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“Of course.”
“No one wants to change that.”
As mid-20th century American leaders both on and off the Supreme Court pondered America’s place in a brutish world, these are the words they used, unhesitatingly and repeatedly, to affirm their loyalty to, and indeed their love of, America’s cherished principle of equal birthright citizenship. All babies born on fully-American soil and squarely under the American flag are born equal citizens, regardless of their parents’ race, or religion, or marital status, or domicile, or immigration status. (Those born under other flags or on other soil – including, alas, those born in certain overseas lands ruled by America but arguably distinct from the United States, strictly defined – raise different issues.)
Consider, for example, the facts of a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1957, United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy. In July 1951, Elizabeth Hintopoulos, an alien seaman and expectant mother in her second trimester, legally entered the U.S under rules that obliged her to leave within a month of her arrival. After seeking medical advice, she decided to stay ashore, unlawfully, beyond this interval. About a month after Elizabeth’s arrival, her husband Anastasios (presumably the father of her unborn child) reached the United States. He too was an alien seaman and he too unlawfully stayed in America beyond his legal visa period. In November, Elizabeth gave birth on American soil, proverbially under an American flag, to a son. Though the court did not tell us his name, let’s call him Adam. In January 1952, the married couple voluntarily disclosed their illegal presence to U.S. immigration officials and asked that they not be deported, invoking Section 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, which allowed officials to suspend deportation in situations involving “serious economic detriment to a citizen . . . who is . . . the minor child of [a] deportable alien.”
In the harsh parlance of today’s MAGA movement, Elizabeth and Anastasios were illegal aliens. Both of them! Elizabeth was, arguably, a birth tourist. Adam was, from one angle, an anchor baby. Both parents initially stayed in the U.S. in willful and surreptitious defiance of U.S. immigration laws. Yet here is what the U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice John Marshall Harlan II, said on behalf of himself and five other justices: “The child is, of course, an American citizen by birth.”
Let’s linger on those passing words: “Of course.” Obviously. Duh.
Now consider this opinion’s author – a traditional and highly respected Princeton conservative placed on the court by a war-hero-president, Dwight Eisenhower. (As a conservative Princeton undergraduate in the late 1960s and early 1970s who himself dreamed of one day sitting on the court, young Samuel Alito idolized Harlan II.) Consider also the justices who joined Harlan that day – two other Republican-president (Ike) appointees and three Democratic-president (FDR and Truman) appointees.
Two justices dissented in the case, but they expressed no disagreement with the majority’s “of course.” Indeed, they went even further on Adam’s behalf: “The citizen is a five-year-old boy who was born here and who, therefore, is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities which the Fourteenth Amendment bestows on every citizen.”
If you blink, you might miss it, but read this sentence again. “Therefore.” Of course. American-born babies of foreign travelers, even if the parents are here illegally, are themselves, simply by dint of their own soil-and-flag birth, therefore citizens.
What does today’s solicitor general say about Hintopoulos? He doesn’t. Hintopoulos goes entirely unmentioned in two merits briefs that together span more than 70 pages, despite the fact that a brilliant amicus brief by three of America’s most accomplished immigration scholars highlighted Hintopoulos above all other modern cases. The case was also prominently mentioned – including its key words “of course” – by another notable Princeton alum, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in last term’s closely related Trump v CASA case. The nearest that Solicitor General D. John Sauer comes to engagement is a quick reference to modern cases in which, according to Sauer, the “Court assumed that children of illegal aliens born here are U.S. citizens.”
Contra Sauer, Hintopoulous did not “assume” this point. Hintopoulos asserted this point. Obviously. Unanimously. Adam’s obvious citizenship was the entire pivot point of the case, the statutory prerequisite to the entire legal dispute. Adam’s rock-solid bulletproof citizenship was the express statutory reason that officials were allowed (but not obliged) to suspend deportation of his illegal-alien parents. (In the end, immigration officials decided not to suspend deportation and the court majority said that was OK. The dissenters would have reversed the immigration officials and required suspension of deportation.)
Why was the Hintopolous court so clear on this issue?
First, because the 14th Amendment itself was clear. (It remains clear today.)
Second, because the birthright citizenship clause of a 1940 statute in place when Adam was born and the birthright citizenship clause of a 1952 statute repeating the earlier verbatim were both clear on the point. (The 1952 statute remains on the books today and it, too, remains clear. Other provisions of this statute were later revised in light of Hintopoulos, especially in 1965 – but not this statute’s birthright citizenship clause. By their selective actions and inactions, subsequent Congresses have clearly blessed the “of course” part of Hintopoulos. Judges today must thus give great weight to this blessing – see, for example, the 1978 case of Lorillard v. Pons at pages 580-82.)
Third, because the immigration officials seeking to deport Adam’s parents were clear on this point. The Board of Immigration Appeals twice called Adam an “American citizen infant child,” and elsewhere called him an “American citizen child.”
Fourth, because the brief filed by the solicitor general in Hintopoulos was also crystal clear: “In November 1951, their child was born in the United States and is a citizen of the United States.” In other words, the man standing in Sauer’s shoes back then did not “assume.” He asserted. He did not simply concede for argument’s sake that Adam was a birthright American citizen. He stated emphatically that – of course – Adam was a birthright citizen. It did not matter that Adam’s parents were not here permanently or even legally. Adam was “born in the United States.”
The SG back then was Ike’s solicitor general, J. Lee Rankin, who had earlier argued by special leave of the court on behalf of the Black students in Brown v. Board of Education. In 1957, Rankin in Hintopoulos was entirely straight with the court.
Back in 1940, when Congress was first pondering statutory language affirming birthright citizenship, it ultimately chose language that closely tracked the language of the 14th Amendment itself. Sauer’s briefs argue in effect that this statute should not be read to protect more than the amendment, as Sauer himself now (mis)construes that amendment.
In fairness to Sauer – and we do want to be fair to him, he is obviously an accomplished and talented lawyer – we could imagine some theoretical world in which his argument might be sound. Imagine that Congress passes a statute that only grudgingly accepts a constitutional mandate. In that imagined world, perhaps Congress would love to have an amendment collapse via future judicial interpretation, and might even try to craft a companion statute that would likewise collapse on cue.
But this theoretical world was miles away from what actually transpired in the 1940s and 1950s as Americans looked out across the ocean at Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin and their ilk. Leading Americans back then loyally and lovingly embraced the clear letter and obvious spirit of the Lincoln-inspired 14th Amendment’s sweeping guarantee of soil-and-flag equal birthright citizenship, as reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark and many other cases.
One particular exchange in Congress is especially worth recounting. In 1940, Texas Congressman William R. Poage was still a young member of the House of Representatives. (He would eventually serve more than 40 years in the House.) In one key committee hearing, Poage referred to “the constitutional provision that all persons born in the United States are citizens thereof.” The expert witness, an eminent immigration scholar and public servant named Richard Flournoy, quickly responded that “no one wants to change that.” No one. Now listen to Poage’s liturgical response: “No one wants to change that, of course.”
No one. Of course.
This is where America was when landmark and constitutionally faithful birthright-citizenship statutes were enacted and reenacted with strong support and clear understandings of all three branches of the federal government, backed by a broader popular culture.
Alas, this is not where America seems to be today. Where have you gone, Joe DiMaggio?
Posted in Brothers in Law, Featured, Recurring Columns
Cases: Trump v. Barbara (Birthright Citizenship)

