monsoons, which
blow from the northeast, dominate the winter. Heavy monsoon rains
accompanied by wind and fog normally begin in October. After reaching
their peak usually in November, the monsoon rains tend to diminish
gradually until their disappearance around mid-March.
The differences between the physical structure of the northern
provinces and the Mekong Delta is even more striking than their
reversed climatic patterns. White beaches stretch almost unbroken along
the entire length of I Corps. Just inland and roughly parallel to the
coast south of Da Nang lies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes and
generally unproductive soil. This strip varies in width from one half
to two miles. In the west it dissolves into the flat, densely populated
coastal plain. Any similarity between the Mekong Delta and the northern
provinces is found in this expanse of fertile rice-producing land where
tiny rural hamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosed by thick
hedgerows and treelines, abound. North of Da Nang the semi-barren
coastal sands tend to extend farther inland, and thereby reduce the
productive portion of the coastal plains.
The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps, and one easily visible
to the Marines at Da Nang, is the chain of towering mountains which
protrude from the flat coastal plain several miles west of the city.
There is a conspicuous absence of foothills leading to the mountains
which seem to surround Da Nang on the north and west. North of the Hai
Van Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which juts into the South China
Sea about 10 miles north of the Marines’ new home, a zone of foothills
eases the transition from the wide coastal plain to the rugged
jungle-covered mountains.
The coastal plains of the five northern provinces are broken by several
significant streams along which most of the region’s principal
population centers are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the 1954
partition line the Cua Viet empties into the southern portion of the
Tonkin Gulf. Both Quang Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri Province,
and Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost population center of any
significance, are situated on the Cua Viet and its major tributary, the
Song Cam Lo. The Song Huong (often referred to as the Perfume River),
which flows past the old imperial capital of Hue, enters the sea at a
point approximately half way between Da Nang and the nation’s northern
boundary.[6-B] At Da Nang the Song Han (also called the Da Nang River)
flows into Da Nang Harbor after its main tributary, the Song Cau Do,
curves through the coastal plains immediately south and west of the
city. Eighteen miles south of the Marines’ new base of operations,
the Song Cau Dai empties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, the
capital of Quang Nam Province. The Song Cau Dai originates about 18
miles inland at the confluence of the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia
which twist seaward from the south and west respectively. Together
these three estuaries constitute the most important geographic feature
of the sprawling coastal plain south of Da Nang. Another major stream,
the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastward course about 32 miles south of
the Song Cau Dai. Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a river
which dominates the wide coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province in much
the same fashion as does the Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the
area south of Da Nang. The provincial capital, Quang Ngai, once a major
railroad center for South Vietnam, is situated several miles inland on
the south bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southernmost stream of any
significance in I Corps is the Song Ve, which angles northeastward
through central Quang Ngai Province. While none of these waterways is
navigable far beyond its mouth by ocean-going vessels, each serves the
local population as convenient local routes of communication as well as
vital sources of irrigation water during the long dry seasons.
[6-B] In the Vietnamese language the word “song” means stream
and normally precedes the name of rivers.
The two and a half million people who inhabited I Corps in 1962 had
developed along social and economic lines dictated largely by the
geography and climate of their region. Rice growing, centered on
the coastal plains, dominated the economic activities of the area.
Combined, the provinces of I Corps produced nearly half a million
tons of rice annually. Fishing, concentrated along the coast and the
major rivers, ranked as the second most important economic pursuit.
Unlike most of South Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potential for
industrial development. A small but productive surface coal mine was
located about 25 miles southwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along the
western bank of the Song Thu Bon. Although the mine was operating in
1962, it had made little discernable impact on the overall economic
picture of the region.
[Illustration: _Aerial view of Marine helicopter flight line at Da
Nang shortly after SHUFLY’s relocation to I Corps in September 1962.
(Official USMC Photo)._]
_Military Situation, September 1962_
From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland’s task unit was
responsible for directly supporting the forces under Major General
Tran Van Don’s I Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions,
headquartered respectively at Hue and Da Nang, were the major tactical
units at General Don’s disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25th ARVN
Division, headquartered at Kontum in northwestern II Corps, joined I
Corps forces for offensive operations along the southern fringe of
Quang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Ranger battalions served as mobile
reaction forces for the corps tactical zone.[6-C] Also scattered over
the northern corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitary units of
assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisoned primarily along the heavily
populated coastal plain.
[6-C] The ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960
from existing ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly
mobile infantry units and were under the direct control
of the CTZ commander.
Opposing these government forces in the early fall of 1962 were Viet
Cong forces of formidable strength. Four interprovincial battalions
(main force), four interprovincial companies, five provincial
companies, 18 district companies, and three district platoons were
known to be operating within the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these
units totalled an estimated 4,750 men.[6-1] Added to the presence
of these known Viet Cong units was the threat posed to I Corps by
its proximity to North Vietnam and to the so-called “Ho Chi Minh
Trails” located across the Laotian border. The relative position of
the northern provinces naturally invited Communist infiltration. In
June, for example, the _4th Viet Cong Battalion_, a main force unit,
was infiltrated into Quang Nam Province from sanctuaries in Laos. By
September MACV intelligence estimates reported one North Vietnamese
(PAVN) infantry division, two independent PAVN infantry regiments, and
an artillery regiment poised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corps
border. “These units,” the U.S. report warned, “... could be committed
anywhere in I Corps or [the] northern part of II Corps 20 days after
starting movement.”[6-2]
While the government’s nationwide strategy focused on clearing and
holding the populated areas, the physiographic configuration of I
Corps (as well as II Corps to the south) demanded that offensive
operations be conducted in the mountains adjacent to the coastal plains
against Viet Cong base areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Army
helicopter company at Da Nang early in the year, General Don had shown
an increasing tendency to mount battalion and regimental heliborne
assaults deep into the western mountains. Capitalizing on the mobility
which the American helicopters afforded, the ARVN command had hoped to
disrupt remote Communist base areas inside the international border.
Still, heliborne offensives into western I Corps were often hampered by
bad weather, particularly during the monsoon season.
Another facet of the government effort to deny the enemy unrestricted
access to the mountains was a system characterized by a network of
small, relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at the urging
of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem government had launched a
program whose ultimate objective was similar to that of the Strategic
Hamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces teams entered
remote Montagnard villages located in the Annamite Chain and built
small fortified camps. This accomplished, the Americans initiated
pacification activities with the hope of securing the allegiance of the
traditionally independent Montagnard tribesmen.
By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appeared on its way to success.
Already Montagnard tribesmen had been organized into a number of
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout the mountains of
I and II Corps. Advised by Special Forces teams, the CIDG units were
monitoring infiltration routes and harassing the Communists as they
attempted to move through the mountains. By the summer of 1962 the
distinctive little barbed wire enclosed camps were scattered over the
length of western I Corps.
Although it played an important role in the government’s strategy for
controlling the insurgency in the northern provinces, the outpost
system had obvious shortcomings. Roads between the distant camps and
the towns along the coastal plain were almost nonexistent. Those that
did exist, such as Route 9, the road which extended from Route 1
westward across Quang Tri Province and into Laos, were vulnerable to
ambush or interdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys, furthermore,
consumed time and required protection by security forces. As a result
of their relative isolation, the CIDG camps had come to depend heavily
on aircraft as a means of resupply. While crude runways had been
constructed at many of the outposts, they were often better suited for
helicopter operations than for fixed-wing transport landings. The newly
arrived Marine commanders anticipated that their squadron, like the
Army helicopter company it had replaced, would be required to devote a
sizable percentage of sorties to resupplying the far-flung outposts.
_Initial Helicopter Operations_
The system of helicopter coordination in I Corps promised to be
somewhat different from that which had governed Marine operations in
the Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)
was organized within the corps headquarters to process all requests
for aviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S. Air Force, and U.S.
Marine officers, the ASOC processed mission requests from the various
field commands, passing them on to the Joint Operations Center at JGS
headquarters for final approval. Once approved, the ASOC assigned
specific missions to the American and Vietnamese units which supported
I CTZ. This arrangement enabled the corps headquarters to plan and
coordinate all combat support missions flown within the five northern
provinces.
[Illustration:
MAJOR OUTPOSTS I CORPS 1962
]
The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, who had learned to value
helicopter support as a result of the Army aviation company’s
eight-month presence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing the newly
arrived Marine squadron. HMM-163 flew its first combat operation from
Da Nang on 18 September, the day after the last flight of helicopters
arrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs lifted troops of the 2d ARVN
Division into two landing zones in the rugged hills about 35 miles
south of Da Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. The scarcity of
suitable landing zones in the steep hill country and the fact that
the enemy could deliver fire on those that did exist from nearby
high ground and the surrounding jungle prompted the Marine pilots
to adjust their tactics in preparation for this mission. After VNAF
fighters bombed and strafed the objective area, the helicopters made an
unopposed landing.
The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zones with air strikes
was continued and refined in the ensuing weeks. The Marines began
using artillery fire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralize
enemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. The OE-1 was well
suited for assisting in the employment of the artillery fire support.
Having familiarized themselves with the landing site during a prior
reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observer of the OE-1 would arrive
over the designated area prior to the operation and adjust artillery
fire until the helicopters appeared. During the landing the crew of the
observation aircraft often coordinated between the helicopters and the
escorting aircraft and were available to assist the ground units with
artillery fire missions.
The task unit’s staff borrowed another idea from their experience
in the Mekong Delta which allowed HMM-163 to provide more efficient
helicopter support in the northern provinces. In this case the concept
of temporarily positioning the TAFDS to support specific operations
was refined somewhat by placing the portable refueling bladders at
secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps. Several days after
arriving in I Corps, the Marines emplaced a 10,000-gallon section of
the TAFDS at Quang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, to serve as a
permanent refueling point for aircraft operating in southern I Corps.
Within the month, another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and a
third was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, which
was situated on Route 1 about half way between Da Nang and Quang Ngai.
These well-chosen refueling points greatly enhanced the squadron’s
operational potential. Used to support daily operations, they enabled
the helicopters to operate deep into the adjacent mountain areas on
resupply and medical evacuation missions.
On 19 September, the day after their initial combat support assignment
in I Corps, the Marine helicopter crews were called upon to conduct an
operation which they would repeat often in the coming months. They were
ordered to evacuate a threatened government outpost from the mountains
18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM-163 pilots lifted an odd
cargo of troops, dependents, personal belongings and an assortment of
pigs, cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on the coastal plain.
Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of encircled or endangered South
Vietnamese outposts would become almost routine for Marine helicopter
squadrons assigned to Vietnam during the period between 1962 and 1965.
As the North Vietnamese stepped up their support for the Viet Cong,
the isolated government outposts along the infiltration routes became
particularly vulnerable. The increased number of helicopter evacuation
missions during the next three years would be grim testimony of the
trend of warfare which was unfolding in the South. Reinforced with more
and more North Vietnamese and growing amounts of Communist bloc and
captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Cong would press the initiative even
in South Vietnam’s most isolated areas.
The Communists operating in I Corps lost little time in challenging the
newly arrived Marine unit. HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage
while lifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into a landing zone
southwest of Tam Ky on 26 September. One of 22 helicopters involved
in the mission was struck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite
the use of preparatory air and artillery strikes on the landing zone.
The day after this incident another of the squadron’s helicopters was
hit by enemy fire while attempting to evacuate wounded ARVN soldiers
from the battlefield. On the 29th two more aircraft were damaged by
ground fire while participating in another troop lift. One round passed
through the windshield and exited at the rear of the cockpit, missing
the copilot’s head by inches. During the first week of October another
HUS was struck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a government outpost about
15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. In this incident two ARVN troops were
killed and the Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I. Mansfield,
was wounded before the pilot could fly the aircraft out of the danger
area. In each of the instances the helicopters were able to return to
Da Nang where necessary repairs were made.
The most serious incident recorded during the early operations in I
Corps ironically resulted from mechanical failure rather than Viet Cong
fire. It occurred on 6 October when a search and rescue helicopter
crashed and burned on a hillside 15 miles southeast of Tam Ky while
covering a 20-plane helilift of 2d ARVN Division elements.[6-D] Unable
to land near the downed aircraft because of the thick jungle, other
helicopters landed troops at the base of the hill with instructions to
proceed to the crash site on foot. When the Vietnamese soldiers reached
the downed aircraft after cutting their way through dense vegetation,
they found the copilot, crew chief, and five other members of the task
unit dead. The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott, who was
injured seriously, was hoisted through the trees and evacuated by an
HUS which came to the rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash
were First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant Richard E. Hamilton,
Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell, Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance
Corporal Miguel A. Valentin. Two Navy personnel, Lieutenant Gerald
Griffin, a doctor, and Hospitalman G. O. Norton were also dead. These
were the first deaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 since deploying
to Vietnam.[6-3]
[6-D] For larger operations the task unit commander usually
designated one HUS as a search and rescue aircraft. This
helicopter normally carried several mechanics and Navy
medical personnel and was equipped with a hoist.
An administrative measure which eventually resulted in the extension of
the length of tours for the Marine helicopter squadron as well as all
other personnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in the first week of
October. Colonel Ireland dispatched a recommendation to the Commanding
General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that the tours for both
the squadron and the individual Marines serving with the sub unit and
the task unit headquarters be set at six months. Pointing out that the
U.S. Army helicopter company which had occupied Da Nang previously had
operated from January to September without rotating personnel, the task
unit commander outlined the positive features of such an adjustment.
It would, he contended, provide more continuity for administration
and operations, thereby resulting in a more effective utilization of
manpower. To underscore his argument, Ireland emphasized the number of
man hours involved in the rotation of a helicopter squadron. Adding his
opinion that the two-month extension of all tours would not measurably
affect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, he recommended that the
next rotation of helicopter squadrons be postponed until January.
After being forwarded to FMFPac for consideration, Colonel Ireland’s
proposals were approved later in the fall and instructions were passed
to all involved commands to implement the new policy.[6-4]
Another adjustment--this one in the area of tactics--had been made
during the task unit’s first two months at Da Nang. By November
the Eagle Flight concept had been tailored to complement reaction
force plans which already existed in I Corps at the time of SHUFLY’s
relocation. ARVN authorities in the northern corps tactical zone had
developed a system whereby their various infantry units were placed on
alert for use as heliborne reaction forces. Designated the Tiger Force,
the alert unit was staged at its base, ready to react to any tactical
emergency.
HMM-163 Marines executed one of their earliest Tiger Flights on 7
November in response to a train ambush sprung by the Viet Cong several
miles northwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marine helicopters
launched from Da Nang, made an airborne rendezvous with two other
HUSs, and proceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick up a 52-man
ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines then helilifted the South Vietnamese
into a suitable landing zone near the ambush site. The relatively
short amount of time consumed in the reaction did not prevent the
Communist attackers from vanishing into the surrounding jungle.
Generally, however, the tactic was more successful, particularly when
the reaction force was used to reinforce a threatened static position
or to establish hasty blocking positions in support of ground offensive
operations that were already underway.
While the task unit encountered few major problems during the early
operations from Da Nang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Most
often these developed during the execution phase of combat support
missions. One that particularly concerned the Marine commanders was
the tendency of South Vietnamese units not to prepare properly for
scheduled helilifts. To the dismay of the Leatherneck helicopter crews,
ARVN activities at the pickup points were usually characterized by
confusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unit scheduled to be
helilifted had not been organized into heliteams prior to the arrival
of the transport aircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operations
were still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVN small unit leaders (and
to many U.S. advisors) at this stage of the war, these circumstances
were perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of prior preparation
at pickup points on the part of the ground units often threatened to
disrupt the timing of preplanned operations.
To help remedy this situation and to insure that their helicopters
were not overloaded, the U.S. Marines began designating one of the
squadron’s noncommissioned officers as “loadmaster.” Equipped with
a radio, the loadmaster would arrive at the assembly area on board
the first helicopter, whereupon he would disembark and supervise the
entire loading process. This technique was particularly valuable during
operations in which ARVN units were being helilifted from the field.
In such cases the loadmaster performed the same function as did those
who supervised the loading process at secure assembly areas. This, of
course, required that the Leatherneck remain in the landing zone until
the last Vietnamese troops had boarded the final helicopter. Although
dangerous, this technique enabled the Marines to eliminate many
problems which might otherwise have occurred.
By early November the monsoon season had begun to settle over the
northern portions of South Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the
Mekong Delta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s crews had managed to
set new helicopter flight records, the winter monsoons that struck the
northern provinces seriously restricted flight operations. Heavy fog
and low clouds frequently made it impossible to conduct air operations
in the mountainous areas; therefore, the squadron was forced to
concentrate most of its operations in the coastal plains. In an effort
to maintain his support at a maximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun
began dispatching an OE-1 to the objective area prior to scheduled
missions in order to obtain a current report on the local weather
conditions. Despite these efforts, the monsoon rains, which often moved
in quickly from the South China Sea, still disrupted flight operations.
A typical weather-related incident occurred on 13 November when a
scheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavy fog after 200
Vietnamese Special Forces troops had loaded onto 20 Marine helicopters
for an early morning operation.
Several unrelated changes in official designations occurred at
approximately the same time that the monsoons began affecting
operations in the northern provinces. In November all Marine aircraft
were redesignated in accordance with a Department of Defense order
which standardized aircraft designations throughout the U.S. armed
services. Thereafter, SHUFLY’s HUS helicopters would be known as
UH-34Ds, its OE-1s as O-1Bs, and its R4D as a C-117. In another
adjustment, the Joint General Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment
of South Vietnam’s tactical zones. A fourth corps tactical zone (IV
CTZ), which encompassed the entire Mekong Delta, and a Capital Military
District, which included Saigon and its environs, were created. The
composition of I Corps was affected by the adjustments as the new
alignment shifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. The Marines,
however, continued to provide helicopter support to the province, which
was relatively isolated from the remainder of II Corps.
More important than either the new aircraft designations or the
realignment of the tactical zones were several internal changes within
the Marine task unit. On 6 November the task unit was redesignated
Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton
W. McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel Ireland’s executive
officer, assumed command of the task element. Ireland returned to
Okinawa where he took command of Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, under
the new arrangement, became responsible for both the administrative and
logistical support of SHUFLY.
_Marine People-to-People Program_
The concept of the People-to-People Program, which had been initiated
with a degree of success in the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang
by Colonel Ireland and his Marines. During the fall and early winter
of 1962, as weather caused flight operations to subside, the Marines
were able to increase the tempo of the program. SHUFLY’s men actively
supported an orphanage in Da Nang which was maintained by an American
missionary family. On Christmas day the Marines participated in a
“Father-For-A-Day” program which had been arranged by the task element
chaplain, Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Each orphan spent
the day with a Marine who had volunteered to serve as his “father.”
The Vietnamese children were treated to dinner in the mess hall,
presented with Christmas gifts, and then joined in singing carols with
the Marines. At the conclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinson
presented the director of the orphanage with a gift in Vietnamese
currency equivalent to over 800 dollars--money which the men of the
task element had donated.
In addition to their activities associated with the orphanage, the
Marine officers taught English to a number of Vietnamese civilians.
Held three nights weekly, the classes were received enthusiastically.
Beyond the foundations of good will which it helped shape, the
People-to-People Program enabled the Marines to acquire a better
understanding of the Vietnamese people, their culture, and their
problems.
_SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_
SHUFLY’s initial helicopter support operations in I Corps represented
the beginnings of what would become a long association of U.S. Marines
with South Vietnam’s rugged northern provinces. Essentially these early
operations were characterized by continuity and adjustment. Since their
arrival at Da Nang in September the Marines had extended the standard
of consistent and effective combat support operations set earlier in
the flat Mekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY’s commanders had modified
the previously developed tactics and techniques to fit the mountainous
terrain and the nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. For the most
part these adjustments had proven successful by allowing the Marines to
continue the pace of helicopter support with a reduction of the risks
involved. That SHUFLY had suffered its first fatalities during these
initial months in I Corps dampened but did not detract from its overall
achievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines had begun establishing a
reputation in the northern provinces as courageous, professional
fighting men and generous allies. It was this reputation upon which a
generation of Marines would build in the ensuing decade.
CHAPTER 7
The Laotian Crisis, 1962
_Genesis of the Problem--The American Response--The Marine Corps
Role--Marine Participation: A Summary_
_Genesis of the Problem_
Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang in April
1962, U.S. Marine combat forces were ordered to Thailand in response
to the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most part by peaceful
hill tribes, the small, landlocked Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely
setting for any significant military confrontation. Even more
improbable was the possibility that a serious international crisis
could stem from what had begun as a political rivalry among relatively
obscure princes.
To be certain, the context of what should have been a rather
meaningless political feud had been altered substantively by North
Vietnam’s drive to extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam.
Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for their southward
thrust, the North Vietnamese, joined by the Soviet Union, had
begun providing military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist
prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To counter these Communist
activities, the United States had extended military assistance to
the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. In the resultant
struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who previously had proclaimed
neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and the
contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, the conflict naturally
escalated. Laos, like South Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.
Administered through a small USMAAG, the American military assistance
to Boun Oum, however, did little to slow the advances of the Pathet
Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with North Vietnamese
units to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long,
southward extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed by North
Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had opened an offensive on the Plain
of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General Phoumi
Nosavan, proved unable to contain this push into central Laos.
By March 1961 the situation had become critical enough for President
Kennedy to direct that CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible
deployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated a task force
headquarters and assigned Major General Donald M. Weller, who was then
serving as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its commander.
Designated Joint Task Force 116 in accordance with existing CinCPac
contingency plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly of
Marine air and ground forces with Army and Air Force units making up
the balance. Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s headquarters
on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the scattered forces earmarked for
assignment to the joint task force.
Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed to defuse the situation
somewhat by securing Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in
Laos. The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, including the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene
the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Kingdom of
Laos. This conference convened on 16 May 1961, and together with
the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With
international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. forces in the Pacific
ended. Subsequently, General Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was
deactivated.
[Illustration:
MAINLAND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
]
The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long and tedious. In Laos,
frequent fighting, usually of a localized nature, punctuated the
cease-fire almost from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first
weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this time on a general
scale, and precipitated a new and more intense crisis. For U.S.
observers the situation seemed to reach its critical point in early May
when Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese formations, routed
a major element of Phouma’s army from Nam Tha, a town located east of
the Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos. Following this action,
Phoumi’s forces retreated southwestward across the Mekong into northern
Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of the Mekong, the
Communists appeared poised for a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged
member of SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces, moreover,
seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining position at the ongoing Geneva
talks.
_The American Response_
In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai border, the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CinCPac to upgrade the readiness
of Joint Task Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on 10
May Admiral Felt directed Major General John Condon, the Commanding
General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, to activate the joint task force
headquarters, assemble its staff, and refine its deployment plans.
The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh Fleet, carrying the Special
Landing Force, promptly sailed into the Gulf of Siam.
Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment to its defense and
to discourage further Communist advances on the Southeast Asian
Peninsula, President Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand
on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately to execute this decision.
In simultaneous actions CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General
John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S.
Army, Pacific, to replace Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116
and instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59,
Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions to the new Commander, JTF 116 were
explicit. General Richardson’s command was to act in such a way that
would leave no doubt as to American intentions to defend Thailand.
Through these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary
impact” on the situation in Laos. Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116
was directed to position his forces in a manner so that they could
respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand.[7-1]
Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116, CinCPac instructed the
Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins,
to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Thailand (USMACThai). Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV and
ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to CinCPac for all U.S. military
activities and operations in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once it
became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus the already existing Joint
U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to
come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai and the JTF staffs could
become operational, however, the various task force components were to
report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major General J. F. Conway, U.S.
Army.
One element of the joint task force was already in Thailand when
President Kennedy issued the order to commit U.S. forces--the Army’s
1st Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry brigade was
participating in a SEATO exercise near Korat, a town located about 130
miles northeast of Bangkok in the central portion of the country. In
response to CinCPac orders it promptly moved into bivouac at a position
40 miles west of Korat.
_The Marine Corps Role_
Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called for a U.S. Marine
expeditionary brigade composed of a regimental landing team (three
reinforced infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a helicopter
transport squadron, and supporting units, to operate from Udorn, a
provincial capital located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok.
Strategically situated only 35 miles south of Vientiane, the political
capital of Laos, Udorn was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A
300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine Air Base Squadron 16, had
actually been positioned at this airstrip for over six months during
1961. While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided maintenance
support for helicopters which were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in
Laos. A Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the base during
this unit’s deployment and was still in the area in 1962 when the
decision was made to commit JTF 116 to Thailand.
[Illustration: _Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (USMC Photo A182977)._]
Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332, an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet
attack squadron, claimed the distinction of being the first Marine
unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962 Laotian crisis. The
20 single-placed Skyhawks departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station
in the Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were refueled in flight
by aircraft from VMA-211, another Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at
Udorn around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began arriving in
Thailand the following day. At Bangkok the Special Landing Force,
composed of Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man Battalion
Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an
HUS-1 helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships of the Amphibious
Ready Group.[7-A] That same day Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began
airlifting additional aviation support detachments from Okinawa to
Udorn. These included detachments of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2
and 4 (MACS-2 and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12), and a
Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) headquarters. Upon landing
Colonel Ross S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG, established his
headquarters at the airfield and assumed operational control of all
USMC aviation elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s helicopters
began arriving at the now busy airfield, having flown from the
Amphibious Ready Group with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant
Colonel Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.
[7-A] A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation
from the infantry battalion around which it is built,
in this case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962,
the BLT included a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an
amphibious tractor platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor
transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and
naval gunfire liaison teams.
Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another BLT
and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the
Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force.
On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson arrived at Udorn with
the staff and communications personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who had been serving
as Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, had assembled
and activated this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after CinCPac’s
activation of JTF 116. As Commanding General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to
assume command of all Marine elements, air and ground, deployed to
Udorn. In addition to being the CG 3d MEB, General Simpson carried
the designation, Naval Component Commander, a title which gave him
responsibility for all Navy as well as Marine forces operating at Udorn
under JTF 116.
Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S. Air Force C-130 and
C-123 transports were ferrying Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion
Landing Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed its supplies
and trucks, along with HMM-261’s heavier equipment, on rail cars
for transport to Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small
to accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered his tank and
amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark on board the USS _Point
Defiance_ (LSD-31). Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its
remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the airstrip. From there
the Leathernecks were transported by Thai Army trucks some eight miles
south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride the main service
road. Adams’ battalion established a temporary camp on some high ground
just beyond the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial Marine combat
forces assigned to JTF 116 were in position. The next day, 20 May,
General Simpson assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy units at
Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground team, was in being.
Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up was continuing apace.
A squadron of 20 U.S. Air Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter
bombers and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had deployed to
Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Two USAF
transport squadrons had also begun operations from this base. At
Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was being reinforced with Army
units from Hawaii. Another Army unit, a logistics support command, was
being activated near Bangkok.
To command this growing assortment of military units, General
Richardson established the JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major
General Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy Commanding
General, FMFPac, since leaving the 3d Marine Division in 1961, joined
Richardson’s headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s offices
were located at Korat initially. Later he relocated at Bangkok where he
headed a rear echelon responsible for coordination with the JUSMAAG,
ComUSMACThai, and the American representatives to SEATO. While in the
capital Weller was also responsible for implementing a logistic plan,
the objective of which was to upgrade lines of communication being used
by JTF-116 elements.
It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who had been the first
U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was serving at
this time as the senior U.S. military representative on the SEATO
planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller, who had commanded JTF 116 for
a period during early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its chief
of staff during that interval, were intimately familiar with the
JTF’s structure, capabilities, and functions. In fact, the operations
plan being executed had been developed in large part under their
guidance.[7-2]
[Illustration: _Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok,
Thailand. (USMC Photo A182785)._]
Another facet of this particular situation was that portions of
Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II, (Laos) were to exert a profound
influence on later U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
A key provision of this particular document outlined the command
relationships which would govern Marine and Air Force tactical air
support in the event JTF 116 actually became involved in combat.
This provision designated the Commander JTF 116 as the “coordinating
authority” responsible for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support.
But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB, operational control
of all Marine tactical aircraft, thereby insuring that the Marine
air-ground team would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s when
American tactical jet squadrons would be called upon to support U.S.
and RVNAF ground forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would
borrow heavily from this arrangement to define the relationships of
Marine and Air Force tactical aviation assets.
[Illustration: _Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff, Joint
Task Force-116. (USMC Photo A407463)._]
Training began almost immediately after the Marine units were in
position at Udorn and Nong Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a
training program designed to help fulfill three requirements: to
make its presence known and thereby enhance its credibility as a
“show of force”; to acclimatize the individual Marines to the hot,
humid, tropical climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational
elements and their commanders with the surrounding terrain. The primary
objective of this program, of course, was to prepare the brigade for
combat should that contingency arise out of the troubled situation
in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises conducted around Udorn
enabled General Simpson’s command to publicize its presence in the
area while concurrently refining its heliborne and close air support
capabilities.[7-B] In addition to air-ground exercises, Lieutenant
Colonel Adams’ infantry companies sharpened their skills in patrolling
of all types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army firing ranges to
maintain their weapons proficiency. All field training was conducted in
an unpopulated area defined by the Thai government and every precaution
was taken so as not to disturb the local population. The Marine units
utilized blank ammunition exclusively in training except for the
closely supervised live fire exercises.
[7-B] The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in
the composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been
no provision made to include light observation aircraft
in its organization. As a result, aerial reconnaissance
had to be accomplished from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s,
neither of which was configured for such a mission. The
A-4C, which could carry only the pilot, and the HUS-1
proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions.
The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future
composite aviation packages of this nature should include
a detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial
observers.
[Illustration: _Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier
General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand. (USMC Photo
A182779)._]
Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of the American
commitment in Thailand might hinge on the relationships U.S. military
men established with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered his
command to initiate a civic action program. The day after his arrival
at Udorn, Simpson met with local civilian officials and established the
basis for a people-to-people program similar to the one instituted by
SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang. Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area
was to foster among the Thai a favorable impression of the individual
Marine, his commanders, and his unit. The people-to-people program
which followed was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated
effort. Officers taught conversational English classes to interested
civilians both at Udorn and at Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck
engineers and Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May) helped
repair public buildings. Navy medical and dental personnel attached
to Colonel Mickey’s ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT joined
the effort by administering almost daily to the physical ailments of
the local populace and occasionally visiting the more remote villages
by helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent friction between
Marines and Thai townspeople, General Simpson directed that MEB units
disembark from trucks as they approached towns, march through the
population centers at sling arms, and re-embark aboard their trucks at
the opposite end of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple but
effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to impress upon the civilian
population that its mission was one of assistance and good will rather
than occupation.
This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the U.S. joint task force
established its presence in northeastern Thailand, and Communist
forces halted their advance short of the international border. With
these two developments there was no requirement for additional Marine
infantry battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated his
force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU), even though other
reinforcements continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and most
of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man Seabee detachment from Navy
Mobile Construction Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position. This
detachment, the initial increment of a larger Logistics Support Group
(LSG), moved to Nong Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon
complete a more permanent camp designed to withstand the approaching
monsoon season. In mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment in
sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG deployed from Okinawa to Udorn.
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this group included a
motor transport detachment, a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an
engineer detachment.[7-C] These reinforcements brought the number of
Marines, Seabees, and Navy medical and dental personnel under General
Simpson’s command to its highest level--3,426 officers and men. A final
change in the composition of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of
June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Reinhardt Leu, replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element.
[7-C] Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant
Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.
While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening its posture in
northeastern Thailand, U.S. officials were reporting definite progress
in the negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane. Encouraged by
these signs and hoping to influence the Geneva talks even further,
President Kennedy ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces
withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four days after HMM-162’s
arrival at Udorn. In response General Richardson directed General
Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal of the ProvMAG and one
infantry company. Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s
Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the Philippines. Subsequently,
HMM-162’s helicopters departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked on
board the USS _Valley Forge_. Okinawa-based GV-1s airlifted one of BLT
3/9’s companies to the Philippines while elements of the Marine air
control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok for embarkation on board
ships of the Seventh Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had been
reduced by just over 1,000 men.
At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked by steady progress
toward a diplomatic solution to the long-standing Laotian problem.
By the 20th it was evident that a formal agreement would soon be
forthcoming. With these encouraging developments, General Richardson
was directed to prepare for the withdrawal of the remainder of his
forces from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political factions had
already agreed to participate in a coalition government headed by
Prince Souvanna Phouma which would serve as the basis for a neutral
state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United States, the Soviet Union,
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada,
India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the Kingdom of Laos, and
Cambodia finally signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an
attached protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to recognize
and respect the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of the
Kingdom of Laos. Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops were
prohibited from entering or operating within the borders of Laos. Had
it been adhered to, this provision would have denied North Vietnam the
use of the corridor down the length of eastern Laos, altering the scope
and nature of the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam.
[Illustration: _Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to
the Philippines. (USMC Photo A182883)._]
Following the signing of this declaration in Geneva, CinCPac directed
General Richardson to effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his
joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began executing these
instructions on the 28th when Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began
airlifting Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to Okinawa. By the 31st no
Marine combat units were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff
departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly thereafter the 3d
Marine Expeditionary Unit was deactivated.
