Mexico City, Mexico – A ruling by a United Kingdom’s commercial court ordered Cuba’s National Bank (BNC) to pay more than £18 million (US$24 million) in damages to the CRF I Limited fund. The decision, issued by Justice Andrew Baker, also sets a 14-day deadline for payment.
The ruling marks the end of a long legal battle over Cuban sovereign debt totaling around $78 million, stemming from loans signed in the 1980s.
In a statement published on July 31, CRF CEO David Charters noted that, unlike previous judicial decisions, this time the court “conclusively established CRF’s standing as BNC’s lawful creditor and its right to pursue the debt”.
The statement also disclosed the private fund’s attempt to approach Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel on June 22 of this year, which went unanswered.
In the letter allegedly sent to the Cuban leader, the creditors proposed “confidential discussions” and “possible solutions, including growth-linked instruments, debt-for-equity arrangements and other structures designed to preserve Cuba’s near-term liquidity”.
BNC –now Banco Central de Cuba (BCC)– has not responded to the court’s latest ruling. In the past, however, it has labeled CRF a “vulture fund” and has refused to recognize its legitimacy as a creditor.
One of the arguments used by the Cuban defense since the case began in 2020 was that BNC had lost the authority to negotiate on behalf of the Cuban government after it became BCC in 1997.
The Cuban side also claimed the fund had bribed bank officials to obtain the signature authorizing CRF as the new creditor.
The Cayman Islands-based fund, which is the largest holder of Cuba’s external debt, has said that it does not rule out a negotiated solution but will “continue pursuing its remaining claims and to seek further judgments where necessary”.
The most recent ruling marks CRF’s fifth consecutive victory in UK courts.
The fund previously won at the High Court, defeated an appeal by BNC, prevailed again before the Court of Appeal in November 2024, and saw the UK Supreme Court reject BNC’s final appeal in March 2025 — clearing the way for the damages assessment that led to this month’s judgment.
Featured image: UK Royal Courts of Justice
Image credit: www.judiciary.uk
Facts Only
* A UK commercial court ruled that Cuba’s National Bank (BNC) must pay CRF I Limited £18 million (US$24 million) in damages.
* The decision was issued by Justice Andrew Baker.
* The ruling sets a 14-day payment deadline.
* The case concerns Cuban sovereign debt totaling approximately $78 million from 1980s loans.
* CRF CEO David Charters stated the court established CRF’s standing as BNC’s lawful creditor and its right to pursue the debt.
* CRF disclosed an attempt to approach Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel on June 22, which was unanswered.
* Creditors proposed "confidential discussions" including growth-linked instruments and debt-for-equity arrangements.
* BNC has previously labeled CRF a "vulture fund" and refused to recognize its legitimacy as a creditor.
* The Cuban defense argued BNC lost negotiation authority after becoming BCC in 1997 and claimed bribery for the transfer of creditor status.
* The Cayman Islands-based fund intends to continue pursuing claims.
* This ruling marks CRF’s fifth consecutive victory in UK courts.
Executive Summary
A United Kingdom commercial court ordered Cuba’s National Bank (BNC) to pay over £18 million (US$24 million) in damages to the CRF I Limited fund, setting a 14-day deadline for payment. This ruling concludes a legal dispute concerning Cuban sovereign debt totaling approximately $78 million from loans signed in the 1980s. The court decision established that the fund, CRF, is the lawful creditor and has the right to pursue the debt against BNC.
The fund's CEO noted that this judgment confirmed CRF’s standing as a creditor, unlike prior judicial decisions. Prior to the ruling, the private fund attempted to engage with Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel regarding potential solutions, proposing measures like growth-linked instruments and debt-for-equity arrangements aimed at preserving Cuba’s liquidity. In contrast, BNC has previously contested CRF's legitimacy, labeling it a "vulture fund" and refusing recognition as a creditor. The Cuban defense argued that BNC lost negotiating authority after becoming the Banco Central de Cuba (BCC) in 1997, and claimed bribery related to the transfer of creditor status. The Cayman Islands-based fund maintains its intent to pursue remaining claims and seek further judgments.
Full Take
The narrative demonstrates a dynamic tension between private financial claims, sovereign debt obligations, and state authority over national assets. The core conflict hinges on the legal recognition of private creditor rights versus the institutional control exercised by the Cuban state apparatus. The shift in judicial precedent, which finally validated CRF’s position against BNC despite counterarguments regarding post-1997 governmental changes, reflects a broader trend where international commercial law is being applied to complex sovereign financial relationships.
The dispute over the proposed solutions—growth-linked instruments versus traditional debt repayment—suggests a fundamental divergence in how liquidity crises are managed when state solvency is involved. The attempt by the fund to engage directly with the Cuban leadership suggests an external push for structured, private-sector mediated risk resolution, which inherently challenges established state-centric financial control mechanisms. The history of BNC's refusal to acknowledge CRF as a legitimate creditor highlights a systemic resistance to decentralized debt settlement models.
The pattern observed is one where legal victories in highly centralized systems are achieved not by changing the underlying political reality, but by leveraging international judicial frameworks. This implies that while formal legal structures can be successfully navigated to secure financial outcomes for private actors, the ultimate imposition of those outcomes relies on a separation between legal decree and political compliance. The implications point toward the complex negotiation space where sovereign debt is processed: the structure allows creditors to enforce demands, but it does not erase the underlying political and economic authority that defined the initial lending terms.
Bridge Questions: What are the long-term consequences for Cuba's ability to manage external financial relationships if these legal precedents continue to prioritize creditor claims over state-managed solutions? How does this ruling establish a new precedent for how international courts adjudicate disputes involving state-owned debt in non-sovereign jurisdictions? What alternative negotiation structures, beyond those proposed by the fund, might effectively resolve the liquidity challenges faced by Cuba without relying on adversarial litigation?
Sentinel — Human
The text reads like factual reporting on a complex international legal case, characterized by detailed procedural references and direct attribution to involved parties.