Facts Only

In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court decided *United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy*, affirming that a child born in the U.S. to undocumented immigrant parents is a U.S. citizen.
The child, referred to as Adam in the article, was born in November 1951 to Elizabeth and Anastasios Hintopoulos, both alien seamen who overstayed their visas.
The parents voluntarily disclosed their illegal status to U.S. immigration officials in January 1952, citing a provision in the Immigration Act of 1917 that allowed suspension of deportation to avoid "serious economic detriment" to a citizen child.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, writing for the majority, stated, "The child is, of course, an American citizen by birth."
The Court's decision was unanimous on the citizenship issue, though two justices dissented on the deportation suspension.
The 14th Amendment and statutory laws from 1940 and 1952 explicitly supported birthright citizenship, regardless of parental immigration status.
The Board of Immigration Appeals and the solicitor general at the time both acknowledged Adam as a U.S. citizen.
The 1952 statute remains in effect today, and subsequent Congresses have not altered its birthright citizenship provisions.
The article contrasts the mid-20th-century consensus with modern legal arguments, noting that the current solicitor general’s briefs do not cite *Hintopoulos* despite its relevance.
In 1940, Texas Congressman William R. Poage and immigration scholar Richard Flournoy affirmed in a hearing that "no one wants to change" the principle of birthright citizenship.
The article references *Trump v. CASA*, a recent case where Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited *Hintopoulos* and its "of course" language.
The piece suggests a cultural shift in the perception of birthright citizenship, invoking the metaphor "Where have you gone, Joe DiMaggio?" to symbolize lost consensus.

