3rd April 2026
The Axios team have published a full postmortem on the supply chain attack which resulted in a malware dependency going out in a release the other day, and it involved a sophisticated social engineering campaign targeting one of their maintainers directly. Here’s Jason Saayman’a description of how that worked:
so the attack vector mimics what google has documented here: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc1069-targets-cryptocurrency-ai-social-engineering
they tailored this process specifically to me by doing the following:
- they reached out masquerading as the founder of a company they had cloned the companys founders likeness as well as the company itself.
- they then invited me to a real slack workspace. this workspace was branded to the companies ci and named in a plausible manner. the slack was thought out very well, they had channels where they were sharing linked-in posts, the linked in posts i presume just went to the real companys account but it was super convincing etc. they even had what i presume were fake profiles of the team of the company but also number of other oss maintainers.
- they scheduled a meeting with me to connect. the meeting was on ms teams. the meeting had what seemed to be a group of people that were involved.
- the meeting said something on my system was out of date. i installed the missing item as i presumed it was something to do with teams, and this was the RAT.
- everything was extremely well co-ordinated looked legit and was done in a professional manner.
A RAT is a Remote Access Trojan—this was the software which stole the developer’s credentials which could then be used to publish the malicious package.
That’s a very effective scam. I join a lot of meetings where I find myself needing to install Webex or Microsoft Teams or similar at the last moment and the time constraint means I always click “yes” to things as quickly as possible to make sure I don’t join late.
Every maintainer of open source software used by enough people to be worth taking in this way needs to be familiar with this attack strategy.
Facts Only
The Axios team experienced a supply chain attack involving a malicious software dependency.
The attack targeted Jason Saayman, a maintainer of the project.
Attackers impersonated the founder of a cloned company to initiate contact.
A branded Slack workspace was created, featuring channels with LinkedIn posts and fake profiles of team members and other open-source maintainers.
A Microsoft Teams meeting was scheduled, during which Saayman was instructed to install software described as an update.
The installed software was a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), which stole Saayman’s credentials.
The stolen credentials were used to publish a malicious package.
The attack vector resembles tactics documented by Google in a 2023 report on social engineering campaigns.
The incident occurred in early April 2026.
The attackers used professional branding and coordinated interactions to appear legitimate.
The RAT was disguised as a necessary update for the Teams meeting.
Open-source maintainers are identified as high-value targets for such attacks.
Executive Summary
A sophisticated supply chain attack targeted the Axios team, resulting in the distribution of a malicious software dependency. The attack involved a highly tailored social engineering campaign directed at one of the project's maintainers, Jason Saayman. The attackers impersonated the founder of a cloned company, created a convincing Slack workspace with branded channels and fake profiles, and orchestrated a Microsoft Teams meeting where Saayman was tricked into installing a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). This RAT stole his credentials, which were then used to publish the malicious package. The attack mirrors tactics documented by Google, where threat actors use elaborate social engineering to compromise targets. The incident highlights the vulnerability of open-source maintainers to such attacks, particularly when time pressure or professional settings lower their guard.
The attack's success relied on meticulous planning, including the creation of a plausible corporate identity, a functional Slack workspace with seemingly legitimate activity, and a coordinated meeting with multiple participants. The use of a RAT to steal credentials underscores the growing sophistication of supply chain attacks, where human trust is exploited as the weakest link. Open-source maintainers, often under-resourced and time-constrained, are particularly susceptible to such tactics, which mimic common professional interactions like last-minute software installations for virtual meetings.
Full Take
This attack exemplifies the evolving sophistication of social engineering in supply chain compromises. The strongest version of this narrative is that it demonstrates how threat actors exploit human psychology—trust, urgency, and professional norms—to bypass technical defenses. The attackers leveraged multiple layers of deception: a cloned corporate identity, a functional Slack workspace with fabricated activity, and a staged meeting with fake participants. The use of a RAT disguised as a routine software update highlights how even security-conscious individuals can be manipulated under time pressure. This aligns with known patterns of psychological manipulation, particularly the exploitation of authority and urgency to override caution.
Patterns detected: ARC-0012 Authority Exploitation, ARC-0024 Ambiguity (disguising malicious software as a legitimate update), ARC-0031 Urgency Manipulation.
The root cause is the asymmetry between the resources available to attackers and the often under-supported open-source maintainers who lack institutional safeguards. Historically, such attacks echo corporate espionage tactics, where human trust is the primary vector. The implications for human agency are stark: as software supply chains grow more complex, the burden of security shifts disproportionately onto individuals who may lack the tools or training to resist such attacks. The costs are borne by end-users who trust open-source ecosystems, while the beneficiaries are likely state-sponsored or financially motivated threat actors.
Bridge questions: How can open-source communities better support maintainers against such targeted attacks? What structural changes could reduce the reliance on individual vigilance in supply chain security? Would mandatory multi-factor authentication for package publishing mitigate such risks, or would attackers simply adapt?
Counterstrike scan: If this were part of a coordinated influence campaign, the playbook would involve amplifying fear around open-source security to erode trust in decentralized software development. However, the content here is a factual account of an attack, not a narrative push. No structural alignment with a disinformation pattern is detected.
Sentinel — Human
The analysis suggests the text is likely to be human-written, with signs of idiosyncratic emphasis and personal voice. However, it's important to remember that human writing can still exhibit mechanical patterns, and further investigation might be necessary for absolute certainty.