_Marine Participation: A Summary_
The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end of the first deployment
of a Marine air-ground combat team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since
the decision to commit American forces to Thailand in mid-May, the
Marine units assigned to General Simpson had demonstrated anew the
value of their service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign
policy on short notice. Within the period of a few days, the various
FMFPac commands had assembled a complete air-ground-support team, and,
assisted by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected units to a
position over 1,800 miles from the nearest major Marine base. Located
far inland from the seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d
MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining its combat
readiness in a difficult tropical environment.
In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial American combat
force could be brought to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen
by the Communists as targets for their so-called “wars of national
liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU by relying on a vigorous civic action
program, had established that a sizable Marine command could maintain
its combat readiness almost indefinitely without eroding the respect of
the indigenous population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had created
a solid foundation of mutual respect and confidence with the Thai
people. This accomplishment alone would prove valuable when American
military forces would be required to return to northern Thailand later
in the decade. Against the backdrop of these accomplishments, the 3d
Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in Thailand could be assessed as
having extended the tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective
instrument of American diplomacy.
PART III
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES,
1963
CHAPTER 8
The Marine Advisory Effort
_The Political Climate--The Advisory Division and VNMC
Operations--Accomplishments_
_The Political Climate_
A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s internal political
situation during 1963 which largely determined the course of the
war as well as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising of
1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced a three-year period of
relative political tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political
dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential segments of
South Vietnamese society. The results of the August 1959 national
elections, in which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in the
National Assembly, served to stimulate political opposition which
had lain dormant for nearly four years. Opposition to the government
mounted steadily in the months following the elections within military
as well as political circles as some South Vietnamese officers began
privately expressing disenchantment with Diem’s management of the war.
Then came the abortive coup in November 1960. The regime’s popularity
diminished in the wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control on
the war-torn nation.
Another problem--religious unrest--which was to play a key role in
determining South Vietnam’s political direction as the decade unfolded,
also emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders throughout South
Vietnam began protesting against various policies enacted by the
Catholic-controlled government. The tensions gradually mounted, and
by early 1963 the protests were highlighted by spectacular and highly
publicized self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in May, the
religious problem erupted into violence when the Vietnamese police and
military forces killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing a
religious demonstration at Hue. This action triggered a protracted
crisis of public confidence in the Diem government which deepened as
the summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s
closest political advisor, ordered the national police to raid key
Buddhist pagodas throughout the nation. Following the raids, which
uncovered some weapons, Nhu attempted to blame the attacks on several
key South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the responsibility
for the police raids served only to alienate some of the nation’s most
powerful military leaders.
On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese generals led by Major
General Duong Van Minh reacted to the deepening political crisis by
deposing President Diem and seizing control of the Government of
Vietnam. Both the president and his brother were murdered by an ARVN
officer the following day. The U.S. government, which had advance
knowledge of the coup and was in contact with the plotting generals,
publically declared its intention to remain neutral. General Harkins
ordered USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw its advisors
from South Vietnamese units pending the outcome of the power struggle.
The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh hope among many Americans
and South Vietnamese that the new government could attract the solid
public support of the Vietnamese people, and thereby wage a more
effective war against the Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders
immediately focused their attention upon healing the nation’s deep
political divisions and securing continued U.S. assistance for the
war effort. They pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the
government to civilian control, and to continue the struggle against
the Viet Cong. Appreciating the interrelationship of these assurances,
the United States officially recognized the new government on 7
November, whereupon ComUSMACV lifted the temporary ban on military
assistance.
The American hopes that the new political climate in the Republic of
Vietnam would stimulate a more effective military effort, however,
proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of the sect uprising
in 1955 spread throughout the government following Diem’s death.
The dismissal of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for
actively supporting the former president during the coup typified the
new regime’s campaign to realign top personnel in all governmental
agencies. Far from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese military,
the power struggle and the chaos which prevailed in its wake dragged
the war effort to its most ineffective level since before the U.S.
stepped-up its military assistance program in early 1962. It was on
this unfortunate note that the year 1963 ended.
_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_
At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory Division, still headed
by Lieutenant Colonel Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10
noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the table of organization
was adjusted slightly when the first sergeant and four assistant
infantry advisor (noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated.
Another small unit training advisor was added to the organization,
changing the strength of Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s command to eight
officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from the 3d Marine
Division continued to augment the advisory effort and gain combat
experience while serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.
Like the U.S. organization which advised and assisted it, the
Vietnamese Marine Corps began the new year at the same strength that it
had achieved when it had been expanded to brigade size in early 1962.
Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese
Marine Brigade continued to operate as part of the nation’s general
reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff.
As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry battalions were
garrisoned separately in small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu
Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th Battalion maintained
its camp at Vung Tau on the coast. The newly formed artillery
battalion, which became fully operational in mid-January when B and C
Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations, was garrisoned near
Thu Duc. While the Marine units spent little time in their base camps,
being deployed almost continuously in combat, the Joint General Staff
normally kept one battalion at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any
emergency which might develop.
For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to be highlighted by
innovations in the important areas of training and operations. Prior
to Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all Vietnamese
Marine recruits had received basic training at ARVN installations,
an arrangement tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine
advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963, Moody was able to
convince Khang that he should push for the authority to establish a
separate Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS approved this
proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese Marine engineers, advised by Captain
Robert C. Jones, began building a small training facility at Thu Duc.
In a related action Moody set in motion plans to have a small number
of specially selected Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers
sent to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego for training as
drill instructors. Although these plans would not come to fruition
during Moody’s assignment, the concept of a separate recruit training
center promised to permit the Vietnamese Marine Corps to establish and
maintain its own standards for basic training.
Another change to occur in 1963, this one in the area of tactical
operations, was the reinstitution of multi-battalion combat operations
under the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.[8-A]
Although the VNMC had performed such operations in 1960, they had been
abandoned in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized deployments
to the various provinces and corps tactical zones. Moody, however,
prevailed upon Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments that
would enable the brigade headquarters to exercise tactical control of
its battalions.
[8-A] Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called
either provisional brigades or provisional regiments but
on at least one occasion the organization was designated
a Marine Task Force. In each case the composition was
similar--two or three infantry battalions, an artillery
unit, an engineer or reconnaissance company, and a
command element.
[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an
honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left,
are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese
Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody,
Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (Official USA
Photo)._]
The first such operation was launched in the first week of the new
year. On 1 January a provisional brigade headquarters, commanded by
Khang and advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese Navy LST
(landing ship, tank) at Saigon along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The
4th VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. Christensen, embarked on
board two Vietnamese LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time. The
mission of the provisional brigade was to conduct an amphibious landing
near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from a
series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Subsequent to the clearing operations, VNMC engineers were to construct
a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to extend until mid-April.
Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose the location of the
objective area. The small flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and
remained afloat for two days before moving into position off Ca Mau. On
3 January the two LSMs proceeded to the coast, moved up a river lined
with thick mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion. The 2d
Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard B. Taylor, came ashore from
the LST in Dong Nai boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed
for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade headquarters
remained on board the LST as the designated operations area did not
extend far inland.
[Illustration: _U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese
recruits. (USMC Photo A183561)._]
To their surprise the VNMC assault elements found the first objective,
a large village, completely deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody later
recalled, “They had removed everything, even the cattle and other
livestock.”[8-1] At the second objective, a nearby village, the Marines
found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity but no enemy
troops. There they captured a handful of rifles, carbines, and light
mortars along with a printed document that contained detailed excerpts
of the Marine operations plan. Quite obviously the operation had been
compromised in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case, this
discovery explained the evacuation of the initial objective as well as
the relative dearth of action during the remainder of the operation.
The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion returned to
Saigon after the initial phases of the operation had been executed,
leaving the 2d Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue security
operations in the area and build the strategic hamlet.[8-B] When the
operation finally ended on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a
total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines and snipers had produced
most of these casualties. The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed
and 14 wounded.
[8-B] Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese
Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction
of strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to
the civil authorities in the area who more often than
not used the local population as a labor force. (_Moody
Comments._)
In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered Lieutenant Colonel
Khang to form two infantry battalions and an artillery element into a
provisional brigade for immediate assignment to II Corps. There the
Vietnamese Marines were to join elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN
Divisions for a multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains just
south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code named BACH PHOUNG XI, this
offensive was to penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never
before entered by government forces. Centered in that portion of the
Annamite Mountains where the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and
Kontum Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been under Communist control
since the early stages of the French-Indochina War. In this remote,
inaccessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly had built-up
extensive staging areas and training camps. Prisoner interrogations
obtained throughout the early 1960s revealed that many North Vietnamese
soldiers entering the South’s northern provinces had infiltrated the
Do Xa before moving into the densely populated coastal lowlands of
Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, the area was thought
to contain the Communist military headquarters for Military Region 5
(MR-5).
After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack howitzer battery, a
reconnaissance platoon, and a headquarters element, Khang flew with
Lieutenant Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences with Major
General Nguyen Khanh and his II Corps staff. The concept of BACH
PHOUNG XI, Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine and Army
helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and artillery elements into positions
which would form a loose ring around the suspected center of the Do Xa
base area. The ARVN units would then begin contracting this ring in
stages, whereupon the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted
into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for Communist camps.
To control the entire operation General Khanh would establish a corps
headquarters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village located on
the southern edge of the operations area, about 25 miles northeast of
Kontum.
On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted Khang and the
2,000-man provisional Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai.
Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft, the Assistant Senior
Marine Advisor and artillery advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The
next day an ARVN truck convoy transported the Marines from Quang Ngai
some 40 miles north to Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the
capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion, advised by Captain
Taylor, dismounted from the trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip
while the remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow dirt road
which curved through the foothills and deep into the jungle-covered
Annamite Chain. Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at Tam Ky,
loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion, and began helilifting
them into a stream-side landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the
provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance of the Marine
force continued its southwest motor march until it reached the small
ARVN-held town of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam Ky,
Khang established his command post in a school house adjacent to a
crude little dirt airstrip. The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised by
Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the reconnaissance platoon
and elements of the 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen,
established security. When these units were in place U.S. Marine
UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the
airfield. Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed, the
Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS bladder, began lifting the 4th
Battalion into the 2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located
several miles south of Tra My.
With the initial movement into the operations area accomplished and the
brigade command post functioning, the two infantry battalions began
combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains for Communist base
camps. After several days Khang’s Marines located one rather complete
camp but encountered no resistance upon entering the position. Once
again the occupants, probably forewarned by the initial movement of the
ARVN units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the Marines. The only
people found in the camp were a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A
subsequent search of the bamboo huts and the underlying tunnel complex
did produce a supply cache. The Vietnamese Marines discovered several
rifles, six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio, 44 maps, a
French artillery computing board, and scores of flashlight batteries.
[Illustration:
LOCATION OF DO XA
BASE AREA
]
ARVN and Marine operations in the area during the next two weeks
failed to locate any large Viet Cong elements. For the most part the
Marines busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned camps and
some cultivated crops. ARVN units operating around the Marines reported
scattered action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong attempting
to escape from the center of the Do Xa. BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in
mid-May when U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions back to Tra
My. From there the Marines returned by convoy to Quang Ngai where they
staged for the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the Marine
portion of the operation revealed that only two Viet Cong soldiers had
been killed. Khang’s force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of
encounters with booby traps constructed from sharpened bamboo spikes.
ARVN forces fared only slightly better, having killed barely a score
of Communists. Except for the fact that they had demonstrated their
ability to penetrate the most difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two
week offensive into the Do Xa base area had little impact on the war
effort. From the standpoint of training and experience, however, the
operation was beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their advisors
learned a great deal about construction of landing zones and about
directing helicopters, fields in which they had received little
previous training.[8-C]
[8-C] An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it
stimulated somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and
the JGS. Military officials from Saigon who visited the
brigade command post, including General Weede, took back
large water-smoothed rocks as souvenirs of their trip to
the infamous Viet Cong stronghold. Printed on the side
of these ornate stones were the words “Do Xa, May 1963.”
(_Moody Comments._)
In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. Noren, recently
transferred from the 2d Marine Division where he had served as
Assistant G-3, arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel Moody
as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already
selected for promotion to colonel, Noren would become the seventh
Senior Marine Advisor when Moody left Vietnam in October.
In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders formed a provisional
regiment for Operation PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted in III
Corps Tactical Zone.[8-D] The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, supported by
a composite artillery battery and the reconnaissance company, joined
ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in a major search and clear
campaign in the northwest corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20
miles southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government military
operations undertaken in 1963, this one failed to uncover any major
enemy forces. The Communist soldiers again managed to elude government
forces. An extensive tunnel and cave network, which the Marines
systematically destroyed with demolitions, was discovered under the
entire area. Still, the Marines managed to kill only six Viet Cong and
capture 10. Two Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others wounded
before the operation terminated on 1 November.
[8-D] After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December,
III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam
which encompassed the southern one third of the Central
Highlands and the area south to the boundary of the
Capital Military District near Saigon.
[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren, Senior Marine
Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, confer with Lieutenant Colonel
Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMC Photo
A420917)._]
The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem from power began the same
day that Operation PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to their
base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalions, accompanied
by the composite battery, moved into the capital to participate in the
power struggle. These units actually launched the coup by seizing key
installations in the heart of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion
blocked the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist intervention.
Sporadic fighting against troops loyal to Diem continued until the
early morning of 2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed
and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese Marines were
killed and 12 wounded during the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines
were involved in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren directed his
subordinate advisors to remain in their quarters. When the situation
stabilized, the advisors rejoined their units and resumed their normal
duties.
[Illustration:
CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
1963–1964
]
Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas resumed for the
Vietnamese Marine Brigade in the second week of November. Accompanied
by its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams, the 3d
Battalion initiated a search and clear operation in III Corps in
conjunction with the 11th ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day
the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a substantial Viet Cong
force west of My Tho and suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen
enemy bodies were found on the battlefield along with four weapons,
several grenades, and some documents. McWilliams, respected by his
fellow advisors for his candid and forthright assessments, later
recalled that such encounters were the exception rather than the
rule. “While the Vietnamese Marines were individually good fighters
and showed tenacity in most cases against forces that would stand and
fight, this was not the nature of the conflict,” he lamented. More
often than not, McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile Viet
Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome government units.[8-2]
On 14 November, the same day that the combined Marine-ARVN operation
in III Corps terminated, the Vietnamese Marine command formed a
provisional regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG 28 and 29, which
were to be conducted concurrently in the same general area. Composed of
the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack howitzer platoon, the Marine
force searched until 21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in
Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results. Only one enemy was
killed, two prisoners taken, and three weapons captured at the expense
of five dead and 13 wounded Marines.
A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised by Captain Joseph N. Smith,
fought a more typical action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG
30. The battalion commander, Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders
for the operation during the early morning hours of 25 November.
Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese Marines boarded trucks
at their camp near Thu Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon
arrival, officers from III Corps headquarters informed Captain Yen
that his battalion was to conduct a heliborne assault against Hoi Dong
Sam, a Viet Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province just west
of Saigon. The purpose of the operation was to intercept a guerrilla
force which had overrun the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the
previous day and had taken several American prisoners. The enemy unit
was believed to be using Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting
to escape across the Cambodian border.[8-3]
The operation began at about 0800 when eight U.S. Army H-21 “Flying
Bananas” from the 145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith,
a Vietnamese company commander, and his 90-man assault force from
Bien Hoa. Eight Army UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B Bird
Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport helicopters on the
20-minute flight to the objective area. The gunships were put to
use almost immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine gun fire
erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge of the village. Under the
suppressive fire of the UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the
assault force in some partially flooded rice paddies about 700 meters
east of the Viet Cong positions. The Marine assault force quickly
deployed into a treeline on the western edge of the landing zone.
From this position the company began returning fire with rifles and
.30 caliber machine guns. The Air Force forward air controller (FAC)
overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships prevented the enemy from
withdrawing across the open rice paddies which surrounded the objective
on the north, south, and west.
The distance between the assembly area at Bien Hoa and the landing
zone combined with the scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the
progress of the helilift. The landings continued at 40-minute intervals
while the UH-1B gunships teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault
force to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements of the battalion
were finally landed about two hours after the initial assault. Largely
because of the effective suppressive fires from the air and ground, no
aircraft were hit during the helilift.
[Illustration:
2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON
HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963
]
Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the assault company,
augmented by a pair of 60mm mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles,
provided a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister
companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three remaining rifle companies
and a battalion command group north to a position from which they could
launch an envelopment on the fortified village. Using a treeline which
bordered an irrigation canal as cover, the force hooked westward until
it was directly north of the Viet Cong position. Meanwhile, a FARM
GATE twin-engine B-26 relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this
point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a group of 30–40 enemy
attempting to flee from the northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After
clearing the target with the Marine battalion, he directed the B-26 to
attack the target with its 250-pound bombs. The aircraft made several
bombing passes and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike ended
the enveloping force began its assault against the northern edge of the
village with two companies abreast and one following in reserve several
hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force was in motion the
base of fire displaced forward, firing as they moved, to a small canal
about 120 meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the treeline.
The two assault companies, followed closely by Yen, Smith, and the
battalion command group, penetrated the northern end of the village and
swept through to its southern periphery. The commander of the company
on the east (or left) flank, deployed elements into the treeline where
the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active. Following a sharp but
brief exchange of gunfire, the Marines cleared the position. They found
eight enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.
By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire village. Captain Yen
ordered his assault companies to establish a perimeter defense and
the reserve company to begin a systematic search of the position. His
Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting
positions. In a small canal just east of the village the Marines
found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic weapon. They also
discovered eight Viet Cong suspects and detained them for questioning.
One rifle company moved to investigate the area where the B-26 had
attacked the fleeing enemy earlier in the morning but found no evidence
of additional casualties. Following the capture of Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s
battalion conducted patrols for several days in search of the Viet
Cong force that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp on the
25th. The enemy force, however, eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in
Cambodia. The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on 28 November.
In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30 pointed up the problems
which frequently frustrated GVN military forces and their American
advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective and in so doing
had killed a handful of Viet Cong and detained a number of suspects.
The Marines had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons and
an assortment of small arms--all without suffering a single casualty
of their own. Still, it was difficult to translate the action into
victory. The Marines, along with the other government forces involved
in the operation, had failed to intercept the Viet Cong raiding force
in its flight toward the international boundary. Moreover, most of
the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made good their escape despite the
presence of observation and attack aircraft. Like many other government
military operations undertaken during the 1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG
30 was successful from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest
the tactical initiative from the guerrillas.
In the first week of December, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff
ordered VNMC units to conduct an extended search in the jungles of
western Tay Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task Force
composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was helilifted into the area
on 3 December to begin Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was
punctuated by two major engagements and frequent enemy harassment. In
one particularly vicious clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy
casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully executed Viet
Cong ambush. When the operation concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese
Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded, and 1 captured. Nine
Viet Cong bodies were found and another Communist soldier was captured.
The enemy left four individual weapons on the battlefield.
In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders removed Lieutenant Colonel
Khang from his position as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
Although he had not participated in the November coup, Khang had been
a political appointee of President Diem and as such was viewed as a
potential threat to the new regime. After being promoted to colonel,
he was assigned to the Philippines as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed
Forces Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who had been serving
as Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed
as Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the Vietnamese Marine Corps
on 16 December.
Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued operations against the Viet
Cong following Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements. Near the
end of December, with the nation drifting into political uncertainty
and its own top leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese Marine
Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel Noren saw this unfortunate trend as
a by-product of the general political instability which was beginning
to grip the country rather than a reflection of Lien’s leadership.
Indeed, Noren thought the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily
capable officer.[8-4] In any case, as 1963 ended the U.S. Marine
advisors were reporting climbing desertion rates in almost every
battalion.
_Accomplishments_
Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging note, the Marine Advisory
Division could report positively on its own activities. At the
urging of the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had
reinstituted multi-battalion combat operations. Steps had also been
taken to cut the VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating a
separate Marine Corps recruit training facility. When activated this
training center was expected to provide VNMC battalions with a stream
of enlisted men who would possess a background of higher quality basic
training.
As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine advisors had accompanied
their units in every combat operation during 1963 except the November
coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month period and only four
(two of whom were on temporary assignment from the 3d Marine Division)
had been wounded. The first combat decorations other than Purple Heart
Medals for wounds were also approved and awarded to the advisors during
the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen and Frank Zimolzak,
former advisors to the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were awarded
the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat “V” for meritorious service.
Captain Richard Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned
the first Silver Star Medal during the same period for “conspicuous
gallantry” between November 1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N.
Smith, advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned the second
Silver Star for gallantry displayed between October 1963 and April
1964.[8-E]
[8-E] Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.
CHAPTER 9
SHUFLY Operations
_Development of the Compound Continues--Combat Support Operations--The
Situation in Vietnam_
SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command assigned to South
Vietnam, continued its combat support operations in the semi-isolated
northern provinces throughout 1963. Although the size of I Corps had
been reduced in late 1962 when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff
shifted Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of the Marine
task element remained essentially unchanged. As the new year opened
Lieutenant Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible for
providing direct helicopter support to the forces of the five northern
provinces. Likewise, the government’s order of battle in the northern
provinces had not changed to any great degree. The 1st ARVN Division
still occupied the coastal plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and
Thua Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the 2d ARVN Division
continued to carry the main burden of operations against the Viet Cong
in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating in Quang Ngai Province
to the south of the new I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the
25th ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal lowlands among
the various regular battalions of these three divisions were small
paramilitary garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the scattered
Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard defenders continued their
struggle for survival while monitoring Communist infiltration.
_Development of the Compound Continues_
The first month of 1963 saw three important changes in the composition
and leadership of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January, HMM-162,
a UH-34D squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu,
replaced Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task element’s
helicopter unit. Five days later, on the 16th, Lieutenant Colonel
George H. Linnemeier, winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses
during World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Davis as
the MABS-16 sub unit commander. In the last week of January Lieutenant
Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who had piloted scout-dive
bombers during the Second World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed
command of the task element from Lieutenant Colonel McCully.
During McCully’s tour as the Commander, Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6,
the Marine compound at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality of
permanency which had never been evident at Soc Trang. The utilities
section of the MABS-16 detachment was responsible for many of the
more noticeable improvements. By the first of the new year they had
constructed several shelters on the west side of the runway to cover
the motor transport section’s working area. They also had replaced the
electrical system and repaired some of the damaged plumbing in the
living areas. The task element’s special services section had begun
to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment by showing nightly
movies, arranging fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing
athletic equipment.
The monsoon season, which was characterized by cold rains, high
winds, and deep mud, proved to be a source of much irritation to the
Marines during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to slowing flight
operations and creating almost constant discomfort, the weather caused
some unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy rainfall had
combined with constant vehicle usage to turn the road between the
living area and the flight line into a quagmire that was virtually
impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then the task unit commander,
had responded by requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve the
Marines’ only road link with their aircraft. Wing authorities promptly
complied and a road grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation
for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot section of the road was
opened and a drainage ditch dug along its entire length.
This measure proved to be only temporary, however, for in January the
mud again threatened to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side
of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully obtained a bulldozer from
Okinawa to make more permanent repairs. With the help of this piece of
equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot section of road on
an eight-inch rock base. These repairs proved to be satisfactory and
the road caused no further problem during the remainder of the monsoon
season.
Improvements in the compound continued to be made under the task
element’s new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was
taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a security detachment
to guard the Marine area. A reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from
the 3d Marine Division joined the task element, thus freeing the men
of the helicopter squadron and the MABS-16 sub unit of the important
secondary responsibility they had held since the task unit’s deployment
to Soc Trang. The assignment of the ground Marines was timely in that
it corresponded with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding the
perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One Marine general later observed
that with the arrival of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in
being in Vietnam.”[9-1]
Other less obvious changes that contributed to the overall efficiency
of the Marine task element also occurred during the early spring. In
April, the task element commander was able to assign a better facility
to medical and dental services. They had been crowded into one of the
small structures along with other offices since the displacement from
Soc Trang, but now were moved into a separate building in the living
compound.
Another problem that plagued the Marines during their entire first
year at Da Nang--inadequate water supply--was finally solved in late
1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a shallow well from
which water was pumped and purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this
source shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the dry season
and their commanders were forced to impose strict water discipline. The
monsoon rains eased the water crisis but by January production again
dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation of heavy silt in
the pumps. A Vietnamese contractor was engaged to clean and repair the
pumping system but the problem soon recurred. In the early spring two
new shallow wells were dug, one in the motor transport working area and
the other in the living compound. With the onset of the dry season,
however, the Marines again were forced to conserve water. This time the
shortage became so acute that tank trucks were required to haul some
16,000 gallons of water a day from a nearby Air Force installation.
Finally, in November, a detachment from a Navy construction battalion
completed a well 450 feet deep and capped it with a high pressure pump.
This proved to be the permanent solution to the long-standing water
shortage.
Over the course of the year the Marines received several new
vehicles which helped relieve the burden on the rebuilt buses
which were beginning to falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger,
four-wheel-drive trucks and two M-442 “Mighty Mite” jeeps were flown
in by KC-130s from Okinawa and assigned to the task element’s motor
transport section. By summer, two of the old buses were replaced with
tactical passenger vehicles which were better suited for transporting
personnel between the barracks and work areas. The addition of the new
vehicles also allowed the mess hall to begin transporting hot noon
meals to the men working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess line
set up in the hangar area fed those Marines who previously had lost
time by travelling to the living compound for noon meals.
Two changes were made in the task element’s command structure in
midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran
aviator with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Linnemeier
as commanding officer of the MABS-16 sub unit. Two weeks later, on the
18th, Colonel Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished himself
as an artillery officer during World War II before becoming a pilot,
assumed command of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.
In summary, the improvements made in the task element’s compound during
the course of 1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained
combat helicopter operations. Although overshadowed by the publicity
which the actual flight operations attracted, the continued improvement
of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall effectiveness of the
Marine combat support effort.
_Combat Support Operations_
Marine helicopter support for government forces in I Corps encountered
a brief interruption shortly after the new year began when HMM-163 was
replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine KC-130s shuttled between
Okinawa and Da Nang for several days during the second week of January
bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to Vietnam and returning
with members of HMM-163. The change-over of units was completed on 11
January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun officially transferred his
squadron’s aircraft and maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.
In the five months and ten days since they initiated operations at Soc
Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record.
The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869 hours, 15,200 sorties,
and had lifted over 25,216 combat assault troops and 59,024 other
passengers. In one month alone (August) they had established a Marine
Corps record for medium helicopter squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter
hours. These records had not been set without risks, however. During
the course of their operations in the Mekong Delta and in I Corps,
helicopters operated by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions by
Communist small arms fire.[9-2] Moreover, the squadron had become the
first Marine unit to suffer combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.
HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, the veteran Marine
aviator who had commanded the squadron during the recent deployment
to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began full-fledged combat support
operations the same day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed
Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had participated in similar
operations around Udorn the previous summer, limited their early
flights to routine resupply missions and a few medical evacuations.
Such missions enabled the squadron’s personnel to become better
acquainted with the terrain over which they would operate during the
next six months.
The new squadron participated in its first major combat troop lift on
January 19, when a break in the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division
to execute a heliborne operation into the mountains about 15 miles
west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into
three separate landing zones near a suspected Communist base area.
The squadron’s pilots and crews encountered their first Viet Cong
opposition during this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed one
of the landing zones while at another the enemy fired at the Marine
aircraft with small arms. Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were shot
down and the mission was completed successfully.
A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots experienced another
of the hazards associated with flight operations in Vietnam while
attempting to land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a clearing
about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five helicopters sustained punctures
in the bottoms of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on tree
stumps concealed by high grass in the landing zone. One stump caused
extensive damage to an aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel
cell. The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in the field under ARVN
protection overnight. The next morning Marine mechanics were flown in
from Da Nang to repair the helicopter.
Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen or more aircraft,
heliborne assault missions did not dominate HMM-162’s operations during
the unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor weather conditions
over the northern provinces continued to restrict flight operations
generally to resupply and medical evacuation missions. Statistics
for the first quarter of 1963, for example, indicated that Marine
helicopters conducted 6,537 logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181
tactical support sorties.
The single most significant incident during HMM-162’s initial three
months in Vietnam took place in the second week of March when the
squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties. These
were incurred during a salvage-rescue attempt in the mountains of
northern II Corps. The incident began on 10 March as two Marine UH-34Ds
attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese ground rescue team
into the jungle about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The team’s
assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk (a twin-engine,
turboprop, electronic reconnaissance aircraft manufactured by Grumman)
which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted into the jungle.
The exact site of the accident had not been located but the general
area was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain, the elevation of
which approached 5,000 feet. While attempting to lower search personnel
into the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters lost power
and crashed. The ARVN ranger who was on the hoist when the accident
occurred was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to climb from
the wreckage shortly before it erupted in flames. The copilot, Captain
David N. Webster, was severely burned in the explosion.
Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in the rescue operation,
refueling from the TAFDS at Quang Ngai for the flight into the
mountains. The situation was complicated further when a second Marine
helicopter experienced a power loss and crashed near the burned-out
UH-34D hulk while attempting to land a rescue team composed of MABS-16
Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did not burn and the only injury
incurred in the crash was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep
and densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from reaching the site
of the other downed helicopter. Bad weather and darkness prevented
further efforts to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese
personnel from the jungle that day. During the night Captain Webster
died of injuries.
The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of some 700 pounds of
equipment so as to enable it to operate more efficiently at the
extreme elevations in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully
maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position, the pilot was able
to extract the survivors and the dead copilot from the site where the
first UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors were flown to Quang
Ngai. There the wounded were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air
Force transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang.
While these events were taking place, the Marines from the second
downed helicopter, guided by search aircraft operating over the area,
located and recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This accomplished,
the Marines hacked out a small clearing from which they were evacuated
by another Marine helicopter.
The episode was not yet over, however, as the crashed OV-1 and its
payload of advanced electronics equipment still had not been secured.
Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had joined the search, reached
the remnants of the Mohawk and established security around the site
while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to examine the debris.
The Marine UH-34D, which had crashed nearby without burning and was
damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable parts and then
destroyed.
On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks completed, Marine
helicopters began shuttling South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc,
a nearby government outpost. During this phase of the mission the
helicopters received fire from Viet Cong who had moved into positions
near the rangers’ perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive fire
on the enemy with their door-mounted M-60 machine guns while the
remaining helicopters picked up the troops in the landing zone. This
was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter providing close
air support in actual combat.
Other developments occurred in the early months of 1963 which either
directly or indirectly affected the conduct of Marine helicopter
operations. One was the improved coordination of intelligence gathering
and usage among all South Vietnamese and American agencies within
I Corps. This effort, which was essentially a concerted drive to
streamline the collection and flow of intelligence information, was
stimulated by a series of corps-wide intelligence seminars, the first
of which was held in early February. Of special interest to the Marine
aviators was the establishment of closer liaison between the Marine
task element, U.S. Army Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in
the northern corps tactical zone.
Closely related to the improvement of the overall intelligence
situation was the acquisition of some new equipment by the SHUFLY
Marines. In March the task element received two new model hand-held
aerial cameras for use by the crews of the O-1B observation aircraft.
Later in the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate the rapid
processing of the photographs. By the end of the month the Marines were
also being provided with high altitude photographic coverage of some
objective areas taken by U.S. Air Force reconnaissance jets.
The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began to quicken in early
April with the advent of sustained periods of clear weather. On 13
April, HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne assault in which
435 2d ARVN Division troops were lifted into a suspected Communist
stronghold in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30 miles
south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions, the Marine O-1Bs
provided reconnaissance and radio relay support. For the first time
in the war Marine transport helicopters were escorted by helicopter
gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a single-engine, turbine-powered utility
helicopter built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five UH-1Bs from a
detachment of the Army’s Da Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed
with M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets, joined the VNAF
fighter bombers to conduct preparatory airstrikes on the landing zones.
The initial landing met no enemy resistance but later in the day action
in the operational area intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight
rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting to evacuate wounded
South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone
near the point where the ARVN forces had been landed that morning. With
the copilot, First Lieutenant John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged
aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.
Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched to the scene to pick up
the Marine crew and complete the evacuation. They managed to evacuate
Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor, and one dead and four
wounded ARVN soldiers without incident. On a return trip to pick up
more wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered heavy damage
from Viet Cong fire. In this incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley
M. Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and back by small arms
fire, and the aircraft was forced to land near the first downed
helicopter. The accompanying UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell, and
returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment. Repair teams were
helilifted to the position on the afternoon of the 13th, and began
repairing both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang later
that day but the other required extensive repairs and could not be
flown to safety until the 15th.
