* CERN’s new internal justice system is in force.
* The reform resulted from collaboration between Management, the Staff Association, and external experts.
* Administrative decisions allow for a request for review by the Administration first, preceding a formal appeal.
* Appeals are examined by the Joint Advisory Appeals Board (JAAB), which now has external professional Chair and Deputy Chair positions.
* JAAB members are jointly designated by the Management and the Staff Association.
* The Joint Advisory Disciplinary Board (JADB) also has an external professional Chair and Deputy Chair.
* JADB members are jointly designated by the Director-General and the Staff Association.
* Potential misconduct must be reported via line management, the Head of HR, the Head of Internal Investigations Service, or a whistleblowing hotline.
* The Internal Investigations Service handles alleged misconduct cases under Operational Circular No. 12.
* A new Conflict of Interest Disclosure form is available for personnel to report potential conflicts early.
* The system is part of CERN’s Ethics and Integrity Framework, which mandates ethics training.
* The Internal Justice Secretariat reports directly to the Director-General.

CERN has implemented a new internal justice system developed through collaboration among Management, the Staff Association, and external experts to establish a more modern, accessible, professional, and independent system. The system aims to clarify options for personnel and ensure fair and consistent handling of disputes, reports, and declarations.
Key changes include streamlining administrative decision review by allowing personnel to request reconsideration directly before formal appeals, which are then handled by the Joint Advisory Appeals Board (JAAB) with external leadership. Disciplinary proceedings are managed by the Joint Advisory Disciplinary Board (JADB), also strengthened with external chairs and members designated jointly by the Director-General and the Staff Association.
Potential misconduct, including harassment and fraud, can be reported through management channels or a dedicated Internal Investigations Service, which handles these cases under specific operational circulars, and via a whistleblowing hotline. Furthermore, a new Conflict of Interest Disclosure form allows for early disclosure, integrated within CERN’s broader Ethics and Integrity Framework that includes mandatory ethics training.
A central Internal Justice Secretariat reports to the Director-General to support the boards and serve as an information hub. The system encourages early and amicable resolution through official support channels, including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the Ombud.

The establishment of a centralized internal justice system signals a structural shift from potentially opaque internal procedures toward formalized, multi-layered accountability mechanisms. The emphasis on external expertise—appointing professional Chairs and Deputies for both appeals and disciplinary boards—suggests an attempt to mitigate potential institutional bias by introducing objective oversight in dispute resolution. This structure moves conflict management from purely internal administrative control to a process integrated with external, shared governance structures (Management, Staff Association).
The introduction of specific reporting channels for misconduct, integrating line management, dedicated investigation services, and whistleblowing mechanisms, aims to enhance accessibility and reduce the barriers to reporting concerns. However, the efficacy of this system hinges on the principle of procedural fairness; the success in achieving "fair and consistent handling" depends entirely on how effectively the Secretariat supports these boards and whether external oversight translates into genuine independence rather than mere symbolic representation.
The link between internal justice and the broader Ethics and Integrity Framework suggests an attempt to embed ethical responsibility institutionally, moving compliance beyond punitive measures toward proactive risk management through disclosure and mandatory training. The tension lies in balancing the desire for streamlined, professional processes (speed and accessibility) with the need to maintain robust procedural integrity when handling sensitive personnel matters. The real implication is whether this framework fosters genuine cognitive sovereignty for personnel, or if it becomes another layer of bureaucratic process that can obscure responsibility under the guise of modern governance.
What criteria should be used to assess whether the increased access and external appointments lead to systemic improvement, rather than simply optimizing compliance reporting? How does the Secretariat’s direct link to the Director-General balance the need for independent adjudication? Is the system designed to resolve disputes efficiently, or merely to manage the appearance of resolution?