Xi Purges Six More PLA Generals
Executive Summary:
- Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign in the military is far from over. A front-page PLA Daily commentary declared 2026 the “year of decisive battle” against graft in the ranks, and Xi’s appointment of a new disciplinary head as he rebuilds the Central Military Commission (CMC) before any other members signals that personnel investigations are his highest priority.
- A new round of purges appears focused on dismantling the patronage network built around the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. The purges target groups that have been relatively insulated from anti-graft probes to date, namely the PLA Air Force and the Western Theater Command.
- The ongoing disappearance of Wang Haijiang, the sole remaining active PLA general known to have fought in the Sino–Vietnamese War, also underscores Xi’s preference for personal loyalty over experience and expertise.
On June 26, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee announced the removal of credentials of 13 delegates, including six People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general officers (Xinhua, June 26). Two days later, a front-page PLA Daily commentary reaffirmed General Secretary Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption stance and declared 2026 to be a “year of decisive battle” (攻坚决战之年) against graft in the ranks (PLA Daily, June 28). This latest round of purges is focused on dismantling the patronage network built around the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia (张又侠), and targets groups that have been relatively insulated from the anti-graft probes, namely the PLA Air Force and the Western Theater Command.
State Media Suggest Anti-Corruption Motivations
Upon the conclusion of the 14th session of the NPC Standing Committee, a proclamation announced that 13 NPC members had been unseated by their respective committees. Among them were six PLA general officers:
- Xu Xueqiang (许学强), head of the Equipment Development Department and director of the Manned Space Program of the People’s Republic of China (PRC);
- Wang Kangping (王抗平), deputy commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command;
- Li Fengbiao (李凤彪), political commissar of the Western Theater Command;
- Yin Hongxing (尹红星), political commissar of the Southern Theater Command;
- Guo Puxiao (郭普校), political commissar of the PLA Air Force; and
- Zhang Minghua (张明华), commander of the PLA Cyberspace Force. [1]
The official statement says only that these members were removed in accordance with the PRC’s Law on Delegates to the [NPC] and Local People’s Congresses (全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法), with no further explanation provided (Xinhua, June 26).
The PLA Daily commentary highlighted anti-corruption, suggesting that the dismissals are a continuation of Xi Jinping’s campaign that has decimated the upper echelons of the armed forces. It emphasized the importance of united and persistent efforts to “not dare to be corrupt” (不敢腐), “be incorruptible” (不能腐), and “be unwilling to be corrupted” (不想腐)—a slogan that comes from Xi’s “major theoretical innovations” (重大理论创新) on the anti-corruption struggle (PLA Daily, June 28). The article claims that sustained pressure and anti-corruption efforts have led to more than 26,000 individuals voluntarily reporting themselves in corruption cases. Its characterization of 2026 as a “year of decisive battle” for anti-corruption efforts suggests that the campaign is far from over (PLA Daily, June 28).
Purge Expands to New Branches and Theater Commands
The profiles of the six general officers purged in this latest round generally reflect a continued elimination of individuals associated with the patronage network of Zhang Youxia, who was purged in January and is the most senior officer to be taken down during Xi’s tenure. Many of the six are officers in aerospace, cyberspace, logistics, and procurement billets (China Brief, March 15, 2025). Xu Xueqiang succeeded Li Shangfu (李尚福) as head of the CMC Equipment Development Department, who himself succeeded Zhang Youxia in the role (Baidu Baike/许学强, accessed July 1). Wang Kangping, commander of the Joint Logistics Support Force, was the commander of the PLA Air Force Weapon Test Base when Li was responsible for the EDD (The Paper, February 9, 2018). Li Fengbiao once commanded the PLA Strategic Support Force after Li Shangfu held the position of deputy commander and before his removal (Beijing Youth Daily, January 28, 2022). Zhang Minghua was commander of the Cyberspace Force, which was previously a component of the Strategic Support Force before its dissolution in 2024 (South China Morning Post [SCMP], June 27). Though Guo Puxiao was previously the political commissar of the CMC Logistic Support Department, neither he nor Yin Hongxing have a clear connection to Zhang Youxia’s faction (NetEase, May 30, 2025).
Beyond potential factional ties, three groups within the PLA stand out as targets of the latest purges: the Air Force, the Western Theater Command, and remaining veterans of the Sino–Vietnamese War.