While HMM-162 repair crews were working feverishly to extricate their
aircraft from the predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon,
another of their helicopters was shot down nearby while supporting the
same operation. This aircraft was hit four times while approaching an
ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about three miles south of
the action in which the two helicopters had been lost earlier. After
temporary repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D to Da
Nang where more detailed repair work was accomplished.
The number of combat support sorties flown into the mountains by
HMM-162’s crews rose steadily as the weather improved. Near the end
of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions of the 1st ARVN
Division into the mountains of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near
the Laotian border. These units were to participate in an extended
multi-regiment drive against suspected Communist infiltration routes
there. This operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron
provided daily support after the initial landing, taxed the durability
of both the Marine crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element
helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing zones located at
elevations as high as 4,500 feet. The majority of these sorties were
resupply and medical evacuation missions with the occasional exception
being the heliborne displacement of infantry and artillery units when
distance or terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the dangers
inherent in helicopter operations conducted over mountainous terrain,
the squadron incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while supporting
the offensive in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN Division’s ongoing drive
near the Laotian border continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed 21
UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the Do Xa base area along the
southern edge of I Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over
567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the mountainous area roughly
22 miles southwest of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG XI. The
squadron was less fortunate during this operation than it was during
the lengthy Quang Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet Cong
fire which wounded the pilot, Captain Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The
crew and the embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury when the
aircraft made a crash landing in which it suffered extensive damage.
After the crew was rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped the
helicopter of all usable parts and burned the hulk so the Viet Cong
could not make use of it. This was the first Marine helicopter loss
definitely attributed to direct enemy action.[9-3]
Following the initial heliborne assaults into the Do Xa area, two
UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling
from the TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used primarily to
perform medical evacuation missions for VNMC and ARVN units involved
in BACH PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, HMM-162’s
crews had evacuated nearly 100 Marine and ARVN casualties from
hazardous landing zones scattered along the border of I and II Corps.
The task element’s O-1Bs also provided aerial reconnaissance support
for all phases of the operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH PHOUNG
XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds lifted the two Vietnamese Marine
battalions to the provisional brigade command post at Tra My. This
particular phase of the operation evoked favorable comment from an
anonymous U.S. Marine pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form
that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly and that the Vietnamese
Marines appeared “well organized in the landing zones and at Tra
My.”[9-4] BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the following day when
HMM-162 helilifted the ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.
One trend which became increasingly apparent as the spring of 1963
unfolded was the growing utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter
gunships as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships
accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical evacuations, and
when available, also escorted resupply flights in order to provide
suppressive fire around government positions while landings were in
progress. Although well suited for the escort missions, the lightly
armed UH-1Bs did not replace the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft
as the principal source of preparatory air strikes around landing zones
being used for assault helilifts. The Marines continued to rely on the
more heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct the so-called “prep
strikes.”[9-A]
[9-A] As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I
Corps, a vigorous debate developed within the Marine
Corps concerning the value of armed helicopters. This
debate and the subsequent development, procurement, and
operations of Marine helicopter gunships will be covered
in a separate historical monograph being prepared by the
History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps.
May was the last full month of combat support operations for Lieutenant
Colonel Leu’s squadron. In the first week of June, transports from
VMGR-152 began landing at Da Nang with the Marines of a new UH-34D
squadron. Since assuming responsibility for helicopter support in I
Corps in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid combat record. While
under the squadron’s operations, the UH-34D helicopters had flown
17,670 sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs added
approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000 hours to these figures. In
the month of May alone HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight
hours--a number which approached the record set by HMM-163 during the
previous summer in the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the
growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its deployment to Da Nang,
Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s unit had lost three helicopters--two as a
result of operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy fire. One
member of the unit had been killed and three others wounded since the
squadron entered the combat zone.[9-5]
After a brief change-over period, the outgoing squadron commander
officially turned over his unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on
8 June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the commanding officer of
HMM-261. Shook, who had flown Marine helicopters in combat during the
Korean War, committed his crews to their first actual combat missions
that same day.
A significant change took place in the coordinating arrangements that
governed U.S. helicopter units supporting I Corps at approximately
the same time that HMM-261 initiated combat support operations. Since
its relocation at Da Nang, the Marine task element, along with all
other aviation units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the Air
Support Operations Center located within the corps headquarters. As
the number of U.S. and VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps
grew and the total number of missions multiplied, it became necessary
to modify the system of coordination and control. In accordance with
a ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters created an Aviation
Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of
Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC, which was composed of
a senior Army representative, a senior Marine representative, and an
operations section, was to be directed by the Commander, Task Element
79.3.3.6. Formally stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct,
and control the employment of all Army and Marine Corps Aviation
Units and aircraft operations in direct support of I Corps.” The
newly organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate in, and provide
assistance to operational planning and the coordination of employment
of USA/USMC Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”[9-6] The AHOC,
therefore, was formed to supplement rather than replace the older Air
Support Operations Center, which continued to direct and control all
U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the northern provinces. It
was under this arrangement that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units
operated after mid-1963.
HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic Viet Cong resistance
to their operations shortly after their first combat missions in early
June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains west of Da
Nang was aborted on 6 July when the Marine pilots discovered that the
Viet Cong had obstructed the two available landing zones with upright
stakes. While inspecting one of the landing zones on a low pass, a
helicopter was hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small arms
fire. The damage to the aircraft was not serious enough to force a
landing, but the pilot of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally
wounded while attempting to suppress the ground fire.
Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation of the assault mission
west of Da Nang, HMM-261 suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam.
The crash, which was later attributed to mechanical failure, occurred
about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang while one of the squadron’s
helicopters was on a routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two
American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were injured in the accident.
The squadron commander dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of
the crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage team. The badly
damaged aircraft was assessed as beyond repair and was destroyed.
In the second week of August, officers from HMM-261 and the task
element’s staff (under the command of Colonel Gomez) met with American
and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to plan a large-scale
heliborne retrograde movement. The planned helilift was to mark the
culmination of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long offensive
by several battalions of the 2d ARVN Division against Communist
infiltration routes in Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border.
Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had encountered increasing
Viet Cong pressure since early August. I Corps authorities feared that
unless their units were withdrawn promptly they might be cut off from
the few landing zones that existed in the rugged operations area.
As planned, the retrograde operation involved helilifting some
1,300 troops with their artillery and equipment to Thuong Duc, a
government-held town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along
the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for the commitment of 20
Marine helicopters, 18 of which would participate in the actual troop
lifts. The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event it became
necessary either to replace helicopters assigned to the troop lift or
to conduct search and rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF
UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs were designated by the I Corps
headquarters to assist HMM-261 with the helilift.
The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center assigned a variety of other
aircraft to support the operation. These included two VNAF T-28s, one
FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would
share the task of providing close air support for the troop lift. A
Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform weather reconnaissance missions.
The entire air operation was to be coordinated from two aircraft. An
American forward air controller in a VNAF observation plane was to
direct all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice,
bilingual effort was to come from a U.S. Air Force U-10 Super Courier.
This six-man, single engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour
fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve as an airborne air
support operations center (Airborne ASOC). It would be flown by an Air
Force pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the task element
along with U.S. and Vietnamese representatives from the Da Nang ASOC.
These officers would be in continuous radio contact with all aircraft
in the operations area, and also with the U.S. Air Force liaison
officer to I Corps who would be positioned with the ground troops.
The concept of the operation called for the ARVN units to be lifted
from two hazardous landing zones over a three-day period. According to
the plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from Landing Zone HOTEL
on Thursday, 15 August. Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which
could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was situated along a river and
was crowded between two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles
from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered ridges generally
paralleled each other less than 400 meters apart on either side of the
landing zone. Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges joined to
form a box canyon. The physical structure of the location dictated that
the transport helicopters use the same approach and retirement routes.
Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain which surrounded
Landing Zone HOTEL, the ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a
125-man security force on the two ridges. This force would provide
cover for the helicopters conducting the final troop lift during this
first phase of the retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese
soldiers would move cross-country to another landing zone to be picked
up by helicopters following the completion of the helilift from Landing
Zone HOTEL.
The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was nearly as treacherous
as the first. ZULU was completely encircled by a rim of hills some
500 feet higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition to
the 125-man security force from HOTEL, the Marine, Army, and VNAF
helicopters were scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm
howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August (the second and
third days of the operation).
An unexpected complication developed the morning the operation began
when the Air Force grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers
crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam as a result of
undetermined causes. Shortly after this crash, HMM-261 was called
upon to divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search and rescue
operations for the downed B-26, thus reducing even further the assets
available to support the heliborne retrograde.
Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned to the operation,
I Corps authorities elected to proceed with the helilift from Landing
Zone HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine O-1B confirmed that
good weather prevailed over the operations area, the first helicopters
departed Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after take off the
Marine and Vietnamese pilots began maneuvering their aircraft between
the two ridges which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice during the
pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew fire from the thick jungle on one
side of the approach lanes being used by the transports. Both times
they returned fire in the direction of the unseen enemy and forced him
to silence his weapons. The first phase of the operation was completed
without serious incident four hours after it had begun.
The second phase of the helilift began the next morning with the two
unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to
lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers. The Marine and VNAF
transport helicopters followed and continued to shuttle troops out of
the landing zone for three hours without encountering enemy opposition.
Then a departing flight of UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline.
One of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the suspected target for
the VNAF T-28s and the attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position.
The Communist activity ceased.
After an overnight march, the covering force from Landing Zone HOTEL
arrived at Landing Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled to be
removed from the field until the next day, the schedule was adjusted
and the 125 weary ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly area
on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification reduced the amount
of work which would be required of the helicopters on the final day of
the operation.
The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on 17 August was characterized
by increasing concern for security around the landing site. The general
scheme for protecting the helicopters during this critical stage of
the exercise was to establish two perimeters, one around the rim of
high ground which surrounded the zone and another around the immediate
landing site. The outer perimeter would be withdrawn first, leaving the
inside ring of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the landing
zone while the force from the outer perimeter boarded the helicopters.
Once the Vietnamese soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills, the
area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses would be automatically
cleared for air strikes. Even with these precautions the helicopters
would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy force that might rapidly
occupy the high ground above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal
of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once the troops from the outer
defenses were staged for the helilift, the transport helicopters would
be directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing interval
between aircraft from the usual five minutes to as short a time span
as possible. By landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous final
stage of the operation could be accomplished more quickly.
Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday morning, the air
liaison officer at ZULU reported that the outer perimeter had been
withdrawn and that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in positions
around the landing zone. At this point the operation, now in its most
critical phase, began to experience agonizing delays. First, a loaded
helicopter arrived at the assembly area with a rough running engine.
Fearing that the fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated,
Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all HMM-261 pilots to check their
aircraft’s fuel strainers while their passengers disembarked at the
assembly point. No evidence was found to indicate that the fuel
contained contaminants, but the operation was slowed at the exact point
where the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another minor delay
occurred after a helicopter flying near the landing zone reported
having drawn enemy ground fire. The approach and departure routes were
adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters would not fly over
the area and VNAF T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy
position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air liaison officer
at the landing zone reported more enemy activity only 500 meters from
his position. This momentary crisis was resolved when the American air
liaison officer personally directed armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the
target area.
Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions to proceed with the
operation, whereupon HMM-261 and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down
into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B gunships provided continuous
protection for the transport helicopters by flying concentric but
opposite patterns around them. One after another the transports landed,
took on troops, climbed out of the landing zone, and turned toward
Thuong Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up helilift began,
the last troops were airborne. The crew chief of the helicopter which
embarked the final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke grenade
into the empty landing zone to signal all other aircraft that the lift
was complete.
The three-day heliborne retrograde from the Laotian border proved
to be one of the most efficient helicopter operations conducted by
the Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the early 1960s. Its
success was due largely to detailed planning, particularly the South
Vietnamese plans for the ground defense of both landing zones. These
plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful Colonel Gomez,
the task element commander, to declare: “This was the first time in
our experience that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been treated as
a retrograde operation rather than an administrative lift. Without a
sound retrograde plan the operation might well have failed.”[9-7]
Although this observation was correct, it should be added that the
close coordination between the airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft,
and the air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to the
successful execution of the plans. These agencies were instrumental in
coordinating the bilingual, multiservice effort, particularly when it
was beset with difficulties in its critical final stage.
HMM-261’s combat support missions continued at a normal rate following
the completion of the mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later,
on 16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron lost its second
UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest of Hue. The helicopter, which
had developed mechanical problems while carrying troops of a South
Vietnamese assault force, was damaged beyond repair. Its crew members
and passengers fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft was stripped of
usable parts by a salvage team from Da Nang and burned.
Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a new squadron
began arriving at Da Nang and HMM-261 turned to preparations for its
departure. Since early June, when it had become the fourth Marine
helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit
had accumulated 5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in the
UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had helilifted over 6,000 troops,
nearly 1,900,000 pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600 medical
evacuation missions.[9-8]
The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility for helicopter
support in I Corps on 2 October after a short period of orientation
flying with the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Ross, was well qualified to
direct a tactical aviation unit in a combat situation. Decorated with
five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II and Korea, he was
a recent graduate of the Air Force Command and Staff College.
Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated combat support operations
at Da Nang, it suffered its first aircraft and personnel losses.
The incident occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed almost
simultaneously while on a search and rescue mission 38 miles southwest
of Da Nang. Both helicopters burned, killing 10 men; the pilots,
copilots, the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A search
of the area was initiated immediately for the downed aircraft, but
darkness prevented their discovery until the next morning. By then
the Viet Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were waiting to
ambush the search and rescue helicopters which they knew would arrive.
When the rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined enemy
opposition. Colonel Gomez requested ARVN assistance and 254 South
Vietnamese troops were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions
to dislodge the enemy force from the area around the downed aircraft.
While executing the landing, HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by
small arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One ARVN soldier
was killed.
The following day, as the South Vietnamese forces moved toward the
downed UH-34Ds, three Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs
and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection team into the crash site to
recover the bodies and investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic
weapons fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in the landing zone
and forced the pilots to take off while the inspection team found
cover on the ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed, the
helicopters returned for the stranded Marines. Their investigation of
the aircraft hulks had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small arms
fire in the wreckage and the relative positions of the two helicopters
led Lieutenant Colonel Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot
down by the Viet Cong.[9-9] But this was not a conclusive finding.
There was room for speculation that the two helicopters had actually
collided in midair while attempting to evade ground fire.
Ground action in the hills around the crash sites continued. On 11
October, another Marine helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while
resupplying ARVN units in the area. In this incident the UH-34D was
struck twice in the engine and once in the wheel strut while in a
landing zone about two miles from the point where the crashes had
occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance team from Da Nang
determined that the helicopter would require a new engine. Marines from
the security platoon were utilized to provide security until 13 October
when an additional 120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area and
established a perimeter around the aircraft. Other helicopters then
delivered the new engine and a maintenance crew to the landing zone.
After the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the UH-34D to Da Nang.
By the time HMM-361 had removed the last ARVN troops from the hills
around the scene of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had begun
to restrict flight operations. The remaining two weeks of October
were characterized by a reduced number of missions, most of which
were either resupply or medical evacuations. By the end of October,
despite numerous flight cancellations, Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews
had gained the unenviable distinction of having attracted more enemy
fire during a one month period than any previous squadron to serve with
SHUFLY. Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different occasions
and had been hit 18 times.[9-10]
SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a halt in the first days of
November as the reverberations from Diem’s overthrow spread to South
Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials in Washington and
Saigon, aware of the pitfalls that might accompany open support of
either side in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military forces
to cease advisory and combat support activities. As a result of the
sensitive political situation, no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2
November. Two days after the new regime seized power in Saigon, the
U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted to perform emergency medical
evacuation and emergency resupply missions. Even these flights were
to be approved beforehand by ARVN military officers in Saigon. Four
days after Diem’s overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the
political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations returned to near normal.
One remaining limitation stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not
transport ARVN units into population centers even though troops could
be helilifted from the cities into rural areas.
Due to torrential monsoon rains which began striking the Da Nang
area in mid-November, HMM-361’s combat support operations continued
at a relatively low level throughout the remainder of the year. This
trend was confirmed by the flight totals compiled for the final two
months of 1963. In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only 145
sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics, 230 helicopter
sorties for 338 flight hours, indicated a slight upswing but fell far
short of the monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With rain
and fog frequently rendering the mountains inaccessible by air, the
preponderance of the squadron’s missions were conducted along the
coastal plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support operations were
continuing at a greatly reduced rate.
_The Situation in Vietnam_
Although not yet desperate, the overall situation in South Vietnam
at the end of 1963 was far from favorable. Mismanaged and poorly
coordinated from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed
to fulfill even the most moderate of American and South Vietnamese
expectations. Little discernable headway had been made toward restoring
any large segment of the populated rural areas to government control.
Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement
of 1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and material down the
Laotian corridor into the South. Although the 1963 figure of 4,200
confirmed infiltrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than the figure for
the previous year, it was substantial enough to force the government
to deviate more and more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet
Cong formations from the vital populated areas. To help meet this
continuing influx of Communist regulars, the government had committed
its ground force to operations against base areas located in the remote
hinterlands with increasing frequency. More often than not these
multi-battalion offensives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do
Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting in scattered
and inconsequential clashes with small groups of Viet Cong. The
continuation of such actions, of course, worked to the advantage of the
Communists as the government forces expended time, energy, and lives
without exacting a commensurate price from the enemy.
Other disturbing trends had emerged on the South’s battlefields during
the course of the year. Following an action fought in the Mekong
Delta during early January in which the Viet Cong soundly defeated a
multi-battalion ARVN heliborne force, enemy main force units continued
to maintain their integrity and fought back when confronted with
helicopter assaults. This trend was evident even in the northern
provinces where each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared
to meet more determined resistance. Aside from the Viet Cong’s
new-found confidence in countering heliborne offensives, another source
of concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the appearance in the
South of several Viet Cong regimental headquarters during the year.
The activation of these headquarters, which assumed control of already
operational main force battalions, seemed to presage another phase of
Communist military escalation.
The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened in the aftermath of
the Diem coup. Subsequent to the widespread command changes ordered
by the new government, the morale, and in turn the effectiveness,
of the Vietnamese armed forces declined sharply. The Viet Cong moved
quickly to exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging a
rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow--attacks which
worked a profound influence on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet
Program. “The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American scholar,
“was accompanied by the complete collapse of the pacification efforts
in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control
quickly came under the influence of the Viet Cong.”[9-11] The nation’s
new leaders therefore formally terminated the badly damaged Strategic
Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be replaced with similar
pacification campaigns, most Vietnamese and American officials conceded
that much time and energy would be required to restore momentum to
the government’s efforts at securing the allegiance of the rural
population. So, by the end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness
of South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest ebb since the
intensification of the U.S. military assistance program in early 1962.
[Illustration: _ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during
an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (USMC Photo A420866)._]
This threatening situation was hardly consistent with American military
plans which were being implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary
of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved by him in the late summer
of 1963, these plans called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S.
servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The phased withdrawal plan,
whose ultimate objective was to end direct American participation in
the war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S. involvement while
simultaneously turning over more military responsibility to the South
Vietnamese. Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction was the 47-man
security platoon which had guarded the U.S. Marine task element’s
compound at Da Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the task
element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous note. While the Viet Cong
threat appeared on the rise, their own defenses were being reduced.
Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range plans already in
motion.
PART IV
AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964
CHAPTER 10
Marines Meet the Challenge
_New American Decisions--A Restructured Military Assistance
Command--Changes in Marine Leadership--Redesignation and
Reorganization--The Vietnamese Marine Brigade--Additional Marine
Activities_
_New American Decisions_
Less than three weeks after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the
U.S. Presidency changed hands. On 22 November President Kennedy was
assassinated in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took
the reigns of the American government. By late November, when the
new president assumed office, the process of political and military
disintegration which had begun in South Vietnam following the Diem
coup was already well underway. This process continued into the early
weeks of 1964 when, in late January, General Nguyen Khanh, the newly
appointed commander of I Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup.
This second turnover in the government of South Vietnam in less than
three months had its most serious impact on the nation’s armed forces.
A new series of command changes ensued and again the government’s
operations against the Communists suffered. As had been the case in the
closing months of 1963, the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the
government’s disarray by expanding its control into previously secure
areas.
By March the rapidly declining effectiveness of the South Vietnamese
military forces led the Johnson Administration to review the earlier
decisions to withdraw American servicemen and to cut back the military
assistance program. In a 16 March memorandum to President Johnson,
Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that “the [military] situation
had unquestionably been growing worse” in South Vietnam.[10-1] To
counteract this threatening trend, McNamara offered a broad set of
recommendations which included a proposal to support a 50,000-man
increase in the size of the Vietnamese military and paramilitary
forces. The memorandum did not address the question of additional
American advisors who might be needed to supervise the proposed
expansion. In any case, President Johnson approved McNamara’s plan the
following day, thus setting the stage for increases in U.S. military
assistance to South Vietnam.[10-2]
Shortly after his most recent decision on Vietnam, President Johnson
ordered changes in his top civilian and military representatives in
Saigon. On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, who
had been serving since January as Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeeded
General Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later, on the 23d, President
Johnson announced that General Maxwell D. Taylor would replace Henry
Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Taylor, who
had been serving since 1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, had been closely associated with the Vietnam problem since his
1961 fact-finding mission. Both he and Westmoreland were thoroughly
familiar with U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam.
Soon after assuming his new responsibilities, General Westmoreland
requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100
additional military personnel. In his opinion, these men were needed
to support and supervise the expansion of the Vietnamese military and
paramilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs on 20
July to discuss this request for 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional
support personnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situation in
Vietnam demanded the measure and recommended its approval. The proposal
was forwarded to President Johnson who approved it in early August.
Emphasizing the urgency of the military situation, McNamara then
ordered the Joint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up before 30
September. At this juncture, however, General Westmoreland pointed
out that such a rapid influx of personnel would “overload existing
facilities [in South Vietnam]” and stated his desire to see the
build-up accomplished in a more orderly progression over a period of
several months. After considering the general’s latest request, the
Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlier demand for an accelerated
deployment.[10-3]
[Illustration: _The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table
are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA.
Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to
General Westmoreland’s immediate left, and Brigadier General Carl A.
Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, is seated two positions
to General Weede’s left. (Photo courtesy of Major General Carl A.
Youngdale, USMC (Ret.))._]
While the details of the expanded U S. advisory program were being
hammered out in Washington, the focus of the administration’s concern
swung abruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam to the Tonkin
Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. In two separate incidents during
the first week of August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked U.S.
Navy ships operating in international waters.[10-A] An international
crisis ensued when the United States retaliated with limited air
strikes against North Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August, the
U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint resolution authorizing the
President “to use all measures, including the commitment of armed
forces to assist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its independence
and territorial integrity....”[10-4] President Johnson signed the
so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution five days after it was passed, and in
so doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for the Government of
Vietnam.[10-B]
[10-A] A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the
actual origins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been
claimed that the Americans precipitated the attacks by
supporting aggressive South Vietnamese naval patrols off
the North Vietnamese coast.
[10-B] U.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which
followed the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine
expeditionary brigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from
elements of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing and deployed on board amphibious shipping
to a position off Da Nang where it was available to
support U.S. contingency plans. Its commander, Brigadier
General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attended planning
conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possible landing
sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed.
Instead, the organization remained in existence
throughout the remainder of 1964 and into early 1965
when, in March, two of its battalions were landed at Da
Nang. The formation and subsequent commitment of the 9th
MEB in the Republic of Vietnam are covered in detail
in the 1965 history of U.S. Marine operations in the
Republic of Vietnam.
While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulf incidents never really
subsided, the immediate crisis soon passed. Thereafter the American
attentions focused once again on South Vietnam where the political and
military situation began to deteriorate at an unprecedented rate after
midyear. Ironically, this process of accelerated decay coincided with
the initiation of a new South Vietnamese pacification strategy designed
to prevent just such an occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was the
Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan. Announced by General Khanh
shortly after his rise to power, this campaign was similar in method
and objective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program. Like the earlier
program, the Chien Tang Plan envisioned the restoration of government
influence in selected rural areas through the coordination of military
and paramilitary operations with social and economic development
programs.[10-C] While the Chien Tang campaign was better planned and
far less ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program, there were
definite similarities between the two. The instrument for the social,
economic, and political developmental phase of the new effort, for
example, was the New Life Hamlet--a variation of the planned government
community. Begun in some areas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets
were to become the symbol of the new pacification effort in much the
same manner that the fortified hamlets had symbolized the earlier
Strategic Hamlet Program.
[10-C] Motivated at least partially by the requirement to
provide better support for the pacification strategy,
the Vietnamese government restructured its paramilitary
forces in the spring of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps
was expanded dramatically and renamed the Popular Force
(PF). The Civil Guard was reorganized and designated the
Regional Force (RF). More importantly, the RVNAF extended
its control over both paramilitary organizations for the
first time since their creation.
Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a similar but locally
concentrated pacification effort was instituted in the rural areas
around Saigon. Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign was
conceived in order to link the seven provinces around the capital into
a zone of intensive pacification in which closely coordinated military,
paramilitary, police, and civil activities would systematically reduce
Viet Cong strength. Because of their proximity to the area and their
availability, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN Airborne
Brigade were assigned primary responsibility for military operations in
support of the Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang and Hop Tac
plans emerged as the backbone of General Khanh’s strategy to stave off
further Communist advances in critical areas of the country.
The development of the government’s newest pacification strategy,
however, was based on the assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue
a campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s populated
rural areas. Such was not the case. Instead, at midyear the Communists
began waging a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale mobile
operations against government military forces. Obviously the enemy had
shifted to the “general counter-offensive”--that phase of guerrilla
warfare designed to bring on the complete political and military
collapse of the opposition.
The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in two general geographic
areas during the fall months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of
northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force regiments staged a series
of particularly swift and successful attacks which virtually eliminated
the government’s presence except in the province capital, Qui Nhon,
and a few district towns. In a coordinated offensive the Communists
increased pressure throughout that portion of the Central Highlands
west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby threatening to sever South Vietnam
along an axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon on the coast and
Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile, another phase of the new initiative
unfolded in III Corps where the government’s Hop Tac campaign was
just getting underway. There the Communist offensive threatened to
neutralize the government’s concentrated pacification campaign.
Eroded by the political side-effects of the battlefield developments,
South Vietnam’s fragile power structure became increasingly unstable.
The last five months of 1964 brought frequent changes in the Saigon
government although General Khanh was able to maintain a semblance of
control until December. The turmoil then climaxed when Air Vice Marshal
Nguyen Cao Ky, the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineered a
bloodless coup that forced Khanh from the Saigon political scene.
The frequent changes of government coupled with the stepped-up Viet
Cong military pressure throughout Vietnam produced a downward spiral
in the effectiveness of the republic’s armed forces. By the end of the
year it was becoming increasingly doubtful that the government could
stave off total collapse even with the increased volume of military
assistance it was already receiving from the United States. Against
this backdrop of Communist military activities, unprecedented political
instability on the part of the South Vietnamese, and mounting combat
losses, American military involvement in Vietnam deepened.
_A Restructured Military Assistance Command_
In many respects 1964 was a year of transition for the U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam. Not only did the command experience a
change in leadership when General Westmoreland replaced General Harkins
as ComUSMACV, but it was thoroughly reorganized in preparation for the
more vigorous U.S. advisory program which was expected to begin about
midyear.
The major organizational change within MACV took place on 15 May when
the MAAG was abolished and its staff integrated into that of the
senior command. In June MACV itself was restructured under a new table
of distribution. These changes reflected the anticipated influx of
advisors and support personnel, and therefore concerned the Army more
than the other U.S. armed services.
Initially, the number of Marine billets on the restructured Military
Assistance Command staff did not change substantially. Twenty-four
Marines (15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in the new table
of distribution. This represented a net increase of only one over the
number previously assigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By the end of
September, however, Marines temporarily assigned to the MACV staff from
FMFPac commands brought the on-board strength to 37. Another increase
occurred in the early fall when eight more permanent Marine billets
(three officers and five enlisted) were approved.
_Changes in Marine Leadership_
Two key links in the Marine command chain that joined government policy
decisions in Washington to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam changed
hands during the first 60 days of 1964. On 1 January, General Wallace
M. Greene, Jr., replaced General Shoup as Commandant of the Marine
Corps. Greene, known in American military circles as a brilliant staff
officer, had been serving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Marine
Corps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken supporter of South Vietnam’s
struggle for independence. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
as a Chief of Service, his presence in administration policies would be
felt until his tour as commandant ended on 31 January 1967.
An equally important change occurred in early March when General
Greene named Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak to replace General
Roberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy, Krulak had won the Navy Cross during ground action in
World War II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washington where he had
served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as special assistant for
counterinsurgency matters. Having made numerous fact-finding trips to
Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimately familiar with the unique
political-military struggle being waged there. He also had a reputation
of being one of Washington’s most vocal advocates of resisting
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. A dynamic leader and a man of
strong convictions, Krulak was to exert a pervasive influence over all
Marine operations in the Pacific for nearly half a decade.
Less obvious but of immense importance to both the Marine Corps and
to the future of U.S. military operations in Vietnam was a change
instituted within MACV by General Westmoreland during the early part
of the year. The command’s modified table of organization called for
the establishment of a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by an Army
general officer. The joint table of distribution for the reorganized
command specified that an Army general would also fill the chief
of staff billet--a position which had been held by General Weede
since MACV’s creation in early 1962. Thus, when Weede’s assignment
ended in May, Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, became
Westmoreland’s chief of staff while Lieutenant General John L.
Throckmorton, U.S. Army, became Deputy ComUSMACV.[10-D] The Marine
Corps, however, did not lose its entire senior presence on the MACV
staff. Brigadier General Carl A. Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year
career included distinguished combat tours in both World War II and
Korea, arrived 15 January for assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff,
J-2 (Intelligence). His presence on the MACV staff would insure a
Marine voice in U.S. military planning at the Saigon level. Still, many
Marines saw their relative strength on Westmoreland’s staff seriously
reduced--a change which seemed to mark somewhat of a turning point in
the overall management of the military assistance effort.
[10-D] For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede was
awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.
_Redesignation and Reorganization_
The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
had little initial effect on the Marine advisory program. With the
dissolution of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, under which the Marine
advisors had operated since 1955, was redesignated the Naval Advisory
Group, MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren’s Marine Advisory Division,
whose authorized strength remained at 11 officers and nine enlisted
men through the first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May.
Known thereafter as the Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, the organization
continued to function in much the same manner as it had under the
previous arrangements.
The last five months of the year, however, saw some substantial changes
in the composition of the Marine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-up
recently approved by the Secretary of Defense began. Colonel William P.
Nesbit, a recent graduate of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted from lieutenant colonel on
1 July) as the Senior Marine Advisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit
arrived in time to supervise the implementation of a new table of
organization which added eight first lieutenants and a captain to the
advisory unit in November.[10-E] The captain and one of the lieutenants
were assigned as advisor and assistant advisor respectively to a new
Vietnamese Marine infantry battalion which was in the process of
being formed. Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit’s
command as assistant advisors to existing infantry battalions and one
became the assistant artillery advisor. The two remaining lieutenants
were assigned as advisors to the brigade’s motor transport and
communications companies, replacing noncommissioned advisors. Two
billets were downgraded in rank: the engineer advisor from captain to
first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor from major to captain.
[10-E] A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly
created billets did not arrive until early 1965.
In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisor billets, these
changes relieved the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor of his artillery
responsibilities. Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had been serving since
mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief of Staff, was instrumental in bringing
about this particular modification. Under the old arrangement, the
Senior Marine Advisor’s presence frequently had been required at
the MAAG headquarters in Saigon while the Vietnamese Marine Brigade
headquarters was deployed to combat. As the Assistant Senior Marine
Advisor was likewise torn between two jobs, Anderson had directed that
he be relieved of artillery advisory duties. Thus, Major Raymond C.
Damm, an officer who had served as Assistant Naval Attache in Saigon
between 1959 and 1961, became the first full-time Assistant Senior
Marine Advisor after he joined Colonel Nesbit’s command in May. When
the changes were finally completed, the restructured and redesignated
Marine Advisory Unit included permanent billets for 24 officers and
men (18 officers and six enlisted men).
