The Federal Government is intensifying efforts to tackle violent extremism by shifting from national strategies to targeted, state-driven and grassroots interventions.
This was as security stakeholders move to close gaps that have allowed extremist threats to thrive in underserved communities.
A consultative forum convened by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC-ONSA) in collaboration with key partners, policymakers, civil society actors, and development organisations, on Thursday in Abuja, emphasised the urgent need to translate the country’s Policy Framework and National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PF-NAP) into practical, localised action.
The initiative, driven through the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Knowledge, Innovation and Resource Hub under the PAVE Network, is being implemented with support from partners including Nextier, the SPRING Programme, the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).
Jaye Gaskia, Chairman of PAVE Network, said the engagement builds on over a year of pilot programmes aimed at closing the long-standing gap between national policy frameworks and subnational realities.
He noted a deliberate transition from mere “domestication” of policies to full-scale localisation, a strategy designed to empower states to craft responses tailored to their unique socio-political and security contexts.
“This is a national framework, but its success depends on how well it reflects local realities. States must define their priorities, develop tailored action plans, and establish coordination systems that work within their contexts,” he said.
Gaskia added that Technical Working Groups already operational in several states, particularly across the North-West, are playing a critical role by bringing together government agencies, civil society actors, and community stakeholders under unified implementation structures.
Also speaking, Iye Mangset, Principal Staff Officer of the PCVE Directorate at NCTC-ONSA, commended the growing multi-stakeholder collaboration and highlighted recent updates to the framework.
She explained that the PF-NAP, originally developed in 2017 and revised in 2025, has been strengthened to reflect emerging threats and evolving security dynamics.
According to her, implementation is guided by six core pillars: institutionalisation and mainstreaming of PCVE, access to justice, community capacity building, strategic communication, research and learning, and gender mainstreaming.
“The focus now is on implementation. We want to see stronger ownership at the state level to ensure the framework delivers measurable impact,” Mangset said.
Yetunde Adegoke, National Coordinator of GCERF Nigeria, ,emphasised the need to sustain momentum, noting that progress recorded over the past year must be consolidated through continuous engagement and long-term planning.
In his intervention, Ndubisi Nwokolo, Partner at Nextier, called for a shift away from reactive, force-driven approaches towards preventive, non-coercive strategies.
“Violent extremism is deeply rooted in governance challenges, inequality, and social exclusion. Addressing these underlying drivers is essential for any sustainable solution,” he said, warning that the threat is becoming increasingly localised and requires adaptive responses.
Deliberations at the forum revealed that while notable progress has been made in establishing state-level structures and action plans, implementation remains uneven.
Participants identified several constraints, including weak inter-agency coordination, bureaucratic bottlenecks, inadequate funding, overdependence on donor support, and fluctuating political commitment.
Participants highlighted ongoing initiatives such as stakeholder engagement platforms, early warning systems, and community-based programmes, but acknowledged that many of these efforts remain fragmented.
“There is increasing awareness, but implementation is still uneven. What is required now is stronger alignment and sustained political will,” one participant observed.
A major takeaway from the discussions was the consensus that fragmented responses have allowed extremist groups to exploit regional gaps, often relocating operations to areas with weaker institutional capacity.
To address this, stakeholders called for stronger alignment between federal and state actors, formal institutionalisation of Technical Working Groups as State Coordination Committees, integration of PCVE strategies into development and security plans, and the creation of dedicated budgetary provisions by state governments.
The forum also underscored the importance of strategic communication in countering extremist narratives and building public trust, with plans underway to unveil a national communication strategy alongside the revised PF-NAP.
Participants further agreed that community engagement, youth inclusion, and early warning mechanisms must remain central to implementation efforts.
While expressing cautious optimism over growing collaboration and increased state participation, stakeholders warned that the success of the localisation drive will ultimately depend on sustained funding, political will, and coordinated execution across all tiers of government.
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Facts Only
The Federal Government of Nigeria is shifting from national strategies to state-driven and grassroots interventions to tackle violent extremism.
A consultative forum was convened by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC-ONSA) in collaboration with partners, policymakers, civil society actors, and development organizations in Abuja.
The forum emphasized translating the Policy Framework and National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PF-NAP) into practical, localized action.
The initiative is implemented through the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Knowledge, Innovation and Resource Hub under the PAVE Network.
Partners include Nextier, the SPRING Programme, the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).
Jaye Gaskia, Chairman of PAVE Network, noted the transition from policy domestication to full-scale localization to empower states.
Technical Working Groups are operational in several states, particularly in the North-West, to coordinate implementation.
