Research can play a critical role in developing Europe’s strategic autonomy. Adam Kola argues Europe must keep science open and secure while ensuring capacity extends beyond a small group of wealthy universities and well-resourced member states.
Europe’s strategic autonomy is usually discussed in relation to defence spending, energy dependence, semiconductor production and artificial intelligence. Research enters this debate mainly as a source of technologies Europe should develop and control.
Yet the European Union is simultaneously making its research system more global. Europe will not become strategically autonomous by trying to produce knowledge alone.
Horizon Europe, the EU’s €95.5 billion research and innovation programme for 2021–2027, now connects the Union with research systems across several continents. Canada became associated with its main collaborative pillar in July 2024, South Korea followed in 2025 and negotiations with Australia concluded in June 2026. Exploratory talks with India have also advanced. This expansion shows that the EU is extending its research space beyond its borders while seeking to reduce strategic dependencies.
The central question is therefore not whether European science should remain open or become secure. It is whether Europe can build institutions capable of achieving both and whether that capacity will be available across the European Research Area rather than concentrated in a small number of already powerful universities and member states.
Horizon Europe is becoming a global institution
The internationalisation of Horizon Europe is not an obscure diplomatic initiative. Pillar II of Horizon Europe funds collaborative research in health, climate, energy, digital technologies, industry and space, precisely the fields in which the EU wants to strengthen its economic security, technological capacity and global influence.
Association allows institutions from partner countries to participate on terms broadly comparable to those in EU member states. Canada and South Korea bring strong universities and research infrastructures. Australia had already participated in more than 200 Horizon Europe projects before negotiations concluded, while India offers a vast scientific system and expanding innovation economy.
These partnerships enlarge Europe’s knowledge base and diversify its networks. Strategic autonomy is often confused with self-sufficiency, yet contemporary science depends on international teams, shared data and distributed infrastructures.
The relevant distinction is not between dependence and independence, but between interdependencies Europe understands and can manage, and dependencies that leave it vulnerable to political pressure or disruption. A global Horizon Europe can strengthen strategic autonomy by broadening Europe’s options. It can weaken autonomy if cooperation enables opaque transfers of sensitive knowledge or creates new concentrations of dependence.
Research security has become an operational question
The Council of the EU’s recommendation of May 2024 identified three principal research-security risks: undesirable knowledge and technology transfer, foreign interference and violations of research ethics or integrity. These risks can affect work on quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, satellite systems, biotechnology, cybersecurity or advanced materials, where civilian research may also have military applications.
The issue has moved from policy statements to institutional practice. Around 500 policymakers and practitioners met in Brussels on 28–30 October 2025 for the first European Flagship Conference on Research Security, organised by the Commission and twelve sector organisations. TU Delft then hosted the first European Network Conference on Research Security on 26–27 May 2026.
Some situations are relatively clear. Formal cooperation with Russian public bodies was curtailed after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions and Iran’s support for Russia’s military capabilities also justify restrictions involving sensitive Iranian entities.
China presents the harder case. It is one of the world’s largest research systems, an essential partner in areas such as climate and public health, and at the same time a strategic competitor in critical technologies. Europe cannot treat China either as a normal partner in every field or as a general security threat. It must distinguish ordinary cooperation from projects involving defence-linked institutions, strategic infrastructure or direct dual-use potential.
Security must be built into cooperation
The principle that research should be “as open as possible and as closed as necessary” is useful, but it does not tell a university whether to sign an agreement, admit a researcher to a sensitive facility or include a partner in a Horizon Europe consortium.
Most international collaboration presents little risk and should not face disproportionate controls. Higher-risk projects may require restricted data access, clearer intellectual-property provisions or export-control checks. Decisions should begin with the project, technology, partner and purpose, not with a researcher’s passport.
Researchers cannot conduct geopolitical due diligence alone. Universities need staff able to assess ownership, funding, sanctions, export controls and possible end uses, with difficult cases escalated to national or European expertise.
Research security must therefore be embedded in partnership development, grant preparation, recruitment, data governance, infrastructure access and commercialisation. It cannot be added as a final compliance check after a consortium has already been formed.
Research security could deepen Europe’s scientific divides
This new responsibility is not distributed evenly. Wealthy universities in established research centres can employ specialist security officers, purchase commercial due-diligence tools and draw on national diplomatic expertise. Smaller and less well-funded institutions, particularly in Europe’s eastern and southern regions, may face the same obligations without comparable resources.
Without shared European capacity, research security may become a privilege of already excellent institutions. Well-resourced universities will continue to cooperate globally with confidence, while institutions with weaker support systems may either accept risks they cannot assess or withdraw from valuable partnerships. In both cases, scientific opportunity becomes more concentrated.
Distributed excellence therefore requires distributed capacity to govern openness. Shared guidance, advisory services, common due-diligence tools and dedicated funding are needed across the European Research Area. The Commission’s proposed European Centre of Expertise, due-diligence platform and methodology for testing institutional resilience are important steps.
