By Parisa Hafezi
DUBAI, Sept 17 (Reuters) – China has privately asked Tehran to help rein in Yemen’s Houthis after an appeal to Beijing by Saudi Arabia following the Iran-backed group’s military blitz in the past week, according to three Iranian sources familiar with the matter.
Riyadh turned to China for help after the Houthis made rapid advances along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, moves that have left Saudi oil exports and shipping more exposed, the sources said.
China has publicly called for restraint, dialog and the restoration of safe navigation, but its private message went further than the public statements, they said.
Beijing wants Iran to use its influence with the Houthis to help prevent the conflict spreading further across energy routes on which China, the world’s second-largest economy, depends.
The sources, who were briefed on the discussions and spoke on condition of anonymity, did not provide details of how the message was delivered or whether it was conveyed during a visit to China on Wednesday by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.
The sources said Tehran’s response was that stability and peace in the region depend on ending the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Chinese officials did not issue any explicit threats or indicate that Beijing would seek to pressure Tehran economically if it failed to use its influence over the Houthis, the three Iranian sources said.
In response to a Reuters request for comment on this story, the Chinese foreign ministry said: “China does not wish to see regional tensions further spill over into Yemen and the Red Sea. Escalating regional instability is not in the interests of any party.”
“The sovereignty and security of all countries should be respected, and facilities vital to people’s livelihoods must not be targeted. China calls for an end to actions that further complicate the situation and urges resolving issues through dialog and negotiation,” it said.
Iran’s foreign ministry and the Saudi government’s media office did not immediately respond to Reuters requests for comment for this article.
DANGERS OF A WIDER REGIONAL WAR
China has been Iran’s largest trading partner for more than a decade and remains the main buyer of its oil. Chinese purchases accounted for more than 80% of Iran’s seaborne oil exports in 2025, averaging about 1.4 million barrels per day, according to commodities data and analytics firm Kpler.
“Beijing is one of the few capitals that can still press Iran to rein in the Houthis,” said a senior Western diplomat in the region.
The Houthis, who emerged in the 1990s in opposition to Saudi Arabia’s Sunni religious influence in Yemen, are armed, trained and funded by Iran, according to Iranian sources and Western countries, and form part of Tehran’s anti-Western, anti-Israel “Axis of Resistance.”
Any threat by the Houthis to shipping in the Red Sea and through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait risks sharply worsening the global energy crisis since Iran started blocking the Strait of Hormuz and increasing the danger of a wider regional conflict.
With Hormuz already effectively shut, sustained Houthi attacks on vessels or ports in the Red Sea would disrupt the Middle East’s two main oil-export routes simultaneously, opening a new front in both the energy crisis and Iran’s broader confrontation with the United States.
Iran and its allies now exert pressure over both ends of the region’s key maritime network, one of the sources said, adding that “China depends on both.”
Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said Beijing may oppose US pressure on Tehran, but its interests in the Middle East extend well beyond Iran. Roughly half of China’s oil imports come from the region, while trade between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council states totals around $300 billion a year.
“Iran can disrupt Hormuz. But at some point that leverage begins hurting the very power Tehran increasingly depends on,” Vatanka said.
CHINA’S DILEMMA
It is unclear whether Tehran will act on the concerns raised by Beijing, according to the three Iranian sources.
The relationship nevertheless carries significant economic and strategic weight for Iran as it continues to face hostilities with the US, they said.
China is among the few countries with the financial capacity to provide the investment Tehran needs to sustain its oil industry and ease pressure on its economy, battered by war and sanctions.
Beijing has also demonstrated its diplomatic influence. In 2023, China brokered the agreement that restored ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia after years of hostility.
That influence has limits, however. Critics inside Iran have complained about the relatively modest level of Chinese non-oil trade and investment since the two countries signed a 25-year cooperation pact in 2021, particularly compared with China’s growing investment commitments in Gulf Arab states.
