August 21, 2026 | Policy Brief
Deadline for Iraq’s Militias To Disarm Nears but Tehran’s Proxies Show They’re Above the Law
August 21, 2026 | Policy Brief
Deadline for Iraq’s Militias To Disarm Nears but Tehran’s Proxies Show They’re Above the Law
Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, appears to be trying to reign in the Iranian-backed militias that have spread terror and disunion in his country. But a recent arrest may point to the limits of his power. Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service detained Abbas Hussein al-Yaqoubi — an official in both a U.S.-designated terror group and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an Iraqi security institution dominated by Iran-backed terror groups — but released him within 24 hours.
The incident is the latest in a struggle between Tehran — with its militia partners — and Zaidi. Zaidi set a September 30 deadline for independent armed groups to hand over their weapons to the state, but Tehran and its partners in Iraq are seeking to control any disarmament process.
Senior Iranian Officials Visit Baghdad With Advice for Militias
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani traveled to Baghdad to discuss disarmament with militia leaders and Shiite politicians on August 10. Reportedly, Qaani told militia leaders to hold onto their weapons as leverage with Washington while avoiding direct confrontation with Iraqi security forces. Several of the most active Iran-backed militias, including Yaqoubi’s Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), have rejected calls to disarm, while three militias, including two of the six Iran-backed militias designated as terror groups by the United States, have agreed.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf followed Qaani’s visit with his own trip to Baghdad on August 19. He is meeting with senior political leaders, including the coalition of Shiite parties that leads the government, the Coordination Framework. According to Asharq al-Awsat, Ghalibaf brought plans from Tehran to hide, move, or otherwise protect militia weapons until a political agreement that is satisfactory to Iran and the militias is reached.
Militia Demands Are Unlikely To Be Met
In Baghdad, the Coordination Framework formed a committee to negotiate with militias over weapons. Key to the committee’s work is Hadi al-Ameri, a member of the Coordination Framework and leader of the Badr Organization, who is trusted by the militias. Badr is Iran’s oldest proxy in Iraq and a major component of the PMF but has remained unsanctioned by the United States. Despite Ameri’s role as a negotiator, Badr has outlined three requirements, two of which are near impossible in a short time: the completion already scheduled American troop withdrawal; “the elimination of the strategic threats facing Iraq;” and “the complete rebuilding of the Iraqi armed forces.”
Other militias have also named additional requirements. Kataib Hezbollah’s demands include the departure of U.S. and Turkish forces, as well as the disarmament of the Kurdish Peshmerga, an important U.S. partner in the country and part of Iraq’s security apparatus.
Disarmament Shouldn’t Lead to Political Power for Militia Leaders
Tehran is instructing its proxies to use their weapons as negotiating leverage Washington. The Trump administration should make clear to Baghdad that handing over weapons does not give these terror groups license to find new ways to exert their influence in Iraq’s government and economy. The prohibition of leaders from the U.S.-designated terror groups serving in the cabinet and senior positions should remain. Furthermore, failure to disarm will result in sanctions on additional militia leaders as well as their political and financial backers.
The Trump administration should also warn Zaidi against permitting efforts to strengthen the PMF, which will continue to be a state-licensed vehicle for militia influence, unless it undergoes substantial reform. Simultaneously, Baghdad should not allow American partners, such as the Peshmerga, to be weakened in any agreement.
Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Bridget and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
Facts Only
* Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi set a September 30 deadline for independent armed groups in Iraq to disarm.
* Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service detained Abbas Hussein al-Yaqoubi, an official in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and a U.S.-designated terror group, and released him within 24 hours.
* IRGC-Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani visited Baghdad on August 10 to meet with militia leaders and Shiite politicians.
* Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf visited Baghdad on August 19 to meet with the Coordination Framework.
* The Coordination Framework formed a committee, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri, to negotiate weapon disarmament.
* Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba has rejected calls to disarm.
* Three militias have agreed to disarm, including two designated as terror groups by the United States.
* Badr Organization requirements for disarmament include the completion of U.S. troop withdrawal, elimination of strategic threats to Iraq, and rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces.
* Kataib Hezbollah requirements include the departure of U.S. and Turkish forces and the disarmament of the Kurdish Peshmerga.
Executive Summary
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is attempting to centralize state power by requiring independent armed groups to disarm by September 30. This effort faces significant resistance from Iranian-backed militias and their political allies in the Coordination Framework. Recent events, such as the rapid release of a detained PMF official, suggest limits to the Prime Minister's authority over these groups.
Iran is actively intervening to ensure its proxies retain leverage. High-level visits from IRGC commander Esmail Qaani and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf indicate a strategy of maintaining armed capability as a negotiating tool against Washington. While some militias have agreed to disarm, others have set stringent conditions, including the total withdrawal of U.S. and Turkish forces and the disarmament of the Kurdish Peshmerga. The situation remains a tension between state-building efforts and the strategic interests of external actors and internal paramilitary organizations.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative presents a fragile state attempting to establish a monopoly on violence against entrenched, foreign-backed paramilitaries who use weapons as geopolitical currency. It frames the struggle as one of sovereign law versus militia impunity.
This perspective is driven by a "stability through state-centric security" paradigm. It assumes that the U.S.-backed model of a centralized national army is the only viable path to peace, while viewing the PMF primarily as a vehicle for Iranian influence rather than a domestic political manifestation of Shiite grievances or security fears. The narrative echoes the historical pattern of "state-building" interventions where external powers attempt to define the boundaries of a host nation's security apparatus.
The implications suggest a high risk of escalation; if the September 30 deadline passes without resolution, the cost will be borne by the Iraqi civilian population through potential instability. For the militias, "disarmament" is not a security gesture but a surrender of political agency.
Patterns detected: none
Counterstrike Scan: A coordinated influence campaign would likely use hyper-emotive language regarding "terror" and "proxies" to justify immediate, aggressive external intervention or sanctions. This text remains largely focused on policy prescriptions and diplomatic movements, matching the profile of a policy brief rather than a psychological operation.
Bridge Questions:
1. How would the disarmament process change if the Iraqi government provided a verifiable, alternative security guarantee to the militias?
2. To what extent is the "Iranian proxy" label masking internal Iraqi political dynamics that exist independently of Tehran?
3. What are the risks to Iraqi stability if the Peshmerga are forced to disarm as a concession to other groups?
