Mexico and the United States recently agreed to deepen security cooperation around counter-drone technology, as governments across Latin America race to adapt to how criminal organizations are transforming the inexpensive commercial technology into increasingly sophisticated tools for surveillance, territorial control, and violence.
Drones now play a significant role in Colombia’s armed conflict, Brazil’s urban turf wars, and Mexico’s fragmented criminal landscape, and government responses are struggling to keep up with the criminal adaptation of cheap, commercially available drone technology.
The challenge is not simply that criminal organizations have acquired drones, but that they have acquired the ability to modify the technology: commercial quadcopters and First-Person View (FPV) drones designed for consumer markets are now routinely fitted with hand grenades, explosives, or surveillance cameras, having been purchased for relatively modest sums—costing as little as US$600–1,200 in Colombia and Mexico.
The rapid transfer of technical knowledge within and between criminal groups means drone capabilities are evolving faster than governments can contain them
Colombia’s Anti-Drone Squad
The scale of Colombia’s drone problem has grown sharply, with the number of Colombian municipalities affected by drone attacks up from 12 to 41 between 2024 and 2025, while the number of illegal drone attacks increased from 38 to 149 over the same period, according to ACLED. In response, the government is developing a projected $1.68 billion anti-drone shield—the Escudo Nacional Antidrones. The multi-phase program is designed to detect and intercept hostile unmanned aircraft by training security personnel and creating a specialized military unit within the Colombian army.
The plan, announced on January 16, 2026, is currently in its initial implementation phase, with authorities reporting early successes in drone seizures as well as targeted operations against specialized operators called “explosivistas especializados en drones,” recruited by criminal groups for their expertise in commercial drone technology and weapons modification.
Disrupting supply chains is another measure the Colombian government is using. Legislation has placed emphasis on restricting the importation of devices at specific chokepoints, namely, ports under the jurisdiction of the Cartagena Regional Customs Directorate and Bogotá’s El Dorado International Airport. The restriction of drone imports via postal services and express deliveries aims to further tighten controls, but legislative gaps persist.
In Colombia’s Catatumbo region, National Liberation Army ((Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) guerrilla units are reportedly furnishing drones with thermal imaging sensor technology to enhance surveillance capacities around the clock. Coordinated “swarm attacks” and drones hovering over communities serve as weapons of psychological intimidation to control territory and undermine public confidence in state security forces.
Colombia’s approach suggests the government of President Aberlardo de la Espriella is treating criminal drone capabilities as a permanent dynamic of the complex criminal landscape rather than an emerging or temporary threat, and criminal groups are already finding get-arounds. The government has highlighted the development of fiber-optic drone technology used by criminal groups to evade electronic jamming by current national anti-drone capabilities.
Drones as Intelligence Tools in Brazil’s Favelas
Brazilian authorities are increasingly countering drone use in urban areas contested by criminal groups, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, by relying on localized responses.
Rio’s Civil Police have launched the Coordenadoria de Operações com Aeronaves Não Tripuladas (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations Coordination Unit – COANT), incorporating drones into police intelligence and operations for mapping and real-time operational monitoring.
São Paulo’s police have prioritized intelligence-led monitoring operations, even experimenting with targeted strikes against drones using drone guns.
SEE ALSO: Criminal Groups Are Ramping Up Explosives in Mexico
These efforts aspire to hinder powerful gangs like the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital—PCC) and Red Command (Comando Vermelho—CV), who are reportedly using drones to monitor favelas, enabling them to track law enforcement movements, identify rival positions, and coordinate attacks while reducing the risks associated with conventional, personnel-intensive reconnaissance.
The Red Command and Pure Third Command (Terceiro Comando Puro—TCP) were reported to be using adapted drones to launch grenades and explosives against one another earlier this year in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. The CV is also in dispute with militia members: in July, a CV drone detonated an bomb in Curicica, according to federal prosecutors, where the faction was seeking to expand its territorial presence.
Brazil’s approach seeks to reverse the intelligence advantage that drones have given criminal groups. But intelligence-led initiatives such as strikes and the seizure of criminal group drones cannot eliminate their drone operations completely. The low-cost commercial hardware allows criminal syndicates to swiftly replace seized equipment, while maintaining territorial dominance.
Mexico Targets Drone Experts
In Mexico, both federal and state governments are introducing harsher penalties to prosecute specialist drone operators, manufacturers, technical facilitators, and suppliers, alongside other measures.
Mexico strengthened federal penalties in 2024 for criminal drone use, introducing prison terms of 10 to 20 years for attacks using drones to deliver explosives or weapons, and 5 to 10 years for manufacturing, acquiring, or adapting drones to transport prohibited materials. Sentencing could run to 40 years if applicable penalties are combined.
In the State of Mexico, lawmakers are considering a proposal that would impose up to 18 years in prison for using drones to surveil victims or gather information to facilitate crimes such as robbery, livestock theft, and dispossession.
