Ethics

Produced by Tom Sharpe.  HTML version by Al Haines.









The Ethics

(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)


by

Benedict de Spinoza




Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes




PART I. CONCERNING GOD.

DEFINITIONS.


I.  By that which is self--caused, I mean that of which the
essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
conceivable as existent.

II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a
body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of substance.

V.  By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
itself.

[1] "Affectiones"

VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
no negation.

VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
existence or action.

VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
that which is eternal.

Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
be conceived without a beginning or end.


AXIOMS.

I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else.

II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
conceived through itself.

III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
impossible that an effect can follow.

IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
knowledge of a cause.

V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
involve the conception of the other.

VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non--existing, its essence
does not involve existence.


PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.

Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
cause of the other.

Proof.--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
Q.E.D.

PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else (Ax. i.),--that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.

PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.--If several distinct substances be granted, they must
be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its
modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows that setting the
modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
truly, (Deff.