How is Colombia’s new president backing up his hardline campaign promises?
Is Ecuador closing in on who ordered the most high-profile murder in its history, Fernando Villavicencio?
And does a wave of high-profile captures and kills across the region signal a renewed regional bet on the “kingpin strategy”—and what comes next?
This week’s top three organized crime stories in On the Radar.
1. Colombia’s De la Espriella Ends “Total Peace,” Opens Door to Glyphosate
Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella’s government has formally ended negotiations with three criminal groups: dissidents of the General Staff of Blocks and Front (Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente – EMBF), led by alias “Calarcá”; the National Coordinator of the Bolivarian Army (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano – CNEB), which includes the Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera); and the Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada – ACSN). Separately, Colombia’s government revoked the decade-old resolution that had suspended aerial glyphosate spraying against coca crops, though the government says fumigation cannot resume until several environmental and judicial conditions are met.
The two moves capture the scale of the shift de la Espriella promised on the campaign trail: away from negotiation and toward militarized, hardline enforcement. But as InSight Crime has reported, glyphosate alone has never solved Colombia’s coca replanting problem, and ending former president Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy risks pushing fragmented armed groups back into open conflict rather than into the state’s fold.
2. Deported Ex-Minister Jailed in Ecuador’s Villavicencio Assassination Case
José Serrano, Ecuador’s former interior minister and ex-president of the National Assembly, was deported from the United States on August 28 and immediately jailed at the maximum-security El Encuentro prison. Prosecutors allege Serrano used his police contacts to help plan the 2023 assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. He is one of seven people who will be tried as alleged masterminds of the killing.
The case has become a test of whether Ecuador can hold its political elite accountable for ties to organized crime. This week’s InSight Take, Who Killed Fernando Villavicencio? Ecuador’s Reckoning, breaks down the case against Serrano and the other six defendants and its significance for Ecuador’s fight against organized crime.
3. Kingpin Strategy Going Strong Across the Region
Three separate operations this week underscore how central the “kingpin strategy”—targeting the leaders of criminal groups—remains to security policy across Latin America.
- Jhonsson Pulpo, leader of Peru’s Pulpos gang, captured in Bolivia. Jhonsson Smit Cruz Torres, alias “Jhonsson Pulpo,” had led the Trujillo-based extortion and kidnapping gang since taking over from his father at 17. He was captured in La Paz on September 1 in a joint operation by Bolivian and Peruvian police, with support from the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), despite having faked his death and undergone plastic surgery to avoid identification.
- “El R5,” accused leader of Mexico’s Los Reyes, killed in Michoacán. Luis Enrique Barragán Chávez, alias “El R5,” was killed in a shootout with Mexican army and National Guard forces in Tocumbo, Michoacán, on August 30. He had taken control of Los Reyes — part of the Cárteles Unidos alliance — a month earlier, after the capture of its previous leader.
- Alleged Tiguerones leader captured in Colombia. Eduardo Cecilio Vásquez Ortiz, alias “Colombia,” was captured in Armenia, Colombia, on August 26 in a joint operation between Colombian and Ecuadorian police. He is accused of coordinating drug trafficking and contract killings for Ecuador’s Tiguerones gang even after fleeing to Colombia.
The kingpin strategy has been used for decades on the bet that removing top leaders weakens a group. But countless examples have shown that removing such figures more often triggers a succession fight—and a new round of violence—than it does a group’s collapse.
Facts Only
* Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella ended negotiations with the EMBF, CNEB, and ACSN criminal groups.
* The Colombian government revoked a resolution suspending aerial glyphosate spraying on coca crops.
* Aerial fumigation is currently paused pending environmental and judicial conditions.
* José Serrano, former Ecuadorian interior minister and National Assembly president, was deported from the U.S. on August 28.
* Serrano is jailed at El Encuentro prison as one of seven alleged masterminds in the 2023 murder of Fernando Villavicencio.
* Jhonsson Smit Cruz Torres ("Jhonsson Pulpo") was captured in La Paz, Bolivia, on September 1.
* The capture of Cruz Torres involved Bolivian and Peruvian police, the FBI, and the DEA.
* Luis Enrique Barragán Chávez ("El R5") was killed in a shootout in Tocumbo, Michoacán, on August 30.
* Eduardo Cecilio Vásquez Ortiz ("Colombia") was captured in Armenia, Colombia, on August 26.
* Vásquez Ortiz is accused of working for Ecuador’s Tiguerones gang.
Executive Summary
Colombia is undergoing a significant strategic pivot under President Abelardo de la Espriella, moving away from the "Total Peace" negotiations of the previous administration toward a hardline, militarized approach. This shift is evidenced by the formal termination of talks with three armed groups and the removal of the ban on aerial glyphosate spraying. While intended to curb coca production and criminal influence, there is uncertainty regarding whether these measures can solve systemic replanting issues or if they will inadvertently trigger a return to open conflict.
Simultaneously, Ecuador is attempting to address high-level corruption and organized crime through the prosecution of former political elites, exemplified by the deportation and jailing of former interior minister José Serrano for his alleged role in the assassination of Fernando Villavicencio. Across the broader region, a resurgence of the "kingpin strategy" is visible through high-profile captures and kills in Peru, Mexico, and Colombia. While these operations signal strong inter-agency cooperation, historical patterns suggest that removing top leaders often results in violent succession struggles rather than the total collapse of criminal organizations.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative is that Latin American states are reclaiming sovereignty through a decisive return to law-and-order paradigms, utilizing international intelligence cooperation to prune the leadership of transnational criminal organizations.
However, the underlying pattern is a cyclical oscillation between "negotiated peace" and "militarized enforcement." The shift in Colombia suggests a lack of institutional memory or a desperate gamble that the "kingpin strategy" and chemical eradication can achieve what diplomacy could not. The unstated assumption is that criminal structures are top-down hierarchies that can be decapitated; the reality is often that these groups are fluid networks that adapt to the removal of leaders through fragmentation and internal warfare.
The root cause is a systemic failure to address the socio-economic drivers of the coca trade and the permeability of the political elite, as seen in the Serrano case. When the state targets the "kingpin" without dismantling the infrastructure of demand and corruption, the result is a "hydra effect"—one head is removed, and two more, often more violent and less predictable, emerge. This cycle benefits security apparatuses and political figures seeking "quick wins" but bears a high cost in civilian blood during the inevitable succession wars.
Patterns detected: none
Bridge Questions:
1. If the kingpin strategy historically triggers succession violence, what specific metrics are governments using to define "success" in these operations?
2. How does the prosecution of political elites like José Serrano change the calculus for current officials regarding their ties to organized crime?
3. In the absence of "Total Peace," what alternative frameworks exist to reintegrate fragmented armed groups into the state?
Counterstrike Scan: A coordinated influence campaign would likely weaponize these events to argue that diplomacy is a failure and that only authoritarian, militarized governance can provide security. The current content does not match this pattern; it explicitly notes the risks of returning to conflict and the historical failure of glyphosate.