Ukraine illustrates why this matters. Its Horizon Europe association entered into force in 2022, and the Commission opened an office in Kyiv in December 2023. Ukraine needs European networks, but its experience in cybersecurity, infrastructure resilience and decentralised energy is also reshaping European priorities.
Europe needs distributed capacity to govern openness
Europe cannot choose between scientific openness and research security. A closed research system would reduce access to talent and expertise. An indiscriminately open one would ignore the geopolitical conditions in which knowledge is produced and applied.
The expansion of Horizon Europe shows that the EU does not intend to retreat from global science. The development of research-security policy shows that the assumption of politically neutral openness is also disappearing. These developments now need to be connected institutionally.
Strategic autonomy means governing interdependence, but that capacity cannot remain concentrated in a small group of wealthy universities and well-resourced member states.
Research security should make cooperation more resilient, not more exclusive, and its costs should not be transferred to universities as another unfunded responsibility. Europe’s strategic autonomy will depend not only on keeping science open and secure, but on ensuring that institutions across the continent possess the capacity to make it so.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: PeopleImages provided by Shutterstock.
Facts Only
* Adam Kola argues Europe must keep science open and secure while ensuring capacity extends beyond wealthy universities and well-resourced member states.
* Europe's strategic autonomy is usually discussed in relation to defence spending, energy dependence, semiconductor production, and artificial intelligence.
* Horizon Europe connects the EU with research systems across several continents.
* Canada became associated with a main collaborative pillar in July 2024.
* South Korea followed in 2025.
* Negotiations with Australia concluded in June 2026.
* Exploratory talks with India have advanced regarding Horizon Europe.
* Pillar II of Horizon Europe funds collaborative research in health, climate, energy, digital technologies, industry, and space.
* Research-security risks identified include undesirable knowledge and technology transfer, foreign interference, and violations of research ethics or integrity concerning quantum technologies, AI, satellite systems, biotechnology, cybersecurity, and advanced materials.
* Formal cooperation with Russian public bodies was curtailed after the invasion of Ukraine.
* The Council of the EU’s recommendation of May 2024 identified three principal research-security risks.
* Decisions on collaboration should begin with the project, technology, partner, and purpose, not a researcher’s passport.
Executive Summary
The pursuit of Europe’s strategic autonomy through research is framed by the need to balance openness with security. Research, typically seen as a source of technologies to develop and control, is now being integrated into international collaborations like Horizon Europe, which connects the EU with global research systems across multiple continents, including Canada, South Korea, Australia, and India. This expansion demonstrates an effort to reduce strategic dependencies by leveraging global knowledge bases.
The central tension lies not in whether science should be open or secure, but in establishing institutional capacity that can achieve both equitably across the European Research Area. The expansion of collaborative frameworks must be managed to prevent cooperation from leading to opaque transfers of sensitive knowledge or new concentrations of dependence. Furthermore, research security involves managing risks like technology transfer and foreign interference, requiring a shift from policy statements to embedded institutional practice throughout partnership development.
The analysis highlights that effective research security demands distributed capacity; well-resourced institutions can absorb many obligations, leaving less supported entities vulnerable. Therefore, building autonomy requires shared European mechanisms for due diligence, guidance, and infrastructure access to ensure resilience across the entire Research Area rather than concentrating risks in elite institutions.
Full Take
The narrative pivots on redefining strategic autonomy from mere self-sufficiency to the capacity to govern interdependence responsibly. The expansion of Horizon Europe serves as both a mechanism for broadening knowledge access and a potential vector for increased dependency if governance mechanisms are weak. The key pattern emerging is the tension between global collaboration—which expands opportunities—and localized risk management—which demands distributed institutional strength.
The shift from viewing security as a purely national concern to embedding it in operational practice (e.g., Flagship Conferences) suggests a necessary paradigm change, but this transition is threatened by existing structural inequalities. The implication is that if security protocols are not deliberately distributed, they will become another layer of privilege for well-funded entities, deepening the divide between leading and lagging institutions within the European Research Area.
The necessity for shared capacity—as opposed to centralized control—challenges the assumption that research sovereignty can be achieved solely through internal institutional strength. The underlying tension is whether internationalization, driven by economic imperatives, forces a necessary evolution in governance structures that prioritize collective resilience over localized advantage. This points toward a future where strategic autonomy relies on shared regulatory frameworks for managing transnational scientific flows rather than competitive self-sufficiency among powerful centers.
Bridge Questions: What specific institutional mechanisms can be established to ensure equitable distribution of research security capacity across all member states, irrespective of funding levels? How can the principle of distributed excellence be operationalized in funding and oversight structures? If external partners cannot reliably adhere to European due diligence standards, what contingency plans exist for managing dependencies arising from global partnerships?
Sentinel — Human
The text presents a highly structured, policy-oriented argument that integrates specific institutional details with broader geopolitical concerns, suggesting authorship by an analyst or established writer familiar with EU strategic frameworks.