China remains a factor Tehran cannot afford to ignore, but two of the Iranian sources said Beijing’s interests were only one consideration among many. Iran’s decisions are shaped by competing strategic, economic and political priorities, they said.
“Tehran and Beijing need each other. China is a factor Tehran cannot ignore, and Beijing wants Hormuz reopened and Red Sea shipping secured,” the Western diplomat said.
Analysts say the key test will be whether China is prepared to attach consequences to its demands. Ultimately, they say, the clearest sign of Beijing’s resolve would be evidence that it is willing to use its leverage over Tehran.
(Additional reporting by Liz Lee in Beijing and Timour Azhari in Riyadh, Writing by Parisa Hafezi, Editing by Angus McDowall and Timothy Heritage)
(c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2026.
Facts Only
Saudi Arabia requested assistance from China regarding Houthi military advances.
Houthi forces have advanced along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
China privately asked Iran to use its influence to rein in the Houthis.
Iran stated regional peace depends on ending the US-Israeli war on Iran.
China's foreign ministry called for restraint and the respect of sovereignty in public statements.
Chinese purchases accounted for over 80% of Iran's seaborne oil exports in 2025.
Iran's seaborne oil exports averaged 1.4 million barrels per day.
China brokered a 2023 agreement restoring ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
China and Gulf Cooperation Council states conduct approximately $300 billion in annual trade.
Iran and China signed a 25-year cooperation pact in 2021.
Executive Summary
Saudi Arabia has requested Chinese intervention to restrain Houthi military advances along the Red Sea coast and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which have increased the vulnerability of Saudi oil exports. In private communications, Beijing has urged Tehran to utilize its influence over the Houthis to prevent further escalation across critical energy routes. Iran has responded by asserting that regional stability is contingent upon the cessation of US-Israeli military actions against Iran.
The situation is complicated by a deep economic interdependence: China is Iran's primary oil buyer and a critical source of investment for Tehran's sanctioned economy. However, China also maintains significant trade ties with Gulf Cooperation Council states and relies on the region for roughly half of its oil imports. While Beijing previously brokered a diplomatic restoration of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, it remains uncertain if China will apply economic pressure on Tehran to achieve its current security objectives.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative presents China as the sole remaining diplomatic bridge capable of preventing a total energy collapse in the Middle East, balancing its role as Iran's economic lifeline against its need for maritime stability.
The narrative relies heavily on anonymous "sources familiar with the matter" to establish the private diplomatic exchange. While this is standard for geopolitical reporting, the central claim—that Beijing is privately pressuring Tehran—rests entirely on these unseen actors without corroborating diplomatic records.
Patterns detected: none
The driving paradigm is "Great Power Mediation," assuming that regional conflicts are primarily managed through the leverage of a global hegemon. This echoes the Cold War era of proxy management, where the interests of superpowers are viewed as the primary stabilizers of local insurgencies. The unstated assumption is that the Houthis are a controllable extension of Tehran, rather than an entity with its own independent agency.
The cost of this dynamic is borne by global energy markets and the populations of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, whose security becomes a bargaining chip in a larger strategic game between Beijing, Tehran, and Washington. If China's leverage is purely economic, the second-order consequence is a heightened risk of "economic blackmail," where Iran may leverage its ability to disrupt Hormuz and the Red Sea to extract further concessions from Beijing.
Bridge Questions:
To what extent do the Houthis operate independently of Tehran's strategic directives?
If China fails to restrain the Houthis, what specific economic tools does it actually possess to pressure Iran without harming its own energy security?
How does the US-Israeli conflict specifically function as a prerequisite for Iranian cooperation in this context?
Counterstrike Scan:
A coordinated influence campaign would use this narrative to portray China as the "rational adult" in the room and the US as the "instigator" of regional chaos. The actual content avoids this by detailing China's own dilemma and Iran's specific grievances, maintaining a neutral reportorial tone.
