Despite US sanctions: Russia screws up LNG

Russia increased Liquefied Natural Gas exports between January and September, exporting 25.3 million tonnes, which is a 14 percent increase from the previous year. This growth is largely attributed to deliveries from sanctioned projects to China. Specific increases were noted at the Arctic LNG 2 terminal, where over 700 percent more LNG was loaded between January and July compared to the prior year. The sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project supplies China via the Beihai terminal since the second half of 2025, and Portovaya also began exporting from sanctioned facilities. Without these specific deliveries, exports would have decreased by 0.3 percent in the first nine months.
The financial aspect involves pricing mechanisms; Novatek offered shipments from Arctic LNG 2 with discounts ranging from 30 to 40 percent on Asian LNG reference prices. Simultaneously, China's LNG imports from Russia grew by 24.9 percent between January and July, reaching 4.23 million tonnes, despite a general decrease in China's total LNG imports during the same period. Furthermore, the EU increased its purchases, importing 60 percent more Russian LNG in September compared to August, with France doubling its imports. Global revenues from deliveries unloaded at destination ports increased by 68 percent compared to August, reaching an average of 75 million euros per day.

* Between January and September, Russia exported 25.3 million tonnes of LNG.
* This represents a 14 percent increase compared to the previous year.
* Deliveries from sanctioned projects to China are a primary driver of this increase.
* Arctic LNG 2 loaded over 700 percent more LNG between January and July than in the previous year.
* The Arctic LNG 2 project supplies China via the Beihai terminal since the second half of 2025.
* Portovaya began exporting quantities from sanctioned facilities to China last year.
* Without sanctioned quantities, Russia's LNG shipments between January and September would have decreased by 0.3 percent compared to the previous year.
* Novatek offered Arctic LNG 2 shipments with discounts of 30 to 40 percent on Asian LNG reference prices.
* Chinese LNG imports from Russia increased by 24.9 percent between January and July, reaching 4.23 million tonnes.
* EU member states imported 60 percent more Russian LNG in September than in August.
* Global revenues from deliveries unloaded at destination ports increased by 68 percent compared to August.

The narrative reveals a dynamic where external pressure, specifically US sanctions, is leveraged through established supply chains to engineer export surpluses, shifting market dynamics away from broader geopolitical constraints toward specific transactional flows. The key pattern is the instrumentalization of sanctioned assets—Arctic LNG 2 and Portovaya—to create an artificial imbalance that serves commercial interests. The fact that deliveries from these specific sources cause a surplus, rather than simply existing under sanctions, highlights how supply chain manipulation becomes the mechanism for economic gain when broader market access is restricted.
The focus on China as the destination creates a critical tension between geopolitical segmentation and economic necessity. Russia gains market share in a shrinking import environment while simultaneously utilizing specific routes to bypass broader trade restrictions, suggesting that established commercial corridors can reassert themselves despite sanctions frameworks. The expansion of transport options, such as the introduction of new tankers under Novatek's management, indicates an effort to mitigate supply bottlenecks created by existing regulatory limitations.
The pattern suggests a pivot from controlling market access to controlling transactional volume. The underlying implication is that in highly constrained environments, localized, high-volume deals executed through circumvention routes can supersede broader regulatory goals. What is being tested here is the resilience of international sanction regimes when economic incentives are sufficiently powerful to foster alternative, albeit riskier, distribution channels. What if this pattern—using sanctioned assets to create surplus via targeted destinations—becomes a repeatable model for navigating future trade restrictions?