Another important aspect of the overall Marine advisory program was
altered in the closing months of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel
Croizat’s tour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immediate post-Geneva
period, most Marine advisors had attended French language courses
prior to departing for service in Vietnam. As French influence in
Vietnam faded during the late 1950s, however, the requirement for
the language had gradually diminished, particularly as French maps
were replaced by American ones. By the early 1960s this situation had
prompted several Marine advisors to recommend that instruction in
French be replaced by Vietnamese language training. Primarily through
the persistence of Colonels Moody and Noren, the policy was revised in
1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fall marked the first time
that Marine officers had received formal Vietnamese language training
before beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, who had the advantage of
commanding advisors trained in both languages, saw the change as “a
marked step forward,” in improving the advisory effort.[10-5]
_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_
At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Vietnamese Marine Brigade,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisis
of morale. The recent command changes that had occurred at almost
every echelon and a soaring desertion rate combined to undermine
the brigade’s combat readiness. In February the Khanh government
recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from the Philippines, promoted him to
brigadier general, and reinstated him as commandant in an attempt to
restore the unit’s spirit. A veteran Marine who had been instrumental
in the development of the VNMC since its inception, Khang commanded
confidence throughout the corps. Following his return, increased
attention was given to the welfare of the individual Marine and his
dependents in order to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Under the
close supervision of the senior Vietnamese officers and their American
advisors, the morale problem was gradually overcome.
Throughout the year the Vietnamese Marine Brigade continued to share
the role of South Vietnam’s general reserve force with an ARVN airborne
brigade. Normally at least one Marine battalion was held in the
vicinity of Saigon, ready to respond to tactical emergencies while
others operated nearby in support of the Hop Tac campaign. Still, the
brigade’s infantry battalions managed to see action in every corps
tactical zone except I Corps, which was the farthest removed from
the capital.[10-F] Although sometimes combined into regimental-sized
task forces for specific operations, the individual Marine battalions
normally were attached to either a corps, a province, or an ARVN
division for combat operations. When so attached, the Vietnamese
Marines often were assigned to clear particularly hazardous or
difficult terrain. At times they served as a reserve force, responding
to crucial situations to either recoup or exploit actions initiated by
other government units.
[10-F] South Vietnam’s corps boundaries were adjusted again in
late 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved
south to include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border
of II Corps was also moved southward to include eight
provinces formerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the
new arrangement, III CTZ formed a narrow strip across
the nation which centered roughly on Saigon. The Capital
Military District, the boundaries of which coincided with
those of Gia Dinh Province, formed an enclave within
III Corps. The southernmost tactical zone, IV Corps,
encompassed the entire Mekong Delta.
In early January, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff assigned a Marine
task force to a pacification mission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces,
located just southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions, controlled by
a task force headquarters, moved into the operations area later in
the month and remained until mid-September when the operation was
terminated. The object of the Marine unit’s presence was to reestablish
government control over the region through systematic small unit
operations designed to deny the enemy his usual freedom of movement.
[Illustration:
CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
AT THE END OF 1964
]
Despite the length of this particular deployment, the Vietnamese
Marines fought no major engagements. Furthermore, they had not
translated their improved morale into an effective pacification
operation. While desertions and unauthorized absences remained low
considering the duration of this particular assignment, Colonel Noren
later recalled several flaws in the campaign. These operations, he
remarked “were characterized by inadequate coordination of military
operations and intelligence reporting ... too little operational
activity ... and a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectives of
pacification.”[10-6] Colonel Nesbit, who became the Senior Marine
Advisor as the operation entered its final stages, tended to confirm
this assessment. “The capacity of the task force headquarters in staff
functioning,” he reported, “was marginal.”[10-7]
[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the
Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines. With him
are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese
Marine Corps, and Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (Official USMC Photo)._]
While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long An areas was in progress,
other Vietnamese Marine task forces were organized to undertake
different combat assignments elsewhere in the southern portion of
Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions, an artillery detachment, and
a headquarters element, launched a brief clearing operation northwest
of Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Province in January. A similar
operation involving another task force was conducted the next month in
the difficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Province at the southern tip
of the nation. In both cases the government offensives enjoyed local
success, but failed to reduce significantly the enemy’s capabilities
and influence in the area.
Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marine commanders and their American
advisors engaged in renewed efforts to restructure and expand the
Vietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for the most part in July, the
salient feature of this latest reorganization was the creation of a new
infantry battalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a small base about
12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newly organized 5th Battalion devoted
the remainder of the year and the first six months of 1965 to forming
and training its companies. It finally became combat ready in June
1965.
[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JULY
1964
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 6,555]
Aside from the addition of the new infantry battalion, the mid-1964
reorganization produced other noteworthy changes in the structure
of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery battalion, the two
75mm pack howitzer batteries were combined into one battery of eight
weapons, while the one 105mm howitzer battery was divided to form two
new batteries of six howitzers each. The tables of equipment were
revised to reflect these adjustments. Another significant change
occurred in the area of training. The Training Company was deleted from
the Amphibious Support Battalion and a separate recruit training center
was created at Thu Duc near Saigon. Tactical planning and control was
also improved when the Brigade Headquarters was reduced in size and two
smaller Task Force Headquarters (Task Force A and Task Force B) were
formed.
Following the mid-1964 reorganization, the Vietnamese Marines performed
combat missions not unlike those they had been assigned prior to
July. One exception was that the brigade no longer found itself
tasked with actual pacification phases of operations. Instead, the
Marine battalions concentrated on clearing operations around Saigon
in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign. Additionally, the various
battalions were called upon occasionally during this period to provide
security for key government installations located in Saigon and Vung
Tau--assignments which gave the infantry units much needed respites
from field duty.
By the end of the year the Vietnamese Marine Corps had been improved in
several areas. In the motor transport field two new pieces of equipment
were put into full-time operation--a high pressure steam cleaner and
an M-108 wrecker. Progress also was made in upgrading the entire
communications capability of the brigade when the table of equipment
was revised in accordance with the modified table of organization. The
new tables provided for modern test and repair equipment and eliminated
obsolete and impractical items. Other unrealized improvements were
still in their formative stages as the year closed. In the field of
supply, for example, the brigade supply officer, with assistance
from his American advisor, was drawing up plans which would give the
Vietnamese Marines a more responsive and more manageable system.
While the technically oriented programs were being developed and
implemented, intensified training programs were preparing more
and better trained Vietnamese Marines for their responsibilities.
Established in July, the Marine Training Center at Thu Duc had
graduated 1,464 recruits before the end of the year. These recruits,
moreover, were trained by Vietnamese noncommissioned officers who had
recently completed the drill instructor course at Marine Corps Recruit
Depot, San Diego. For the first time since its inception, the VNMC was
benefiting from a flow of recruits trained by Vietnamese Marines at a
separate Marine training facility.
Other programs likewise were helping prepare Vietnamese officers
and noncommissioned officers to command and manage their growing
service. A total of 718 officers and noncommissioned officers attended
various training courses in South Vietnam during the year while 42
more officers attended formal schools in the United States during the
same period. Another 52 small unit leaders participated in on-the-job
training programs with U.S. Marine units on Okinawa between January and
December.[10-8]
Unfortunately, these developments were overshadowed by a military
disaster which befell the 4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the
year. The Marine unit had been serving since early December as the
reserve force for III Corps Tactical Zone. On the 27th an estimated
Viet Cong battalion overran the small pro-government town of Binh
Gia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35 miles east of Saigon.
III Corps officials reacted by dispatching the 4th Battalion and an
ARVN Ranger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion, accompanied by
two U.S. Marine advisors and three OJT observers from the 3d Marine
Division, was ordered to recapture the town. It proceeded to do so on
the 30th, encountering no enemy opposition. Later in the day, while the
Marines were developing defensive positions around the town, a spotter
aircraft sighted a large Viet Cong force approximately two miles to the
west and called for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicopter gunship was
shot down and its crew killed while attacking the target.
Against the advice of his senior U.S. Marine Advisor, Captain Franklin
P. Eller, the 4th Battalion commander ordered one of his companies
to secure the crash site and recover the bodies of the dead crewmen.
Accompanied by Eller, First Lieutenant James P. Kelliher, and Staff
Sergeant Clifford J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, the company
moved west from Binh Gia on the morning of the 31st to carry out the
mission. After reaching the crash site, the Marine unit was ambushed
by a large Viet Cong force using 82mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles,
and .50 caliber machine guns. Unable to maneuver because of the intense
fire, the company radioed for assistance and began withdrawing from the
ambush site in small groups.
[Illustration: _Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th
Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised
units operating nearby. (USMC Photo A183570)._]
The battalion commander, accompanied by the assistant Marine advisor,
First Lieutenant Philip O. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to the
call for assistance by leading the remaining three companies from
their positions at Binh Gia. Just outside the town they met Captain
Eller, who had been wounded in the face, along with Lieutenant Kelliher
and the remnants of the hard-hit company. Eller and the survivors of
the morning ambush returned to Binh Gia while the remainder of the
battalion pushed westward in an attempt to locate the enemy force.
Later in the morning, the Marine column was surprised while moving
through an abandoned rubber plantation by a Communist force of between
1,200 and 1,800 men.
No artillery was available to support the beleaguered battalion.
Vietnamese Air Force A-1 Skyraiders, however, were able to deliver
close air strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army helicopter gunships
replaced the Skyraiders on station, but their rocket and machine gun
fire proved too light to dislodge the enemy from his positions under
the dense vegetation. By late afternoon, 29 of the 4th Battalion’s 35
officers, including the battalion commander, were dead. In desperation,
the Americans organized the surviving Vietnamese Marines into small
groups some of which managed to slip past the Viet Cong and find their
way back to Binh Gia.
The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their most decisive defeat of the
war. Their losses were extremely high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and
13 missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipment losses included 142
weapons and over a dozen radios. Additionally, all four of the U.S.
Marines who had participated in the disastrous action had been wounded.
Both Captain Eller and Lieutenant Brady were later awarded the Silver
Star Medal for their roles in the battle.[10-G] Captain Donald G. Cook,
one of the OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division, was missing in
action at the close of the battle.[10-H]
[10-G] Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more
frequently to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier
in the year (16 February), a Marine captain, Donald
E. Koelper, an advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine
Battalion earned a Navy Cross, the nation’s second
highest award for heroism. Koelper was decorated for
warning the occupants of a crowded American theater in
Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of a
Viet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a Viet
Cong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number
of casualties to three killed and 51 wounded.
[10-H] It was later learned that Captain Cook had been wounded
and captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in
captivity in 1967.
The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered a similar fate,
incurring nearly 400 casualties in another violent ambush. Thus, within
a 24-hour period two elite government battalions had been shattered.
Only later was it learned that the Marines and rangers had clashed with
two main force regiments of the _9th Viet Cong Division_--the first
Communist division to become operational in South Vietnam.
As a result of the disastrous engagement at Binh Gia, the 4th
Vietnamese Marine Battalion was rendered ineffective as a fighting
force for a period of three months. This loss created two immediate
problems for General Khang and his American advisors. It reduced the
brigade’s available infantry strength by approximately 25 percent and
placed an added burden on the recruit training center which was already
laboring to provide enough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. For
the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on a discouraging note.
[Illustration: _Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4th
Vietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumously awarded the first Navy
Cross for action in Vietnam. (USMC Photo A411741)._]
_Additional Marine Activities_
U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam War during 1964 was not
limited to the activities of the advisory division and the helicopter
task element. Various other Marine units and detachments made
significant, although less publicized, contributions to the war effort
throughout the year. One of these was the Marine security detachment
which continued to protect the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Twice during
the year the growing political unrest and the increasing threat of
Communist terrorist attacks prompted the expansion of the security
detachment, first in April and again in October. By the end of the year
the detachment’s strength stood at 30 Marines--a figure which made it
the second largest such unit in the world. Only the Marine detachment
in Paris, with 37 officers and men, was larger. And nowhere was an
embassy guard assignment more dangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist
attacks were apt to occur at anytime.
Other groups of Marines performed an assortment of missions in
support of the Government of Vietnam during the course of the year.
The Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, for example, continued
its duties at the U.S. Army Communications installation in Pleiku.
A handful of these Marines also served at a newly opened U.S. Army
communications station at Phu Bai some eight miles southeast of Hue.
The strength of the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, however,
was reduced from 42 officers and men to only 16 by the end of December.
The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially larger Marine
communications detachment introduced into the northern provinces of
South Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and Phu Bai, this unit
was composed exclusively of Marines and included an infantry element
for security purposes. Designated the Signal Engineering Survey Unit,
the radio detachment consisted of three officers and 27 enlisted men
drawn from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and from Headquarters Marine
Corps. This element, commanded by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived
at Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry detachment from
Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. The infantry element, reinforced
with an 81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded by First
Lieutenant Raymond J. Otlowski. Major Gray assumed overall command of
the composite force which was designated Marine Detachment, Advisory
Team One. Advisory Team One became the first actual Marine ground unit
to conduct independent operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted the bulk of the newly formed
unit to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe Sanh
in northwestern Quang Tri Province in the closing days of May. Two
officers and five enlisted communicators remained behind at Da Nang
and a four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Army compound at Phu
Bai to provide radio support for the main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory
Team One initially concentrated on building a solid supply base prior
to undertaking actual communications operations. ARVN truck convoys
brought the preponderance of its supplies from Quang Tri over Route 9,
the old colonial road that snaked through the Annamite Mountains into
Laos. While Major Gray and his men proceeded with this task, Marine
UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted an ARVN infantry company onto Tiger
Tooth Mountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-covered mountain located eight
miles north of the CIDG Camp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger
Tooth Mountain is the highest terrain feature in northern I Corps. On
13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopters lifted Major Gray, nine enlisted
men, and several thousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landing
zone which the South Vietnamese troops had hacked out near the top of
the rugged mountain. The ARVN soldiers, who had established a rough
perimeter around a peak slightly below the mountain’s highest point,
were on hand to greet the small group of Americans. After the initial
helilift, however, bad weather in the form of dense clouds intervened
to delay the remainder of the movement for an entire week. SHUFLY
helicopters finally completed the mission on 21 June. When the helilift
concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100 Vietnamese troops were strung
around and across a 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth’s highest
elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks remained at Khe Sanh to provide a
pool from which fresh security forces and radiomen could be drawn when
needed.
MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marines on Tiger Tooth Mountain
from patrolling or engaging in any other activity which could have been
construed as offensive in nature. As a result of this restriction,
Major Gray’s men were confined to defensive positions around the crude
little landing zone and the tents which housed the radio equipment.
Even so, life on the mountain was extremely rigorous. The clouds
which frequently enshrouded the mountain top left the Marines, their
clothing, weapons, and equipment constantly damp. High winds heightened
their discomfort. The local weather conditions also made food and water
deliveries to the position hazardous and irregular. Marine UH-34Ds
prepositioned at Khe Sanh brought C rations and water cans whenever the
clouds revealed Tiger Tooth’s higher elevations. Often, however, the
weather did not break for days. Normally the men were limited to two
canteens of water daily--a restriction which made bathing and shaving
impossible. Because of the harsh living conditions on the mountain,
fresh security forces and radio men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two
week intervals, weather permitting.
[Illustration:
MARINE DETACHMENT
ADVISORY TEAM ONE
OPERATIONS IN I CTZ
MAY-AUGUST 1964
]
Advisory Team One operated in the extreme northwestern corner of the
republic without incident until the second week of July. Then a severe
storm struck its mountaintop base, blowing away tents and antennae,
collapsing fighting positions, and generally disrupting operations.
Several nights later, on the 17th, a Viet Cong force of undetermined
size probed the Marine sector of the perimeter. An intense exchange
of small arms and automatic weapons fire ensued for nearly two hours.
Although the Marines suffered no casualties and could find no dead or
wounded Viet Cong the next day, it was apparent that their location had
been compromised.
Amid reports of increasing Communist activity throughout the area, MACV
authorities in Saigon promptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw his force
from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunately good weather permitted Marine
helicopters from Da Nang to helilift the men and their equipment from
the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after the firefight. On the 22d, Air
Force C-123 transports airlifted the entire Marine detachment to Da
Nang. There Gray and his Marines crowded into the old French compound
occupied by the helicopter task element. Although cramped, the SHUFLY
facilities provided welcome relief for the men who had endured the
rigors of Tiger Tooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly two months.
While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a small group of radiomen to
Monkey Mountain, a rocky, jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into the
South China Sea just northeast of the city. There in relative comfort
and safety, the technicians conducted equipment tests for two weeks.
Several changes in the leadership and composition of the advisory
team took place during this interval. Captain Raymond A. Becker, a
communications officer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, relieved
Major Gray as the commander of the unit on 13 August. Soon thereafter
a reinforced infantry company, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,
commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replaced Lieutenant Otlowski and
the Company G Marines as the advisory team’s security element.
Under Captain Becker’s command, Advisory Team One redeployed, this
time to Dong Bach Ma, a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 miles
west-northwest of Da Nang. An abandoned French resort, still untouched
by the war, sprawled across the higher elevations of Bach Ma and a hard
surface road curved up its steep northern face from Route 1. Using this
road ARVN trucks moved Captain Irwin and the infantry element to the
newly selected site in advance of the radio personnel. Once atop the
mountain, Irwin had his men establish a perimeter around an abandoned
monastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared a small helicopter
landing zone near the old but well-preserved religious building
which was to serve as their base of operations. On 19 August Marine
helicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communicators, and some 4,000
pounds of equipment to the site from Da Nang.
Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marine helicopters for logistical
support, operated without incident from the quaint old monastery
until the second week of September. The composite unit completed its
operations at Bach Ma on the 10th whereupon it returned to Da Nang.
Within days the detachment was disbanded without fanfare. The radio
experts returned to their parent commands in Hawaii and Washington
while Company K was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the 3d
Battalion, 3d Marines. The quiet dissolution of the Marine Detachment,
Advisory Team One, ended the first brief and little publicized chapter
of Marine ground unit operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
In October an element of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine
Division, operating from ships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an
extensive survey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps. The purpose
of its survey was to determine the feasibility of establishing a
naval facility. Marine counterintelligence teams from FMFPac also
were temporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periods throughout the
year. These officers and noncommissioned officers normally augmented
the U.S. Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during their stay in
Vietnam. Another group of Marines to employ their skills in the
counterinsurgency environment was a small Special Operations Group of
six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marines conducted operations
under the auspices of MACV.
A more permanent influx of Marines into the war-torn republic occurred
in the last quarter of the year. In response to the intensified
advisory effort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July, General Greene,
the new Marine Commandant, assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that the Marines could be expected to carry their share of the
increased burden. Shortly thereafter, the Marine Corps was directed to
provide 60 officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as advisors
with ARVN units in I Corps Tactical Zone. These orders, later described
by Major Damm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor to the VNMC as
“very short fused ones,” were executed without delay.[10-9] The 3d
Marine Division was given short notice to select suitable personnel
and to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV. In response to these
instructions, the Okinawa-based command quickly formed four advisory
teams, each composed of four men--a captain, a first lieutenant, a
gunnery sergeant, and a corporal (who was to serve as the team’s radio
operator). Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, the first increment of
Marine advisors was airlifted to Da Nang by KC-130 in mid-September.
Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S. Advisor, Colonel Howard B.
St. Clair, U.S. Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marines being
assigned individually to battalions of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions.
Major Walker joined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang as assistant
operations officer. The balance of the 60 new Marine advisors were
formed into teams on Okinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuing
weeks. By December the advisors, who had initially been drawn from
the 3d Marine Division, were being replaced gradually by officers and
noncommissioned officers just beginning their normal 12-month overseas
tours.
Two additional permanent Marine advisor billets were also approved
in the closing weeks of 1964. These were created within the Naval
Advisory Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy in controlling one of
South Vietnam’s most troublesome areas--the Rung Sat Special Zone
(RSSZ). Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of the Long Tao
River, the main ship channel to the capital, the Rung Sat was a vast,
difficult-to-penetrate, mangrove swamp. Due largely to its relative
inaccessibility, the area had been developed by the Viet Cong into a
key base for supporting their operations in the surrounding provinces.
More significantly, by early 1964 the Communist-held Rung Sat posed a
serious threat to commercial ships bound for Saigon. For this reason
the responsibility for pacifying the area was turned over to the
Vietnamese Navy in April.
Initially one Marine major, Edward J. Bronars, was assigned to assist
and advise the Vietnamese Navy in its attempts to secure the Rung
Sat. In November, however, the RSSZ advisory staff was reorganized to
include one Marine captain and one sergeant. Although they did not
arrive for duty until early the following year, the newly approved
billets created the third distinct group of Marine ground advisors
assigned to the Republic of Vietnam.[10-10]
The OJT program continued in effect for junior Marine officers and
staff noncommissioned officers throughout 1964. Near the end of
the year the program was broadened somewhat to include members of
Hawaii-based Marine commands. Each month 10 Leathernecks arrived at
Da Nang to begin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY headquarters the
visitors were briefed as a group before being attached individually
to specific South Vietnamese units for the duration of their stay in
Vietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncommissioned officers
joined a unit already being advised by a U.S. Marine. When possible,
the OJT was assigned to a unit which could benefit from his particular
military and technical skills. Still, the on-the-job-trainee was not
always considered an asset. “In honesty,” one permanent advisor to the
Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, “OJTs were a mixed blessing--they
provided some help but they also were an added responsibility for the
VNMC commander who was charged with their safety.” “Some OJTs,” he
added, “received misperceptions of the capability of the Viet Cong
since their knowledge/experience was limited to the events occurring
during their brief 30-day tour.”[10-11] Nevertheless, a significant
number of Marine small unit leaders were able to gain some degree
of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla warfare under the
provisions on the OJT program.[10-I]
[10-I] The 3d Marine Division’s OJT program did not end until
after elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March
1965. The Marine Advisory Unit experimented successfully
with another form of augmentation in the first days of
1965. When the Vietnamese Marines deployed to the Binh
Gia area with a provisional brigade in early January,
Colonel Nesbit, who was still serving as Senior Marine
Advisor, requested additional personnel to assist
and advise at the staff level. FMFPac responded by
temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men
to the advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine
officers and seven additional enlisted men, all of whom
remained attached to the Marine Advisory Unit for the
duration of the operation. The temporarily assigned
Marines returned to their parent organizations when the
operation terminated. This is covered in more detail in
the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam.
A similar but shorter term program for field grade officers and
colonels, the Job Related Orientation (JRO) Program, also took hold
during the early months of 1964. Instituted in the last half of the
previous year, the JRO program provided for a small number of staff
officers from the various FMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquarters
in Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period. Small groups of these
officers arrived at Da Nang from Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were
briefed by the helicopter task element commander and his staff. Later
they were afforded an orientation flight over the northern provinces.
Next, the visiting officers were flown to Saigon where they received
more briefings at MACV headquarters. In the capital, where they were
hosted by the Senior Marine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marine
units and discussed tactics and problem areas with the advisors.
After four days in the Republic of Vietnam the Marines travelled on
to Bangkok where they spent the balance of their visit. Upon the
conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer was required to submit a
detailed written report to the Commanding General, FMFPac. In turn,
extracts of these reports were forwarded to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps in Washington.
Generally these reports addressed tactical, operational, logistics,
and intelligence matters. But a number of the Marine officers used
the reporting system to articulate their opinions relative to the
overall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P. Baker, a member of the
3d Marine Division staff who visited Vietnam in March, pointed out
that field advisors and MACV staff members differed sharply in their
personal assessments of progress being made. The field advisors, Baker
observed, demonstrated far less optimism than did the staff members.
Furthermore, he reported that unless the people of South Vietnam
could be won over to the government, the Viet Cong’s success could be
expected to continue.[10-12] Another officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harry
E. Dickinson, summarized his conclusions with an even more emphatic
warning:
The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units should not be effected
except to protect the seat of government. While local success might
be achieved in certain areas, it is extremely doubtful whether any
lasting degree of success would entail in the northern and western
sections. As combat units were increased, the forces of Vietnam
would do less and less with the inevitable conflict of overall
command. The end result would be the ringing of the country with
combat units but no solution for the internal conflict. I strongly
disagree that any two or three divisions could achieve real victory
as has been stated in the press.[10-13]
Through candid reporting of this nature, Marine commanders from Okinawa
to Washington were kept abreast of the complex and difficult problems
being generated by the war in Southeast Asia.
CHAPTER 11
Spring and Summer Fighting
_The Monsoons--The Weather Breaks--Sure Wind 202--Operations Elsewhere
in I Corps--Changing the Watch_
Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, the strength of the Marine task
element at Da Nang stood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened.
Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 continued its assignment as the task
element’s helicopter squadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy’s
204-man MABS-16 sub unit retained responsibility for maintaining and
operating the support facilities.
Shortly after New Year’s Day, ComUSMACV advised Colonel Gomez that
the entire Marine task element would be withdrawn from the Republic
of Vietnam during the first half of 1964. This decision was one of
CinCPac’s continuing responses to the Defense Department plans for
reducing the level of direct American military involvement in Vietnam.
Additionally, Gomez was informed that the task element would be called
upon to initiate a training program designed to prepare Vietnamese Air
Force pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds. This
program was scheduled to culminate with the takeover of the 24 Marine
helicopters by a new VNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequent
departure of the entire task element for Okinawa where it would rejoin
MAG-16, its parent organization.[11-1]
_The Monsoons_
The new year broke with Marine flight operations at Da Nang still
proceeding at a reduced rate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As had
been the case at the close of 1963, medical evacuation and resupply
missions continued to constitute the major source of work for HMM-361’s
crews. The first Marine helicopter loss during 1964 occurred during
one such mission on 3 January when an aircraft was shot down while
attempting to perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles due west
of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on its descent toward the landing
zone, the UH-34D crashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculously escaped
injury and was rescued by another Marine helicopter. The aircraft,
damaged beyond repair, was intentionally destroyed by U.S. Special
Forces personnel. This was only the second Marine helicopter loss
definitely attributed to Communist fire since SHUFLY’s arrival at Soc
Trang nearly two years earlier.
In the second week of January the weather over the mountains west to
Da Nang broke long enough for Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ squadron to
accomplish a critical trooplift. On short notice the Marines were
ordered to remove a 200-man CIDG force from the hills about 30 miles
west-southwest of Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor, the
South Vietnamese unit had been conducting a reconnaissance in force
about eight miles west of its camp at An Diem.[11-A] Under cover of the
monsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. or VNAF air support, Viet
Cong elements of undetermined strength had closed in on the government
force, threatening to isolate and destroy it before the weather lifted.
[11-A] See map of outposts in I CTZ, page 81.
The immediate nature of this particular mission left little time for
detailed planning and briefing. I Corps headquarters could only advise
the Marines of such vital information as the unit’s radio call sign,
radio frequency, size, and location. To familiarize himself with
the terrain in the vicinity of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel
Ross first made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an O-1B. His
reconnaissance revealed the landing zone to be “a precarious hill top
knob exposed to a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.[11-2]
The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron commander returned to
Da Nang, exchanged the O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14
helicopters to the pickup point. In accordance with the squadron’s
standing operating procedure, Ross, the flight leader, was to land
first, drop off a loadmaster, and lift out the first Vietnamese
heliteam. Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead helicopter
was forced away by heavy small arms fire which punctured the aft
section of the aircraft’s fuselage, wounding the loadmaster.
The second aircraft, following at close interval, was also hit.
Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered the entire formation into a
holding pattern out of small arms range while he attempted to persuade
the American advisor to move the Vietnamese unit overland a short
distance to a less exposed landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S.
advisor was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,” Ross concluded, “that
his real concern was the shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts
about being able to get them moving to the alternate site.”[11-3] After
some delay the Vietnamese unit finally moved to the new landing zone,
whereupon the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the helicopters
were exposed to unnecessary risks.
Understandably concerned with problems of this nature which tended to
plague all but the larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel
Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to make operational
decisions based upon considerations beyond their own tactical
problems.”[11-4] In this particular case the selection of the exposed
hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the Marine commander’s
complaints.
[Illustration: _Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared
landing zone. (USMC Photo A329576)._]
During the second week of January, General Greene, the newly appointed
Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at Da
Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection of the compound and was
briefed on operations by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting
combat decorations to several members of the task element, Greene
departed for Hawaii where he was to visit the FMFPac headquarters.
The Commandant summed up his impressions of the Marine helicopter task
element in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services
several weeks after his return to Washington. “I was assured by
General Harkins and his officers--and by the officers of the supported
Vietnamese units--that this squadron has performed its supporting
mission in an outstanding manner,” related Greene. “Everything that
I observed,” he added, “certainly attested to the high morale and
effectiveness of this unit.”[11-5][11-A]
[11-A] A more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter task
element was Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff.
An experienced aviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a
Marine bomber squadron (VMB-443) in the latter stages of
World War II. While serving as the MAAG Chief of Staff
during 1963 and 1964, Anderson participated in a number
of combat missions as a pilot with the various squadrons
assigned to SHUFLY.
Late January and early February saw the normal rotation of several of
the task element’s key personnel as well as its helicopter squadron.
On 14 January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officer with a diverse
military background, assumed command of SHUFLY. Merchant had commanded
an artillery battalion on Okinawa in World War II, a Marine attack
squadron in Korea, and had served on the joint staff of the Specified
Commander for the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958 Lebanon
Operation. More recently he had graduated from the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces. Having flown with the task element’s squadron
while on temporary duty in Vietnam the previous October and since
his arrival in early January, Merchant was thoroughly familiar with
SHUFLY’s operations.
Command of the MABS-16 sub unit changed hands two weeks later when
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy.
Beal, also a veteran of World War II and Korea, came from the 4th
Marines in Hawaii where he had served as that unit’s air liaison
officer.
Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 ended its tour at Da Nang on 1
February. The squadron’s arrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided
with the arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit’s flight
statistics had suffered also from the interruption caused by the
political infighting which had deposed President Diem. As a result, its
operations never reached the sustained tempo which had characterized
the records of the Marine helicopter squadrons previously assigned to
SHUFLY. Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ UH-34Ds totalled 4,236 combat flight
hours and just under 7,000 combat sorties--figures which, considering
the conditions surrounding their accumulation, compared favorably with
the number of combat flight hours (7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged
by the four previous UH-34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.[11-6]
HMM-364, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. La Voy, a pilot who
had flown his first combat helicopter missions during the Korean War,
initiated support operations from Da Nang on 1 February. Under the
existing plans to deactivate the Marine task element, La Voy’s squadron
was scheduled to be the last Marine helicopter unit to operate in
South Vietnam. As such, HMM-364’s pilots and maintenance crews were to
launch the training program that would prepare the Vietnamese Air Force
personnel to take over the Marine helicopters upon the task element’s
departure from Da Nang.
On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamese pilots began a
50-hour package of flight instruction under the supervision of
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s pilots. Included in the course of
instruction were operational missions, night and instrument flying,
formation work, and landing practice. Each student was already a
qualified copilot with at least 25 flight hours in VNAF UH-34s--a
factor which allowed the training to be conducted concurrently with
normal operations. This was accomplished by having the Vietnamese
trainees fly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operational flights.
In addition to being an effective training method this system had two
other advantages. First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquire
a first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tactics most commonly used
in the northern provinces. Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel
La Voy’s squadron to concentrate on its primary mission of providing
combat support for the ground forces in I Corps.
Another vital aspect of the training program involved preparing
Vietnamese ground personnel to keep the squadron operational. This
demanded extensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs, engineering,
supply, operations, and ordnance personnel. “This additional duty,”
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy explained, “was a tremendous burden on all
departments of my squadron, whose primary job was to keep aircraft in
commission and to conduct combat operations.” The language barrier
understandably threatened the success of the overall training effort.
In La Voy’s opinion, however, “the eagerness of the students to learn
and the wealth of practical experience and varied demonstrations”
combined to help reduce problems imposed by the language
difference.[11-7]
The progress of the program proved the concepts sound. The first small
group of student pilots was graduated on 9 March despite numerous
flight cancellations due to bad weather during the training period.
Subsequent classes of VNAF pilots continued to train with the Marine
helicopter task element throughout 1964. Eventually, a more advanced
training program would have the Vietnamese pilots flying sections
of two and four helicopters as integral elements of larger Marine
helicopter operations.
Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered over I Corps throughout most of
the month of March, brief periods of good weather sometimes allowed
heliborne incursions into the mountainous areas. One such period
began on the 5th and lasted long enough for Marine, Army, and VNAF
helicopters to lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to a landing
zone near the Laotian border. During the operation one escorting
U.S. Army UH-1B gunship accidentally struck a tree and was forced
to land in a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicopters quickly
rescued the crew and weapons of the downed UH-1B, but drew automatic
weapons fire in the process. That afternoon 15 Marine helicopters and
two armed UH-1Bs returned to the crash site with 64 ARVN troops who
established a perimeter around the damaged helicopter after being
landed. A maintenance team then landed and repaired the aircraft which
subsequently was flown back to Da Nang.
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews undertook to correct several problems
which they identified during these initial combat operations. One
was the need for machine gun fire to protect the port (left) side
of the transport helicopters as they approached contested landing
zones. To fill this requirement the squadron’s metalsmiths designed
and fabricated a flexible mount for an additional M-60 machine gun.
