Split in Russian Diaspora Deepens
Executive Summary:
- In the Russian emigrant press, a popular subject is the conflict between those who have left Russia and those who remain, even if these people hold the very same views.
- Russian emigrants hold different values and opinions, and it is possible to observe a split between political emigrants living in relatively safe EU countries and the overwhelming majority of Russians living in countries that have visa-free agreements with Russia.
- This split is not only social and cultural but also quite practical. The lack of understanding by prominent oppositionists of the needs, problems, and risks of emigrants living in visa-free countries makes them easier prey for the Kremlin, both legally and psychologically.
Last autumn, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Margarita Zavadskaya reported that the negative feelings inside Russia toward emigrants are not only the result of propaganda. Some of those left behind in Russia believe that those who departed “left them to solve the problems” by themselves. Some preach to those who remain in Russia from a position of moral superiority (in the Russian information space, this is called “the white coat”). Zavadskaya emphasized that “the sharpest pronouncements to those remaining in Russia, as a rule, are from people representing privileged groups unconnected to the post-war emigration,” while “ordinary” emigrants continue to support their relatives and friends in Russia and stay in touch with them (Riddle, September 3, 2025).
Sociologist Anna Kuleshova shares this view. She notes that among those who emigrated after 2022, many travel regularly to Russia, maintain close ties with it, or even return and stay there (YouTube/@7×7, June 18). In interviews, Russian emigrants living in EU countries complain that European bureaucracy constantly worsens their situation, imposes restrictions on the use of banking services, and introduces additional checks on businesses (Radio Svoboda, January 7).
The problems of Russians living in EU countries have become a focus of “status” emigration. The situation of emigrants in non-visa countries, however, is more often ignored by opposition media. In the meantime, increasing numbers of Russians residing in these countries are experiencing pressure from targeted transnational repression from Russia regarding critics of the regime, and more “massive” pressure from the European Union related exclusively to their Russian citizenship (European Parliament, June 17). While such measures are intended to address legitimate concerns about Russian influence and security risks, they can also affect Russians who have left the country precisely because of their opposition to the Kremlin.
In November 2025, the European Commission called upon Serbia to tighten its visa regime for Russian citizens, declaring that Russians obtaining Serbian citizenship and thereby the possibility of visa-free entry into the European Union “threaten European security” (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, November 5, 2025). In June, the Balkan service of Radio Liberty presented evidence that Serbia allegedly issued passports to a record number of Russian citizens. The article provides the names of oligarchs close to the Kremlin who received Serbian citizenship via an “accelerated procedure,” that is, upon the president’s decision that this was “in the interests of Serbia.” At the same time, the text notes that a Serbian passport can allegedly be obtained in just three years, and therefore “perhaps even more Russian citizens have received Serbian citizenship as part of the standard naturalization procedure” (Radio Slobodna Evropa, June 10). As independent Serbian media have repeatedly noted, the article does not show the whole picture. The problem of issuing Serbian citizenship to persons close to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, including those under sanctions, does exist and has been described in both the independent Serbian and Russian-language press (Istories.media, April 16, 2025).
Reports on this topic emphasized that this procedure has nothing to do with naturalization in the usual sense. Immigration lawyers note that before applying for Serbian citizenship, immigrants must have resided in the country legally for at least six years—three years with a temporary residence permit and three years with a permanent one (Istories.media, April 16, 2025). According to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the total number of Russians receiving citizenship in 2024 decreased from 532 to 188, and the “growth” mentioned in the article concerns only an “accelerated procedure” (Тelegram/@volna_srbjia, June 8). The article confuses these procedures, and the previously mentioned European Commission document calling for a reduction in the issuance of citizenship to Russians does not mention the accelerated procedure at all.
In response to calls from the European Commission to limit naturalization for emigrants from Russia, Serbian authorities are imposing an unofficial ban on issuing passports to all Russians—including those who have already renounced their Russian citizenship. As a result, dozens of people are forced to remain stateless for years, possessing neither Russian citizenship nor Serbian (The Moscow Times, May 22, 2025). At the same time, no restrictions are being introduced on acquiring citizenship through the simplified procedure.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that even Russians inclined to be pro-European, living under such pressure, are starting to feel negatively about the West (Facebook/alexander.kynev, July 2). Russian propaganda is taking maximum advantage of this situation, averring that Serbia plans to introduce a visa regime with Russia and cut the issuance of residence permits by half (Izvestiya, May 28). Neither assertion is true, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has denied them publicly (Forbes.ru, June 2). [1]
At the same time, practice shows that dependence on a Russian passport makes emigrants a convenient target for recruitment by Russian intelligence services, since, in this case, their ability to legalize themselves in another country depends on Russia (see EDM, February 9). Many Russian emigrants’ desire to obtain another passport means they seek to break with Russia and build their own lives independently. Paradoxically, however, these attempts are hindered by both Moscow and the countries they seek to live in.
Many in the mainstream Russian opposition, which declares itself the representative of anti-war Russians, simultaneously ignores this situation and makes little to no effort to speak up to the European Commission for anti-war emigrants from “third countries.” Lobbying for “gray” passports for victims of transnational repression concerns only people living in the European Union. It does not affect visa-free countries where hundreds of thousands of Russians live (Meduza, June 26). As a result, many of these individuals feel abandoned and betrayed by Europe and their former like-minded associates, making them easy targets for Russian intelligence services both psychologically and legally.
Note:
[1] Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced in late June that he would resign as Serbia’s president in the next few weeks (Radio Slobodna Evropa, June 29).