Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi indicated that the country would disarm Iranian-backed militias by June 2027, according to a report in The New York Times on September 21. He made the comments during a trip to New York City to attend the United Nations General Assembly. During his trip, Zaidi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the leaders agreed that Turkey would gradually hand over a key military base in northern Iraq. The two developments happened amid the pending withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the recent unification of the Kurdish Peshmerga.
Under the disarmament plan being discussed, militias would first adhere to a 90-day ceasefire in which they stop attacks in Iraq. “Weapons would then be handed over progressively, with the government seeking to end the factions’ existence as independent armed organisations by the middle of next year,” The Arab Weekly added. At the same time, militias that have refused to disarm will be integrated into Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an official Iraqi security institution made up of mostly Shiite militias.
The new disarmament plan is seen as delaying or extending the deadline for the militias to hand over their weapons and be placed under state control. “Al-Zaidi had previously committed to bringing weapons outside state control under government authority by 30 September, following attacks by pro-Iran armed groups on US bases during the war on Iran and subsequent US air strikes on their positions,” The New Arab noted.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Zaidi on September 21. “The Secretary and Prime Minister agreed on the importance of Iraq dismantling terrorist militias, preventing attacks from Iraqi territory, and fully exercising its sovereignty,” the State Department said. The statement did not mention the new disarmament timeline. Zaidi’s office stated that the government in Baghdad was determined to move forward with the plan to place arms under state control.
Zaidi submitted a six-point proposal related to the disarmament plan that includes the 90-day “probationary period for de-escalation,” during which militias will cease attacks. Many of the militias within the PMF have been sanctioned as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorist groups by the US. The Badr Organization is the most powerful Iran-aligned PMF faction that has not been designated.
Iraq’s plan to disarm the militias comes at a time of several major interlinked developments in the country. US forces deployed to Iraq as part of the anti-Islamic coalition are leaving the country by September 30. On September 25, The National in the UAE noted that the US had signed a deal to hand over the Diplomatic Support Center at Baghdad International Airport to the Iraqis. This is one of the sites that Iranian-backed militias have targeted numerous times with rockets and drones. In addition to the US withdrawal, the Yazidi Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), an armed group in Sinjar, has agreed to disarm.
Turkey has been concerned about the YBS presence in Iraq because of its links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey designates as a terrorist organization and fought for decades until the group announced its disbandment in 2025. Now, Turkey has agreed with Iraq to hand over its base near Bashiqa, located 16 miles northeast of Mosul. Unlike Turkish camps and bases closer to the Turkish border in the mountains of the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq, this facility was fifty miles south of the border.
“Within the framework of the progress achieved by Iraq through security steps, the Turkish forces will gradually hand over the Baashiqa-Zeliqan camp to the Iraqi Federal Government, in accordance with the agreed mechanism and timetable,” Iraq’s Prime Minister’s Office noted on September 23.
The Bashiqa-Zilkan base was established in 2015 during the height of the war on the Islamic State. It provided support for the Kurdish Peshmerga and helped train a small Arab militia called the Hashd al Watani. The base was targeted by rocket attacks several times over the last six years. “Shiite armed groups affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have regularly claimed responsibility for previous attacks targeting the Zilkan base,” Kurdistan24 reported in 2022.
Iraq’s Iranian-backed militias have opposed the Turkish military presence in Iraq. For instance, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada demanded that Turkish forces leave Iraq as one of its conditions for disarming. The Turkish base deal with Iraq is therefore linked to the wider process of disarmament in the country.
Facts Only
* Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi indicated disarmament of Iranian-backed militias by June 2027, according to a New York Times report on September 21.
* Zaidi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a trip to New York.
* The leaders agreed that Turkey would gradually hand over a key military base in northern Iraq.
* The disarmament plan requires militias to adhere to a 90-day ceasefire stopping attacks in Iraq initially.
* Weapons would then be handed over progressively, with the goal of ending factions as independent armed organizations by the middle of the next year.
* Militias refusing disarmament will be integrated into Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
* Zaidi previously committed to bringing weapons outside state control under government authority by September 30.
* Zaidi submitted a six-point proposal including the 90-day ceasefire period.
* The Badr Organization is the most powerful Iran-aligned PMF faction not designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US.
* US forces are leaving Iraq by September 30.
* The Yazidi Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) agreed to disarm.
* Turkey agreed with Iraq to gradually hand over the Baashiqa-Zeliqan camp.
Executive Summary
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi indicated that the country would disarm Iranian-backed militias by June 2027, according to a report in The New York Times on September 21. During a trip to New York, Zaidi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the leaders agreed on a gradual handover of a key military base in northern Iraq by Turkey. This discussion occurred amidst the pending withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the recent unification of the Kurdish Peshmerga.
The disarmament plan involves an initial 90-day ceasefire during which militias must stop attacks in Iraq. Weapons would then be progressively handed over, with the government aiming to end the factions’ existence as independent armed organizations by the middle of the following year. Militias refusing to disarm may be integrated into Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an official security institution comprising mostly Shiite militias.
The disarmament timeline was previously committed to by Zaidi to bring weapons under government authority by September 30, following attacks on US bases. A six-point proposal was submitted regarding the plan, which included the 90-day de-escalation period. The Badr Organization is noted as the most powerful Iran-aligned PMF faction not yet designated by the US.
The process is complicated by concurrent developments: the withdrawal of US forces by September 30, and an agreement for Turkey to gradually hand over the Baashiqa-Zeliqan camp to the Iraqi Federal Government. This base was established in 2015 and provided support for Kurdish groups and other militias. Disarmament efforts are linked to opposition from Iranian-backed militias concerning Turkish military presence.
Full Take
The narrative weaves a complex interplay between internal Iraqi security restructuring, external geopolitical maneuvering, and shifting regional power dynamics concerning Kurdish groups and Iran. The core tension lies in the synchronization—or lack thereof—between stated intentions for disarmament and the actual operational realities on the ground, particularly concerning entities like the PMF and cross-border agreements involving Turkey.
The sequencing of events suggests a strategy where internal control (disarmament) is framed to coincide with external withdrawals (US forces) and bilateral concessions (the Turkish base handover). The fact that specific, powerful factions like the Badr Organization remain outside US designation while the process unfolds signals a potential gap between formal state objectives and the practical enforcement of sovereignty. Furthermore, linking the disarmament to the broader context of Kurdish group presence and Turkish security concerns suggests that these localized power struggles are being refracted through a larger framework of international military transitions.
The implication for agency is whether this phased approach genuinely empowers Iraqi state control or merely manages transitional friction among competing armed actors. If the timeline is indeed flexible, the success hinges less on the stated goal (disarmament by 2027) and more on the mechanism of integration into the PMF versus autonomous existence. What is being obscured is the internal calculus: whether the security gains for Baghdad are prioritized over maintaining cohesion among diverse armed groups or managing external leverage from actors like Turkey and Iran.
Sentinel — Human
The text reads like a detailed journalistic compilation synthesizing reported statements and background details surrounding complex political negotiations in Iraq.