This new mount was designed to allow the machine gun to be swung out
a portside window from the cabin. Placed on each of HMM-364’s 24
helicopters, this modification ultimately added a gunner to each crew
and enabled the Marines to deliver fire to either or both sides of the
aircraft during the critical landing phase of helilifts.[11-8]
La Voy personally instituted another change which made the coordination
of trooplifts more effective. Prior to HMM-364’s arrival in Vietnam,
different Marines had served as loadmasters for each heliborne
operation. While this system of rotating the loadmaster assignment had
stood the test of numerous operations since its inception in late 1962,
La Voy believed that it could be improved. Accordingly, he assigned
one pilot and two crew chiefs permanent additional responsibilities
as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-man team was responsible for
coordinating loading and unloading activities at pickup points and
landing zones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relatively minor
adjustment, the Marines helped insure the closer coordination of their
helicopter operations with ARVN ground forces.[11-9]
In early March hostile incidents around the Da Nang air base increased
dramatically. The incidents usually took the form of sniper fire from
the village situated just across the perimeter fence from the living
compound. The primary target of the enemy snipers seemed to be the
task element’s electrical generators whose high noise level prevented
sentries from determining the firing position. Tensions heightened on
the night of the 15th when a terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle
into the doorway of the staff noncommissioned officers quarters. The
crude bomb fortunately failed to ignite. Several days later, however,
a Marine in the compound was wounded by sniper fire from beyond the
perimeter wire.
These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant to request that the
security platoon from the 3d Marine Division be redeployed to help
protect the base camp and flight line. This request was approved by
ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac without delay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from
the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on a Marine KC-130
and assumed responsibility for security around the Marine compound and
flight line. Attached to the MABS-16 sub unit, the infantry platoon
freed Colonel Merchant’s aviation personnel to devote full time to
their primary mission--providing helicopter support to I Corps. Like
its predecessor which had been withdrawn only three months earlier, the
new infantry unit would assist with rescue operations in insecure areas
and on occasion would be called upon to provide security around TAFDS
bladders during helicopter operations in more remote areas.
[Illustration: _South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a
UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel and wheel
strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (USMC Photo
A329570)._]
The same day that the platoon from the 3d Marine Division arrived
at Da Nang, a task element Marine was involved in an act of heroism
which later earned him the Bronze Star Medal. While escorting Marine
helicopters on a resupply mission about five miles west-northwest of
Tam Ky, a U.S. Army UH-1B gunship from Da Nang was hit by Viet Cong
fire and crashed in flames. Marine Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a
volunteer machine gunner on board the Army gunship, acted rapidly to
help secure the area despite having suffered injuries in the crash.
Manning an M-60 machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on the approaching
enemy while the pilot, copilot, and three other passengers were pulled
from the wreckage. All six American personnel, including the injured
Marine, were evacuated safely to Da Nang, and then flown to the U.S.
Army Field Hospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medical attention.
_The Weather Breaks_
Much of I Corps began experiencing improved weather conditions during
the first days of April. Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN
resumed its offensives into the rugged mountainous regions. On the 6th
a combined Allied helicopter flight lifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky
to a landing zone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai. An Army
UH-1B was shot down by Communist fire during the operation. Shortly
after the crash, one of HMM-364’s helicopters landed to rescue the crew
and strip the weapons from the downed aircraft. Marine mechanics then
helped Army aviation technicians disassemble the UH-1B whereupon it was
suspended beneath an Army UH-37 (a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy
helicopter manufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designed sling and
helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs.
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s squadron suffered its first combat aircraft
loss on 14 April. The incident occurred after one of HMM-364’s
helicopters was hit in the engine by Viet Cong fire while attempting
to evacuate wounded Vietnamese infantrymen from a hillside landing
zone about 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotian border. Struck
while taking off, the UH-34D plunged 150 feet down the steep hillside
and crashed through the jungle into a stream bed. One Marine manning
an M-60 machine gun suffered a broken leg in the crash. The other crew
members and passengers, however, were able to carry him up the hill to
the ARVN landing zone. Heavy thunder showers prevented rescue for two
hours, but the weather finally broke and the men were helilifted to Da
Nang. The aircraft was destroyed the next day.
Four days after this incident, HMM-364 committed all available aircraft
to a battalion-size heliborne assault into rugged northwestern Thua
Thien Province. The ARVN’s objective was a mountainous area on the
northern rim of the A Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-wide
trough whose location adjacent to the Laotian border invited Communist
infiltration. Although enemy activity would eventually force the
government to abandon its string of outposts in the valley, the issue
of control of the area was still unresolved in early 1964.
Colonel Merchant, as commander of the Aviation Headquarters Operations
Center for I Corps, assigned 20 Marine UH-34Ds, four VNAF UH-34s, five
U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, and three Marine O-1Bs to the operation
which the ARVN code named LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAF T-28s,
four A-1H Skyraiders, and two observation aircraft were assigned by
the Joint General Staff to provide support for the helicopter assault.
The operation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchant as the Tactical
Air Commander Airborne (TACA) from a U.S. Air Force U-10, whose radios
would permit the commander and his staff to communicate with every
aircraft participating in the effort. (The Marine helicopters had UHF
and VHF communications, while the Marine observation aircraft used UHF
and FM. The Army UH-1Bs had UHF; the VNAF transport helicopters also
relied upon UHF radios.)
In addition to Merchant, the airborne control staff from the ASOC
included Lieutenant Colonel William Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnamese
officer. The Vietnamese representative was to assist in clearing close
air strikes with ARVN ground forces and also was to help resolve any
language problems which developed.
The one-day operation began early on 18 April with Marine and VNAF
transport helicopters lifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from an
outpost in the northwestern portion of the A Shau Valley into a rugged
landing zone approximately six miles further north. Later the same
morning 300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from a government
outpost in the central portion of the valley to a second landing zone
situated six miles north of the 200-man unit which had been flown in
earlier. HMM-364’s helicopters averaged almost 8 hours per aircraft
while flying 160 total hours in support of LAM SON 115. Only one Marine
UH-34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit by enemy fire during the
execution of the well-planned and efficiently coordinated operation. No
aircraft were lost.
Often the daily support flights proved more hazardous then the large
assault operations whose details were planned in advance. An incident
that occurred on 21 April while a UH-34D was evacuating a wounded South
Vietnamese soldier from the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Ky confirmed
the dangers inherent in such daily operations. In an effort to lure the
evacuation helicopter within range of their weapons, the Communists
ignited a yellow smoke grenade in a clearing close by the actual
landing zone. The pilot alertly identified the correct landing zone,
thereby foiling the enemy ruse.
[Illustration:
MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER
OPERATIONS FIRST HALF 1964
]
[Illustration: _HMM-364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop
landing zone during operations in I Corps. (USMC Photo A329571)._]
Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s Marines encountered an
equally clever Viet Cong tactic while performing another evacuation
mission, this time in support of a U.S. Special Forces patrol 20
miles west of Thuong Duc. Army UH-1B gunships made several low-level
reconnaissance passes over the pickup site while the UH-34D pilot
prepared to hoist the casualties through the dense jungle. When the
gunship crews reported no enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuvered
his aircraft into a hovering position above the invisible patrol. At
this juncture, well-concealed Viet Cong began firing automatic weapons
at the hovering helicopter and forced it to seek safety away from
the pickup area. The escorting gunships then wheeled in from above,
returning the Viet Cong’s fire with rockets and machine guns. The
enemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon the Marine helicopter again
maneuvered into position above the patrol. Again the enemy challenged
the aircraft with fire, this time striking it in the rear portion of
the fuselage. Although no serious damage was done, the evacuation
helicopter was again forced away from the patrol’s position.
The UH-1Bs once more placed suppressive fire on the enemy position,
finally allowing a second Marine helicopter to hoist the wounded man
through the trees. A new burst of enemy fire, however, interrupted a
subsequent effort to retrieve the body of a dead patrol member. An
HMM-364 helicopter returned to the area the following day and completed
the evacuation.
Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAF aircraft losses, the
incidents of 21 and 24 April confirmed that the Viet Cong was devising
new methods with which to counter the Allies’ helicopters. His use
of false smoke signals and his persistent refusal to compromise his
position by firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S. gunships
represented crude but effective additions to his expanding repertoire
of counter-helicopter tactics. Although unappreciated by the
Leatherneck crews, the enemy’s most recent flurry of actions had no
lasting effect on the overall pattern of helicopter operations.
_Sure Wind 202_
In late April Colonel Merchant’s Marines joined with VNAF and U.S.
Army elements to launch what would be the costliest and most viciously
opposed heliborne assault attempted in South Vietnam during the
1962–1965 period. On the 26th, Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and
Lieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the task element operations officer,
flew to Quang Ngai and Pleiku to participate in the final stages of
planning for a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into the Do Xa area,
the mountainous Viet Cong stronghold located along the northern border
of II Corps. At Quang Ngai officials from the II Corps headquarters
had already completed the general plans for Operation SURE WIND 202
(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202), the size of which demanded
the use of all transport helicopters available in both I and II Corps.
The Marine representatives learned that HMM-364’s role in the upcoming
operation would be to helilift a 420-man South Vietnamese battalion
from the Quang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO, an objective
located about 30 miles due west of the pickup point. Simultaneous
with this assault, a U.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleiku was
scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions (960 troops) from Gi Lang,
an outpost located 24 miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a second
landing zone about eight miles west-southwest of Landing Zone BRAVO.
The operation was to begin on the morning of 27 April, with the first
assault waves scheduled to land at 0930.
Due to the distance between the mountainous landing zones and because
two different helicopter units would be conducting the respective
trooplifts, the operation plan treated the two assaults as separate
operations. A U.S. Air Force U-10 aircraft had been assigned to carry
Colonel Merchant, the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who would
coordinate the helilift into Landing Zone BRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A-1H
Skyraiders had been assigned to provide tactical air support for the
Marine portion of the operation. Twelve of these attack aircraft were
scheduled to conduct preparatory strikes on and around the landing
zones, four were to orbit above the area after the helicopter landing
began, and the remaining four were to be positioned on airstrip alert
at Da Nang. Five Army UH-1B gunships were assigned to escort the Marine
UH-34Ds to and from the landing zone.
The preparatory air strikes around Landing Zone BRAVO began as the
first ARVN heliteams boarded the 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters
at Quang Ngai. Following the VNAF’s air strikes, the escorting Army
gunships swept in for a prelanding reconnaissance of the zone. They
were met by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 caliber machine guns.
The gunships countered with repeated rocket and machine gun attacks
on those enemy positions that could be located but were unable to
silence the Communist weapons. Meanwhile, the loaded Marine and VNAF
helicopters cleared Quang Ngai and were closing on the objective. After
the UH-1Bs expended their entire ordnance load and most of their fuel
in attempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchant ordered all
helicopters, transports and gunships alike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm
and refuel.
With the transports and gunships enroute to Quang Ngai, the ASOC
summoned the on-call VNAF A-1Hs to attack the Viet Cong positions.
During ensuing strikes one Skyraider was damaged severely by .50
caliber machine gun fire. The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking
aircraft eastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it to the Quang
Ngai airstrip. The attack bomber crashed less than one mile from the
west end of the small airstrip.
The A-1H air strikes on and around Landing Zone BRAVO continued until
1225. Shortly after the strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered the
first wave of transport helicopters to land the ARVN assault force.
Escorting UH-1Bs were still drawing fire as the first flight of three
UH-34Ds approached the contested landing zone. This time, however,
the Marine and VNAF pilots were not deterred. The first UH-34Ds
touched down at 1230 with their machine gunners pouring streams of
orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despite the high volume
of suppressive fire, several helicopters in the first wave sustained
hits from Viet Cong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically, crashed
in the landing zone. Its crew members, all of whom escaped injury,
were picked up by another Marine helicopter, piloted by Major John R.
Braddon, which had been designated as the search and rescue aircraft
for the operation. Another UH-34D with battle damage proceeded to the
outpost from which the Army helicopter missions were originating and
made an emergency landing.
[Illustration: _A formation of Marine UH-34Ds lift South Vietnamese
troops into mountains southwest of Da Nang. (USMC Photo A329574)._]
The second assault wave was delayed while VNAF Skyraiders renewed their
efforts to dislodge the enemy from his positions around the embattled
landing zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in the face of reduced but
stubborn Communist resistance. During this phase of the troop lift,
one VNAF and several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50 caliber
fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lost its tail rotor controls,
spun sharply while trying to take off and crashed near the center of
the zone. Its crew members escaped injury and were picked up by Major
Braddon’s rescue helicopter.[11-B]
[11-B] For his role in the two successful rescue attempts,
Braddon was awarded the Silver Star Medal.
After this incident, as the South Vietnamese soldiers began fanning out
from the landing zone and forcing the Communist gunners to withdraw
deeper into the jungle, the landing proceeded somewhat faster. The
fourth and final assault lift of the day was executed at 1730, after
which 357 of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported into Landing
Zone BRAVO. During the first day of the operation, 15 of the 19
participating Marine UH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF
helicopters originally assigned to support the operation remained
airworthy.
[Illustration: _At the loadmaster’s direction, a Marine UH-34D waits in
a crude landing zone as an unidentified U.S. advisor and two Vietnamese
soldiers unload supplies. Other ARVN troops provide security. (USMC
Photo A329572)._]
The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND 202 was completed the next
morning. Fourteen UH-34Ds from HMM-364, several of which had been
repaired during the night, and four Army UH-1Bs lifted the remainder
of the South Vietnamese battalion into the landing zone. By then the
intensity of the enemy action in the surrounding hills had diminished
greatly. Only one Marine helicopter was hit and it suffered only minor
damage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM-364’s aircraft proceeded to Gi
Lang, the outpost from which the Army helicopter company was operating,
to help it complete its portion of the assault lift.
Aircraft losses for the operation continued to accumulate on the second
day when a Marine UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other landing
helicopters and crashed while approaching the runway at Quang Ngai. The
aircraft plummeted into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip,
rolled over onto its side, and completely submerged. The crewmen
managed to climb to safety but the helicopter was a total loss.
On 29 April, three UH-34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection team and a
Marine security squad from Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO to assess
the damage suffered by the two helicopters which had been shot down on
the first day of SURE WIND 202. The inspection team found that four
bullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAF aircraft, on the
other hand, was riddled by nearly 30 bullets, including a .50 caliber
round that had severed the tail rotor control cable. The inspection
team concluded that both helicopters were damaged beyond repair and
proceeded to destroy them where they had fallen.
Originally, MACV and II Corps planners had anticipated that the
Marine helicopters would not be required to support SURE WIND 202
beyond the initial assault. It soon became apparent, however, that
the daily helicopter requirements for the operation would exceed the
aviation assets available in II Corps. The American command in Saigon,
therefore, directed Colonel Merchant’s task element to continue
providing support for the duration of the offensive. Accordingly,
the task element commander assigned a liaison officer to the 2d ARVN
Division headquarters. This officer was tasked with coordinating daily
aircraft requirements. When SURE WIND 202 finally ended on 25 May,
HMM-364’s crews had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flight hours to the
South Vietnamese effort in northwestern II Corps.[11-10]
_Operations Elsewhere in I Corps_
While some of HMM-364’s crews continued flying support missions from
Quang Ngai, others conducted a critical operation in western I Corps.
The mission, which already had been delayed five days because of the
Marines’ extensive commitment during the early stages of SURE WIND
202, was executed on 30 April. It involved 17 Marine UH-34Ds, four
Army UH-1Bs (two transports and two gunships), two Marine O-1Bs,
two VNAF Skyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observation aircraft.
Their assignment was to evacuate a 78-man ARVN patrol which had
been under frequent enemy fire for six days in the rugged jungle
about 42 miles west of Da Nang. The transport helicopters encountered
almost continuous small arms fire during the landing and subsequent
evacuation. One Marine helicopter carrying a crew of four Marines
and five ARVN passengers was shot down while climbing away from
the contested landing zone. The pilot made a forced landing in a
nearby clearing and the nine men were evacuated under fire by other
UH-34Ds. Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, the entire
South Vietnamese patrol was removed to the safety of Nam Dong, a
well-defended Special Forces camp located in a valley 34 miles west of
Da Nang.
Acts of heroism were commonplace during the 30 April evacuation. One
Marine copilot assumed control of his severely damaged helicopter and
flew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chief had been wounded.
Staff Sergeant John C. Thompson, who served as one of the loadmasters
for the operation, was later awarded the Navy Cross for his role in the
action. Having arrived in the landing zone aboard the first transport
helicopter, the Marine noncommissioned officer exposed himself to Viet
Cong fire almost continuously while supervising the loading of each
aircraft. After the last five South Vietnamese troops had boarded the
final helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilot that he would remain on
the ground to provide covering fire while the aircraft took off. But
the pilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board and then succeeded
in maneuvering the heavily loaded UH-34D out of the empty landing zone.
By late May it had become apparent to U.S. military authorities in
South Vietnam that the demand for American transport helicopters in I
Corps would continue beyond the 30 June date which had been set earlier
for SHUFLY’s departure. General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to
the Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unit be retained at Da
Nang indefinitely. He further recommended that HMM-364 turn over its
helicopters and maintenance equipment to the Vietnamese Air Force on
30 June as scheduled, and that the unit be replaced by another Marine
UH-34D squadron. These recommendations were forwarded to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff who approved them on 10 June. In response, the Marine
Corps began immediate preparations to deploy a new, fully equipped,
medium helicopter squadron to Da Nang.
HMM-364 began its final month in Vietnam by supporting another
heliborne assault into II Corps. This time the Marines teamed with the
U.S. Army’s 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVN battalion from Dak
To, a town situated in western Kontum Province, to an objective in
the Do Xa base area. To support the operation, which was code named
SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews positioned a TAFDS
fuel bladder at the Dak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15
Marine UH-34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assault phase of the new
government operation. No battle damage was recorded by Marine aircraft
during this latest incursion into northern II Corps.
The Marine task element’s responsibilities were expanded slightly
in the first week of June when MACV directed Colonel Merchant to
provide search and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerial reconnaissance
operations which had begun over Laos and North Vietnam. After 7 June
at least two UH-34Ds (one section) were positioned together either at
Quang Tri or at Khe Sanh, ready to conduct SAR missions for downed
American and VNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the helicopters were
also used to support Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At
Quang Tri the SAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacent to a
local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilots who had stood the SAR
duty there would recall the incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boys
playfully pursuing their soccer games alongside parked combat aircraft
and a TAFDS bladder.
In addition to normal support operations, HMM-364’s pilots devoted
much of the second week of June to a search for Privates First Class
Fred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, two MABS-16 Marines who had
disappeared from the Da Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reports
indicated that both men had been captured by Communist guerrillas about
five miles south of the airfield while sight-seeing on rented motor
bikes. The aerial search produced no signs of the missing enlisted
men but reliable Vietnamese sources reported that the Viet Cong had
displayed them in several villages. The task element commander finally
called off the fruitless search on 15 June, a full week after it had
begun. Ground efforts by the South Vietnamese to locate the men
continued but were also futile. The two Marines were never found.[11-C]
[11-C] The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed
from missing in action to killed in action, body not
recovered, on 23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L.
Greer was likewise changed on 14 November 1975.
While the aerial search south of Da Nang was in its final stages,
HMM-364 suffered its last aircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter
crashed while carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to Major Gray’s Advisory
Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. The accident occurred on 13 June when
a UH-34D was caught in severe down drafts while attempting to land in
the small landing zone near the top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak.
The crew and passengers luckily escaped injury and were rescued but the
aircraft was damaged too extensively to be repaired. Marines stripped
the UH-34D of radios and machine guns and then burned the hulk.
_Changing the Watch_
On 16 June, three days after the crash on Tiger Tooth Mountain,
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit ceased its operations and began
preparations for turning over its helicopters and equipment to the
Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spent three days removing the
automatic stabilization equipment (the helicopter’s equivalent of an
automatic pilot) and the USMC identification from the 24 UH-34Ds. While
HMM-364’s men accomplished the necessary last-minute preparations,
pilots from a new Marine medium helicopter squadron, HMM-162, began
flying their UH-34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS _Valley Forge_.
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis, an Oklahoman who
held four Distinguished Flying Crosses for air actions fought during
World War II and Korea, HMM-162 was the first Marine squadron since
Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s to deploy to Vietnam with its complement of
aircraft and maintenance equipment. With HMM-162’s arrival, elements of
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit began departing for Okinawa on board
refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR-152. Also on board one of the
KC-130s bound for Okinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, who relinquished
command of the MABS-16 sub unit to Major Marion R. Green on the last
day of June.
The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadron informally accepted the
aircraft from HMM-364 on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 days
later with Major General Paul J. Fontana, the commanding general of
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, attending a ceremony presided over by
the I Corps commanding general. Following the exchange of equipment,
the Vietnamese officials presented various orders of the Cross of
Valor, their nation’s second highest decoration, to Marine pilots who
had distinguished themselves during Operation SURE WIND 202. Vice
Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Vietnamese Air
Force, then presented Vietnamese pilot wings to Colonel Merchant,
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot who
had participated in the helicopter pilot training program. HMM-364’s
tour in South Vietnam ended officially on 30 June when the last of
its members boarded KC-130’s bound for Okinawa. Since initiating
combat flight operations in February, the squadron’s helicopters
had logged 2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours. Another
statistic underscored the intensity of the actions in which the unit
had participated. Well over half of the squadron’s 24 helicopters
had been damaged by enemy fire during its five-month deployment in
Vietnam.[11-11]
CHAPTER 12
Fall and Winter Operations
_Dry Weather Fighting--Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations--Changes and
Improvements--Action as the Year Ends_
_Dry Weather Fighting_
The military situation in I Corps remained essentially unchanged as
HMM-162 began its assignment with SHUFLY. Hot, dry weather, with its
promise of near perfect flying conditions and spirited fighting,
continued over the mountainous northern provinces.
After a series of orientation briefings and familiarization flights,
Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ squadron initiated support operations in
the closing days of June. HMM-162’s first real taste of action came on
the last day of the month when six UH-34Ds, escorted by two armed U.S.
Army UH-1Bs, attempted to resupply ARVN troops operating in the hills
nine miles west of Tam Ky. While trying to locate a Communist position
which was firing on the resupply aircraft, one of the gunships was hit
and crashed in flames. Two transport helicopters landed immediately to
rescue the crew. The Marines pulled three of the four injured men from
the wreckage before being driven away from the scene by approaching
guerrillas. During takeoff, one UH-34D was struck by ground fire but
was able to continue its flight to Da Nang. The wounded copilot of the
downed Army aircraft died while enroute to the dispensary, but the
injured pilot survived and later was evacuated to the Nha Trang Field
Hospital. The heat from the still-smoldering aircraft hulk prevented a
second attempt to extricate the body of the fourth soldier later in the
day. It was finally recovered on 1 July.
The squadron’s first critical troop lift came within days of its
initial action when the task element was called upon to helilift
urgently needed reinforcements to the Nam Dong CIDG camp which had come
under heavy Communist attack. Situated in south central Thua Thien
Province at a point where two prominent mountain valleys converge,
Nam Dong held special strategic appeal to both sides engaged in the
struggle for South Vietnam. It sat astride natural infiltration
routes from Laos into the lowlands around Da Nang and Phu Bai and
also protected some 5,000 Montagnard tribesmen who occupied a string
of villages along the valley floor. The camp and the villages were
defended by only a handful of U.S. Special Forces personnel and three
CIDG companies, none of which could muster more than 90 men. Its
status as a thorn in the enemy’s side, its relative isolation, and its
proximity to Communist base areas along the Laotian border, combined to
make the outpost a particularly lucrative target for the Viet Cong.
Nam Dong’s hour of crisis came shortly after midnight on 7 July when
the Communists launched a large-scale ground assault against the barbed
wire-enclosed main camp. Shortly after 0400, with his position holding
out against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, Captain Roger H. Donlon,
the Special Forces officer in charge, radioed for assistance. Two hours
later, six Marine helicopters, loaded with U.S. Special Forces and
South Vietnamese personnel, launched from Da Nang for the beleaguered
little fortress. Colonel Merchant, flying an O-1B, led the transport
helicopters to the objective area while two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships
provided escort. Meanwhile, two other HMM-162 helicopters launched for
An Diem carrying U.S. Special Forces officers with instructions to
assemble a company-sized reaction force for commitment to Nam Dong.
Intense enemy mortar and ground fire at Nam Dong initially prevented
the six UH-34Ds from landing the reinforcements, whereupon Colonel
Merchant and the flight returned to Da Nang for fuel. At the airfield
the task element commander briefed VNAF A-1H Skyraider pilots and the
crew of a Marine O-1B on the battlefield situation. He took off again
at 0910, this time to act as TACA in an Air Force U-10. Meanwhile, a
U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou (a twin-engine, fixed-wing light transport)
had managed to airdrop small arms ammunition to Donlon and the
embattled defenders. Following this emergency resupply, air strikes
were conducted on the hills to the south and west of the outpost,
causing enemy ground fire to diminish somewhat. At 0945, a flight of
18 Marine helicopters, led by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis and escorted
by four UH-1B gunships and two VNAF Skyraiders, began landing a 93-man
relief force which had been collected earlier from Da Nang and An Diem.
Evacuation of the dead and wounded began immediately. At 1545, a flight
of 10 UH-34Ds lifted 9,500 pounds of ammunition, medical supplies,
radios, and miscellaneous equipment to Nam Dong. Six passengers, five
wounded Vietnamese, and eight more bodies were evacuated to Da Nang on
the return trip. By then, the battle was finished. Two Americans, one
Australian advisor, and 55 South Vietnamese had been killed. Captain
Donlon, who earned the first Medal of Honor awarded for action in
Vietnam, and 64 other defenders had been wounded. The Viet Cong, who
had failed to eliminate the Nam Dong outpost, left 62 bodies on the
battlefield.[12-A]
[12-A] For a more detailed account of the battle for Nam Dong,
see Donlon, _Outpost of Freedom_.
Four days after the battle for Nam Dong, Colonel Merchant’s tour in
Vietnam ended. He returned to Okinawa to assume command of Marine
Aircraft Group 16 whereupon Colonel Hardy (“Tex”) Hay, a 1940 graduate
of Texas A&M, assumed command of Task Element 79.3.3.6.[12-B]
[12-B] For his role as Task Element Commander, ARVN I Corps
Aviation Headquarters Commander, and Senior U.S.
Aviation Advisor to I Corps, Colonel Merchant was later
awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” He was also
decorated with two Vietnamese Crosses of Valor--one for
SURE WIND 202 and the other for the relief of Nam Dong.
Normal flight operations continued during the remainder of July with no
major heliborne assaults conducted and no Marine aircraft lost. These
operations, however, did not lack excitement. Supporting the Marine
and ARVN forces on Tiger Tooth Mountain proved extremely hazardous as
the HMM-162 crews soon came to realize. On 11 July, for example, the
mountain nearly claimed one of their helicopters when a UH-34D lost
power as a result of the extreme altitude while delivering supplies to
Advisory Team One. As the aircraft plummeted into the hillside landing
zone, its tail pylon struck the vegetation around the edge of the tiny
clearing causing some structural damage. Fortunately, the damage was
such that the crewmen were able to make emergency repairs while Major
Gray’s men provided security around the aircraft. This accomplished,
the crew returned their damaged helicopter to Khe Sanh without further
incident.
Daily operations continued to produce action for the newly arrived
squadron as July wore on. On the 15th a UH-34D was hit by Viet Cong
fire while performing a routine resupply mission south of Da Nang.
Again, damage was only minor and the aircraft continued its mission.
Support for Tiger Tooth Mountain dominated SHUFLY’s operations on
the 18th after MACV officials ordered Major Gray’s Advisory Team
One withdrawn to safety. Colonel Hay directed HMM-162 to commit all
available aircraft in order to complete the withdrawal as rapidly as
possible. Good weather and flying expertise helped the helicopter crews
transport the entire Marine force (92 men) and over 21,000 pounds of
equipment to Khe Sanh before nightfall on the 19th.
In a simultaneous but unrelated development, HMM-162 was called upon
to detach four helicopters to Udorn, Thailand, for temporary duty.
These aircraft and crews were assigned to assist with search and rescue
operations in support of ongoing U.S. aerial reconnaissance efforts in
that area.
In early August, the heightened international tensions which
accompanied the Gulf of Tonkin crisis prompted General Westmoreland to
order all American military installations throughout South Vietnam to
brace for possible enemy attacks. Colonel Hay responded to ComUSMACV’s
instructions by placing his Marines on high alert status for several
weeks. The precautions were relaxed gradually as the crisis eased and
the likelihood of a sudden Communist attack diminished.
The pattern of helicopter operations in the northern provinces
throughout the remainder of the summer differed little from that which
had emerged earlier in the dry season. Medical evacuation and resupply
sorties continued to constitute the majority of the task element’s
support missions. Generally, medical evacuation missions, many of
which were executed while Viet Cong and South Vietnamese forces were
engaged in combat, provided the major source of action for Lieutenant
Colonel Curtis’ squadron during this period. On 6 August, for example,
a UH-34D was hit by enemy fire while its crew was evacuating ARVN
casualties from a landing zone along the Song Tra Bon. Two days later,
a second Marine helicopter was hit during an attempt to evacuate dead
and wounded from the mountains about eight miles west of Tam Ky. The
following day, on 9 August, another HMM-162 UH-34D drew fire while
evacuating a wounded U.S. advisor from a village on the coastal plain
12 miles southeast of Tam Ky. In all three incidents the aircraft
received only minor damage and were able to return safely to Da Nang.
Although the medical evacuation missions generally attracted more
Viet Cong attention, many resupply flights also proved hazardous.
Small landing zones, high elevations, and bad weather often made even
the most routine missions difficult. HMM-162 lost a helicopter as a
result of a combination of two of these adverse conditions--extreme
elevation and a small landing zone--on 30 August. While resupplying
a mountain-top outpost five miles southwest of Nam Dong, the UH-34D
struck a tree at the edge of a tiny clearing and crashed. The crew
members were uninjured, but the extent of the aircraft’s damage was
too great to permit repair. It was stripped of radios, machine guns,
machine gun mounts, and other usable parts before being destroyed.
In mid-August the Marines also lost their first observation aircraft
since deploying to Vietnam in 1962 when an O-1B crashed after
experiencing mechanical failure. The incident occurred on the 15th
while the pilot and observer were conducting a reconnaissance of
the northwestern corner of Quang Ngai Province. Bad weather delayed
rescue attempts for over an hour, but the two injured crewmen were
finally recovered by helicopter and flown to the Da Nang dispensary
for treatment. The pilot’s injuries were severe enough that he was
evacuated to the U.S. field hospital at Nha Trang.
The last major heliborne assault conducted in extreme western I Corps
during 1964 was initiated in the first week of September. Eighteen
Marine UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs, six VNAF Skyraiders, two Marine
O-1Bs, and two U.S. Air Force liaison aircraft were assigned to support
a 2d ARVN Division heliborne offensive against Communist infiltration
routes in remote southwestern Quang Nam Province. The operation, code
named CHINH BIEN, began on the morning of 4 September when 15 HMM-162
helicopters (the other three UH-34Ds participating in the operation
were serving as search and rescue aircraft) lifted the first wave
of South Vietnamese soldiers from Kham Duc, a government-controlled
town located 12 miles from the Laotian border in northwestern Quang
Tin Province. Their objective was a landing zone situated 24 miles
northwest of the assembly area in Quang Nam Province and only three
miles from the Laotian border. No enemy resistance was encountered
and the initial assault helilifts were completed shortly after noon.
Support for CHINH BIEN continued the next morning. When the helilifts
were finally completed shortly before 1000, Marine UH-34Ds had flown
265 sorties for 180.2 flight hours in another effort to place ARVN
ground forces in remote areas of I Corps.
_Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations_
Adverse weather began influencing SHUFLY’s operations a few days
after CHINH BIEN ended. On 14 September all flights were cancelled by
rain and high winds from Typhoon Violet, a severe tropical storm. All
aircraft remained grounded until late afternoon of the next day when
HMM-162 helicopters conducted an emergency evacuation of storm victims
from Tam Ky which had been hard hit by Violet. The typhoon caused some
minor damage to SHUFLY’s facilities when electrical power was lost for
a few hours. By the morning of the 16th, power was restored and all
Marine operations returned to normal.
Within a week, however, a more severe weather disturbance--Typhoon
Tilda--struck the coast near Da Nang. On the morning of 21 September,
in the face of the approaching storm, Colonel Hay ordered Lieutenant
Colonel Curtis to displace his squadron to Nha Trang in central II
Corps. Later in the day, the unit’s entire complement of aircraft
departed Da Nang on the 325-mile flight to safety. The task element’s
C-117D found refuge at Saigon. HMM-162 remained at Nha Trang until the
23d when it returned to I Corps.
[Illustration: _Marine helicopters enroute to an objective overfly the
coastal plain south of Da Nang. (Official USMC Photo)._]
Typhoon Tilda caused considerably more damage to the Marine base of
operations than had her immediate forerunner. Most of the permanent
structures in the compound showed signs of water damage and the
electrical power was lost for an entire week, except at the waterpoint
and the mess hall where a concerted repair effort restored power
promptly. Teletype communications circuits were closed for a full week
as a result of damage, and the radio link with the 1st MAW was broken
for nearly two hours.