Measures aim to target experienced drone operators, or “droneros,” who are valuable assets for Mexican criminal groups that rely on sophisticated weaponry to maintain control of territory and drug routes, as well as engineers and bomb-makers capable of rebuilding lost capabilities using commercially available equipment.
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG) has repeatedly demonstrated sophisticated drone capabilities in Michoacán and Jalisco, including attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against rival groups, security forces, and civilian populations to secure territories and access to trafficking routes for a number of years. The group’s technical expertise has also transferred to its allies—the Familia Michoacana, according to reports. Meanwhile, smaller organizations such as the Carteles Unidos coalition have also adopted similar tactics after acquiring experienced operators, illustrating how drone expertise has diffused well beyond Mexico’s largest criminal organizations.
The effectiveness of Mexico’s approach will depend on whether authorities can build the intelligence, forensic, and prosecutorial capabilities needed to identify these specialized technician operators and networks.
Facts Only
* Mexico and the United States agreed to deepen security cooperation around counter-drone technology.
* Criminal organizations are transforming commercial drone technology into tools for surveillance, territorial control, and violence across Latin America.
* Drones are used in Colombia’s armed conflict, Brazil’s urban turf wars, and Mexico’s criminal landscape.
* Commercial drones are modified with explosives or surveillance cameras, costing as little as US$600–1,200 in Colombia and Mexico.
* Technical knowledge transfer among criminal groups allows drone capabilities to evolve faster than government containment.
* Colombia is developing a $1.68 billion anti-drone shield program (Escudo Nacional Antidrones) involving training and a specialized military unit.
* Colombian authorities are restricting drone imports at specific chokepoints like ports and airports.
* In Colombia’s Catatumbo region, ELN units reportedly furnish drones with thermal imaging technology for surveillance.
* Brazil’s police in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo use drones for intelligence monitoring and operational assessment.
* Criminal groups such as the PCC and CV are reported to use adapted drones to launch explosives in Rio de Janeiro favelas.
* Mexico strengthened federal penalties in 2024 for criminal drone use, introducing prison terms up to 20 years for drone attacks using explosives or weapons.
Executive Summary
Security cooperation between Mexico and the United States is deepening regarding counter-drone technology due to criminal organizations adapting inexpensive commercial drones for surveillance, territorial control, and violence across Latin America. This adaptation is occurring because criminal groups can modify readily available consumer drones, often costing as little as US$600–1,200, by adding weapons or cameras. The rapid transfer of technical knowledge between criminal groups accelerates the evolution of drone capabilities beyond government containment efforts.
In Colombia, the government is developing an anti-drone shield and a specialized military unit to counter drone threats, while simultaneously attempting to disrupt supply chains by restricting drone imports at key customs points. Criminal groups, such as ELN guerrilla units in the Catatumbo region, utilize thermal imaging technology and drone swarm attacks for territorial control and psychological intimidation.
Brazil’s approach involves localized responses, with police forces in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo deploying drones for intelligence gathering and operational monitoring. These efforts aim to counter criminal groups like the PCC and CV, which have reportedly used drones to track law enforcement and coordinate attacks within favelas, although the low-cost hardware allows syndicates to quickly replace seized equipment.
Mexico is implementing harsher penalties targeting specialists, manufacturers, and suppliers of drone technology and related materials. This response targets those who possess the expertise to exploit commercial technology for criminal objectives, recognizing that groups like the CJNG have demonstrated sophisticated use of drones in securing territory and routes.
Full Take
The narrative demonstrates a critical decoupling between technological capability and regulatory response across the region. The central dynamic is the exponential advantage gained when low-cost commercial technology intersects with established criminal networks capable of technical appropriation. This suggests that conventional security responses focused solely on physical interdiction or large-scale hardware seizures are inherently reactive, failing to account for the fluid nature of digital exploitation.
The differing regional strategies—Colombia's centralized military response and supply chain disruption versus Brazil’s localized policing intelligence models—highlight a gap in integrated transnational security planning. The pattern observed is that criminal adaptation acts as an accelerant, forcing states into reactive measures rather than proactive systemic controls over the technology's lifecycle. Furthermore, the focus on prosecuting drone operators and manufacturers in Mexico suggests an understanding that capability resides not just with end-users but within the specialized technical facilitators who bridge the gap between commercial tech and illicit application.
The implication for human agency is that control is shifting from state monopolies on force to decentralized knowledge economies accessible to organized illicit actors. The effectiveness of imposing penalties depends entirely on establishing forensic and intelligence infrastructure capable of tracking diffuse networks rather than just individual operatives. This raises the question: if criminal groups can rapidly iterate modifications using commercially available hardware, does focusing solely on detection and punitive action neglect the structural shift where technological expertise becomes a primary asset for territorial control? What mechanisms exist to ensure that legal frameworks evolve at a pace commensurate with the rapid, decentralized technical evolution exploited by non-state actors?