The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 1 of 3)

The World As Will And Idea

                                    By

                           Arthur Schopenhauer

                      Translated From The German By

                           R. B. Haldane, M.A.

                                   And

                              J. Kemp, M.A.

                                 Vol. I.

                          Containing Four Books.

            “Ob nicht Natur zuletzt sich doch ergünde?”—GOETHE

                             Seventh Edition

                                  London

                    Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.

                                   1909





CONTENTS


Translators’ Preface.
Preface To The First Edition.
Preface To The Second Edition.
First Book. The World As Idea.
   First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient
   Reason: The Object Of Experience And Science.
Second Book. The World As Will.
   First Aspect. The Objectification Of The Will.
Third Book. The World As Idea.
   Second Aspect. The Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient
   Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.
Fourth Book. The World As Will.
   Second Aspect. The Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When
   Self-Consciousness Has Been Attained.
Footnotes






TRANSLATORS’ PREFACE.


The style of “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung” is sometimes loose and
involved, as is so often the case in German philosophical treatises. The
translation of the book has consequently been a matter of no little
difficulty. It was found that extensive alteration of the long and
occasionally involved sentences, however likely to prove conducive to a
satisfactory English style, tended not only to obliterate the form of the
original but even to imperil the meaning. Where a choice has had to be
made, the alternative of a somewhat slavish adherence to Schopenhauer’s
_ipsissima verba_ has accordingly been preferred to that of inaccuracy.
The result is a piece of work which leaves much to be desired, but which
has yet consistently sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit as well as
the letter of the original.

As regards the rendering of the technical terms about which there has been
so much controversy, the equivalents used have only been adopted after
careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. For
example, “Vorstellung” has been rendered by “idea,” in preference to
“representation,” which is neither accurate, intelligible, nor elegant.
“Idee,” is translated by the same word, but spelled with a
capital,—“Idea.” Again, “Anschauung” has been rendered according to the
context, either by “perception” simply, or by “intuition or perception.”

Notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text, the book is
probably quite intelligible in itself, apart from the treatise “On the
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.” It has, however,
been considered desirable to add an abstract of the latter work in an
appendix to the third volume of this translation.

R. B. H.

J. K.





PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.


I propose to point out here how this book must be read in order to be
thoroughly understood. By means of it I only intend to impart a single
thought. Yet, notwithstanding all my endeavours, I could find no shorter
way of imparting it than this whole book. I hold this thought to be that
which has very long been sought for under the name of philosophy, and the
discovery of which is therefore regarded by those who are familiar with
history as quite as impossible as the discovery of the philosopher’s
stone, although it was already said by Pliny: _Quam multa fieri non posse,
priusquam sint facta, judicantur?_ (Hist. nat. 7, 1.)

According as we consider the different aspects of this one thought which I
am about to impart, it exhibits itself as that which we call metaphysics,
that which we call ethics, and that which we call æsthetics; and certainly
it must be all this if it is what I have already acknowledged I take it to
be.

A _system of thought_ must always have an architectonic connection or
coherence, that is, a connection in which one part always supports the
other, though the latter does not support the former, in which ultimately
the foundation supports all the rest without being supported by it, and
the apex is supported without supporting. On the other hand, a _single
thought_, however comprehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect
unity. If it admits of being broken up into parts to facilitate its
communication, the connection of these parts must yet be organic, _i.e._,
it must be a connection in which every part supports the whole just as
much as it is supported by it, a connection in which there is no first and
no last, in which the whole thought gains distinctness through every part,
and even the smallest part cannot be completely understood unless the
whole has already been grasped.