Speaking quietly but enunciating clearly, Ahunna Eziakonwa, under-secretary general and special adviser on Africa to the United Nations secretary-general, distils a truth that has long haunted the continent’s development story: Africa pays more because the world perceives it as high risk.
“Africa loses an estimated $74.5bn in additional debt service costs due to exaggerated risk perceptions and biased credit ratings,” she says. “It’s what has been called the Africa risk premium.”
This figure, she explains, is not just a line item in a budget spreadsheet. It is the difference between progress and paralysis. “If the borrowing cost is lowered by just 2% over a three‑year period across a $18.6bn portfolio, Africa could save about $1.12bn, which will be enough to provide electricity to 50 million people or hire 900,000 teachers. What Africa loses through biased credit rating is not just revenue; it loses future prospects and potential for the continent’s youthful and vibrant people.”
A costly risk premium
Eziakonwa’s argument is as moral as it is economic. African countries are not serial defaulters.
“The default rate is relatively low on the continent,” she says.
“A recent study by Moody’s Analytics showed that default rates for infrastructure loans in Africa averaged 1.9%, while comparable figures for Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe were 4.6%, 10.1% and 12.4%, respectively.”
This discipline, however, is rarely rewarded. Consequently, borrowers across the continent face higher interest rates than peers with similar risk profiles elsewhere.
“We’ve examined countries that have similar risks,” she says. “They get better deals.”
This disparity fuels a vicious cycle: inflated borrowing costs drain fiscal space, forcing governments to divert funds from social investment to debt repayment.
“The more money spent on repaying this debt,” she says, “the less is available for addressing social needs.”
If she could change three things, Eziakonwa says, she would begin with what she calls the ‘narrative premium’ – the persistent framing of Africa as fragile and volatile and risk prone.
“When you play up the risk, you play down the strengths,” she says.
Those strengths are measurable.
“Africa’s resilience is extraordinary. Despite multiple shocks, including the 2008 global financial crisis, Covid‑19 and the Middle East crisis, the continent has always bounced back.”
She points to the wave of macro‑ and micro‑economic reforms undertaken across African economies under IMF programmes and domestic restructuring.
“There is no region in the world that has responded to reforms like Africa,” she says.
Yet the global rating agencies rarely highlight these achievements.
“Africa has high growth projections, abundant resources from minerals for people but all of that is not adequately factored in. Skewed credit ratings exaggerate Africa’s risk and undermine development financing prospects.”
Building an African ratings agency
One of the most tangible steps toward correcting that imbalance is the proposed African Credit Rating Agency, a home‑grown institution designed to broaden the data and methodology behind sovereign ratings.
“It’s not just for foreign lenders,” she explains. “It’s also for the rating agencies themselves. Sometimes they work from narrow datasets because the players in the system are few. The new agency will introduce broader and alternative data sources.
The goal, she says, is not to make Africa look good but to make the picture complete.
“It’s going to be professional, credible, and transparent,” she insists. “It will provide other perspectives and dimensions that may have been missing.”
Currently, global raters often fly in analysts for brief visits, producing assessments without sufficient qualitative depth.
“They often rate countries on the basis of brief visits,” she says. “The African rating agency will be home‑grown. It will prioritise credibility and transparency.”
Beyond sovereigns, Eziakonwa sees the agency as a catalyst for strengthening domestic rating networks, the local institutions that currently assess African businesses and financial entities.
“They exist now, but that network is not really elevated,” she says. “They are a very important part of the ecosystem.”
Preparation, she adds, is key.
“We now have a council of advisors that go out before ratings, a kind of pre‑audit, so governments can put their things in order. Sometimes African governments just need support to prepare better.”
Reimagining the global financial architecture
Eziakonwa’s critique extends beyond ratings to the structure of global finance itself. The Africa Finance Corporation’s State of African Infrastructure Report 2025 estimated that the continent holds $4.5 trillion in domestic capital – pension funds, reserves, and sovereign wealth – much of it domiciled abroad.
“That money could be capital for Africans,” she says, “instead the global financial architecture holds the continent hostage.”
Multilateral lenders, she notes, are bound by the same system that penalises risk.
