The first question to consider when thinking about a major defence program such as AUKUS is this: defence against whom?
Australian governments have given two different answers to this question over the years.
Prime minister Bob Hawke’s government said in 1987 that Australia would have a ten-year warning window within which to prepare against an emerging regional threat.
It did not mean the Soviet Union. Rather, it was concerned about the remote threat of the re-emergence of an aggressive Indonesia, something that had concerned Australia in the 1960s and 1970s.
By contrast, the government of Kevin Rudd said in 2009 that Australia would need to significantly build up its military capability by 2030 as a hedge against the prospect of major war where Australia might have to defend itself for a time with minimal combat assistance from the United States, which would likely be stretched and not able to spare much for the defence of Australia.
In defending against a regional military power (say, an aggressive Indonesia that was led by an authoritarian and nationalistic former general), we would almost certainly be fighting on our own.
Australia would favour fighting an offensive campaign, without having to call on the combat forces of the United States or anyone else. The objective of the campaign would be to rapidly destroy as much of the enemy’s fighting power as possible, with a view to dictating the terms of war termination and, hopefully, peace.
In a major war where the US and its allies would be fighting China, and possibly Russia and North Korea, along a long arc that stretched from Alaska all the way around the landmass of Eurasia to the western Indian Ocean, we would be, at a grand level, not on our own. However, our allies would find it hard at the outset to send us meaningful help.
Australia would be a vital southern front for the US, as a sanctuary and as a base from which to launch strikes. That is why Washington is so keen on establishing operating locations for its forces across Australia.
Australia would have to fight a defensive campaign until allied help arrived, until the United States prevailed to the point where it could dictate terms or until conflict was contained in an uneasy truce that arrested a slide into the nuclear abyss of planetary destruction.
Whether Australia was facing a regional military power on its own or a major power as part of a US-led alliance, dominance in undersea warfare would be critical in order to deny the sea to the enemy’s naval forces, to hunt and kill its submarines and sink its commercial shipping, to collect intelligence and for other missions, such as seabed warfare.
Had it been seen through, the Rudd government’s 2009 submarine plan would have served us well in both war scenarios. By the mid-2020s, Australia would have had six refurbished Collins-class submarines, six new Super Collins-class submarines (with six more on order) and an emerging fleet of uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs). Consideration could have been given in the 2014–19 Defence planning cycle to the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs).
But this path was not taken. Under later governments, a decade was lost.
The AUKUS program puts us back on track.
Acquiring submarines of the US Virginia class and then the Anglo-Australian SSN-AUKUS class – or if the latter fails, joining the USN SSN-X program – will give us a pathway to undersea warfare dominance. The initial acquisition of three Virginia class Block IV submarines from 2032 to 2038 will be our entry ticket.
More crucially, by integrating our submarine industrial and technology base with those of the United States and Britain, we will forge an exclusive club of undersea dominance.
Undersea warfare will increasingly resemble the world of the novel Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea. Large and fast SSN that can deploy UUVs and other autonomous systems will dominate under the sea. They will remain on station for much longer than conventional submarines and be able to conduct a variety of different missions, using an increasingly diverse array of droid and drone undersea systems, that even Jules Verne hardly could have imagined.
None of this is to say that the rest of the Australian Defence Force should be starved of resources. On the contrary, whether we were fighting on our own or holding out against a major power until allies arrived in force, we would need a surface navy, an army and an air force that can fight decisively in their domains.
To be sure, the program and industrial challenges of AUKUS are enormous. That is why the government pays its Defence leaders their million-dollar salaries.
Enough time has been lost. It is now time to ruthlessly hold people to account so that we can become an undersea superpower.
This article is based on the author’s opening statement to the AUKUS Public Inquiry on 2 September 2026. It was first published by News24 and has been lightly edited for The Strategist.
Facts Only
* Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s government stated in 1987 Australia would have a ten-year warning window to prepare against an emerging regional threat.
* The concern in 1987 related to the re-emergence of an aggressive Indonesia, not the Soviet Union.
* The government of Kevin Rudd said in 2009 Australia needed to build up military capability by 2030 as a hedge against major war with minimal U.S. combat assistance.
* Fighting a regional military power was assessed to likely require fighting on own terms without calling on U.S. combat forces.
* In a major war involving the US and allies, Australia would be viewed as a vital southern front for the US.
* Undersea warfare dominance is critical in both scenarios to deny sea access, hunt submarines, and collect intelligence.
* The Rudd government’s 2009 submarine plan was considered useful in both regional and major power war scenarios.
* The AUKUS program involves acquiring US Virginia-class submarines and Anglo-Australian SSN-AUKUS class submarines, or joining the USN SSN-X program.
* This integration aims to forge a club of undersea dominance by merging industrial and technological bases with the US and Britain.
* The program involves acquiring three Virginia-class Block IV submarines from 2032 to 2038 as an initial step.
Executive Summary
The initial consideration for a major defense program like AUKUS is defining the adversary. Historically, Australian governments have held differing views on the necessary scope of military preparedness. Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s government suggested a ten-year warning window for preparing against an emerging regional threat, which was interpreted as concern over potential aggression from Indonesia rather than the Soviet Union. Conversely, the government of Kevin Rudd argued that by 2030, Australia needed significantly enhanced military capability to hedge against major wars where U.S. combat assistance might be limited.
The reasoning for differing approaches relates to anticipated conflict scenarios. Fighting a regional military power, such as an aggressive Indonesia, was viewed as likely requiring Australian forces to fight on their own, favoring offensive campaigns. In contrast, facing a major power alliance conflict involving the US and its allies against powers like China or Russia might position Australia as a southern front relying on allied support. A critical aspect across both scenarios is dominance in undersea warfare, which is deemed vital for denying sea access, hunting submarines, and intelligence gathering.
The Rudd government’s 2009 submarine plan was considered suitable for both regional and major power conflict scenarios. The AUKUS program aims to leverage this realization by integrating Australian industrial capabilities with those of the United States and Britain to establish undersea dominance through the acquisition of specific submarine classes and the development of autonomous underwater systems.
Full Take
The narrative establishes a tension between two historical approaches to defense planning: preparing for localized regional threats versus hedging against massive, multi-polar global conflicts. The analysis pivots on the realization that undersea dominance is a non-negotiable requirement regardless of the specific threat context—whether fighting an independent regional power or operating within a broader U.S.-led alliance structure.
The trajectory highlights a gap between strategic foresight (the submarine plan) and implementation (the delay in acquiring nuclear submarines). This suggests a pattern where long-term, high-impact strategic planning is often stalled by institutional inertia, leading to missed opportunities for achieving necessary capability. The push for AUKUS attempts to correct this timeline loss by forcing an industrial integration that creates an exclusive domain of undersea dominance.
The implication for agency lies in recognizing how geopolitical framing dictates security priorities and resource allocation. When external powers frame conflict, the resulting defense strategy is constrained. The necessity of forging an "exclusive club" implies a shift from multilateral dependency to self-sufficient strategic positioning. The central question for future analysis is whether the mechanism of industrial integration can overcome the inherent friction of alliance politics when competing for critical technological dominance in a contested environment. What systems ensure that capability acquisition translates into genuine sovereignty rather than merely reinforcing existing geopolitical alignments?
Sentinel — Human
The text presents a sophisticated analysis framed around historical defense philosophy and the strategic implications of the AUKUS program, exhibiting the characteristics of human policy writing rather than pure machine generation.