PLA Air Force
The PLA Air Force had been largely insulated from previous rounds of purges. Western analysts speculated that this was because Xi placed relatively more trust in the PLA Air Force. [2] In this latest round of purges, however, three of the six generals are Air Force officers (Xu Xueqiang, Wang Kangping, and Guo Puxiao). While Li Fengbiao is officially a general in the PLA Army, he built his career as an officer in the Airborne Corps and eventually commanded the formation which is subordinate to Air Force headquarters (Beijing Youth Daily, January 28, 2022). This suggests that Xi intends to make good on his promise to overhaul the PLA’s officer corps, and no affiliation carries a promise of safety.
Western Theater Command
The latest disciplinary action may signify a departure from previous rounds of purges in which the Western Theater Command fared considerably better compared to the other four theater commands, especially the hard-hit Eastern and Southern theater commands (CSIS, February 24). Of the six removed from their posts, Li Fengbiao had been serving as the political commissar of the Western Theater Command, and Yin Hongxing had previously served as the political commissar of the Tibet Military Command, which falls under the direct leadership of the PLA Army but is within the Western Theater Command’s area of responsibility (The Paper, May 12, 2016; China Brief, January 13, 2017; SCMP, June 27).
More important is what the removal of these two individuals might indicate about the fate of the commander of the Western Theater Command, Wang Haijiang (汪海江). Missing since 2025, it would not be surprising if Wang himself soon becomes subject to Party discipline, given the fate of his associate Li Fengbiao and his former subordinate Yin Hongxing. Wang’s subordinate commanders, Liu Lin (柳林) and Wang Kai (王凯) of the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Commands, respectively, and subordinate commissar Yang Cheng (杨诚) of the Xinjiang Military Command, have also been missing since 2025 (CSIS, February 24).
Remaining Sino–Vietnamese War Veterans
The disappearance of Wang Haijiang is noteworthy. He is the sole remaining active PLA general known to have fought in the Sino–Vietnamese War. If his purge is confirmed, it would be a major loss to the PLA, just as the removals of other veterans of the PLA’s last real conflict were. Alongside Wang, Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli (刘振立), and Deng Zhiping (邓志) all participated in the Laoshan Campaign of 1984–1986 and received decorations for valor (Sina, April 6, 2021; SCMP, September 13, 2024; The Diplomat, July 21, 2025).
There is no substitute for skills and capabilities that combat confers, and removing these four general officers takes away leaders who know what realistic training looks like and have proven themselves to be effective commanders (China Brief, March 20). For the moment, it seems as though Xi places greater importance on eliminating corruption and ensuring personal loyalty over any potential contributions to force development and readiness that these veterans bring.
Conclusion
The most recent round of purges indicates that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is far from over. In this “year of decisive battle,” other PLA general officers who have since gone missing can be expected to be officially purged from their positions and from the Party. Under this overhaul, no affiliation or qualification guarantees security. Xi is prioritizing officers who are loyal and unwilling to engage in graft, even over those who are battle-hardened and militarily proficient.
The recent promotion of Zhang Shuguang (張曙光) to become the Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission and Wang Gang (王刚) to become the PLA Air Force Commander only solidifies this interpretation (Xinhua, July 3). [3] By selecting the chief disciplinary officer as the first non-CMC Vice Chairman position to be backfilled, Xi is signaling that personnel investigations are currently his highest priority. [4]
The views expressed are solely personal and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Notes
[1] Both Li Fengbiao and Guo Puxiao held key billets in the PLA Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps (now just the PLAAF Airborne Corps), but Li Fengbiao wears a PLA Army uniform while Guo Puxiao wears an Air Force uniform.
[2] Evidence for this includes the promotion of two Air Force officers, Yang Zhibin (杨志斌) and Han Shengyan (韩胜延), to lead the Eastern and Central Theater Commands, respectively (CSIS, February 24). The fact that they were the only two officers promoted to the rank of general in 2025 adds credence to this notion.
[3] Wang Gang’s predecessor as Air Force commander, Chang Dingqiu (常丁求), has been missing since 2025 (CSIS, February 24). It seems more likely that he has been purged rather than simply retiring or aging out of his position as Chang became the PLAAF commander at the age of 54 in 2021 and would not be close to the active-duty officer regulation age limit (The Diplomat, September 24, 2021).
[4] The high-profile investigations of former Ministers of Defense Wei Fenghe (魏凤和), Li Shangfu, former Vice-Chairman He Weidong (何卫东), and former director of the Political Work Department Miao Hua (苗华) were reported by PRC state media to have been carried out by the Discipline Inspection Commission. Interestingly, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli’s investigation and purge was not reported to have been conducted by the Discipline Inspection Commission, but rather it was a decision from the CCP Central Committee (党中央) (Ministry of National Defense, January 24).