Iye Mangset, Principal Staff Officer of the PCVE Directorate at NCTC-ONSA, highlighted the PF-NAP's six core pillars, including institutionalization, access to justice, and community capacity building.
The PF-NAP was originally developed in 2017 and revised in 2025 to reflect emerging threats.
Yetunde Adegoke, National Coordinator of GCERF Nigeria, emphasized the need to sustain momentum through continuous engagement.
Ndubisi Nwokolo, Partner at Nextier, called for a shift from reactive, force-driven approaches to preventive, non-coercive strategies.
Participants identified constraints such as weak inter-agency coordination, bureaucratic bottlenecks, inadequate funding, and fluctuating political commitment.
Stakeholders called for stronger federal-state alignment, formal institutionalization of Technical Working Groups, and dedicated budgetary provisions by state governments.
The forum underscored the importance of strategic communication and community engagement in countering extremist narratives.
Executive Summary
The Federal Government of Nigeria is shifting its approach to countering violent extremism from national strategies to state-driven and grassroots interventions. A consultative forum in Abuja, convened by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC-ONSA) and partners, emphasized the need to translate the Policy Framework and National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PF-NAP) into localized action. The initiative, supported by organizations like Nextier, the SPRING Programme, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), aims to empower states to tailor responses to their unique security contexts. Technical Working Groups are already operational in several states, particularly in the North-West, to coordinate efforts among government agencies, civil society, and communities. The PF-NAP, revised in 2025, is guided by six pillars, including institutionalization, access to justice, and community capacity building. However, implementation remains uneven due to challenges like weak inter-agency coordination, funding gaps, and fluctuating political commitment. Stakeholders called for stronger federal-state alignment, dedicated budgetary provisions, and sustained political will to ensure success. The forum also highlighted the importance of strategic communication and community engagement in countering extremist narratives.
While progress has been made in establishing state-level structures, participants noted that fragmented responses have allowed extremist groups to exploit regional gaps. The focus now is on consolidating gains through long-term planning and ensuring that preventive, non-coercive strategies address underlying drivers such as governance challenges and social exclusion. The success of this localization drive will depend on sustained funding, political will, and coordinated execution across all tiers of government.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative is that Nigeria is making a principled shift toward decentralized, community-driven counter-extremism strategies, recognizing that top-down approaches have failed to address localized drivers of violence. The emphasis on state-level ownership, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and preventive measures—rather than purely coercive tactics—reflects a mature understanding of the problem. The inclusion of civil society, development actors, and grassroots structures suggests a holistic approach that acknowledges governance gaps, inequality, and social exclusion as root causes. This is a credible evolution in policy, especially given the documented failures of militarized responses in regions like the North-West.
However, the narrative also reveals familiar patterns of institutional fragility. The admission of "uneven implementation," weak coordination, and overdependence on donor funding echoes long-standing challenges in Nigerian governance. The call for "sustained political will" is a tacit acknowledgment that past efforts have faltered due to leadership inconsistencies. The focus on "localization" could also be a double-edged sword: while it empowers states, it risks creating fragmented responses if federal oversight is too weak. The emphasis on "strategic communication" to counter extremist narratives is necessary but raises questions about whether messaging alone can overcome structural grievances.
Root cause: This narrative assumes that decentralization and community engagement are sufficient to counter extremism, but it underplays the role of systemic corruption, elite capture of state resources, and the weaponization of identity politics—factors that often undermine local governance. The historical pattern here is the cyclical nature of Nigerian security reforms: well-intentioned frameworks are launched, donor funding flows, but implementation stalls due to bureaucratic inertia and shifting political priorities.
Implications: If successful, this approach could reduce extremist recruitment by addressing local grievances. However, if states lack capacity or political will, it may create new vulnerabilities, allowing extremist groups to exploit weak governance zones. The second-order consequence is the potential for donor fatigue if progress remains slow, leaving communities more exposed.
Bridge questions: How can Nigeria ensure that state-level coordination committees are insulated from political interference? What metrics will determine whether "localization" is working, beyond just the existence of action plans? And if extremism is rooted in governance failures, why isn’t anti-corruption a more explicit pillar of the PF-NAP?
Counterstrike scan: A bad actor pushing this narrative might exaggerate the effectiveness of "localization" to justify reduced federal accountability, framing it as a panacea while ignoring systemic corruption. They might also weaponize the call for "community engagement" to legitimize ethnic or religious militias under the guise of counter-extremism. However, the actual content does not match this pattern—it acknowledges implementation gaps and calls for measurable impact, suggesting a genuine (if ambitious) reform effort rather than a coordinated influence campaign.
Patterns detected: none