While the Marines of the MABS-16 sub unit concerned themselves with
cleaning up the debris and repairing their damaged facilities,
HMM-162’s crews resumed combat support operations. On the
afternoon of their return from Nha Trang, a flight of UH-34Ds
delivered 19 passengers and 4,000 pounds of cargo to Tien Phuoc, a
government-controlled town located seven miles west of Tam Ky. The next
day Major General Paul J. Fontana, who as commanding general of the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing was responsible for the administrative and
logistical support of the task element, arrived at Da Nang for a one
day visit to assess the damage and to confer with Colonel Hay. Flood
relief missions and clean up activities combined with normal flight
operations to consume the remainder of September.
Two changes were made in the composition of the Marine task element in
late September and early October. On 29 September, the security force
from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines rotated back to its parent unit
on Okinawa. It was replaced by a 78-man element from Company E, 2d
Battalion, 9th Marines the same day. Led by Second Lieutenant Anthony
A. Monroe, the newly arrived Marines would provide protection for the
aviation unit until late November.
The second alteration occurred about a week later when HMM-162 was
relieved on-station by the officers and men of a fresh squadron.
The rotation of helicopter units was completed on 8 October when
Lieutenant Colonel Curtis officially signed over the aircraft and
maintenance equipment to the new squadron’s commanding officer. In
a three month deployment to the war zone HMM-162’s helicopters had
conducted approximately 6,600 sorties for a total of slightly over
4,400 flight hours. Many of these sorties had been missions of mercy
flown in the wake of the typhoons which had ravaged Vietnam’s northern
provinces. During three months of sustained combat support activities,
the squadron had lost two UH-34Ds and one O-1B in operational
accidents.[12-1]
The newly arrived squadron, HMM-365, was commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr., an experienced Marine officer who had
begun his career shortly after World War II as an infantry platoon
leader with the 1st Marine Division in China. Under his leadership
the squadron began performing resupply missions the same day that
the last of HMM-162’s personnel departed Da Nang. On their first day
of operations, Koler’s crews airlifted over 25,000 pounds of cargo
to various outposts around Da Nang. The following day a flight of
12 HMM-365 helicopters provided transportation for ARVN troops who
were being rotated between Kham Duc and A Roe, an isolated outpost in
southwestern Quang Nam Province less than seven miles from the Laotian
border. On 11 October the newly arrived Marine pilots and crews tasted
their first actual combat when eight UH-34Ds drew Viet Cong fire while
landing a 112-man Vietnamese unit in the hills 10 miles west-southwest
of Tam Ky.
The day after its crews had witnessed their first ground fire, Koler’s
squadron lost its first aircraft in Vietnam. The incident occurred in
western Quang Nam Province while a UH-34D was attempting to take off
from a South Vietnamese landing zone located high in the mountains.
The crash, in which the pilot was slightly injured, resulted from a
loss of power due to the high altitude. After the crew was evacuated, a
maintenance team salvaged the usable parts and destroyed the aircraft.
In mid-October Colonel Hay summarized the situation in I Corps for his
superiors at the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The task element commander
was particularly concerned about a new phase of Viet Cong activity
which he saw developing in the coastal lowlands of the northern
provinces. Although there were few visible signs of either combat or
enemy movement to confirm the trend, intelligence sources indicated
that Viet Cong main force battalions in I Corps had increased in number
from nine to 11 in the past several months. During this same period,
the number of local force Viet Cong companies in the area had jumped by
50 percent to a total of 17. These growth patterns, Colonel Hay noted,
enabled the Communists to tighten their grip on the civilian populace.
Likewise, they were responsible for increased enemy harassment of
lines of communications in I Corps and posed a particular threat to Da
Nang.[12-2]
Colonel Hay’s tour as task element commander ended on 17 October.
After a brief change of command ceremony during which he expressed his
appreciation to his subordinates for their assistance, Hay departed
for Okinawa to assume command of MAG-16. His replacement at Da Nang,
Colonel John H. King, Jr., an officer who had seen his first action
as a fighter pilot during World War II, was well prepared to direct
the task element’s operations. A recent graduate of the National War
College, King had commanded the first operational Marine transport
helicopter unit, Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, during the Korean War.
HMM-365’s operations continued throughout the remainder of October
with only a few significant actions reported. One of these was an
abortive medical evacuation mission attempted on 26 October during
which the squadron suffered its first combat casualties. The incident,
in which both the copilot and crew chief were wounded by Viet Cong
small arms fire, occurred while the helicopter was approaching a poorly
protected landing zone 10 miles southwest of Tam Ky. The pilot managed
to return the damaged helicopter to Tam Ky and land safely, whereupon
the seriously wounded copilot was evacuated to Nha Trang and the crew
chief was administered first aid.
In early November, at the height of the monsoon season, Typhoon Iris
struck the Annamese coast. The tropical storm, whose full force was
felt on 4 November, was followed by nearly a week of continuous
rain, wind, and fog. The conditions caused flight operations to be
suspended except for emergency medical evacuations. When the operations
resumed on the 10th, the Marine Corps birthday, the Leatherneck crews
concentrated on rescuing Vietnamese civilians from the inundated
coastal plains. Between 1700 and 1900 on their first day of the flood
relief operation, Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s Marines rescued 144 flood
victims. These rescues, many of which were accomplished by hoisting
the Vietnamese from precarious positions in trees or on roof tops were
complicated by sporadic Viet Cong harassing fire. Many of the stranded
civilians were evacuated to the Da Nang airfield. Following emergency
medical treatment administered by Navy doctors and hospitalmen, the
civilians were given shelter in the task unit hangar. Lieutenant Robert
P. Heim, the Navy chaplain assigned to SHUFLY at the time, later
praised the Marines who shared their birthday cake with the homeless
Vietnamese that night.[12-3] The next day, although poor visibility
continued to hamper flights, the Marines helilifted 1,136 more flood
victims to safety. Again the guerrillas harassed the rescue attempts
with small arms fire, this time hitting three of the participating
aircraft.
The humanitarian operation continued until 16 November, when another
typhoon--Kate--threatened to make matters even worse. The weather on
the storm’s periphery forced the cancellation of many Marine flights
but the center of the disturbance passed about 200 miles south of Da
Nang. The flooding which resulted from the two back-to-back storms,
however, demanded a rescue effort beyond the capabilities of the Marine
and VNAF helicopter units located in I Corps. Accordingly, the Special
Landing Force (SLF) of the U.S. Seventh Fleet joined the operations on
17 November. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ HMM-162, the helicopter element
of the SLF, returned to its former operations area and spent six days
rescuing flood victims. The Marines evacuated the most seriously
injured to the USS _Princeton_ where they received emergency treatment
before being returned to civilian hospitals. When the SLF departed
Vietnamese waters on 23 November, HMM-162’s helicopters had flown over
600 hours and completed 1,020 sorties in support of the disaster relief
operations. Unfortunately, one UH-34D was lost at sea in an operational
accident on 21 November while participating in these operations. Two
crewmen, Corporal Richard D. Slack, Jr. and Lance Corporal David
Nipper, died in the crash.[12-4]
With the SLF’s departure, the Marine task element and the VNAF 217th
Squadron reassumed the full burden of rescue operations until they
were finally terminated on 10 December. During this period HMM-365 was
forced to divide its flights judiciously between combat support and
missions of mercy.[12-C]
[12-C] The magnitude of the damage inflicted upon the
inhabitants of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin
Provinces by the November storms is borne out by the
following statistics. In these three provinces over
50,600 houses were destroyed while 4,870 civilians
were reported either dead or missing. Another 12,240
Vietnamese were forced to seek refuge at government
centers in the wake of the flood. (CTU 79.3.5 ComdD,
17Oct64–14Jan65.)
_Changes and Improvements_
While some of Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s men were employed in
evacuating the flood-stricken Vietnamese, others were modifying three
of the squadron’s helicopters to carry a new weapons system which
had been developed specifically for use on the UH-34D. The TK-1, an
externally mounted combination of M-60 machine guns and 2.75-inch
rocket launchers, was first used on 19 November in support of a Tiger
Flight mission conducted just south of the Song Thu Bon about 17 miles
from Da Nang. Two armed UH-34Ds expended 90 rockets and 500 rounds
of 7.62mm ammunition on enemy positions during prelanding strikes.
The effectiveness of the new system could not be determined after
this particular strike, but an estimated 10–15 Viet Cong were killed
in a similar action by the armed UH-34Ds the next day. The transport
aircraft armed with the TK-1 would continue to escort troop carrying
helicopters regularly throughout the remainder of the year. At best,
however, the TK-1 was of only marginal value. The inherent limitations
of the UH-34D, which possessed neither the maneuverability nor the
speed to conduct truly effective attacks, reduced the overall value
of the system. Because of these limitations the Marines seldom relied
solely on the UH-34D for fire suppression during assault missions.
The system would eventually be phased out in 1965 with the arrival of
Marine jet attack squadrons in Vietnam.
[Illustration:
MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER
OPERATIONS SECOND HALF 1964
]
Two improvements, one in the physical facilities available to the task
element and the other in the size and composition of its security
detachment, were made shortly after the Marines began using the UH-34Ds
in the gunship role. On 25 November, HMM-365 moved its aircraft and
maintenance equipment across the airfield into a newly constructed
hangar just west of the strip. The second change took place the next
day when the security force from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was
replaced by Company L, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced with
engineers, 81mm mortar teams, and counter-mortar radar personnel.
This adjustment came in response to the reports of the growing Viet
Cong threat to Da Nang. Designated the Security Detachment, Marine
Unit Vietnam, the 255-man organization was under the command of Major
William F. Alsop, the battalion’s executive officer. Captain John
Sheridan, the company commander, retained tactical control of the
infantry unit.
Although responsibility for the overall defense of the Da Nang airstrip
still resided with the ARVN, the enlarged security detachment greatly
strengthened the Marine defenses within the installation. Major Alsop
divided his reinforced rifle company into two groups--one to protect
the living compound and the other to defend the flight line and the
new hangar. Around the living compound the engineers constructed a
complex of machine gun positions, mortar pits, and ammunition bunkers.
A barricade was also erected at a gate near the Marine compound which
previously had been open and manned only by Vietnamese sentries. Strong
defensive positions were also constructed around the task element’s
new hangar and flight line. This network included fox holes, barbed
wire, and cleared fields of fire. As an added precaution, Company L
maintained a reaction force at the living compound. This force was
prepared to board trucks and rush to reinforce the critical defenses
around the aircraft and maintenance facilities in the event of an enemy
ground attack.[12-5]
Despite the stronger defenses and the presence of the larger Marine
infantry force, several security-related problems were still unsolved.
One which remained outside of Colonel King’s influence was the laxity
of the ARVN sentries around the outer perimeter who sometimes allowed
Vietnamese civilians to wander into the installation. Another was
that a small village close to the Marine compound, but outside the
perimeter fence, still harbored an occasional sniper. The task element
commander had lodged repeated complaints about both situations with the
appropriate South Vietnamese authorities but no action had been taken
to eliminate them. In spite of these minor sources of irritation, the
recent changes in its defenses greatly enhanced the task element’s
ability to protect itself against Communist ground attacks.
_Action as the Year Ends_
While Company L was developing defensive positions at the airbase,
HMM-365’s crews continued to provide support for both flood relief
and military operations throughout I Corps. On 7 December, 17 Marine
helicopters and eight Army UH-1B transports were called upon to help
trap a Viet Cong force known to be hiding in a village less than five
miles west of Da Nang. Code named DA NANG SIX, the operation began at
daybreak when the American helicopters lifted 240 men of the 11th ARVN
Ranger Battalion into the objective area. Two UH-1B gunships teamed
with two armed UH-34Ds to suppress ground fire that erupted as the
first wave of transport aircraft began their approach to the landing
zone. One Army gunship sustained minor damage when hit three times
during the exchange of fire. After the enemy had been silenced, the
landing proceeded without incident and the Vietnamese rangers quickly
secured their objective. In the process, nine Viet Cong were killed and
four others captured along with nine rifles and one automatic weapon.
Successful though it was, the action on the outskirts of Da Nang
confirmed previous reports that the Communists were tightening their
grip on Quang Nam Province.[12-6]
Another indication of the enemy’s growing strength in I Corps came only
two days later when a large Viet Cong force overran an ARVN outpost
four and a half miles southwest of Tam Ky. I Corps Headquarters quickly
drew up plans for a multi-company search of the area even though the
Communists had withdrawn from the badly damaged government position
shortly after their final assault. At 0845, 18 Marine UH-34Ds (three
armed) and four Army UH-1Bs (two armed) helilifted a 208-man Tiger
Force from Da Nang to Tam Ky where it had orders to stage with other
units for the operation. While the U.S. helicopters were in the process
of transporting the Vietnamese troops to Tam Ky, an aerial observer
sighted a large formation of Viet Cong moving southwest from the scene
of the previous night’s battle. The observer immediately brought air
strikes and artillery fire to bear on the enemy, blocking his escape.
Firepower contained the enemy throughout the morning while the infantry
units at Tam Ky prepared to exploit the situation with a heliborne
assault. The helilift was launched at 1345. Enroute to a landing
zone, located six miles southwest of Tam Ky, the helicopter formation
passed over the smoldering ruins of the ARVN outpost where ammunition
stockpiles were still exploding. Once at the objective, the armed
helicopters began delivering suppressive fire into the surrounding
hedge rows and treelines as the troop carrying aircraft approached
the landing zone. Still, after nearly six hours of air and artillery
strikes, the Communist force was able to oppose the landing with
intense small arms fire. No helicopters were hit during the landing,
however, and the assault force managed to secure the landing zone.
This accomplished, two companies from the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion
were helilifted into the position without incident. After the final
troop lifts, the Marine transport helicopters began evacuating
casualties from the outpost where eight Vietnamese soldiers and one
American advisor had died and 20 ARVN and an Australian advisor had
been wounded. The government’s response to the enemy-initiated action,
including air and artillery strikes, accounted for 70 Viet Cong
killed and 39 weapons captured. While reflecting a moderate success,
these statistics were little compensation for the knowledge that the
Communists could destroy a well-fortified position within five miles of
a provincial capital.[12-7]
Weather caused many Marine flights to be delayed and some to be
cancelled during the closing month of 1964. But the interruptions
were not frequent enough to prevent the task element from fulfilling
its support commitments. The only type of support operation actually
curtailed due to the monsoons was the preplanned heliborne assault into
the mountains. Brief periods of favorable weather usually enabled the
Marine crews to accomplish resupply and medical evacuation missions
even into the most remote areas of I Corps, although delays of such
flights were not uncommon.
Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s HMM-365 was past the midpoint of its
assignment in Vietnam as 1964 drew to a close. Through 31 December the
unit’s helicopters had already flown over 6,700 sorties for a total of
nearly 4,700 hours of flight time. Since its arrival in early October,
Koler’s squadron had distinguished itself not only by providing support
to military units throughout I Corps but by its extensive participation
in the flood relief operations of November and December. During the
30-day period after 10 November, HMM-365 had contributed a substantial
percentage of its flights to the prolonged effort to rescue and
evacuate Vietnamese civilians from flooded areas.[12-8]
FMFPac changed the designation of the task element on the final day of
1964. From that date until mid-March of the following year the Marine
helicopter squadron and its supporting elements in Vietnam would be
known officially as Task Unit 79.3.5, Marine Unit Vietnam. This change,
however, did not alter the existing command relationships. ComUSMACV
continued to exercise operational control over the Marine task unit
while the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing retained
responsibility for its administrative and logistic support.
CHAPTER 13
Prelude to Escalation
The close of 1964 marked the end of a full decade of American
political, economic, and military advice and assistance to South
Vietnam. That 10-year period saw a fragile state born and begin its
struggle for survival only to have its existence threatened by a new
brand of Communist aggression--the “war of national liberation.” It
also saw the U.S. commitment to Vietnam’s defense deepen in almost
direct proportion to the increasing threat. Despite growing amounts
of American aid and advice, there was little doubt that South Vietnam
stood near the brink of destruction at the hands of the Viet Cong and
their North Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended.
In many respects, the disaster which befell the Vietnamese Marines and
ARVN Rangers at Binh Gia on the final day of 1964 marked a critical
turning point in the war being waged in South Vietnam. General
Westmoreland feared that the battle heralded “the beginning of the
classic and final ‘mobile’ phase of the war.” “To the South Vietnamese
government,” he reported, “it meant the beginning of an intensive
military challenge which the Vietnamese government could not meet
within its own resources.”[13-1] Brigadier General Carl Youngdale,
Westmoreland’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence and the
ranking Marine assigned to Vietnam, assessed the meaning of the battle
in equally distressing terms. “Binh Gia,” he explained, “was just part
of the whole thing. All the reserve--the strategic reserve--was fixed:
the airborne and the four Marine battalions had all been committed.
There was absolutely no strategic reserve left.”[13-2] So, as 1964
ended, hope was fading rapidly among American military officials in
Saigon that the ground war for South Vietnam could continue for long
without more vigorous participation of the United States.
Pressures other than those produced by military events in the South
were also working to move the United States toward direct military
intervention against the Communists in Indochina. Although sustained
open warfare had not occurred as a result of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of
early August, tensions continued to mount between North Vietnam and
the United States throughout the autumn. On 1 November, just after
the cessation of the U.S. air strikes which followed the Tonkin Gulf
incidents, Viet Cong mortar squads attacked American facilities at the
Bien Hoa airbase near Saigon. Four American servicemen were killed,
five B-57 medium bombers destroyed, and eight others heavily damaged in
the raid.
President Johnson’s reaction to the Bien Hoa attack was to initiate
a month-long review of U.S. policy regarding North Vietnam. In early
December that review culminated in the adoption of a two-phased plan
to discourage further North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong
by expanding the air war. Phase I, approved for implementation in
December, called for stepped-up air operations against the vital
Communist infiltration routes in Laos, and for the intensification
of covert operations against North Vietnam. Approved “in principle,”
Phase II involved “a continuous program of progressively more serious
air strikes” against North Vietnam. The implementation of Phase II,
it was agreed, would depend on future enemy actions.[13-3] As if to
indicate that Communist policy makers had settled on a parallel course
of escalation, Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers’ quarters
in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing two Americans and wounding over 50
others.[13-A]
[13-A] Among the wounded was Major Damm, the Assistant Senior
Marine Advisor.
The new year, 1965, would open against this portentous combination
of intensified U.S. air activities over Laos, a worsening military
situation on South Vietnam’s battlefields, and the existence of the
Phase II contingency plans. It was this situation which would spawn
a new series of events as the first months of 1965 unfolded--events
which would determine the direction of American and North Vietnamese
military involvement in the war for South Vietnam. In January, MACV
intelligence would learn that two new North Vietnamese Army regiments,
the _32d_ and the _101st_, had infiltrated the South and had initiated
combat operations. Intelligence sources would also report the existence
of another NVA regiment in the first stages of formation in Quang Tri
Province. When added to a unit of similar size which had appeared in
Kontum Province (II Corps Tactical Zone) in the final weeks of 1964,
the new arrivals would raise to four the number of North Vietnamese
regiments known to be operating on South Vietnamese soil.[13-4]
The pace of escalation would quicken in early February. The Viet Cong
would attack a U.S. installation at Pleiku in the Central Highlands on
the 7th. Eight Americans would die in this incident, over 100 would be
wounded, and a score of aircraft would be either destroyed or damaged.
President Johnson would react quickly to the Pleiku attack by ordering
a series of reprisal air strikes under the code name FLAMING DART.
Recognizing the possibility of surprise North Vietnamese air strikes
against U.S. installations in Vietnam, Johnson would also order a
Marine light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion to Da Nang, the
American base located closest to Communist airfields. Armed with Hawk
missiles, the Marines would protect the growing Da Nang airbase from
which many of the FLAMING DART raids were to originate.
American reaction to the Communists’ escalation would not be limited
to the bombing of North Vietnam. Washington also would authorize
the use of U.S. jet attack aircraft to engage targets in the south.
On 19 February, U.S. Air Force B-57s would conduct the first jet
strikes flown by Americans in support of Government of Vietnam ground
units. Less than one week later, on the 24th, Air Force jets would
strike again, this time to break up a Communist ambush in the Central
Highlands with a massive series of tactical air sorties.[13-5]
While the events of February would serve to focus world opinion more
sharply on the intensifying conflict already raging over Southeast
Asia, March would prove the decisive month in terms of the commitment
of American combat power to the war in Vietnam. On 2 March, the
President would order the FLAMING DART raids replaced by Operation
ROLLING THUNDER--a sustained air campaign against the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam designed to escalate gradually in response to
continued Communist military activities in South Vietnam. ROLLING
THUNDER would constitute a transition from the earlier reprisal type
raids to a continuing air campaign based upon strategic considerations.
Within a week after the first ROLLING THUNDER strikes over the North,
the ground war in South Vietnam would also shift toward deeper and more
active American involvement. On 7 March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade--the force which had been poised in the South China Sea since
the Tonkin Gulf crisis of the previous August--would finally land at
Da Nang to provide protection for the air base. Although the Pentagon
would announce their mission as purely defensive, the Marines would
become the first actual American ground combat battalions on hand for
use in Vietnam. With that commitment, the stage would be set for a
new and more dramatic phase of what was already becoming known as the
“Second Indochina War.”
Notes
PART I
THE WATERSHED
Chapter 1
Background to Military Assistance
Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from:
Department of Defense, _United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1947_,
12 books (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter _Pentagon Papers_; The
Senator Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department
History of Decision Making On Vietnam_, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon
press, n.d.), hereafter Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_; Foreign
Area Studies Division, American University, _Area Handbook for South
Vietnam_ (Washington: GPO, 1967), hereafter American University, _Area
Handbook_; Chester L. Cooper, _et al._, _The American Experience With
Pacification in Vietnam_, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Institute For
Defense Analysis, 1972), hereafter Cooper, _et al._, _The American
Experience With Pacification_; Joseph Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon:
A Political History of Vietnam_ (New York: Praeger, 1958), hereafter
Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon_; Bernard Fall, _Two Viet-Nams: A
Political and Military Analysis_ (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2d rev.
ed.), hereafter Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; D. G. E. Hall, _A History of
South-East Asia_ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), hereafter
Hall, _A History of South-East Asia_; Frances FitzGerald, _Fire In
The Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans In Vietnam_ (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1972), hereafter FitzGerald, _Fire In The
Lake_; Ellen J. Hammer, _The Struggle for Indochina_ (Stanford, Cal.:
Stanford University Press, 1954), hereafter Hammer, _The Struggle for
Indochina_; Douglas Pike, _Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques
of The National Liberation Front_ (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press,
1966), hereafter Pike, _Viet Cong_.
[1-1] Hanson W. Baldwin, _Strategy for Tomorrow_ (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 261.
[1-2] Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_, p. 3.
[1-3] Pike, _Viet Cong_, p. 81.
[1-4] FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_, p. 42.
[1-5] Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), _A Translation From
The French Lessons of The War In Indochina_, v. II (Santa
Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 12, hereafter
Croizat, _A Translation From the French Lessons_.
[1-6] Dean Acheson, _Present At The Creation: My Years in The
State Department_ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1969), p. 673.
[1-7] Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon_, p. 46.
[1-8] B. S. N. Murti, _Vietnam Divided_ (New York, 1954), p. 49.
[1-9] Letter, SecState to SecDef, 18Aug54 as quoted in “U.S.
Training of the Vietnamese National Army 1954–1959,”
_Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. IV.A.4, p. 3.
Chapter 2
The Formative Years
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
from: MajGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret.), _In the Midst of Wars:
An American’s Mission To Southeast Asia_ (New York: Harper & Row,
1972), hereafter Lansdale, _In the Midst of Wars_; George McTurnam
Kahin and John W. Lewis, _The United States in Vietnam_ (New York:
Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Kahin and Lewis, _The
U.S. In Vietnam_; Joseph Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, 2
vols (New York: Praeger, 1967), Vol. II, _Vietnam at War_, hereafter
Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Robert Scigliano,
_South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963),
hereafter Scigliano, _South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_; Fall, _Two
Viet-Nams_; Pike, _Viet Cong_; Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, vs.
I & II; Vietnam Histories Comment File, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter
Vietnam Comment File; U.S. Marine Activities in RVN, 1954–1964 Project
Interview Folder Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter 1954–1964 Project
Interview Folder.
_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Bernard B. Fall, _Street Without Joy: Indochina At War, 1946–1954_,
(Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1961), hereafter Fall,
_Street Without Joy_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Vietnamese
Naval Forces: Origin of the Species,” _USNI Proceedings_, v. 99, no.
2 (Feb73), pp. 48–58, hereafter Croizat, “Vietnamese Naval Forces”;
Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd
10–11 Feb70 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Croizat
Interview_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments and supporting
materials on Draft MS, Jack Shulimson, “U.S. Marines in Vietnam,” pt.
1 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Croizat Comments and Supporting
Materials_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS,
Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Croizat Comments On Whitlow MS_; Col
James T. Breckinridge, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment
File), hereafter _Breckinridge Comments_; MajGen William B. Fulton,
USA (Ret.), _Riverine Operations_ (Washington, D.C.: Department of
The Army, 1973), hereafter Fulton, _Riverine Operations_; Croizat, _A
Translation From The French Lessons_.
[2-1] Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Notes on The
Organization of the Vietnamese Marine Corps,” p. 3
(_Croizat Comments and Materials_), hereafter Croizat,
“Notes on The Organization.”
[2-2] _Ibid._, p. 5.
[2-3] _Ibid._, p. 6.
_Political Stabilization and its Effects_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Buttinger, _Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Gravel Edition,
_Pentagon Papers_, v. I; Fall, _Two Viet-nams_; Robert Shaplen, _The
Lost Revolution_ (New York: Harper, 1965); Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S.
In Vietnam_; Lansdale, _In The Midst of Wars_.
[2-4] Col John T. Breckinridge, telephone conversation
with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 21 Feb 74, subj: Early
Experiences with the VN Marine Corps (Addenda to
_Breckinridge Comments_, Vietnam Comments File),
hereafter _Breckinridge Conversation_.
[2-5] Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 5.
[2-6] _Breckinridge Conversation._
Chapter 3
Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
Department of State, _Aggression From The North; The Record of North
Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam_ (Washington: GPO,
1965), hereafter Department of State, _Aggression From The North_;
Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_;
FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_; Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. In Vietnam_;
Pike, _Viet Cong_.
[3-1] _U.S. News & World Report_, 9Nov64, p. 63.
[3-2] Scigliano, _South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_, p. 164.
[3-3] Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_, p. 360.
[3-4] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II, p. 35.
[3-5] “Evolution of The War,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec.
IV.B.1, p. 1.
[3-6] Pike, _Viet Cong_, p. 81.
[3-7] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II, p. 36.
[3-8] HistBr, G-3, HQMC, “General Chronology of Events in
Vietnam, 1945–1964,” p. 41.
_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_
Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from:
SMA to CMC, ltr dtd 22 March 1973, Subj: Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine
Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954–1973, hereafter VNMC/MAU
HistSum, 22Mar73; Maj James Yingling, Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw, and
Mr. Benis M. Frank, “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam
1954–1963,” MS (HistDiv, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Yingling, _et al._,
“USMC Activities 1954–1963”; Col Frank R. Wilkinson, USMC (Ret.), intvw
by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Jul74 (Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),
hereafter _Wilkinson Interview_; LtCol Robert E. Brown, Comments on
Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam,
1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, _R. E. Brown Comments_;
Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File)
hereafter _Damm Comments_; LtCol Michael J. Gott, Comments on Draft MS,
Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
(Vietnam Comment File) hereafter _Gott Comments_; Col Gary L. Wilder,
Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “Marine Activities in
Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Wilder Comments_.
[3-9] VNMC/MAU HistSumm, 22Mar73.
[3-10] _Wilkinson Interview._
[3-11] _Ibid._
[3-12] _Damm Comments._
[3-13] _Gott Comments._
_Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Maj T. C. Edwards, “3d MarDiv Counterguerrilla Training: A Readiness
Report,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 47, no. 5 (May 1963), pp. 45–48,
hereafter Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training”; MajGen Donald M.
Weller, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _Weller Comments_; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.),
intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),
hereafter _Weller Interview_; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.),
Intvw with Captain Robert Whitlow, dtd 26Sep73, Subj: 3d MarDiv
Training Program (1954–1964 Project Interview Folder), hereafter
_Weller Interview on Training Programs_.
[3-14] _Weller Interview on Training Programs._
[3-15] Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training,” p. 46.
_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II; “The Fall Decisions,”
_Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. IV.B, ch. V and VI; Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., _A Thousand Days_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1965), hereafter Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_; Maxwell D. Taylor,
_Swords and Plowshares_ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972),
hereafter Taylor, _Swords and Plowshares_; Chester L. Cooper, _The Lost
Crusade: America In Vietnam_ (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970),
hereafter Cooper, _The Lost Crusade_; Gen. William C. Westmoreland and
Adm U. S. G. Sharp, _Report On The War In Vietnam_ (Washington: GPO
1969), hereafter Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_.
[3-16] Taylor, _Swords and Plowshares_, p. 225.
Chapter 4
An Expanding War, 1962
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
William A. Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification in Vietnam 1962–1965_
(Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1966), hereafter
Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_; USMAAG, Vietnam, “Tactics
and Techniques of Counterinsurgent Operations” (Saigon, RVN: USMAAG,
1961), hereafter, USMAAG Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of
Counterinsurgent Opns”; Hdqts, U.S. Army, _The Viet Cong_ (Ft. Bragg,
N.C.: 1965) hereafter, U.S. Army, _Viet Cong_; Cooper, _et al._, _The
American Experience With Pacification_; Gravel Edition, _Pentagon
Papers_, v. II; “The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961–63,” _Pentagon
Papers_, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.2; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_.
[4-1] As quoted in the Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v.
II, p. 140.
_Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Senior Marine Advisor letter to CMC, dtd 24Jan64, hereafter _SMA ltr
to CMC, 24Jan64_; CinCPac Command History, 1962; MACV Command History,
1962; Marine Corps Command Center, Items of Significant Interest,
Jan-Feb62, hereafter _MCC Items_; LtGen Richard G. Weede, Intvw by
Hist&MusDiv, HQMC dtd 23Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),
hereafter _Weede Interview_.
_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
_SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64_; Capt Don R. Christensen, “A Special Gazette
Report: Dateline ... Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 47, no. 9
(Sep63), p. 5, hereafter Christensen, “Dateline”; Gen David M. Shoup,
SE Asia Trip Folder, Sep62, hereafter _Shoup SEA Trip Folder_; LtCol
Harold F. Brown, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _H. F. Brown Comments_.
[4-2] _SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64._
[4-3] Gen David M. Shoup, ltr to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dtd
Oct62 (_Shoup SEA Trip Folder_).
[4-4] Gen David M. Shoup conversation with BGen Edwin H.
Simmons, dtd Feb74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder).
[4-5] _SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64._
PART II
MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR
Chapter 5
SHUFLY at Soc Trang
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File _MCC Items_; CinCPac Command
History, 1962; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation In Vietnam,
1962–1970,” _Naval Review_, v. 10 (1971), hereafter McCutcheon, “Marine
Aviation.”
[5-1] JCS to CinCPac, 17Jan62, 1212Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-2] CinCPac to JCS, 28Feb62, 0217Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-3] JCS to CinCPac, 6Mar62, 1838Z (HQMC Msg File). DA to
CinCPac and CinCUSARPac, 2Mar63 (HQMC Msg File).
[5-4] ChMAAG, VN to CinCPac, 26Feb62, 0945Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-5] CGFMPac to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 0113Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-6] _Ibid._
[5-7] CinCPacFlt to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 2044Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-8] CinCPac (Bangkok Th) to ComUSMACV, 5Mar62, 0340Z (HQMC
Msg File).
[5-9] ComUSMACV to CinCPac, 8Mar62, 0941Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-10] CinCUSARPac to CinCPac, 9Mar62, 2100Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-11] Dir, DivAv, HQMC, Briefing Item, dtd 14Mar62, for CMC
Weekly Conf., Subj: Assignment of Marine Helicopter
Squadron to ChMAAG, Vietnam.
[5-12] CinCPac to JCS, 14Mar62, 0712Z (HQMC Msg File).
[5-13] _Ibid._
[5-14] CinCPac to CinCPacFlt and ComUSMACV, 21Mar62, 0412Z (HQMC
Msg File); CinCPacFlt to ComSeventhFlt, 21Mar62, 2048Z
(HQMC Msg File).
_Deployment to Soc Trang_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Commander Task Unit 79.3.5 ComdDiary, 31Jul–5Nov62, hereafter _CTU
79.3.5 CmdD, 31Jul-Nov62_; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, OpSums, Apr-Sep62; CG,
1st MAW, Ltr of Instruction, SHUFLY, dtd 12Nov62, hereafter _CG, 1st
MAW LOI_; LtCol Archie J. Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” _USNI Proceedings_,
v. 89, no. 10 (Oct63), hereafter Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; Cdr Withers
M. Moore, Chaplain Corps, USN, _Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954–1964_
(Washington: Department of Navy, 1968), hereafter Moore, _Navy
Chaplains_; Capt Robert B. Asprey, “Saga At Soc Trang: Marines In
Viet-Nam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 46, no. 12 (Dec62), pp. 2–3,
hereafter Asprey, “Saga At Soc Trang”; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN
(Ret.), Intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 15Apr74 (1954–64 Project
Interview Folder), hereafter _Hooper Interview_.
