Rebel Defends the Government: Sudan’s Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambour
Rebel Defends the Government: Sudan’s Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambour
Executive Summary:
- Rebel leader Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambour has shifted from fighting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to allying with them, after the Rapid Support Force’s (RSF) brutal attacks against the Darfur’s non-Arab communities.
- Tambour relocated his forces to eastern Sudan following the shift, sparking internal group friction, troop defections, and rising tensions with local host communities unaccustomed to their armed presence.
- Tambour strongly rejects the RSF’s rival government and resists their demographic changes in Darfur; however, he struggles to convince his followers to support a state historically hostile to non-Arabs.
Sudan’s civil war began in April 2023 amid power struggles between two arms of the Sudanese military—the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, 2023). The latter is a paramilitary unit formed in 2013 to integrate Arab fighters of Darfur’s notorious Janjaweed movement into official government security formations. The Janjaweed gained infamy for their role in the Darfur conflict. After Zaghawa and Masalit fighters were unleashed by the SAF in 2003 as a response to an insurgency in Darfur led by Fur, the Arab Janjaweed were responsible for as many as 400,000 deaths and the displacement of millions from 2003 until 2013. Their integration into the RSF aimed to defuse these tensions and rebuild Sudan’s fractured state.
The extreme violence inflicted by the Janjaweed militias on the non-Arab peoples of Darfur left a deep impression on Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambour and many others who now reject the RSF as the successor to the Janjaweed (on the formation of the RSF, see Terrorism Monitor, May 30, 2014; AIS Special Report, October 15, 2017). The RSF’s looting, ethnic cleansing, and massacres of non-Arabs in al-Geneina and al-Fashir have reinforced the view that the group is an illegitimate contender for power in Sudan (see Terrorism Monitor, January 15). Though Tambour spent many years at war with the SAF, he at least regards the SAF and the ruling military/civilian Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) as legitimate national entities that remain preferable to the brutality and often senseless destruction that characterize the RSF. Despite this, Tambour remains dedicated to federalism and greater power-sharing between Sudan’s non-Arab minority and the northern riverain Arab tribes that have dominated political life in Sudan since independence in 1956.
Early Life, Field Commander, and Spokesman
Tambour was born on July 24, 1982, in Zalingei, Central Darfur. He is a member of the Fur ethnic group, whose royal Kayra clan was the last of the three dynasties (Daju, Tunjur, Fur) to rule Darfur before the independent sultanate was defeated and absorbed into the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan in 1916. Tambour studied law at Khartoum’s Neelain University—despite Fur students often encountering discrimination in Arab-dominated Khartoum—and graduated in 2007. Tambour’s pursuit of a career in law would be interrupted, however, by a growing military struggle in Darfur.
By 2007, Tambour’s homeland was engaged in a bitter struggle with the SAF and Janjaweed armed groups. The Janjaweed committed numerous atrocities against civilians, but rarely engaged with the well-armed and highly mobile non-Arab rebel movements in Darfur. Tambour then began serving as a field commander for the Fur/Zaghawa faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement led by ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) in the mountainous Jabal Marra region of Darfur. After participating in numerous operations against the SAF and its allies, Tambour became the movement’s military spokesman.
Tambour and two companions were arrested by government forces near al-Daein (East Darfur) on December 11, 2015. The SLM–AW urged that the three detainees be treated as prisoners of war, noting that Tambour suffered from kidney disease (Sudan Tribune; Radio Dabanga, December 14, 2015). Tambour was eventually released in June 2017, but remained a target for his enemies (Sudan Tribune, April 4, 2021). For example, a group of seven gunmen led by an RSF lieutenant attempted to assassinate Tambour near Zalingei on September 2, 2017. The attempt failed, but Tambour’s mother, brother, and sister were wounded (Sudaress.com, September 3, 2027).
SLM/A-Tambour and the Juba Peace Agreement
Tambour split from the SLM-AW in 2018, before founding his own faction, SLM-Tambour. He reportedly had differences with ‘Abd al-Wahid concerning the latter’s conduct and growing intransigence regarding negotiations and cooperation with other movements, such as Minni Minawi’s SLM-MM and Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). A more pragmatic approach enabled Tambour’s new movement to participate in the Joint Peace Agreement (JPA) and to eventually integrate into the SAF. In contrast, ‘Abd al-Wahid created a personal fiefdom in Jabal Marra, the Fur ancestral homeland, but directed operations from cafés in Paris and Nairobi.