“If you lend with high risk, you get downgraded,” she says. “So the architecture doesn’t allow Africa to unlock its capital for use where it matters.”
The African Development Bank, alongside UNDP and other institutions, is now leading efforts to design a new African financial architecture. The New African Financial Architecture for Development (NAFAD formerly NAFA) was adopted by a broad coalition of public and private sector leaders on April 9 2026 through the Abidjan Consensus.
The NAFAD model is tailored to the continent’s development journey and focuses on mobilising domestic capital by unlocking billions in local African institutional savings and pension funds rather than relying on external aid; lowering the cost of capital by reversing the prevalent risk premium narrative; and promoting financial sovereignty by strengthening Africa’s role in global financial governance and pushing for economic independence.
Responding to the development Eziakonwa says: “I’m hopeful that when that model is built, it will start to free up the continent’s financial infrastructure from this trap.”
But reforming the global system is slow.
“We’ve raised this issue for years and nothing has really shifted,” she admits. “The shareholders of those systems are not responding.”
Meanwhile, Africa faces mounting external shocks, from the Iran conflict to the lingering effects of Covid‑19 and the war in Ukraine.
“We are very dependent on global supply chains,” she says, explaining why Africa remains exposed to geopolitical tectonic shifts. “We haven’t yet really gotten our independence from those supply chains.”
The fallout is that the pressure on the fiscal space is immense.
“Governments must boost investment in energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and digitalisation, all pillars of development, and it all needs investment,” she says. “We cannot wait for the international system to take its time to change.”
Mobilising domestic resources
That urgency is driving UNDP’s focus on domestic resource mobilisation. “We have a programme called Tax Inspectors Without Borders,” she explains, “bringing technical support to governments to see how to generate revenue domestically.”
The goal is not to tax the poor more but to expand the base.
“The tax ratio is very narrow,” she says. “We need to look at potential areas that have not been touched for example where you have tax holidays that are not really deserved.”
Reclaiming idle capital is another priority. “A lot of our sovereign wealth funds and reserves are sitting idle or boosting other economies,” she says. “We’re looking at how to call back some of that money from institutional investors.”
Toward a collective African voice
Eziakonwa’s vision of reform is continental, not national.
“Africa needs to come together and negotiate together and build together,” she says. “The way the world is going, it’s going to be difficult for individual countries.”
She cites Zambia’s experience during debt negotiations as a cautionary tale.
“They had to go it alone, and it was painful because there was no support system,” she says.
The newly launched Borrowers’ Platform, launched by developing countries, offers a forum for nations in distress to share experiences and negotiate collectively.
“Here you’ll have a borrowers’ network where they can support each other, sometimes even go together to the creditors,” she says. “It’s also a space where ideas like debt swaps and restructuring can be born and advanced.”
The instinct to act alone is understandable, she concedes. “Countries feel like they’re in survival mode,” she says. “But long‑term, this is the way to go.”
The African Union, she believes, provides the scaffolding for that unity.
“The structure exists,” she says. “It’s now a matter of seeing how, issue by issue, you build a coalition and make a determination that you will.”
Ultimately, she frames it as a political choice. “It’s a political decision,” she says.
“I don’t think we’re there yet, not on all issues, but we will be.”
Owning the story
For Eziakonwa, the success of each reform – from credit ratings to tax policy and collective bargaining – is contingent upon Africa’s ownership of its own narrative.
“Africa has not owned its own story,” she says. “It still allows others to tell it. And when you do that, you lose your leverage.”
Data, she insists, is central to reclaiming that story.
“A lot of the credit rating agencies often have no choice but to make assumptions based on whatever data they have.”
UNDP’s work, she explains, is about building that intelligence layer from econometric data to digital governance. AI accountability will help to underpin Africa’s financial sovereignty, she says.
But Eziakonwa reminds us that, at its core, development financing is about people. Every dollar lost to excessive financing costs is a dollar diverted from vital services: the teachers not hired, the clinics not built, and the families left without electricity.
“We deal with human development and human security,” she says. “The more money spent on repaying debt, the less is available for social needs.”
Facts Only
* Africa loses an estimated $74.5 billion in additional debt service costs due to exaggerated risk perceptions and biased credit ratings.