[5-15] CG, 1st MAW to ComSeventhFlt, 30Mar62, 0700Z, (HQMC Msg
File).
[5-16] _Ibid._
[5-17] ComSeventhFlt to CTF 76 and CTG 79.3, 3Apr62 (HQMC Msg
File).
_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Study No. 1, dtd 12Mar63,
“Characteristics of U.S. Marine Helicopter Operations in the Mekong
Delta,” hereafter _MCOAG Study No. 1_; LtCol Robert L. Rathbun,
Comments on Yingling, _et al._, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” (Vietnam
Comment File), hereafter _Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS_; Richard
Tregaskis, _Vietnam Diary_ (New York: Popular Library, 1963), hereafter
Tregaskis, _Vietnam Diary_; Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD,
31Jul–5Nov62; CG, 1stMAW SHUFLY OpSums, Apr-Sep62.
[5-18] Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” p. 46.
[5-19] _Ibid._, p. 51.
[5-20] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62.
[5-21] Yingling, _et al._, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” p. 118.
[5-22] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul-Nov62.
[5-23] C of S memo 007A20763, as quoted in Yingling, _et al._,
“USMC Activities, 1954–1963,” p. 153.
Chapter 6
SHUFLY Moves North
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
Col Julius W. Ireland, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _Ireland Comments_; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; _Weede
Interview_; _Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS_.
_I Corps Tactical Zone_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965–1966,”
_Naval Review_, 1968, hereafter Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in
RVN, 65–66”; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; Fall, _Street Without Joy_;
Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_.
_Military Situation, September 1962_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Col Francis J. Kelly, USA, _U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971_
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), hereafter Kelly,
_U.S. Army Special Forces_; MACV J-2 ltr to CTU 79.3.5, dtd 11Oct62,
Subj: Intelligence Estimate, Period Oct62–Feb63 (Encl D-17 to CTU
79.3.5 ComdD), hereafter _MACV Intell Est, 11Oct62_.
[6-1] _MACV Intel Est, 11Oct62._
[6-2] _Ibid._
_Initial Helicopter Operations_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
from: _CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62_; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, OpSums,
Sep-Dec62; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; _Ireland Comments_; _Rathbun
Comments on Yingling MS_.
[6-3] _MCC Items_, 7Oct62.
[6-4] CTU 79.3.5 ltr to CG 1st MAW, dtd 4Oct62, Subj: Rotation
of Task Unit Personnel to South Vietnam (encl D-15, _CTU
79.3.5 ComdD, 6Apr–5Nov62_).
Chapter 7
The Laotian Crisis, 1962
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
3d Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Report, 16May–7Aug 1962, hereafter
_3d MEU Special Report_; CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II (Laos),
hereafter _OpPlan 32-59_; _Weller Interview_; _Croizat Interview_; _MCC
Items_, May, Jun, Jul62; Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_; Cooper, _The
Lost Crusade_; Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, _North Vietnam
and The Pathet Lao: Partners in The Struggle For Laos_ (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), hereafter Langer and Zasloff,
_North Vietnam and The Pathet Lao_; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC
(Ret.) Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities
In Vietnam, 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Simpson
Comments_; Foster Rhea Dulles, _American Policy Toward Communist China:
The Historical Record_ (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972),
hereafter Dulles, _American Policy Toward Communist China_; Taylor,
_Swords and Plowshares_.
[7-1] _MCC Items_: 16 May 62.
[7-2] _Croizat Interview_; _Weller Interview_.
PART III
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963
Chapter 8
The Marine Advisory Effort
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_; “The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem,
May-November, 1963,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.5; Gravel
Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III; Shaplen, _The Lost Revolution_;
Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. In Vietnam_.
_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_
Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from:
Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, Monthly Historical Summaries, 1963–1965,
hereafter _SMA, MACV HistSums_; Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft
MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964”
(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Noren Comments on Bradshaw MS_;
Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”. (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS_; Col Clarence G. Moody,
Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In
Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Moody Comments_;
LtCol James P. McWilliams, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _McWilliams Comments_; LtCol Joseph N. Smith, Comments on
Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam,
1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Smith Comments_; LtCol
Joseph N. Smith intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow (1954–1964 Project
Interview Folder), hereafter _Smith Interview_; Col Edwin F. Black,
USA, and Lt R. P. W. Murphy, USNR, “The South Vietnamese Navy,” _USNI
Proceedings_, v. 90, no. 1 (Jan64) pp. 52–62, hereafter, Black and
Murphy, “The South Vietnamese Navy”; Maj Alfred J. Croft, “A Special
Gazette Report: Dateline, Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_ v. 47, n.
10 (Oct63), p. 18, hereafter Croft, “Dateline, Vietnam”; Christenson,
“Dateline”; Capt. James P. McWilliams, “Pacify and Hold,” _Marine Corps
Gazette_, v. 49, no. 2 (Feb65), p. 56, hereafter McWilliams, _Pacify
and Hold_.
[8-1] _Moody Comments_; _Weede Interview_.
[8-2] _McWilliams Comments._
[8-3] _Smith Interview._
[8-4] _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS._
Chapter 9
SHUFLY Operations
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD,
31Oct63–14Jan64; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS, Bradshaw,
“U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964,” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS_.
[9-1] McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.”
_Combat Support Operations_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD,
31Oct63–14Jan64; CTE 79.3.3.6 After Action Reports, 26Apr–20May63,
hereafter _CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR_; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; MajGen
Paul J. Fontana, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964,” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _Fontana Comments_; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS,
Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Ross Comments On Whitlow MS_; _Ross
Comments On Bradshaw MS_; _H. F. Brown Comments_.
[9-2] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.
[9-3] _Ibid._
[9-4] CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR, 19May63.
[9-5] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.
[9-6] Aviation Headquarters Operations Center SOP, p. 1 (encl
5, CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).
[9-7] Col A. D. Gomez ltr to Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing
Force Development Center, dated 23Oct63 (encl 1, CTE
79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).
[9-8] 1st MAW OpSums, 8Jun–20Oct63.
[9-9] _Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS._
[9-10] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov63–14Jan64.
_The Situation in Vietnam_
Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived
from: Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II; Nighswonger, _Rural
Pacification, 1962–65_; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; Cooper, _The Lost
Crusade_; Department of State, _Aggression from the North_.
[9-11] Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_.
PART IV
AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964
Chapter 10
Marines Meet the Challenge
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC,
dtd 24Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Youngdale
Interview_; MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft
MS, Capt Robert Whitlow “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–64”
(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, _Youngdale Comments_; Westmoreland
and Sharp, _Report On The War_; Cooper, _et al._, _The American
Experience With Pacification, 1962–65_; “Military Pressures Against
North Vietnam, July-Oct 1964,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2;
Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III; CinCPac Command History,
1964, hereafter _CinCPac ComdHist, 64_; U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, Command History, 1964, hereafter MACV ComdHist, 64;
Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_.
[10-1] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III, p. 501.
[10-2] _Ibid._
[10-3] _Ibid._, v. II, p. 471.
[10-4] “Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Jul-Oct 1964,”
_Pentagon Papers_, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2(b), p. 42.
_Redesignation and Reorganization_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, After Action Reports, 1964–65, hereafter
_SMA, MACV, AARs 64-65_; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments
on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam,
1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Nesbit Comments On
Whitlow MS_; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft
MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations In RVN, 1964”
(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS_;
_Noren Comments on Whitlow MS_; _Noren Comments on Bradshaw MS_; James
C. Pickerell, “Marine Advisor: Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 48,
n. 4 (Apr64), hereafter Pickerall, “Marine Advisor”; _Damm Comments_.
[10-5] _Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS._
_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
_SMA, MACV, AARs, 64-65_; CG FMFPac On-The-Job-Training, RVN, Monthly
Reports, Jan-Dec, 1964, hereafter _OJT Monthly Repts, 64_; Capt Philip
O. Brady, intvw by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Jan66 (OralHistColl,
Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Brady Interview_; Westmoreland and
Sharp, _Report On The War_; Pickerell, “Marine Advisor”; Naval Advisory
Group, MACV, Historical Review, 1964–65, hereafter NAVGP, MACV,
HistRevw, 64-65.
[10-6] _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS._
[10-7] _Nesbit Comments on Whitlow MS._
[10-8] NAVGP, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 21.
_Additional Marine Activities_
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
LtCol Raymond Becker, intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 25Jan74
(1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter _Becker Interview_;
Capt Charles H. Gallina, Intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 29Jan74
(1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter _Gallina Interview_;
Director of Intelligence, HQMC, to Director, History and Museums
Division, dtd 31Jan74, Subj: Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Operations
at Tiger Tooth Mountain and Dong Bach Ma in 1964, hereafter “Summary
of USMC Opns at Tiger Tooth Mountain”; Col Raymond C. Damm intvw with
Captain Robert H. Whitlow, dtd 19Jul73 (1954–64 Project Interview
Folder), hereafter _Damm Interview_; NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65; CTE
79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
[10-9] _Damm Interview._
[10-10] NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 14.
[10-11] _Smith Comments._
[10-12] Col Warren P. Baker, ltr to CG, 3dMarDiv, dtd 3Apr64,
Subj: Job Related Orientation Report.
[10-13] CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 18Mar64, Subj: SVN Observations.
Chapter 11
Spring and Summer Fighting
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; Col Andre Gomez, Comments on Draft
MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam 1954–64”
(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Gomez Comments_; Col Robert A.
Merchant, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine
Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
_Merchant Comments_; Col John H. La Voy, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam
Comment File), hereafter _La Voy Comments_; _Ross Comments on Whitlow
MS_; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt
Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam
Comment File), hereafter _Nickerson Comments_.
[11-1] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
[11-2] _Ross Comments on Whitlow MS._
[11-3] _Ibid._
[11-4] _Ibid._
[11-5] Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., CMC, before
the House Committee On Armed Services, dtd March 1964
(Greene Papers Collection).
[11-6] CTE ComdD 79.3.3.6, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
[11-7] _La Voy Comments._
[11-8] _Ibid._
[11-9] _Ibid._
[11-10] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; _Merchant Comments_;
_La Voy Comments_.
[11-11] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
Chapter 12
Fall and Winter Operations
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65;
1st MAW OpSums, 9Jul64–7Oct64; CinCPac CmdHist 64; _Fontana Comments_;
BGen Joseph Koler, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
hereafter _Koler Comments_; Col Hardy Hay, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam
Comment File), hereafter _Hay Comments_; _Becker Comments_; _Merchant
Comments_; _Nickerson Comments_; Capt Roger H. Donlon, USA, _Outpost of
Freedom_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), hereafter Donlon, _Outpost of
Freedom_; Moore, _Navy Chaplains_.
[12-1] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CG 1st MAW OpSums,
9Jul–7Oct64.
[12-2] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
[12-3] Moore, _Navy Chaplains_, p. 92.
[12-4] _MCC Items_, 23Nov64.
[12-5] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65.
[12-6] _Ibid._
[12-7] _Ibid._
[12-8] _Ibid._
Chapter 13
Prelude to Escalation
[13-1] Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_, p. 95.
[13-2] _Youngdale Interview._
[13-3] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III, p. 289.
[13-4] Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_, pp. 95, 97.
[13-5] _Ibid._, p. 98.
Appendix A
USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964
USMC SENIOR MARINE ADVISORS
LtCol Victor J. Croizat Aug 1954–Jun 1956
LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr Jun 1956–Jun 1958
LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr Jun 1958–Jun 1960
LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr Jun 1960–Aug 1961
LtCol Robert E. Brown Aug 1961–Oct 1962
LtCol Clarence G. Moody, Jr Oct 1962–Oct 1963
LtCol Wesley C. Noren Oct 1963–Sep 1964
Col William P. Nesbit Sep 1964–
VNMC SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDANTS
Maj Le Quang Trong 1 Oct 1954–17 Jun 1956
Maj Phan Van Lieu 18 Jan 1956–22 Aug 1956
Capt Bui Pho Chi 23 Aug 1956– 1 Oct 1956
Maj Le Nhu Hung 2 Oct 1956–23 May 1960
LtCol Le Nguyen Khang 24 May 1960–15 Dec 1963
LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien 16 Dec 1963– Feb 1964
BGen Le Nguyen Khang Feb 1964–
SHUFLY, SQUADRON, AND SUB UNIT COMMANDERS[14-A]
_SHUFLY Commanders_ _Dates_
Col John F. Carey 15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
Col Julius W. Ireland 1 Aug 1962– 5 Nov 1962
LtCol Alton W. McCully 6 Nov 1962–28 Jan 1963
LtCol Harold F. Brown 29 Jan 1963–17 Jul 1963
Col Andre D. Gomez 18 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964
Col Robert A. Merchant 16 Jan 1964– 9 Jul 1964
Col Hardy Hay 10 Jul 1964–16 Oct 1964
Col John H. King, Jr 17 Oct 1964–
_Squadron Commanders_ _Squadron_ _Dates_
LtCol Archie J. Clapp HMM-362 15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
LtCol Robert L. Rathbun HMM-163 1 Aug 1962–11 Jan 1963
LtCol Reinhardt Leu HMM-162 12 Jan 1963– 7 Jun 1963
LtCol Frank A. Shook HMM-261 8 Jun 1963– 1 Oct 1963
LtCol Thomas J. Ross HMM-361 2 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964
LtCol John H. La Voy HMM-364 1 Feb 1964–21 Jun 1964
LtCol Oliver W. Curtis HMM-162 17 Jun 1964– 7 Oct 1964
LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr HMM-365 8 Oct 1964–
_Sub Unit Commanders_ _Dates_
LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr 15 Apr 1962– 3 Aug 1962
LtCol Ralph R. Davis 4 Aug 1962–15 Jan 1963
LtCol George H. Linnemeier 16 Jan 1963– 4 Jul 1963
LtCol Earl W. Cassidy 5 Jul 1963– 6 Feb 1964
LtCol Samuel G. Beal 7 Feb 1964–26 Jun 1964
Maj Marion R. Green 27 Jun 1964–14 Dec 1964
LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 15 Dec 1964–
[14-A] SHUFLY was designated Task Unit 79.3.5 from 15 April
1962 until 6 November 1962; Task Element 79.3.3.6 from 6
November 1962 through 31 December 1964.
Appendix B
Awards and Decorations, Vietnam, through 1964[14-B]
_Navy Cross_
Maj Donald E. Koelper[14-C] 16 Feb 1964
SSgt John C. Thompson 30 Apr 1964
_Navy Distinguished Service Medal_
MajGen Richard G. Weede[14-D] Feb 1962–May 1964
MajGen Carl A. Youngdale 25 Jan 1964–20 Jul 1965
_Silver Star Medal_
Maj John R. Braddon 27 Apr 1964
1stLt Phillip O. Brady 31 Dec 1964
Capt Franklin P. Eller, Jr 31 Dec 1964
Capt Joseph N. Smith 27 Oct 1963–25 Apr 1964
Capt Richard B. Taylor[14-E] 25 Nov 1962–31 Oct 1963
_Legion of Merit_
Col Earl E. Anderson 8 Jul 1963–15 May 1964
LtCol Earl W. Cassidy 2 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964
Col John F. Carey[14-F] 9 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
LtCol Archie J. Clapp[14-G] 15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
Col Andre D. Gomez 19 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964
Col John H. King, Jr 16 Oct 1964–15 May 1965
LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr 7 Oct 1964–18 Feb 1965
LtCol John H. La Voy 1 Feb 1964–22 Jun 1964
Col Robert A. Merchant 2 Jan 1964–10 Jul 1964
LtCol Clarence C. Moody, Jr 18 Jan 1962–24 Oct 1963
Col Wesley C. Noren 13 Oct 1963–13 Sep 1964
LtCol Thomas J. Ross 1 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964
Col Roy H. Thompson 27 Feb 1962–16 Jun 1964
Col Charles E. Warren 8 Feb 1962– 9 Jul 1964
Col Edwin B. Wheeler 1 Aug 1964–23 Aug 1965
_Distinguished Flying Cross_
Maj Albert N. Allen 27 Apr 1964
Capt William J. Burrows 27 Apr 1964
Capt Charles E. Cannon 27 Apr 1964
Capt William Cunningham 27 Apr 1964
1stLt Ronald V. Debrincat 27 Apr 1964
Capt George H. Dunn II 27 Apr 1964
Capt George H. Dunn II 30 Apr 1964
Capt Robert K. Ervi 31 Dec 1963
1stLt Melvin T. Graves 27 Apr 1964
Capt Theodore A. Heister 1 Aug 1963
1stLt Donald A. Hodgen[14-H] 10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963
LtCol John H. La Voy 27 Apr 1964
Capt Peter A. Love 27 Apr 1964
WO Dennis T. McKee 27 Apr 1964
1stLt Edward P. Moore 27 Apr 1964
CWO Robert F. Patton 5 Jun 1964
1stLt Thomas H. Peters[14-I] 9 Mar 1963–10 Mar 1963
Capt Eugene W. Rawlins 27 Apr 1964
Capt Howard G. Taylor 27 Apr 1964
1stLt Charles R. Upshaw 27 Apr 1964
Capt William W. Wamel, Jr. 27 Apr 1964
Capt William W. Wamel, Jr. 30 Apr 1964
Maj Goodell P. Warren 27 Apr 1964
1stLt Charles C. Wood, Jr. 27 Apr 1964
Capt Grant T. Yule 27 Apr 1964
_Bronze Star Medal_
SSgt John Baran 12 Dec 1964
LtCol Samuel G. Beal 3 Feb 1964– 1 Jul 1964
SSgt Clifford J. Beaver 30 Dec 1964–31 Dec 1964
LtCol George A. Brigham 3 Apr 1964– 3 Jul 1964
SSgt Marvin I. Bryant 12 Oct 1964– 8 Mar 1965
Cpl Clarence L. Chester 30 Jun 1964
Capt Don R. Christensen[14-J] 28 Sep 1962–31 Jul 1963
2dLt Francis R. Ciccone 16 Oct 1964
SSgt James A. Coryer 30 Jun 1964
Maj Alfred J. Croft 1 Feb 1962– 7 Feb 1964
LtCol Oliver W. Curtis 17 Jun 1964–23 Nov 1964
LtCol Raymond C. Damm 10 May 1964– 1 Dec 1964
Maj Alfred M. Gray, Jr. 11 Apr 1964–15 Aug 1964
Capt James J. Harp 10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963
Cpl Cary F. Janulewicz 9 Dec 1964
1stLt Weston L. Johnson 10 Nov 1964
2dLt James P. Kelliher 31 Dec 1964
1stLt Donald H. Larson 4 Apr 1964– 1 Feb 1965
GySgt Richard L. Latimer 9 Dec 1964
Capt John P. Monahan 21 Mar 1964–28 Feb 1965
Capt James P. McWilliams 2 May 1963– 9 Jun 1964
GySgt Charles D. Peck 14 Apr 1963–22 Apr 1964
LCpl James N. Phinney 10 Apr 1964
LCpl Walter L. Rupp 24 Mar 1964
GySgt Edmund R. Sewell 20 Sep 1964
SSgt Cecil C. Stibbens Dec 1962– Dec 1964
Capt Edward H. Walsh 28 Sep 1964– 1 May 1964
Maj Charles K. Whitfield 31 Jan 1964–20 Jan 1965
Capt Frank Zimolzak[14-K] 27 Apr 1962–25 May 1963
[14-B] Other awards, such as Navy Commendation Medals, Air
Medals, and Purple Hearts are not included in this list.
[14-C] First Navy Cross approved for Vietnam.
[14-D] First Navy Distinguished Service Medal awarded for
Vietnam.
[14-E] First Silver Star Medal awarded to a Marine for Vietnam.
[14-F] First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for
Vietnam.
[14-G] First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for
Vietnam.
[14-H] First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC
personnel in Vietnam.
[14-I] First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC
personnel in Vietnam.
[14-J] One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the
same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.
[14-K] One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the
same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.
Appendix C
Glossary of Acronyms
AHOC Aviation Headquarters Operations Center
ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam
ASOC Air Support Operation Center
BLT Battalion Landing Team
CG Civil Guard
ChMAAG Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CIDG Civil Irregular Defense Group
CinCPac Commander in Chief, Pacific
CIP Counter Insurgency Plan
ComUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COSVN Central Office for South Vietnam
CTZ Corps Tactical Zone
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
FAC Forward Air Controller
FEC French Expeditionary Corps
FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
GCA Ground Controlled Approach (system)
GVN Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
ICC International Control Commission
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
JRO Job Related Orientation (Program)
JTF Joint Task Force
LSG Logistics Support Group
MABS Marine Air Base Squadron
MAG Marine Aircraft Group
MATCU Marine Airfield Traffic Control Unit
MAW Marine Aircraft Wing
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MR Military Region
NLF National Liberation Front
OJT On-The-Job Training (Program)
PAVN Peoples Army of Vietnam
PF Popular Forces
RF Regional Forces
RLT Regimental Landing Team
RSSZ Rung Sat Special Zone
RVN Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SAR Search and Rescue
SDC Self Defense Corps
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SLF Special Landing Force
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation (system)
TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System
TERM Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
TRIM Training Relations Instruction Mission
USMAAG (MAAG) U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
USMACThai U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USOM U.S. Operations Mission
VC Viet Cong
VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron
VNA Vietnamese National Army
VNAF Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC Vietnamese Marine Corps
Appendix D
Chronology
1954
7 May--French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrenders to Viet Minh.
16 Jun--Ngo Dinh Diem named premier of Vietnam by French-sponsored
emperor, Bao Dai.
20 Jul--French and Viet Minh representatives sign Geneva
cease-fire. Vietnam is divided into northern and southern zones
pending reunification elections to be held in 1956.
2 Aug--LtCol Victor J. Croizat, USMC, arrives in South Vietnam
for duty with USMAAG.
8 Sep--Manila Pact signed by U.S. and seven other nations. Within
weeks (Sep 1954) the Manila Pact is transformed into the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
13 Oct--Premier Diem decrees the establishment of a 1,137-man
Marine Corps (VNMC).
1955
Feb--LtCol Croizat becomes first advisor to VNMC.
Apr--Sect rebellion threatens to topple the Diem government. Marine
Landing Battalion deploys to the Mekong Delta.
31 May--Diem names Major Le Quang Trong as Senior Marine Officer
of VNMC.
Sep--Two USMC advisors, a captain and a technical sergeant, are
assigned to the USMAAG, Vietnam, for duty with the VNMC.
23 Oct--Premier Diem receives 98 percent of South Vietnamese vote
during a national referendum in which he was opposed by Bao Dai.
26 Oct--Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims the Republic of Vietnam and
becomes the republic’s first president.
1956
18 Jan--Diem appoints Major Phan Van Lieu as Senior Officer of
VNMC.
Feb--Marine Landing Battalion returns to garrison at Nha Trang. VNMC
reorganized into two landing battalions, a 4.2-inch mortar
company, and a small headquarters.
Jun--LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr., replaces LtCol Croizat as Senior
Marine Advisor to VNMC.
Jul--Election deadline for reunification of northern and southern
zones passes without serious incident.
Aug--Diem appoints Captain Bui Pho Chi as Senior Officer of VNMC.
Oct--Diem appoints Major Le Nhu Hung as Senior Officer of VNMC.
Nov--LtGen Samuel T. Williams, USA, relieves LtGen John O’Daniel as
Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.
1958
Jun--LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkes as Senior
Marine Advisor to VNMC.
1959
May--1st VNMC Landing Battalion conducts operations against Viet
Cong in An Xuyen Province while 2d Landing Battalion conducts
similar operation against Communist guerrillas in Vinh Binh
Province.
1 Jun--The VNMC is expanded to a Marine Corps Group of 2,276
officers and men. A 3d Landing Battalion is formed and the
battalions are reorganized into four infantry companies.
1960
Jun--LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkinson as
Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.
Sep--LtGen Lionel C. McGarr, USA, relieves LtGen Williams as Chief
USMAAG, Vietnam.
11 Nov--An abortive attempt by ARVN paratroops and two Marine
companies to overthrow the Diem Government.
20 Dec--The Communist “National Front for Liberation of South
Vietnam” was formed.
1961
May--On The Job Training (OJT) program for USMC junior officers and
staff noncommissioned officers is initiated. Thereafter, 20
Marines per month enter Vietnam to observe operations.
16 May--A 14 nation conference on the deteriorating Laotian
situation convenes at Geneva.
Jul--VNMC again reorganized and expanded. The addition of a fourth
infantry battalion and a 75mm pack howitzer battery raises the
strength of the VNMC to 3,321.
Aug--LtCol Robert E. Brown relieves LtCol Robichaud as Senior Marine
Advisor to VNMC.
Aug--VNMC battalion conducts operations in the inundated U Minh
Forest region of the Ca Mau Peninsula.
Nov--General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (ret.), President Kennedy’s
special military advisor, visits South Vietnam on fact-finding
mission.
11 Dec--The first direct support contingent of U.S. military
forces arrives in Vietnam--400 Army Troops and two helicopter
companies.
Dec--USMAAG approves plan for new 18-man Marine Advisory Division.
1962
1 Jan--VNMC expanded to 6,109 officers and men, and redesignated
the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. A new amphibious support
battalion is formed.
3 Jan--First element of USAF transport aircraft arrive in South
Vietnam to support government forces.
Jan--Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, FMF arrives in Vietnam for duty
with Army communications unit.
20 Jan--CinCPac authorizes all MAAG advisors to accompany their
Vietnamese units into combat.
3 Feb--President Diem issues decree formalizing initiation of the
Strategic Hamlet Program.
8 Feb--U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV)
activated in Saigon with General Paul D. Harkins as commander.
MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, becomes MACV’s first chief of
staff.
7 Feb--Vietnamese Air Force fighters bomb and strafe the
Presidential Palace in Saigon but fail to injure President Diem.
9 Apr--The leading elements of Marine Task Unit 79.3.5 (SHUFLY),
commanded by Col John F. Carey, arrive at Soc Trang, Republic
of Vietnam.
15 Apr--HMM-362 (Reinforced), a Marine medium transport helicopter
squadron, arrives at Soc Trang to begin operations in support
of government forces.
22 Apr--HMM-362 helicopters fly their first combat support
missions in Vietnam.
9 May--Eight Marine helicopters hit by small arms fire during
landing on Ca Mau Peninsula.
18 May--The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU) began moving
into position at Udorn, Thailand, in response to the
deteriorating situation in Laos. The 3d MEU was part of Joint
Task Force 116, organized for use in the mounting crisis.
20 May--BGen Ormond R. Simpson assumes command of 3d MEU.
18 Jun--Eagle Flight first employed in combat by Marine
helicopters operating from Soc Trang.
25 Jun--HMM-162 replaces HMM-261 at Udorn as 3d MEW (MEB)
helicopter element.
1 Jul--First Marine Combat units withdraw from Udorn, Thailand,
as a display of good faith.
23 Jul--An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos is signed
by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam,
and 10 other nations at Geneva.
30 Jul--Col Julius W. Ireland relieves Col Carey as SHUFLY
commander.
31 Jul--Last Marine combat units withdrawn from Udorn, Thailand.
1 Aug--HMM-163 replaces HMM-362 as operational squadron assigned
to SHUFLY.
Aug--First machine guns mounted on Marine helicopters operating in
Vietnam.
4 Sep--Initial SHUFLY elements begin displacing to Da Nang in I
Corps Tactical Zone.
18 Sep--HMM-163 conducts first combat operations in I Corps.
20 Sep--All SHUFLY elements are in place at Da Nang.
Oct--LtCol Clarence G. Moody relieves LtCol Brown as Senior Marine
Advisor to VNMC.
6 Oct--Five Marines and two U.S. Navy personnel killed in HUS
crash near Tam Ky.
7 Nov--HMM-163 executes first tiger flight reaction force mission
in I Corps.
Nov--All Marine Corps aircraft redesignated.
6 Nov--Marine Task Unit (SHUFLY) redesignated Task Element
79.3.3.6.
6 Nov--LtCol Alton W. McCully assumes command of SHUFLY.
Dec--Vietnamese Joint General Staff realigns South Vietnam’s Corps
Tactical Zones, creating a fourth CTZ and a Capital Military
District.
1963
11 Jan--HMM-162 replaces HMM-163 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
19 Jan--HMM-162 conducts its first combat troop lift in Vietnam.
10–13 Mar--HMM-162 helicopters participate in search and rescue
attempts for U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk and crew. Two Marine
helicopters crash in high mountains of northern II Corps.
13 Apr--Marine transport helicopters conduct first operation with
U.S. Army UH-1B armed helicopters.
Apr--Organization of Marine Advisory Division modified slightly.
1 May--Provisional Marine Brigade joins ARVN forces for operation
in Do Xa base area.
8 Jun--HMM-261 replaces HMM-162 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
15–16 Aug--HMM-261 helilifts 2d ARVN Division units from field to
culminate operation LAM SON XII.
21 Aug--Vietnamese National Police raid Buddhist pagodas
throughout South Vietnam.
Sep--LtCol Wesley C. Noren relieves LtCol Moody as Senior Marine
Advisor to VNMC.
2 Oct--HMM-361 replaces HMM-261 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
Oct--Provisional Marine Regiment conducts operation PHI-HOA 5 in Gia
Dinh Province.
1 Nov--Diem government overthrown by coup of military leaders.
Diem and brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated.
14 Nov--Provisional Marine Regiment launches Operation DAI-PHONG
28 and 29 in III Corps Tactical Zone.
25 Nov--2d VNMC Battalion participates in Operation DAI-PHONG 30.
16 Dec--LtCol Khang relieved as Commandant of Vietnamese Marine
Corps. Replaced by LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien.
1964
1 Jan--General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., relieves General David
Shoup as Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps.
Jan--General Greene visits Vietnam.
15 Jan--BGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC, becomes MACV Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence (J-2).
1 Feb--HMM-364 replaces HMM-361 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
Feb--Col Khang recalled from Philippines and relieves LtCol Lien as
Commandant of VNMC.
Mar--LtGen Victor H. Krulak relieves LtGen Carson A. Roberts as
Commanding General, FMFPac.
27 Apr--HMM-364 participates in Operation SURE WIND 202 in
northern II Corps.
May--MajGen Weede, USMC, relieved as MACV Chief of Staff.
15 May--USMAAG abolished. Marine Advisory Division renamed Marine
Advisory Unit and placed under Naval Advisory Group, MACV.
20 May--Marine Advisory Team One arrives at Da Nang.
7 Jun--Two Marines from SHUFLY compound reported missing south of
Da Nang.
13 Jun--Advisory Team One moves to Tiger Tooth Mountain in
northwestern I Corps.
19 Jun--HMM-364 turn over helicopters and maintenance equipment to
VNAF 217th Squadron.
21 Jun--HMM-162 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
Jul--Vietnamese Marine Recruit Training Center opens at Thu Due. VNMC
expanded with the creation of a fifth infantry battalion.
7 Jul--HMM-162 participates in relief of Nam Dong Special Forces
Camp.
2–5 Aug--North Vietnamese patrol boats and U.S. ships clash in
Tonkin Gulf.
6 Aug--U.S. Congress passes Tonkin Gulf resolution.
11 Aug--President Johnson signs the so-called Tonkin Gulf
Resolution.
19 Aug--Advisory Team One moves to Bach Ma and continues
operations.
4 Sep--Col William P. Nesbit replaces Col Noren as Senior Marine
Advisor to VNMC.
13 Sep--Advisory Team One dissolved, departs Vietnam.
14 Sep--SHUFLY aircraft flown to safety in face of severe tropical
storm.
Sep--Marine Advisory Unit reorganized and expanded.
8 Oct HMM-365 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
Oct--Marine reconnaissance element conducts survey of Cam Ranh Bay in
southern II Corps.
31 Dec--Viet Cong terrorist bomb American BOQ in Saigon.
31 Dec--4th VNMC Battalion defeated at Binh Gia in III Corps.
Appendix E
List of Reviewers
_General Officers_
Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC
Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Gen David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.)
LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
LtGen Carson A. Roberts, USMC (Ret.)
LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.)
LtGen Richard G. Weede, USMC (Ret.)
MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)
MajGen Paul J. Fontana, USMC (Ret.)
MajGen Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army (Ret.)
MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)
MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)
BGen Joseph Koler, Jr., USMC
_Colonels_
Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)
Col Samual Beal, USMC (Ret.)
Col John T. Breckinridge, USMC
Col Harold F. Brown, USMC (Ret.)
Col John F. Carey, USMC (Ret.)
Col Archie J. Clapp, USMC (Ret.)
Col Alfred J. Croft, USMC
Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)
Col Oliver W. Curtis, USMC (Ret.)
Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC
Col Andre Gomez, USMC (Ret.)
Col Hardy Hay, USMC (Ret.)
Col Julius W. Ireland, USMC (Ret.)