Executive Summary

The article examines the historical and legal foundations of birthright citizenship in the United States, focusing on the 1957 Supreme Court case *United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy*. In this case, the Court unanimously affirmed that a child born on U.S. soil to undocumented immigrant parents is automatically a U.S. citizen, a principle rooted in the 14th Amendment and reinforced by statutory law. The decision reflected bipartisan consensus, with justices appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents agreeing on the "of course" nature of birthright citizenship. The article contrasts this mid-20th-century legal clarity with contemporary debates, noting that recent legal arguments, such as those by the current solicitor general, avoid direct engagement with *Hintopoulos* despite its relevance. The piece also highlights broader cultural and political shifts, suggesting that the once-uncontroversial principle of birthright citizenship is now under scrutiny, with implications for national identity and immigration policy.
The analysis underscores the consistency of legal interpretations across branches of government in the 1940s and 1950s, including congressional hearings where lawmakers and experts affirmed the principle without dissent. It also points to the role of key figures like Justice John Marshall Harlan II and Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin, who upheld birthright citizenship as a cornerstone of American law. The article frames this historical context as a counterpoint to modern challenges, raising questions about the evolution of legal and political norms.

Full Take

The strongest version of this narrative is its rigorous historical and legal defense of birthright citizenship as a foundational American principle. The article effectively demonstrates how mid-20th-century legal and political leaders, across party lines, treated the citizenship of U.S.-born children as self-evident, even when their parents were undocumented. By centering *Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy*, it highlights a moment of clarity where the Supreme Court, Congress, and executive branch all aligned in interpreting the 14th Amendment and statutory law without ambiguity. The piece also credibly contrasts this past consensus with contemporary legal evasions, such as the current solicitor general’s failure to engage with *Hintopoulos* despite its direct relevance. This framing serves as a powerful reminder of how legal norms can shift—and how easily foundational principles can be sidelined in modern discourse.
Patterns detected: ARC-0024 Ambiguity (in the modern legal arguments avoiding direct engagement with *Hintopoulos*), ARC-0043 Motte-and-Bailey (implied in the contrast between historical clarity and contemporary obfuscation)
The root cause of this narrative is a tension between legal originalism and evolving political priorities. The article assumes that birthright citizenship was once universally accepted as a moral and legal absolute, but it doesn’t fully explore why this consensus eroded. Was it due to changing demographics, partisan realignment, or a broader shift in how sovereignty is understood? The piece echoes historical patterns where immigration policy becomes a proxy for deeper anxieties about national identity—similar to debates over the 14th Amendment in the late 19th century or the Chinese Exclusion Act.
The implications for human agency and dignity are profound. Birthright citizenship is a bulwark against statelessness and a guarantee of equal protection under the law. If this principle weakens, the most vulnerable—children of undocumented immigrants—bear the cost, while political actors who weaponize immigration for electoral gain may benefit. Second-order consequences could include increased legal uncertainty, a chilling effect on immigrant communities, and further polarization over what it means to be American.
Bridge questions: What would it take to restore bipartisan consensus on birthright citizenship today? Are there valid legal or philosophical arguments against the "of course" interpretation that the article doesn’t address? How might the erosion of this principle interact with other trends, such as the rise of global statelessness or the redefinition of citizenship in a digital age?
Counterstrike scan: If this were part of a coordinated influence campaign, the playbook would involve selectively amplifying historical consensus to shame modern dissenters, while framing opposition as a betrayal of American values. The actual content aligns with this pattern to some degree—it leverages nostalgia for mid-century unity to critique contemporary legal ambiguity. However, the article’s reliance on primary legal sources and its avoidance of overt emotional appeals mitigate concerns. It’s more of a principled legal argument than a manipulative narrative, though it does risk oversimplifying the complexities of modern immigration debates.