* A 2% reduction in borrowing costs over three years across a $18.6 billion portfolio could save approximately $1.12 billion.
* Default rates for infrastructure loans in Africa averaged 1.9%, compared to 4.6%, 10.1%, and 12.4% for Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, respectively, according to a Moody’s Analytics study.
* African borrowers face higher interest rates than peers with similar risk profiles elsewhere despite relatively low default rates.
* The persistence of high borrowing costs drains fiscal space from social investment.
* Africa has demonstrated resilience against shocks like the 2008 global financial crisis, Covid-19, and the Middle East crisis through macroeconomic reforms and domestic restructuring under IMF programs.
* There is a proposal for an African Credit Rating Agency to incorporate broader data sources and increase transparency.
* The New African Financial Architecture for Development (NAFAD) was adopted by a coalition of leaders to focus on mobilizing domestic capital.
* Some sovereign wealth funds and reserves are currently idle or invested in other economies.
* UNDP runs the "Tax Inspectors Without Borders" program to support governments in revenue generation domestically.
Executive Summary
A statement by Ahunna Eziakonwa, Under-secretary General and Special Adviser on Africa to the UN Secretary-General, posits that Africa incurs higher debt service costs due to global risk perceptions and biased credit ratings, referred to as the "Africa risk premium." She calculates that this premium results in an estimated $74.5 billion lost in debt service costs. Eziakonwa argues that reducing borrowing costs by just 2% over three years across a $18.6 billion portfolio could yield significant savings, which could fund social investments like providing electricity to 50 million people or hiring 900,000 teachers.
The speaker asserts that this risk premium is economically detrimental because it drains fiscal space, forcing governments to prioritize debt repayment over social spending. She notes that African countries do not exhibit high default rates, citing a Moody's Analytics study showing infrastructure loan default rates of 1.9% for Africa compared to 4.6%, 10.1%, and 12.4% for Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, respectively. Eziakonwa suggests that this low default rate is not rewarded, resulting in higher interest rates for African borrowers compared to peers with similar risks elsewhere.
Eziakonwa proposes several reforms, beginning with changing the "narrative premium" by highlighting Africa's demonstrated resilience and economic reforms undertaken under IMF programs. She advocates for establishing a home-grown African Credit Rating Agency to incorporate broader and alternative data sources and enhance transparency. Furthermore, she calls for reimagining global finance through models like the New African Financial Architecture for Development (NAFAD), which aims to mobilize domestic capital rather than relying on external aid and reduce the risk premium. Finally, mobilizing domestic resources through revenue generation and fostering a collective African voice through platforms like the Borrowers’ Platform is presented as essential for achieving financial sovereignty.
Full Take
The argument hinges on a systemic disconnect between objective economic performance and global financial valuation. The central pattern being illuminated is how risk—as defined by external rating agencies—operates as a mechanism of control, rather than a mere reflection of risk. The fact that low default rates are not rewarded financially suggests a structural bias where the cost of capital is determined externally, irrespective of internal economic capacity or demonstrated resilience. This fuels a feedback loop: perceived risk leads to higher costs, which suffocates social investment, leading to less capacity for future resilience, thus reinforcing the initial risk perception.
The proposal for an African rating agency and NAFAD reflects a desire to establish internal sovereignty over data and financial architecture. This is not simply about improving scores; it is about shifting the locus of authority from external bodies to continental institutions that can incorporate context-specific resilience—such as documented recovery from crises—into risk assessment. The observation that global players ignore demonstrated regional reforms suggests an institutional inertia where established structures resist change unless directly compelled, which demands a collective political choice rather than merely economic persuasion.
The tension between the need for immediate fiscal relief and the slow pace of systemic reform reveals a conflict between operational urgency and structural transformation. The call to mobilize domestic capital is framed as the necessary corrective mechanism against an externally imposed vulnerability. The ultimate implication concerns agency: true development requires not just technical fixes but the political will to own and articulate a narrative that reflects internal realities, moving beyond passive reception of external assessments to active self-determination in shaping global economic terms.
Sentinel — Human
This analysis presents a sophisticated argument grounded in economic concepts and policy proposals, exhibiting the depth and nuanced emphasis characteristic of expert or high-level journalistic commentary rather than generic synthetic text.