SLM-Tambour signed onto the JPA—along with several other non-Arab rebel movements—with the Sudanese government on March 25, 2021. The agreement was made possible by the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir, a militaristic Islamist whose authoritarian regime ruled Sudan for three decades, and promises by civil and military leaders of a new and more democratic power structure less dominated by the three powerful Arab tribes of North Sudan: the Danagla, the Sha’iqiya, and the Ja’alin. The JPA signing ceremony was overseen by RSF commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” a former member of the Janjaweed who hails from the Mahariya branch of the Northern Rizayqat Arabs of Darfur (see Militant Leadership Monitor, February 7, 2019). The JPA included provisions for the appointment of former rebel leaders to administrative posts, and Tambour became governor of Central Darfur State, created in 2012 from regions of West and South Darfur. Tambour arrived in Khartoum on April 23, where he pledged to support the “democratic transformation and building of Sudan” (Sudan Tribune, April 4, 2021).
The SAF and RSF’s insistence on retaining a leading political role in Sudan after the 2021 revolution angered many Sudanese who demanded a transition to civilian rule and even a dissolution of the JPA. Tambour cited the military’s constitutional right to participate in government, however, warning:
“The demands of some to cancel the Juba Peace Agreement mean a return to square one, which means war. They don’t understand the meaning of war, which leads to killing, displacement, homelessness, and destruction in every sense of the word” (Elhayatnews.com, July 14, 2022).
Rapprochement with Israel and War with RSF
Tambour met with a visiting Israeli delegation on February 3, 2023, not long before the outbreak of the war. Tambour was no doubt chosen for this task as a non-Arab whose views could, if necessary, be said not to represent those of the government, unlike remarks by a foreign ministry official. Nonetheless, the meeting appeared to have gone well as part of the gradual Sudanese–Israeli rapprochement that existed before the start of Sudan’s civil war and Israel’s later offensive on Gaza. According to Tambour, who described Israel as a sister to his country: “This visit has significant implications, especially since Israel is considered one of the important countries with which a strategic relationship based on mutual interests must be established” (Al-Zuhair, February 3, 2023).
SLM-Tambour did not align itself with either side when the civil war started on April 15, 2023. Despite this, Tambour’s Khartoum home was raided and looted by seven armed men three weeks later, on May 8. Although they were dressed in civilian clothes, the gunmen were believed to be associated with the RSF (Alzaheera.com, May 12, 2023). On July 31, 2023, Tambour’s movement was the first Darfur rebel militia to align itself with its former SAF enemy against the perceived greater threat posed by the RSF. SLM-Tambour conducted patrols alongside the SAF around al-Fashir and was involved in heavy fighting in the last two weeks of July 2023 during the RSF siege of Zalingei, with reports of heavy losses (Sudan Tribune, August 1, 2023). Tambour, however, suffered a personal loss on July 17 when one of his brothers, Muttawakil, was assassinated on the road between Nyala and Zalingei (Altaghyeer, July 18, 2023; Sudan Tribune, August 1, 2023).
Initially, the rest of the Darfur rebel movements declared neutrality in the conflict, while agreeing to form a joint force responsible for security in Darfur. By November 16, however, Tambour was joined by Minni Minawi’s SLM-MM and Jibril Ibrahim’s JEM, who announced that they had abandoned neutrality in the conflict due to the RSF’s repeated attacks on civilians and public property (for Minawi, see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 12, 2017; Sudan Tribune, November 30, 2023).
Relocation to East Sudan
Most members of the Darfur militias that sided with the SAF were sent to eastern Sudan for training after Khartoum fell to the RSF (see Terrorism Monitor, December 15, 2023). Isolated clashes erupted between SLM-Tambour and the Zaghawa SLM-MM in al-Qadarif State (eastern Sudan) in January 2024 after Minawi’s forces were sent to Rabwa camp, already occupied by Tambour’s men. Local authorities expelled Minawi’s fighters, though the presence of both armed groups was unpopular in al-Qadarif, which was considered a safe zone outside the normal range of fighting in the conflict (Radio Dabanga, January 31, 2024).
