Defectors from the Myanmar military told The Diplomat that the regime will intensify its airstrikes on the civilian population in the country’s Rakhine State.
In an interview in Myanmar’s Arakan region on February 25 this year, two military defectors – Major Myint Zaw Than and Sergeant Kyaw Han Toe – told this correspondent that the military will increase its air raids in the Arakan region.
“There will be more airstrikes on the civilians in Arakan in the coming months because the military has to defend the three townships [Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung] still under its control,” Myint Zaw Than said.
Despite this, Kyaw Han Toe predicted that the military would eventually be defeated by the Arakan Army (AA) and will lose control of the three townships.
Of all the ethnic armed organizations operating in Myanmar, the AA has wrested control of the largest expanse of territory.
The defectors identified the “support of the people” for the AA as the outfit’s biggest strength, which has enabled it to stage a series of spectacular victories against the military over the past decade.
An annual report issued by the United Nations Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) that covers the period from July 2025 to June 2026 also pointed to a marked escalation in aerial attacks across the country in the months preceding the elections. Aerial attacks have continued unabated since the elections as well.
The IIMM report pointed out the Myanmar military was increasingly using motorized paragliders, gyrocopters, and drones to carry out low-altitude airstrikes with unguided explosives.
An estimated 228 civilian casualties, including 89 deaths and 139 injuries, have been reported as a result of airstrikes in Rakhine State from January 1 to August 13 this year.
On the resistance movement in other regions of Myanmar, Kyaw Han Toe said that “the resistance groups will emerge victorious if they are able to work together.” If they do, “the junta will collapse within three years,” he said.
About the recent success of the military in regaining territories from the resistance groups, he said that lack of coordination among the groups has been a fundamental drawback that has contributed to the military’s success in some zones. This, he added, stands in sharp contrast to the situation in Arakan, where “there is only one organization [opposed to the military] and so only one chain of command.”
The two military defectors clarified that they had received salaries and health care regularly when they were in service, as did other personnel in the military. Echoing accusations made previously by other defectors and some functionaries of resistance groups, Myint Zaw Than alleged that a small section of military personnel is involved in drug trafficking.
Facts Only
* Major Myint Zaw Than and Sergeant Kyaw Han Toe stated the military will increase airstrikes on civilians in the Arakan region in the coming months.
* The military must defend the townships of Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung in the Arakan region.
* Kyaw Han Toe predicted the military would eventually be defeated by the Arakan Army (AA) and lose control of the three townships.
* The Arakan Army (AA) controls the largest expanse of territory among ethnic armed organizations.
* Defectors identified "support of the people" for the AA as its greatest strength.
* A United Nations report from July 2025 to June 2026 indicated an escalation in aerial attacks before and after elections.
* The Myanmar military used motorized paragliders, gyrocopters, and drones for low-altitude airstrikes with unguided explosives.
* Estimated civilian casualties in Rakhine State from airstrikes between January 1 and August 13 of this year were 228 deaths and 139 injuries.
* Kyaw Han Toe stated that resistance groups will emerge victorious if they work together, predicting junta collapse within three years.
* Lack of coordination among resistance groups contributed to military successes in some zones.
* Defectors alleged a small section of military personnel is involved in drug trafficking.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative presents a tension between immediate, localized conflict dynamics and broader strategic shifts. The information about escalating aerial attacks, the specific methods used by the military (drones, paragliders), and documented civilian casualties establishes an empirical reality of conflict intensity in Rakhine State. This is contextualized by the predictions from defectors regarding long-term outcomes—the potential defeat of the junta by the AA, contingent on unity. The contrast drawn between the fractured resistance movements and the unified opposition structure in Arakan suggests a pattern where internal cohesion dictates military success or failure, shifting the focus from purely tactical air operations to overarching political legitimacy.
The implication for cognitive sovereignty lies in recognizing how data—whether from defectors, UN reports, or aerial observation methods—is filtered and prioritized. The use of specific casualty figures alongside predictions about future collapse forces an analysis of agency: what levers exist within the conflict structure (e.g., coordination, control over territory) that determine survival versus defeat? Furthermore, the mention of alleged drug trafficking by military personnel introduces a layer of internal systemic corruption, suggesting that the struggle is not solely between state and resistance but involves contested internal allegiances and resource management. The absence of detailed information on the mechanisms behind territorial shifts invites questioning: what forms of 'support' are most effective in this environment, and does focusing solely on aerial strikes obscure the underlying socio-political fragmentation driving these military maneuvers?
Bridge Questions: What verifiable metrics exist to assess the impact of internal coordination versus fragmentation on resistance victories across Myanmar? How can external observers weigh the risk suggested by defectors’ predictions against the reported escalation of kinetic actions? What is the relationship between allegations of internal corruption and the operational capacity of the armed groups mentioned?