Sweden’s election remains on a knife edge after the announcement of preliminary results. Magnus Blomgren writes that while the final outcome may not be clear until 16 September, the Sweden Democrats appear to be one of the main losers.
In many respects, Sweden’s 2026 election campaign has been marked by a striking paradox. On the one hand, it has focused almost entirely on household finances, with parties offering a wide range of pre-election giveaways. All parties have presented an unusually large number of proposals aimed, in different ways, at strengthening household purchasing power. These have generally been reforms with a relatively short-term horizon.
On the other hand, this has been one of Sweden’s most ideologically defined elections for many decades. The question of government formation has been central. On one side stands the Sweden Democrats: a radical right party with a far-reaching reform agenda on migration and cultural issues, and a critical stance towards climate policies.
On the other side stands the Left Party, calling for higher taxes on billionaires, more ambitious climate policy and an expansion of public funded welfare systems. For the first time, both parties have issued an ultimatum that they should be included in government if “their” side wins.
At the same time, the two parties competing for the premiership, the Social Democrats and the Moderates, have sought to remain as close to each other as possible on issues where they do not wish to encourage conflict. The Social Democrats have largely accepted the main lines (and the rhetoric) of a tougher approach to migration and crime. The Moderates, for their part, proposed free preschool for all children, a proposal more commonly associated with the left.
Furthermore, both parties have above all promoted their party leaders as candidates for prime minister. The contest between the incumbent prime minister, Ulf Kristersson of the Moderates, and the opposition leader, Magdalena Andersson of the Social Democrats, has at times taken on almost presidential features. The result has been an unusual election campaign in which the division into two opposing blocs has been reinforced rather than weakened.
Dealing with the Sweden Democrats
Turning first to the right-wing bloc, one key issue has been how to handle the Sweden Democrats. The background is that the outgoing government, composed of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, entered into a far-reaching agreement with the Sweden Democrats that has structured the past four years: the so-called Tidö Agreement.
Although the outgoing government has formally been a minority government, it has de facto rested on a parliamentary majority. The agreement has endured throughout the parliamentary term, and the government has implemented an extensive reform agenda, particularly in areas such as stricter migration and criminal justice policy, as well as reduced ambitions in climate policy.
This type of contract parliamentarism has become increasingly common in Sweden. Ahead of the 2026 election, however, the Sweden Democrats made it clear that they expected to be included in any future right-wing government if their side won.
This demand placed the other parties on the right in a difficult position, especially the Liberals. Having previously been clearly critical of the Sweden Democrats, the party changed course in the spring and came to accept the Sweden Democrats as a potential government partner.
This was widely seen as a decisive strategic choice. The Liberals had been below the four per cent threshold for most of the parliamentary term, and accepting the Sweden Democrats was a way of attracting “tactical votes” from other parties in the right-wing bloc; voters who in principle prefer another party on the right but vote for the Liberals to help them pass the threshold. Without the Liberals, a continued right-wing government would hardly be possible. For a long time, this shift did not seem to help the Liberals, but in the final weeks the opinion polls moved in the party’s favour.
The left-wing bloc
In the left-wing bloc, the Social Democrats have throughout faced a strategic choice between moving to the right and forming a government with the Centre Party or moving to the left and forming a government with the Left Party. The Green Party is expected to be part of such a government in either case.
The Centre Party and the Left Party are, in many respects, fundamentally different. In economic policy, they represent two opposing poles. The Centre Party is probably one of Sweden’s most market-liberal parties in relation to taxation and labour market policy, while the Left Party defends a more traditional left-wing position and a large tax-funded welfare sector.
At the same time, and this is the politically interesting point, the Centre Party and the Left Party are often closer on what political scientists describe as the GAL–TAN dimension, particularly on issues such as migration, the environment and culture. On these issues, they may also find themselves in conflict with the Social Democrats. Depending on the political dimension in question, the two parties are therefore either far apart or relatively close.
The Social Democrats have been under strong pressure, not least internally, to clarify which path they intend to take. They have nevertheless consistently argued that they are keeping all doors open and are prepared to cooperate with everyone except the Sweden Democrats.
Their longer-term strategy has been to exploit tensions among the parties on the right and thereby complicate future cooperation between them. However, this open-door strategy has also made the Social Democrats appear somewhat indistinct during the campaign, and the party has relied above all on the popularity of its leader. This does not seem to have worked as well as they had hoped.
In the later stages of the campaign, the Social Democrats sharpened their tone towards the Left Party. This occurred not least after reports that candidates on the Left Party’s electoral lists had previously written tributes to Hamas on social media or made antisemitic statements. Few voters are likely to regard this as representative of the Left Party’s official policy. Nevertheless, the scandals that broke in the weeks before election day caused the party to lose momentum and gave the Social Democrats an opportunity to define the Left Party as unfit for government.
Winners and losers
At the time of writing, not all votes have yet been counted, and the race between the two blocs remains very close. As things stand, the result is positive for the parties in the outgoing government.
The Moderates are on 19.9 per cent, an increase of 0.8 percentage points compared with the 2022 election. The Liberals’ strategy of attracting tactical votes turned out to be a major success: the party ultimately received 5.4 per cent of the vote and cleared the threshold. The Christian Democrats appear to have run a strong campaign, but in the end finished at 6.2 per cent, an increase of 0.9 percentage points compared with four years ago.