Tambour’s decision to transfer his troops from Darfur to eastern Sudan was not universally popular in the ranks and may have contributed to incidents of indiscipline that followed. A faction of the SLM-Tambour under Colonel Ahmad Harun “Khomeini” defected to the RSF in June, 2024, claiming that Tambour had allied the movement with the Islamist factions operating alongside the SAF without consulting the movement’s base and leadership (Radio Tamazuj, June 10, 2024). The defection was followed by a purge of potentially disloyal members of Tambour’s movement.
In July 2024, most residents of the village of Abu Rakham fled their homes, complaining of raids by members of SLM-Tambour and SLM-MM that terrorized villagers. Tambour called the allegations “entirely false and baseless.” He insisted that his movement had no presence in Abu Rakham, where Darfuri fighters were assigned to protect the Abu Rakham bridge and reservoir (Radio Dabanga, July 5, 2024).
Alignment with SAF
Alignment with the SAF brought Tambour’s movement into conflict with the SLM-Transitional Council and the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF). Both groups are Darfur rebel movements that sided with the RSF. Militia leaders Al-Hadi Idris (SLM-Transitional Council) and Al-Tahir Hajar (GSLF) both held positions on the Transitional Sovereignty Council (a result of the JPA), but were dismissed after refusing to support the SAF’s military coalition. After the two movements announced plans in April 2024 to form their own joint force, Tambour announced that his forces would join the SAF in combating “rebels and supporting groups,” in a reference to the two movements (Sudan Tribune, April 7, 2024).
SLM-Tambour fighters regularly conducted operations on the frontline against the RSF. In July 2024, they joined other rebel groups in refusing to endorse the final communiqué of the 2024 Cairo peace conference, arguing that it failed to denounce the RSF’s actions specifically. Tambour was especially vehement, condemning the presence of United Arab Emirates (long suspected of support for the RSF) and “Janjaweed” representatives at the conference, demanding “those who support the army to boycott [the conference] and return immediately to Port Sudan [the temporary capital] out of respect for themselves and the victims” (Sudans Post, July 7, 2024).
By November 2024, three former rebel Darfur militias were receiving training in Port Sudan, including Tambour’s movement, the SLM-MM, and Jibril Ibrahim’s JEM (see Terrorism Monitor, May 15, 2008). All were signatories of the JPA. Their presence, however, was not welcome by many members of the Beja, the non-Arab ethnic group that dominates the eastern region. The Free Beja Youth Movement demanded the expulsion of these groups, citing their damage to the local “social fabric” and their contribution to rising tribal tensions (Asharq al-Awsat, November 6, 2024).
The RSF Declares a New State
Seeking international recognition, the RSF created the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis) government in July 2025 (see Terrorism Monitor, November 20, 2025). Based in Nyala, capital of southern Darfur, the government claims to represent all Sudanese peoples and rejects the SAF/Transitional Sovereignty Council government in Khartoum. Tambour denounced the creation of this rival administration, describing it as a “fake advocate of neutrality” and a cover for the RSF, which, despite evidence to the contrary, he insisted was “nearing the end” (Radio Dabanga, July 28, 2025).
The RSF reminded Tambour that they were still active in September 2025. At that time, Tambour was targeted by RSF suicide drones at al-‘Ubayd shortly after his group had helped retake the strategic town of Bara in Kordofan. The attack, involving 15 drones, was intercepted by elements of the SAF and was characterized by Tambour’s movement as yet another attempt to assassinate their leader (Sudan Tribune, September 13, 2025).
Conclusion
Tambour has shifted the focus of his movement from an ethnically based self-defense militia with the ultimate goal of independence to a state-preservationist partner in a coalition led by his former enemies in the Sudanese military. Though the shift was motivated as a response to the greater threat to Darfur’s non-Arab communities posed by the RSF, the move has bewildered many of Tambour’s followers. They cannot forget that the Arab-supremacist RSF was SAF’s own creation.
Many of Tambour’s fighters now find themselves locked out of their homeland as the RSF consolidates its control of Darfur after the seizure of al-Fashir last October. Tambour has cited the historical example of Darfur’s unity (presumably under the old Fur sultanate), insisting that efforts to change the region’s demography to an Arab majority would ultimately fail (Zool.net, April 23, 2024). For now, however, such unity grows ever more distant as Tambour struggles to persuade his fighters to preserve a state that has a long record of efforts to eliminate the non-Arab presence in Darfur.