Hiring a hit man to commit murder is not always ‘a crime of violence,’ 9th Circuit rules
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- The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated two felony convictions that stemmed from a pair of contract killings negotiated to settle an oil well dispute in North Dakota.
- The judges argued that, under the current statute, “a defendant may be convicted ... based on an accidental killing.”
- The defendant in the case is serving two consecutive life sentences for related crimes and will remain in prison despite the appellate court ruling.
Hiring a hit man is not a crime of violence, even in cases where the killer fulfills his contract and his employer is convicted in the conspiracy, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled this week.
In a unanimous decision, a three-judge panel vacated two felony convictions that stemmed from a pair of contract killings negotiated to settle an oil well dispute in North Dakota.
The court found that although trucking and drilling magnate James Henrikson had paid Timothy Suckow tens of thousands of dollars to beat one of his employees to death with a tire jack and shoot a co-investor at home, “solicitation” of those crimes did not meet the legal threshold for violence, even if fatal violence flowed from the deal.
The judges argued that under the current federal statute, “a defendant may be convicted ... based on an accidental killing.” Evidence of the conspirators’ intent to use force was legally essential to a conviction, the court ruled.
A lower court had already tossed two related convictions because additional hits Henrikson ordered from a different contractor were never carried out.
The appeals court went further, saying even soliciting a successful hit is “not categorically a crime of violence.”
The ruling turns on the concept of mens rea, Latin for “guilty mind,” a legal term used to differentiate crimes such as premeditated murder and involuntary manslaughter, which is a charge used when authorities believe a killing was unintentional.
Contracting a murder might seem to be the very definition of a guilty-minded crime. But the way the federal solicitation statute is written, convicting it doesn’t require proof the hit man actually intended the target to die — only that it happened after the person who commissioned the job took necessary steps to assure their target’s demise.
The court gave an example: A person who “lures the intended victim into his car, and then negligently (or even non-negligently) causes a crash that kills the intended victim.” Such a scenario would satisfy “the ‘if death results’ element of the offense” that is required for a conviction, the panel wrote.
The decision puts the 9th Circuit at odds with the 4th, which ruled just the opposite in a similar case five years ago.
“If a defendant willingly agrees to enter into a conspiracy with the specific intent that a murder be committed for money and death results from that agreement, it follows that the defendant acted with specific intent to bring about the death of the conspiracy’s victim,” the 4th Circuit ruled in a different murder-for-hire case in 2021.
The 9th Circuit brushed aside that logic, saying the Supreme Court had since struck down a key legal tenet of that case. The West Coast appellate judges said it was “inappropriate” to extrapolate intent from one element of the crime, such as making a contract, to another, like the agreed-upon death.
In theory, the decision knocks years off Henrikson’s sentence. But because he is already serving two consecutive life sentences for related crimes, it will not alter the amount of time he spends in prison.
Facts Only
* The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated two felony convictions related to contract killings in North Dakota.
* The killings stemmed from a dispute over an oil well settlement.
* The court found that the "solicitation" of these crimes did not meet the legal threshold for violence under the current federal statute.
* The court noted that a defendant may be convicted based on an accidental killing under the existing statute.
* The trial involved a trucking and drilling magnate who paid money for actions including beating an employee to death and shooting a co-investor at home.
* Evidence of conspirators' intent to use force was deemed legally essential for conviction.
* A lower court had previously overturned two related convictions because additional ordered hits were not executed.
* The ruling addresses the concept of *mens rea*, or guilty mind.
Executive Summary
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated two felony convictions stemming from contract killings negotiated to settle an oil well dispute in North Dakota. The court determined that soliciting these crimes did not meet the legal threshold for violence, even when fatal violence resulted from the agreement. Specifically, the court found that while a trucking and drilling magnate paid money for actions involving beating an employee to death and shooting a co-investor, the "solicitation" of these crimes lacked the requisite legal element of violence under the current federal statute.
The ruling centers on the concept of *mens rea*, or guilty mind, distinguishing between premeditated murder and involuntary manslaughter. The court reasoned that the federal solicitation statute permits conviction based on an accidental killing if the necessary steps to ensure death were taken by the commissioning party. For example, a scenario where someone lures a victim into a car and causes a fatal crash satisfies the "if death results" element of the offense, regardless of the contracting intent. This interpretation diverges from a previous ruling by the Fourth Circuit in a similar murder-for-hire case five years prior.
Although the decision suggests that hiring a hitman is not automatically a crime of violence, the convicted defendant is still serving two consecutive life sentences for related crimes.
Full Take
The legal debate pivots on whether the act of contractually arranging a murder necessitates proof of specific intent to kill, or if proving that the killing resulted from the commissioning party's actions is sufficient under current statutory interpretation. The Ninth Circuit's decision suggests a pragmatic reading of mens rea, focusing on the observable result (death) rather than strictly dissecting the internal mental state of the solicitor regarding the act of homicide itself. This challenges the notion that contracting murder inherently involves premeditated intent, as previous interpretations suggested in other jurisdictions.
The tension highlighted by the contrast with the Fourth Circuit's prior ruling illustrates how legal precedent evolves based on subsequent Supreme Court shifts. The shift suggests a move away from extrapolating intent across separate elements of a crime (like contract formation versus the actual act of killing) when that extrapolation is deemed inappropriate. The core implication for human agency and dignity lies in how culpability is assigned: does the structure of accountability prioritize the transactional agreement or the specific mental state required for an act of lethal violence? This forces a re-evaluation of what constitutes criminal intent when complex financial arrangements are involved in violent outcomes.
The pattern suggests that legal definitions, even those seemingly technical ones like *mens rea*, are subject to contextual and evolving interpretation based on broader judicial philosophy. When systems attempt to codify inherently human moral concepts like intent into rigid legal structures, the application of those structures often reveals underlying philosophical disagreements about causality and responsibility. The missing piece is how this judicial shift impacts public perception of accountability versus contractual obligation in extreme scenarios.
Bridge Questions: How should courts reconcile differing jurisdictional interpretations of intent when dealing with complex criminal conspiracies? What are the long-term effects on sentencing philosophy if the distinction between "solicitation" and "commission" becomes legally malleable based on context? Does this ruling suggest a shift toward outcome-based justice in organized crime cases, or does it simply redefine the scope of what constitutes actionable intent?
Sentinel — Human
This article presents a focused analysis of a specific appellate court ruling concerning contract killings, demonstrating sophisticated legal reasoning among disparate precedents.