On September 9th, Ukrainian Naval forces successfully launched a raid against the Russian Black Sea Fleet moored in Novorossiysk, utilizing Long Neptune type cruise missiles to strike the Russian Frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov along with a Buyan-M class corvette.
The Ukrainian Navy’s official X account initially announced the strike only on the Admiral Essen, and a day later Exilenova+ published satellite imagery which confirmed the strikes on the Admiral Essen, Admiral Makarov and a Buyan-M type Corvette. The damage appears most severe aboard the Buyan-M, where everything aft of the superstructure including the VLS cell bank, appears to have experienced extensive fire damage alongside severe structural collapse, with debris scattered over the stern.
Both Project 11356R Grigorovich-class frigates sustained moderate to severe damage to their front sections, particularly near both VLS cell banks, and the forward superstructure likely robbing both vessels of any capability to employ both surface to air and surface to surface munitions. Both vessels now appear in visibly worse shape compared to the aftermath of previous drone raids.
Previously, Naval News also reported on strikes in mid August where several vessels including the Admiral Essen and the Admiral Makarov sustained hits from Ukrainian strike drones, with an apparent reshuffle of the arrangement in moorings since then likely in an attempt to complicate targeting. This round of strikes appears to have done significantly more damage to the vessels targeted, likely owing to the heavier and more destructive nature of missiles over previously used strike drones.
Hunting the Black Sea Fleet’s Missile Carriers
As it stands, at least 4/10 of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s surface cruise missile carriers have been put out of action to some extent, with most of those 4 sustaining heavy or moderate damage. This round of strikes proves that Ukrainian built cruise missiles, such as the Long Neptune, can range maritime roughly 400km away from the front lines and that Ukraine possesses the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to make use of these munitions against targets that may move.
This dramatically increases an already dire threat picture for the Black Sea Fleet, adding to a more high-end and increasingly devastating munition set that Ukraine can employ to target sensitive Naval assets, with Neptune available in larger quantities and with less restrictions than donated western munitions such as Storm Shadow.
The overall tally puts only 8 vessels capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles as still active in the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, out of a potential total of 17 ships, with a total of 3 Grigorovich-class frigates, 4 Buyan-M class corvettes, 3 Karakurt-class corvettes, and 7 Kilo/Improved Kilo-class submarines (assuming all 7 improved Kilos can carry Kalibr). 6 of 9 vessels are out of service due to damage, with 2 Grigorovich-class frigates, 1 Karakurt-class corvette, 1 Buyan-M, and 2 Kilo-class submarines crippled. The Grigorovich herself and 2 other Kilos are still gated from re-entering the Black Sea due to the closing of the Bosporus straits.
The Neptune Saga
These strikes are the first known instance of a Long Neptune hitting a ship, with previous usage primarily being against land-based targets in occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Long Neptune is an improved and larger iteration on the original R-360 Neptune anti-ship cruise missile, with both missiles designed and manufactured by Ukraine’s Luch Design Bureau.
In early 2022, 2 missiles of the original Neptune design sunk the Slava-class cruiser, the Moskva, making the former flagship and largest vessel of the Russian Black Sea fleet the first Russian maritime casualty of the full scale invasion. Since, then Luch reengineered and updated Neptune for optimized use against land targets throughout 2023, with The War Zone reporting that the missile received a new guidance package of an improved inertial navigation system and the tandem usage of a GPS based guidance method along with a new terminal seeker.
Luch would proceed to introduce Long Neptune, a variant designed around extending the range of the already existing Neptune variants from roughly 300-360 kilometers out past 500 kilometers. Extended range has been accomplished not only by enlarging the missile, but also the inclusion of “bulges” or additional fuel tanks towards the front of the missile, requiring a noticeably larger transport erector launcher (as seen in the video above). This variant would emerge in service in late 2025, making up the heavier edge of Ukraine’s strike munitions, alongside the extremely large and long ranged FP-5 Flamingo.
Facts Only
* Ukrainian Naval forces conducted a raid against the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk on September 9th.
* Long Neptune cruise missiles were used to strike the frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov and a Buyan-M class corvette.
* Satellite imagery published by Exilenova+ confirmed the strikes.
* The Buyan-M class corvette sustained extensive fire damage and structural collapse aft of the superstructure.
* The Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov sustained damage to their front sections and forward superstructures.
* These vessels had previously been targeted by Ukrainian strike drones in mid-August.
* Long Neptune missiles have a range of approximately 400km from front lines and over 500km total.
* The Long Neptune is an updated version of the R-360 Neptune developed by Luch Design Bureau.
* Eight vessels capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles remain active in the Caspian and Black Seas out of a potential 17.
* Six of nine specific surface vessels are currently out of service due to damage.
* Two Kilo-class submarines are unable to enter the Black Sea due to the closure of the Bosporus straits.
Executive Summary
Ukrainian forces have escalated their maritime strike capabilities, transitioning from drone raids to the use of Long Neptune cruise missiles against the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk. On September 9th, these missiles targeted the Admiral Essen, Admiral Makarov, and a Buyan-M class corvette. The resulting damage is significantly more severe than previous drone attacks, particularly for the Buyan-M, which suffered structural collapse, and the two frigates, which likely lost their ability to deploy surface-to-air and surface-to-surface munitions.
The operational capacity of Russia's Kalibr-capable fleet is severely diminished, with only eight of 17 potential vessels remaining active across the Black and Caspian Seas. This attrition is driven by combat damage and the strategic closure of the Bosporus straits. The deployment of the Long Neptune signifies a shift toward higher-end, domestically produced munitions that offer extended range and fewer usage restrictions than Western-supplied alternatives, increasing the vulnerability of Russian naval assets far from the front lines.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative is that Ukraine has achieved a qualitative leap in asymmetric naval warfare, replacing "nuisance" drone strikes with precision-guided, long-range cruise missiles capable of neutralizing high-value assets. This suggests a maturing domestic defense industry and a sophisticated intelligence network capable of tracking moving targets over hundreds of kilometers.
The narrative relies on a pattern of additive escalation—linking the Moskva sinking to current strikes to create a sense of inevitable Russian naval decline. However, the evidence is primarily based on satellite imagery and official X accounts, which are high-signal but often lack the granular detail of a full damage assessment.
Patterns detected: none
The driving paradigm is one of "strategic attrition." The unstated assumption is that the loss of Kalibr-capable platforms creates a linear reduction in Russian strike capacity, ignoring potential redundancies in land-based launchers or naval repositioning. This echoes the historical pattern of "fleet-in-being" strategies, where the mere existence of a fleet forces an opponent to over-allocate resources, regardless of the fleet's actual combat readiness.
The second-order consequence is the erosion of the "safe zone" for Russian logistics. As domestic munitions like the Long Neptune and FP-5 Flamingo emerge, the geographic buffer for the Black Sea Fleet vanishes. This empowers Ukrainian agency but may provoke more indiscriminate retaliatory strikes on civilian infrastructure.
Bridge Questions:
1. How does the loss of these specific surface vessels impact Russia's actual launch cadence of Kalibr missiles compared to their land-based counterparts?
2. To what extent does the publicized nature of these strikes serve as a psychological operation to demoralize Russian crews?
Counterstrike Scan: A coordinated campaign would emphasize the "irreversibility" of the fleet's collapse to induce a sense of hopelessness in the adversary. While the data is presented as a tally, the tone remains focused on technical capability rather than propaganda. The content is clean.