Falling fertility rates have created a unique scenario in human history: many countries are experiencing structural population decline.
Many countries around the world are in a unique position in human history: rather than having a constant or growing population, their populations are starting to shrink. This is not a temporary decline, caused by war or famine. There are plenty of population shocks like that in the history books.
Instead, this decline is structural. It is caused by falling birth rates.
If we look at the United Nations’ population estimates and medium projections, 64 countries and territories had already passed peak population in 2026.
In the map below, you can see which countries they are. Almost all of them are in Europe and East Asia, which have seen rapid reductions in fertility rates and persistently low rates since then. Many Eastern European countries have also seen large numbers emigrating, adding to the decline.
There are a few other, more surprising, countries that may have passed their peak, too. Thailand in Southeast Asia — which dropped below two births per woman in the early 1990s — now has a rate below 1.2. Uruguay in South America has also seen fertility rates drop to an average of 1.4 births per woman.
Many of these countries have only just passed the peak. But some, such as Japan and Italy, peaked more than a decade ago. In the chart below, you can see the trajectories of a small selection of countries.
If we include the UN’s projections to the end of the century, the decline is substantial. South Korea and China’s populations could more than halve. Italy could shrink by more than 40%. Spain and Thailand, by a third.
Which countries will peak in the middle of the century?
In the coming decades, many more countries are expected to join them.
By the 2050s, much of South America is projected to have passed the peak. By the 2060s, much of South Asia may do so. This includes the world’s most populous country today: India.
In the map below, you can see which specific countries these are. Using the interactive timeline, you can see how this evolves over different time periods.
What if birth rates or migration patterns become very different from expectations?
These projections of population peaks are based on the UN’s “medium variant” projection, and sensitive to its assumptions about three things: fertility rates, life expectancy, and migration. All of these things are hard to predict 50 years into the future.
Recently, we published a tool that allows you to see how future populations would change if these assumptions were different.
One factor that could change these maps a lot is migration rates. Many high-income countries only have constant or growing populations today because of immigration; without it, they’d be shrinking.
In this small map (click to enlarge), you can see which countries would be shrinking (in orange) in 2060, if we were to assume no migration.
The United States is one of the most stark examples. You might have noticed that in our earlier peak maps, the US never turned blue. Even by the end of the century, its population is not expected to peak. This is because the UN’s projections assume that there is enough immigration into the country to offset low birth rates.
If we were to assume zero migration in the US, its population would peak soon and would shrink by 60 million by 2100. Compared to the scenario with migration, the US population would be 130 million smaller at the end of the century.
You can see this comparison in the chart below.
So, for some countries, the timing of population peaks is very sensitive to the assumptions demographers make about future changes in migration rates, fertility rates, and longevity.
For others, a shrinking population now seems all but inevitable. In a recent article, I used our population tool to explore what would need to happen to any of these three factors in South Korea to stop its decline. I came away from the experiment concluding that it was next to impossible. The necessary rebounds in fertility rate, leaps in life expectancy, or rise in immigration levels did not seem plausible.
There, like in many other countries with steep declines, this new demographic reality seems inevitable.
Population tool: How will populations across the world change in the 21st century?
We created an interactive tool that lets you test how changes in fertility rates, life expectancy, and migration rates will change future populations.
South Korea’s population is set to shrink: what would it take to stop the decline?
How much would fertility rates, life expectancy, or migration rates need to change to stop the population from shrinking?
The global population pyramid: How global demography has changed and what we can expect for the 21st century
Global demographic transition signals a shift from young, growing populations to older, stable ones, reshaping societies and economies.
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Hannah Ritchie, Edouard Mathieu, and Lucas Rodés-Guirao (2026) - “Which countries have already passed peak population, and when will the rest do so?” Published online at OurWorldinData.org. Retrieved from: 'https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20260818-184715/which-countries-have-already-passed-peak-population-and-when-will-the-rest-do-so.html' [Online Resource] (archived on August 18, 2026).
BibTeX citation
@article{owid-which-countries-have-already-passed-peak-population-and-when-will-the-rest-do-so,
author = {Hannah Ritchie and Edouard Mathieu and Lucas Rodés-Guirao},
title = {Which countries have already passed peak population, and when will the rest do so?},
journal = {Our World in Data},
year = {2026},
note = {https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20260818-184715/which-countries-have-already-passed-peak-population-and-when-will-the-rest-do-so.html}
}
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Facts Only
* 64 countries and territories passed peak population by 2026.
* Peak populations are concentrated primarily in Europe and East Asia.
* Japan and Italy passed their population peaks more than ten years ago.
* South Korea and China's populations are projected to potentially decrease by more than 50%.
* Italy's population is projected to shrink by over 40%.
* Spain and Thailand's populations are projected to shrink by one-third.
* Thailand's fertility rate is below 1.2 births per woman.
* Uruguay's fertility rate averages 1.4 births per woman.
* Much of South America is projected to pass peak population by the 2050s.
* Much of South Asia, including India, is projected to pass peak population by the 2060s.
* United States population projections depend on continued immigration to offset low birth rates.
* Without migration, the United States population would shrink by 60 million by 2100.
Executive Summary
Structural population decline is emerging globally, driven primarily by falling fertility rates rather than temporary shocks like war or famine. While East Asia and Europe have already seen significant numbers of countries pass their population peaks, projections indicate this trend will expand to South America by the 2050s and South Asia, including India, by the 2060s. The scale of decline varies; some nations may see their populations halved by the end of the century.
The timing and severity of these peaks are highly sensitive to three variables: fertility rates, life expectancy, and migration. In many high-income nations, immigration currently serves as the primary mechanism preventing population shrinkage. For example, the United States is not expected to peak by 2100 only if current migration assumptions hold. However, in countries like South Korea, the decline appears nearly inevitable, as required increases in fertility or immigration to reverse the trend are viewed as implausible.
Full Take
This analysis operates in ACADEMIC MODE. The methodology relies on the UN’s “medium variant” projections, which are essentially probabilistic models based on current trends. A peer reviewer would immediately flag the inherent instability of 50-year projections; small shifts in fertility or migration policy can create massive divergences in outcomes. The reliance on a "medium variant" simplifies a complex spectrum of possibilities into a singular narrative of inevitable decline.
The data shows a clear correlation between falling fertility and population peak, but the claims move toward determinism—specifically regarding South Korea—where the authors conclude a reversal is "next to impossible." This shifts the work from descriptive demography to a prescriptive conclusion about the limits of human agency.
The framing suggests a paradigm where population growth is the historical norm and shrinkage is a "unique scenario." This echoes a Malthusian preoccupation with numbers, though inverted. The real-world implication is a shift in global power dynamics: nations that cannot maintain their populations may face systemic economic contractions and a loss of geopolitical influence.
Bridge Questions:
1. How would a shift in global economic structures (e.g., automation) change the necessity of population growth for national stability?
2. What cultural or policy interventions have historically succeeded in reversing fertility declines, and why are they considered "implausible" now?
Counterstrike Scan:
A coordinated influence campaign would use these projections to trigger "demographic panic," arguing that certain nations are doomed to collapse to justify extreme immigration policies or authoritarian reproductive mandates. The actual content remains clean, as it explicitly acknowledges the variables and uncertainties involved.