The headache for the outgoing government is the Sweden Democrats, who lost 2.9 percentage points compared with 2022 and ended up on 17.7 per cent. For the party, this is a major disappointment. Having increased its support in every national election since its formation, it now faces a clear break in that trend.
Although the opposition appears to have won this election by a narrow margin, this was not due to a Social Democratic success. The party ended up on 28 per cent, a decline of 2.3 percentage points compared with 2022. Instead, it was the parties on both sides of the Social Democrats that gained support: the Left Party (8.1 per cent), the Green Party (6.1 per cent) and the Centre Party (7.1 per cent).
For a small majority of voters, changing government appears to have been important, but so too was signalling whether the Social Democrats should move to the left or to the right. How Andersson, as the likely government-former, will handle this remains unclear. This uncertainty is a natural consequence of the Social Democrats’ decision not to set out clearly, from the start, the political direction they preferred.
The signals sent towards the Left Party in the later stages of the campaign, together with the Social Democrats’ longer-term ambitions, make it likely that they will first try to form a government with the Centre Party and the Green Party. The Left Party’s demand for cabinet posts will probably be negotiated away in exchange for concessions that give the party some influence over actual policy. This means that contract parliamentarism will remain the most likely strategy for dealing with Sweden’s divided party system in the future.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: Krister Hagglof / Shutterstock.com.
Facts Only
* Preliminary results are pending until September 16.
* The Sweden Democrats appear to be one of the main losers.
* The campaign focused almost entirely on household finances through pre-election giveaways.
* Both the Sweden Democrats and the Left Party issued ultimatums to be included in government if their side wins.
* The Social Democrats largely accepted tougher approaches to migration and crime.
* The Moderates proposed free preschool for all children, a proposal more commonly associated with the left.
* The contest between the incumbent Prime Minister and the opposition leader took on almost presidential features.
* The Moderates received 19.9 per cent of the vote, an increase of 0.8 percentage points from 2022.
* The Liberals received 5.4 per cent of the vote.
* The Christian Democrats received 6.2 per cent of the vote.
* The opposition party received 28 per cent of the vote.
* The Left Party received 8.1 per cent of the vote.
* The Green Party received 6.1 per cent of the vote.
* The Centre Party received 7.1 per cent of the vote.
Executive Summary
The preliminary results for the 2026 Swedish election leave the outcome uncertain, with the Sweden Democrats appearing to be among the main losers. The campaign featured a paradox: focusing heavily on household finance reforms while maintaining deep ideological divisions, particularly regarding migration and climate policy. This ideological split manifested in an ultimatum from both the right and left blocs to be included in government if their respective sides won. The Social Democrats and Moderates sought moderate positions, with the Social Democrats accepting tougher stances on migration, while the Moderates proposed proposals more aligned with the left, such as free preschool. The contest between the incumbent Prime Minister and the opposition leader reinforced a division between opposing blocs.
The political landscape is shaped by prior agreements, such as the Tidö Agreement, which structured recent government policies concerning migration and climate. The right-wing bloc saw strategic shifts, with the Liberals accepting the Sweden Democrats as a potential partner to secure tactical votes. In the left-wing bloc, the Social Democrats navigated between various options regarding coalition partners, with tensions existing between the Centre Party and the Left Party on economic issues, though they shared some alignment on migration and environment. The final vote tally showed gains for parties outside the Social Democratic camp, specifically the Left Party, Green Party, and Centre Party.
Full Take
The analysis reveals a system characterized by contract parliamentarism and deep, often contradictory, ideological alignment across party lines. The paradoxical campaign highlights how economic focus can mask profound identity politics; parties negotiated policy not just on concrete issues but on fundamental stances regarding migration, climate, and the welfare state structure. The shift in strategy among parties—the Liberals accepting the Sweden Democrats, the Social Democrats sharpening their tone towards the Left Party, and the Centre/Left parties finding relative common ground on GAL–TAN dimensions despite economic differences—suggests that strategic cooperation is being prioritized over pure ideological fidelity.
The primary dynamic centers on the Social Democrats' position: by keeping doors open, they aim to exploit tensions among other blocs while positioning themselves as flexible mediators, yet their internal shifts suggest a move towards coalition possibilities with the Centre and Green parties. The result suggests that the potential for stable right-wing governance is diminished without external partners, reinforcing the necessity of contract parliamentarism. The uncertainty surrounding leadership direction remains crucial because future cooperation will depend entirely on whether the leadership chooses to exploit existing tensions or forge new alignments.
What assumptions underpin the narrative of successful coalition building versus ideological rigidity? If the strategy of exploiting right-wing tensions proves effective in the long run, it suggests a persistent pattern where tactical flexibility supersedes stated policy goals. Furthermore, how does the tension between market liberalism (Centre Party) and social democratic welfare principles interact when they are forced into common policy spaces like environmentalism? What unseen costs are borne by voters when policy is framed through an ideological lens that simultaneously demands both stringent outcomes and flexible partnerships?
Sentinel — Human
The text exhibits the depth, strategic framing, and subtle focus characteristic of expert journalistic analysis rather than purely synthetic generation.