Col John H. La Voy, USMC (Ret.)
Col Reinhardt Leu, USMC (Ret.)
Col Robert A. Merchant, USMC (Ret.)
Col Ross S. Mickey, USMC (Ret.)
Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC
Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.)
Col Wesley C. Noren, USMC (Ret.)
Col Robert L. Rathbum, USMC (Ret.)
Col Thomas J. Ross, USMC (Ret.)
Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
_Lieutenant Colonels_
LtCol Robert E. Brown, USMC (Ret.)
LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, USMC (Ret.)
LtCol Michael J. Gott, USMC
LtCol George H. Linnemeier, USMC (Ret.)
LtCol James P. McWilliams, USMC
LtCol Joseph N. Smith, USMC
_CMC Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History_
Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)[14-L]
MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)[14-M]
Dr. Gordon A. Craig
Dr. Philip K. Lundeberg
Mr. Robert L. Sherrod
MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)[14-N]
_Others_
Center of Military History, Department of the Army
Dr. Philip A. Crowl
Capt Joseph Drachnik, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy
Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force
[14-L] Cited previously.
[14-M] Cited previously.
[14-N] Cited previously.
Index
Adams, LtCol Harold W., 89–90, 92–94
Africa, 11
Agroville Program, 45
Aircraft
Types
AD-6, _See_ A1-H
A1-H (Skyraider), 71, 116, 137, 149, 152–154, 158–159
A-4C, (Skyhawk), 89, 92
B-26, 109, 117–118
B-57, 166–167
F4U (Corsair), 71
F-100 (Super Sabre), 90
C-117 (Skytrain), 60–61, 84, 160
C-124 (Globemaster), 71
C-123 (Provider), 46, 90, 103, 139, 141
CH-21 (Shawnee), 58, 103, 107
CV-2 (Caribou), 158
GV-1. _See_ KC-130
H-21. _See_ CH-21
HUS-1. _See_ UH-34D
KC-130 (Hercules), 61, 70, 73, 89–90, 93–94, 112–114, 142, 147,
156
O-1B (Bird Dog), 60, 67–69, 73, 82, 84, 92, 107, 115–118,
144–145, 149, 154, 157–159, 161
OE-1. _See_ O-1B
OV-1 (Mohawk), 114
R4D. _See_ C-117
T-28 (Trojans), 46, 67, 71, 116–118, 120, 149
U-10 (Super Courier), 118, 149, 152, 158
UH-1B (Iroquois), 107, 109, 115–120, 139, 147–149, 151–152, 154,
157–159, 164–165
UH-34D, 57–58, 65, 71, 84, 89, 92–93, 103, 105, 111, 113–121, 139,
144–146, 149, 151–161, 164–165
UH-37 (Mojave), 149
Air Force, 46, 62, 71, 76, 82, 112, 114–115, 117, 149, 152,
158–159, 167
Air Force Command and Staff College, 120
Air Support Operations Center, 80, 82, 117–119, 149, 152
Allied Training Operations Mission, 16
Alsop, Maj William F., 164
Amphibious Ready Group, 59, 88–90
Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5), 61–62
Andaman Sea, 3
Anderson, Col Earl E., 47, 131, 146
Anderson, Cpl Thomas E., 83
An Diem, 144, 147, 158
Annam, 3, 9, 11–12, 78
Annamese Coast, 8, 162
Annamite Mountains, 6, 80, 103, 139
Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, 27
An Xuyen Province, 31, 49, 71, 133
Armed Services Committee, 146
Army, 23, 26, 42, 46, 62, 80, 83, 117, 136, 152, 154, 157–158
Units
27th Infantry Brigade, 88, 90
52d Aviation Battalion, 155
145th Aviation Battalion, 107
33d Helicopter Company, 57, 59
57th Helicopter Company, 65, 70–71
68th Aviation Company, 115
81st Helicopter Company, 58–59
93d Helicopter Company, 58, 73–74
704th Counterintelligence Unit, 141
3d Radio Research Unit, 46
Paratroopers, 70
Special Forces, 80, 111, 114, 151, 155, 157
Army Communications Station, Phu Bai, 139
Army Communications Station, Pleiku, 139
Army Field Hospital, Nha Trang, 148, 157, 159
Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, NC, 41, 47
A Shau Valley, 149
Asia, 12
Associated States of Indochina, 11
Atsugi, Japan, 61
Australia, 14, 165
Aviation Headquarters Operations Center, 117
Bach Phoung XI, 103, 105, 116
Baker, Col Warren P., 143
Bangkok, Thailand, 88–89, 93, 143
Ban Me Thuot, 9, 49
Bassac River, 65
Ba Xuyen Province, 61, 67
Beal, LtCol Samuel G., 146, 156
Beaver, SSgt Clifford J., 137
Becker, Raymond A., 141
Beirut, Lebanon, 146
Bell Helicopter Company, 115
Ben Hai River, 12
Ben Tre, 70
Bien Hoa, 105, 107, 166
Binh Dinh Province, 129
Binh Duong Province, 45, 107
Binh Gia, 136–138, 143, 166
Binh Thuan Province, 49, 51
Binh Xuyen, 13, 18–20, 26
Braddon, Maj John R., 153
Brady, Lt Philip O., 137–138
Breckinridge, Capt James T., 19–20, 23
Brigham, LtCol George, 152
British Advisory Mission, 45
Bronars, Maj Edward J., 142
Bronze Star, 110, 148
Brown, LtCol Harold F., 111–112
Brown, LtCol Robert E., 36, 48–49, 53
Buddhist, 8, 99
Burma, 3, 93
Cai Ngai, 67
California, 59, 70
Ca Mau, 40, 65, 67, 69–71
Ca Mau Peninsula, 11, 36, 62, 101
Cambodia, 3, 8–9, 11–12, 14, 30, 67, 93, 109
Cambodian Border, 107
Campbell, Cpl Charley M., 115
Cam Ranh Bay, 22, 31, 141
Canada, 12, 93
Can Tho, 9, 62, 65
Cao Dai, 8, 13, 18–19
Cape St. Jacques, 36
Capital Military District, 84, 105, 132
Carey, Col John F., 60–61, 63, 69–71, 73
Cassidy, LtCol Earl W., 112, 144, 146
Catholicism, 8, 12–13, 99
Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, 28
Central Highlands, 6, 9, 32, 49, 53, 105, 129, 167
Central Office for South Vietnam, 44–45
Chai Doc, 65
Chams, 6
Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan, 129
Chi, Capt Bui Pho, 19, 23
China, 3, 11–13, 93, 96, 161
Chinese, 6, 8
Chinese Nationalist Forces, 9, 11
CHINH BIEN, 159
Cholon District, 13
Christanity, 3, 8
Christensen, Capt Don R., 49, 101, 103, 110
Civil Guard, 27–28, 30–32, 34, 45, 67, 129
Civilian Irregular Defense Group, 80, 139, 144, 157
Clapp, LtCol Archie J., 60–62, 65, 67, 69–70, 156
Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, 90
Cochinchina, 3, 8, 11
Cold War, 86
Collins, Gen James F., CinCUSARPac, 58
Collins, Gen J. Lawton, 15
Command and Staff Training Course, 41–42
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 94, 144, 155
Condon, MajGen John P., 59–61, 73, 88
Confucianism, 8
Conway, MajGen J. F., 88
Cook, Capt Donald G., 138
Corps Tactical Zones
I Corps, 46, 58, 63, 73, 76, 78–80, 82–85, 103, 111, 113–114,
116–118, 120, 127, 132, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148–149, 152,
154–162, 164–165
II Corps, 46, 49, 58, 63, 79–80, 84, 102–103, 111, 114, 129, 132,
141, 152, 154–155, 160, 167
III Corps, 58–59, 61–63, 67, 69, 71, 73–74, 107, 109, 129, 132, 136
IV Corps, 84, 132
Counter-Insurgency Plan, 29–30
Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group, 41
Croft, Maj Alfred J., 49, 51, 103
Croizat, LtCol Victor J., 16, 18–20, 22–23, 32, 90, 132
Cronin, LtCol Angus J., 93
Cross of Valor, 156
Cua Viet, 78
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, 89
Curtis, LtCol Oliver W., 156–159, 161–162
Cushman, MajGen Robert E., 41–42
Cuu Long, 36
Cuu Long Navy Yard, 31–32
Dai, Emperor Bao, 8, 11–13, 19
DAI-PHONG 28, 107
DAI-PHONG 29, 107
DAI-PHONG 30, 107, 109
DAI-PHONG 31, 109
Dak To, 155
Damm, Maj Raymond C., 131, 142, 166
Da Nang, 9, 32, 58, 71, 73–76, 78–80, 83–85, 103, 111–118,
120–121, 123, 129, 139, 141–149, 154–162, 164–165, 167
Da Nang Harbor, 78, 111
Da Nang River, 78
DA NANG SIX, 164
Davis, Capt Dale N., 31
Davis, LtCol Ralph R., 71, 111
Davis, BGen Raymond G., 129
Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, 93
Dees, LtCol Harry C., 71
Delayen, Capt Jean Louis, 17, 19
Demilitarized Zone, 13, 27–29, 76, 78, 111
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. _See_ North Vietnam
Department of Defense, 42, 47, 61, 76, 84, 144
Department of State, 15, 19, 28
Dickinson, LtCol Harry E., 143
Diem, President Ngo Dinh, 8, 12–16, 18–20, 22–23, 26–32, 35–36, 42,
45, 53, 80, 99–100, 105, 121–122, 127, 146
Dien Bien Phu, 12, 71
Distinguished Flying Cross, 59, 111, 120, 156
Distinguished Service Medal, 131
Don, MajGen Tran Van, 79–80
Dong Bach Ma, 141
Dong Ha, 9, 78
Dong Nai boats, 101
Donlon, Capt Roger H. C., 157–158
Do Xa Base Area, 103, 105, 115–116, 121, 152, 155
Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster, 14
Eagle Flight, 69–70, 83
Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 14–15, 29
Eldridge, LtCol William W., 60–61, 71
Eller, Capt Franklin P., 137–138
Ely, Gen Paul, 15–16
Europe, 11
Father-For-A-Day Program, 85
Felt, Adm Harry D., 47, 57–58, 86, 88, 90
FLAMING DART, 167
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 40, 42, 58, 70, 76, 83, 90, 94, 141,
143, 147, 165.
_See Also_ Marine Corps, FMF Units
Fontana, MajGen Paul J., 156, 160
Fort Ord, California, 57, 59
Forward Air Controller, 72, 107, 109
France, 8, 9, 11–14, 19, 22, 93
French Expeditionary Corps, 9, 11–16
French High Command, 16, 22, 24
French-Indochina, 9, 11, 15
French-Indochina War, 13–14, 16, 22–24, 36, 48, 103
French Navy, 16
French Union, 11
Futema, Okinawa, 61
General Commission for Refugees, 16
Geneva Conference, 12–16, 25, 27, 86, 88, 93–94, 121, 132
German Army, 70
Gia Dinh Province, 105, 132
Giap, Gen Vo Nyguyen, 11–12
Gi Lang, 152, 154
Go Cong, 132–133
Gomez, Col Andre D., 112, 117, 119–120, 144, 146
Gott, Capt Michael J., 37
Gray, Maj Alfred M., 139, 141, 156, 158
Great Britain, 9, 12, 14, 93
Green, Maj Marion R., 156
Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., 142, 145–146
Greer, PFC Robert L., 155–156
Griffin, Lt Gerald, 83
Ground Control Approach, 60
Guadalcanal, 22, 35
Gulf of Siam, 3, 88
Gulf of Tonkin, 6, 78, 128–129, 158, 166–167
Haiphong, 16
Hai Van Peninsula, 78, 83
Hamilton, Sgt Richard E., 83
Hanoi, 11–12, 29
Harkins, Gen Paul D., 46–47, 57–59, 61–62, 73, 88, 99, 127, 146
Hau Nghia Province, 107
Hawaii, 47, 59, 90, 141–142, 146
Hay, Col Hardy, 158, 160–161
Heim, Lt Robert P., 162
Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, 107, 109
Hoa Hao, 8, 13, 18–19
Hoa My, 83
Ho Chi Minh. _See_ Minh, Ho Chi
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 80
Hoi An, 9, 78
Hoi Dong Sam, 107, 109
Honolulu Conference, 46
Hop Tac Program, 129, 132, 136
Hudson, LtCol Robert S., 93
Hue, 9, 12, 16, 78–79, 82, 99, 113, 119
Hughes, Capt Virgil R., 116
Hugo, Victor, 8
Hung, Maj Le Nhu, 23, 31, 35
India, 93
Indian Ocean, 3, 12
Indochina, 3, 11–12, 16, 35, 62, 166
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 146
Infantry Unit Training Course, 41
Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, 45.
_See Also_ Strategic Hamlet Program
International Control Commission, 12, 30.
_See Also_ Canada, India, and Poland
Interzone V, 44
Ireland, Col Julius W., 71, 73, 75–76, 79, 83, 85, 112
Irwin, Capt William R., 141
Iwo Jima, 62
Japan, 8–9, 11, 62, 71
Jeep, M-442 “Mighty Mite,” 112
Job Related Orientation Program, 143
Johnson, President Lyndon B., 127, 166–167
Johore, Malaya, 41
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 51, 53, 57, 59, 88, 127, 142, 155
Joint General Staff, 20, 22, 31–32, 35–36, 40, 82, 84, 100, 102, 109,
111, 132, 149
Joint Operations Center, 62–63, 82
Joint Operations Evaluation Group, 47
Joint Task Force 116, 86, 88–90.
_See Also_ Marine Corps, FMF Units
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand, 88, 90
Jones, Capt Robert C., 100
Jungle Warfare School, 41
Kelliher, Lt James P., 137
Kennedy, President John F., 30, 36, 42–44, 57, 86, 88, 93, 127
Kham Duc, 159, 161
Khang, BGen Le Nguyen, 35–36, 49, 53, 100–103, 105, 109–110, 132, 138
Khanh, MajGen Nguyen, 103, 127, 129, 132
Ke Sanh, 139, 141, 155–156, 158
Khmers, 6
Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, 30
Kien Giang Province, 18
King, Col John H., Jr., 161–164
Koler, LtCol Joseph, Jr., 161–162, 165
Kontum, 9, 79, 103
Kontum Province, 103, 155, 167
Korat, Thailand, 88, 90
Korean War, 15, 35, 47–48, 59, 70, 111, 116, 120, 131, 146, 156, 161
Ky, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Cao, 156
LAM SON XII, 117
LAM SON, 115, 149
Laos, 3, 9, 11–12, 14, 29–30, 80, 86, 88, 92–94, 139, 155, 166
Laotian Border, 78, 80, 117–119, 121, 147, 149, 157, 159
La Voy, LtCol John H., 146–147, 149, 151–152, 155–156
Legion of Merit, 59, 158
Leu, LtCol Reinhardt, 93, 111, 113, 115–116
Lien, Lt Col Nguyen Ba, 110, 132
Lieu, Maj Pham Van, 20
Linnemeier, LtCol George H., 111–112
LOCKJAW, 65
Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, 127
Logistics Support Group, Thailand, 93
Long An, 133
Long An Province, 132
Long Tao River, 142
Loyko, GSgt William A., 49
Malaya, _See_ Malaysia
Malaysia, 3, 45
Mang Buc, 114
Manila Pact, 14
Mansfield, LCpl James I., 83
Mao Tse-tung, 11
Marine Corps, 22–25, 34–35, 40–41, 46–48, 53, 57–58, 65, 73–74, 82,
85, 90, 95, 100, 103, 107, 110–111, 116–117, 121, 123, 136–139,
142, 156
FMF Air Units:
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 59–61, 70, 83, 88, 129, 156, 160–161,
165
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 71, 70
Task Unit 79.3.5. _See_ SHUFLY
Task Element 79.3.3.6. _See_ SHUFLY
MAG-16, 58, 62, 70, 85, 158, 161
ProvMAG, 89–90, 92
MACS-2, 89
MABS-12, 89
MABS-16, 60–63, 69–71, 73, 75–76, 88, 111–114, 144, 146, 148,
155–156, 160
VMA-211, 89
VMA-324, 71
VMA-332, 89, 93
VMB-443, 146n
VMGR-152, 61, 116, 156
VMGR-352, 61
VMO-2, 68
HMM-161, 161
HMM-162, 93, 111, 113, 115–116, 156–162
HMM-163, 70–73, 75, 80, 83, 111, 113, 116
HMM-261, 61, 89–90, 93, 117–120
HMM-361, 120–121, 144, 146
HMM-362, 60–63, 65, 67–71
HMM-364, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 155–156
HMM-365, 161–162, 164–165
MATCU-68, 60, 62
Task Element 79.3.5.2, 60.
_See also_ MABS-16
FMF Ground Units
1st Marine Division, 161
3d Marine Division, 40–41, 86, 90, 100, 110, 112, 129, 136–138,
142, 147–158
4th Marine Division, 146
3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 88, 90, 92–93
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 129, 167
5th Marines, 47
3d Marine Expeditionary Unit, 93–95, 113
Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, 131, 143
Infantry Battalions
1/9, 147, 160
2/9, 164
3/9, 89, 93–94
Infantry Companies
G/2/3, 139, 141
K/3/3, 141
E/2/9, 161
L/3/9, 164
Advisory Team One, 139, 141, 155–156, 158
1st Radio Company, 46, 139, 141
Signal Engineering Survey Unit, 139.
_See Also_ 1st Radio Company
Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, 164
Marine Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, 70
Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, 61
Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, 16, 18, 23, 24, 35
Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, 47
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, 100, 136
McCully, LtCol Alton W., 71, 84, 111–112
McGarr, LtGen Lionel C, 29, 36
McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 43, 46, 122, 127, 142
McWilliams, Capt James P., 107
Medal of Honor, 51, 158
Mekong Delta, 3, 6, 8–9, 16, 18–19, 28, 32, 36, 44–45, 57–59, 61–62,
67, 69, 73–75, 78, 80, 82, 84–85, 113, 116, 121, 132
Mekong River, 6, 8, 88
Merchant, Col Robert A., 146–149, 152, 154–158
Mickey, Col Ross S., 89, 93
Middle East, 3, 146
Midway, 60
Military Assistance Program, 30
Military Region 5, 45, 103
Military Region 9, 45
Minh, MajGen Duong Van, 99
Minh, Ho Chi, 11, 29
“Minute of Understanding,” 15
_Missouri_ (BB-63), 9
M-108 Wrecker, 136
Monkey Mountain, 141
Monroe, Lt Anthony A., 161
Montagnards, 6, 103, 111, 157
Montgomery, LtCol William, 149
Moody, LtCol Clarence G., 48–49, 100–103, 105, 132
My Tho, 62, 65, 107
NAMBO Interzone, 44
Nam Dong, 155, 157–159
Nam Tha, 88
National Intelligence Estimate, 29
National Liberation Front, 29, 44, 45
National War College, 161
Navy, 37, 48, 71, 90, 128
Navy Cross, 60, 48, 155
Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, 93, 112
New Life Hamlets. _See_ Hop Tac Program
Newport, Rhode Island, 131
New Zealand, 14
Nesbit, Col William P., 131–133, 143
Nghiem, BGen LeVan, 61–62, 73
Nha Trang, 16, 18–19, 22, 31, 114, 157, 160, 162
Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 45–46, 99
NIGHTINGALE, 65
Nipper, LCpl David, 162
Nong Son, 79
Nong Ta Kai, Thailand, 90, 92–93
Noren, LtCol Wesley C., 105, 107, 110, 131, 132
Normandy, France, 70
Northern Training Area, Okinawa, 41
North Korea, 11, 13, 15
North Vietnam, 3, 9, 11–12, 16, 26, 28–29, 44, 80, 86, 93–94, 128,
155, 166–167
North Vietnamese, 27, 29, 30, 88, 103, 121, 129
North Vietnamese Army
Units
32d Regiment, 167
101st Regiment, 167
Norton, H. G. O., 83
Nosavan, Gen Phoumi, 86
O’Daniel, LtGen John M., 15–16, 22
Olmen, Lt John D., 115
Okinawa, 41, 47, 58, 61–62, 70–71, 74, 76, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 112–113,
136, 141–144, 146, 156, 161
On-The-Job Training Program, 40, 42, 136–137, 142–143
Otlowski, Lt Raymond J., 139, 141
Oum, Prince Boun, 86
Pacific Ocean, 3
Pacifier, _See_ Eagle Flight
Pakistan, 14
Paris, France, 138
Parker, Capt Evan L., 49
“Passage to Freedom,” 16
Pathet Lao, 29, 86, 88
Patton, LtCol Harvey M., 89
Pendell, Sgt Jerald W., 83
People-to-People Program, 71, 74, 85, 92–93
People’s Army of Vietnam, 13, 80
People’s Republic of China. _See_ China
Perfume River, 78
Phan Rang, 6
Phan Thiet, 51
PHI-HOA 5, 105
Philippines, 12, 14, 59, 61, 89–90, 93, 110, 132
Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 86, 88, 93
Phu Bai, 139
Phouc Thuan Province, 30
Phouc Thy Province, 136
Phouc Vin, 30
Plain of Jars, 86
Plain of Reeds, 70
Plateau Gi, 103
Pleiku, 9, 32, 46, 103, 129, 139, 152, 167
_Point Defiance_ (LSD-31), 90
Poland, 12, 93
Popular Forces, 129
Porter, Col Daniel B., Jr., 67, 73–74
_Princeton_ (CV-37) (LPH-5), 61–62, 162
Purple Heart Medal, 110
Radar, counter-mortar, 164
Radios, 61, 68, 149
Rathbun, LtCol Robert L., 70–74, 84, 111, 113
Red River Delta, 3, 11, 16
Regional Forces, 129
Republic of Korea. _See_ South Korea
Republic of Vietnam. _See_ South Vietnam
Richardson, LtGen John L., 88, 90, 93–94
Roberts, MajGen Carson A., 57–58, 70
Robichaud, LtCol Clifford J., 35–36
Roe, 161
ROLLING THUNDER, 167
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 23
Ross, LtCol Thomas J., 120, 144–146
Route 1, 9, 80, 141
Route 9, 9, 80, 139
Route 19, 9
Royal Marines, 48
Royal Thai Regiment, 88
Rung Sat, 18–19
Rung Sat Special Zone, 142
Rupp, LCpl Walter L., 148
Saigon, 8–9, 15–16, 18–19, 28, 30–32, 34–36, 40, 45–48, 51, 53, 58,
60, 62, 65, 80, 100–102, 105, 107, 121, 129, 131–133, 136, 138,
141–153, 160, 166
Saigon Central Police Headquarters, 18
Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, 45
Saigon River, 8
St. Clair, Col Howard B., 142
Saipan, 47
Secretary of Defense, 57, 128, 131
Self Defense Corps, 30, 45, 129
Seventh Fleet, 59–60, 88, 93–94, 141, 162
Schoech, VAdm William A., 59–61
Schrenkengost, PFC Fred T., 155–156
Shapley, LtGen Alan, 40, 57–58
Sheperd, Gen Lemuel C., 16
Sheridan, Capt John, 164
Shook, LtCol Frank A., 116, 119–120
Shoup, Gen David M., 51, 53, 58
SHUFLY, 59–62, 65, 69–71, 73–75, 83–86, 92, 111, 113–114, 117, 120,
121, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 157–159, 165
Sides, Adm John H., 58–59
Silver Star Medal, 110, 138
Simpson, BGen Ormand B., 90, 92–95
Sinnott, Lt William T., 83
Slack, Cpl Richard D., Jr., 162
Smith, Capt Joseph N., 107, 109–110
Snell, Capt Bradley S., 49
SocTrang, 58, 60–63, 65, 67, 70–71, 73–76, 82, 86, 92, 111–113, 144
So Huynh Pho, 8
Son, MajGen Tran Van, 79
Song Cam Lo, 78
Song Cau Dai, 78
Song Cau Do, 78
Song Han, 78
Song Huong, 78
Song Thu Bonm, 78–79, 115, 162
Song Tra Bon, 159
Song Tra Bong, 78
Song Tra Khuc, 78
Song Ve, 78
Song Vu Gia, 78, 117
Souphanauvong, Prince, 86
South China Sea, 3, 6, 8, 78, 84, 141, 167
South Korea, 11–13, 15
South Vietnam, 3, 6, 8–9, 12, 14–16, 18–19, 22–23, 25, 27–30, 35, 40,
42–45, 48, 51, 53, 57–58, 61, 65, 68, 70–71, 74, 78–79, 84,
86, 88, 90, 93–94, 100, 109, 110–111, 119, 121–123, 127–129,
138–139, 141–144, 152, 155–158, 166–167
South Vietnamese Armed Forces, 30, 32, 34, 36, 43, 45–46, 58, 129
Units
Vietnamese Air Force, 27, 46, 48, 62, 67–69, 72, 80, 82, 105,
115–120, 137, 144, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 154–156, 158, 162
Vietnamese Army, 13–16, 18, 22–23, 26–27, 32, 49, 60–61, 63, 65,
67, 72, 74, 80, 83–84, 103, 105, 110, 112, 116–121, 129, 139,
141–142, 145, 147–149, 152–153, 155, 157–159, 161, 164–165
1st ARVN Division, 79, 111, 113, 115, 142
2d ARVN Division, 79, 82–83, 103, 105, 111, 113, 115, 117, 142,
154, 159
5th ARVN Division, 62
7th ARVN Division, 62, 65
21st ARVN Division, 62, 65, 67, 79–80
25th ARVN Division, 79, 103, 111
Airborne Brigade, 34, 129, 132
11th ARVN Regiment, 107
43d ARVN Regiment, 51
Ranger Battalions, 79, 114, 136, 164–166
Special Forces, 84
Vietnamese Marine Corps, 16, 18–20, 22–24, 29–30, 32, 34–37, 40,
47–49, 53, 58, 65, 84, 90, 100, 102–103, 105, 107, 109–110,
116, 121, 129, 131–133, 136, 138, 142–143, 166
Amphibious Support Battalion, 136
1st Battalion, 16, 18–20, 22–23, 31, 37, 49, 105, 107, 109
2d Battalion, 22–23, 31, 35, 49, 101–103, 107, 109–110
3d Battalion, 32, 36–37, 53, 105, 107, 109–110
4th Battalion, 36, 49, 51, 100–103, 105, 110, 136–138
5th Battalion, 133, 138
Reconnaissance Company, 105
Training Company, 136
Artillery Batteries, 51, 100, 105
Vietnamese Navy, 16, 36–37, 48, 101, 105, 142
South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, 32
South Vietnamese Ministry of Interior, 27, 30
Southeast Asia, 3, 9, 11, 14, 29, 40–41, 94, 167
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 14, 59, 61, 88, 90
Soviet Union, 12–13, 86, 93
Sparrow Hawk, _See_ Eagle Flight
Special Landing Force, 59, 62, 88–89, 162
Special Operations Group, 141
Steele, Col Fred A., 89–90
Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., 131
Strategic Hamlet Program, 45–46, 51, 53, 80, 101, 121–122, 129
SURE WIND 202, 152, 154–156, 158
Tactical Air Commander Airborne, 149
Tactical Air Navigation, 60
Tactical Air Support System, 62
Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, 60, 62, 69, 73, 75, 82,
103, 114, 119, 148, 155
Takjli, 90
Tam Ky, 82–83, 103, 116, 149, 157, 159–161, 165
Taoism, 8
Tarawa, 51
Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 42–43, 57, 127
Taylor, Capt Richard B., 101, 103, 110
Tay Ninh Province, 109, 133
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 26, 30
Texas A&M, 158
Thailand, 3, 14, 86, 88–90, 92–94, 113, 143
Thi, Col Nguyen Chanh, 29, 36
Thompson, SSgt John C., 155
Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., 45–46
Thoung Duc, 117, 119, 151
Throckmorton, LtGen John L., 131
Thua Thien Province, 76, 111, 115, 149, 157
Thu Duc, 36, 53, 100, 107, 136
Tien Phouc, 83, 160
Tiger Flight. _See_ Eagle Flight
Tiger Force, 83, 162, 165
Tiger Tooth Mountain, (Dong Voi Mep), 139, 141, 155–156, 158
Timmes, MajGen Charles J., 47, 57
Tonkin, 3, 8–9, 11–12, 16
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 128
Tourane, 71.
_See Also_ Da Nang
Tracy, TSgt Jackson E., 19–20
Training Relations Instruction Mission, 16, 19, 22
Tra My, 103, 105, 116
Trong, Maj Le Quang, 16, 19
Tropic of Cancer, 6
Truman, President Harry S., 12, 15
TULUNGAN, 59–60
Tunny, Lt Michael J., 83
Turner, Capt James S. G., 37
Typhoon Kate, 162
Typhoon Tilda, 159–160
Typhoon Violet, 159
Udorn, Thailand, 88–90, 92–93, 113, 158
U Minh Forest, 36, 40
United Front of National Forces, 18
United States, 13, 15, 19, 42, 71, 93, 99, 136, 166
U.S. Air Force. _See_ Air Force
U.S. Army. _See_ Army
U.S. Congress, 12
U.S. Embassy, Saigon, 32, 45, 138
U.S. Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation, 45
U.S. Marine Corps. _See_ Marine Corps
U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, 15–16, 19, 22–24, 26, 29,
31–32, 35–36, 42, 44, 46–48, 53, 57, 86, 131, 146
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, 88, 90
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 46–48, 53, 57–63, 67, 73,
76, 80, 88, 99–100, 117, 127, 131, 139, 141–144, 147, 154–155,
158, 165, 167
U.S. Military Assistance Program, 16
U.S. Navy. _See_ Navy
U.S. Operations Mission, 27
Valentin, LCpl Miguel A., 83
_Valley Forge_ (LPH-8), 93, 156
Vichy Government, 9
Vientiane, Laos, 88, 93
Viet Cong, 19, 27–32, 34–37, 40, 43, 45–46, 49, 51, 53, 62–63, 65,
67, 69–74, 80, 82–83, 99, 101–103, 105, 107, 109–111, 113–116,
120–123, 127, 129, 136, 138, 141–144, 148–149, 151–153, 155,
157–159, 161–162, 164–167
Units
9th Viet Cong Division, 138
4th Viet Cong Battalion, 80
Viet Minh, 8, 11–13, 16, 27, 32.
_See Also_ Viet Cong
Village Self Defense Corps, 27–28
Vinh Binh Province, 31
Vinh Long, 9, 65
Vinson, Lt Richard P., 85
Vung Tau, 36, 40, 100, 136
Walker, Maj John W., 142
Washington, D.C., 22, 29–30, 42, 46, 121, 128, 141, 143, 167
Watson, Cpl Billy S., 74
Weapons
Types
AR-15 automatic rifles, 65
Browning automatic rifles, 22
81mm mortars, 32, 164
82mm mortars, 137
57mm recoilless rifles, 32, 109, 137
.50 caliber machine guns, 107, 109, 137, 152–154
4.2-inch mortars, 22, 32, 60
Hawk missiles, 167
Light antiaircraft missiles, 167
M-14 rifles, 65
M-1 carbines, 22, 32
M-1 rifles, 32
M-16 rifles, 65
M-60 machine guns, 73, 114–115, 147–149, 162
M3A1 submachine guns, 65
105mm howitzers, 49, 118, 136
75mm pack howitzers, 36, 49, 136
60mm mortars, 32, 109
.30 caliber machine guns, 107, 152
TK-1, 162, 164
2.75-inch rockets, 115, 162
Webster, Capt David N., 114
Weede, MajGen Richard G., 47, 76, 131
Weller, MajGen Donald M., 40–41, 86, 90
Westmoreland, Gen William C., 127–128, 131, 155, 158, 166
Wilder, Capt Gary, 31
Wilkes, LtCol William N., Jr., 22–23, 31
Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., 23, 31, 34–35
Williams, LtGen Samuel T., 26–27, 29, 32, 35
World War II, 9, 11, 13, 35–37, 40, 47, 51, 59, 62, 70, 75, 111–112,
120, 131, 146, 156, 161
Yen, Capt Nguyen Thanh, 107, 109
Youngdale, BGen Carl A., 131, 166
Zimolzak, Capt Frank, 110
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 O-211-623
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs and
outside quotations.
The original book uses bottom-of-page footnotes and end-of-volume
endnotes. In this ebook, the footnotes have been moved directly
below the paragraphs that reference them, and their symbols have
been replaced by letters, so as to be unique within the eBook, while
retaining the original physical sequence. The endnotes remain in their
original positions, and their numbers have been modified to be unique
within the eBook. The modifications are intended to allow successful
hyper-linking in HTML and ereaders that support such links.
The modified footnote numbering uses chapter numbers and sequences
within those chapters. The bottom-of-page sequences are alphabetic,
while the endnote sequences retain their original numeric values.
In the original book, several footnotes were referenced multiple times.
In this eBook, those footnotes have been duplicated and assigned new,
unique letters, so that the references lead to separate footnotes. This
is intended to facilitate back-linking from the footnotes to their
references.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
references.Project Gutenberg
U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964
Whitlow, Robert H.
Chimera68
Academic