Georgia Weighs Diplomatic Cost of Mourning Khamenei
Executive Summary:
- Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili traveled to Tehran on July 3 to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
- The visit has divided Georgia’s political class, with critics arguing that the delegation’s rank and the attendance itself turned a condolence gesture into a political statement against Georgia’s Western partners.
- Supporters frame the trip as balanced diplomacy toward a neighboring power under explicit Iranian pressure, while opponents warn that deepening ties with Tehran risks isolation, the expansion of sanctions-evasion channels, and lasting damage to Georgia’s international reputation and constitutionally mandated Euro-Atlantic course.
On July 3, a Georgian state delegation headed by President Mikheil Kavelashvili arrived in Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On the same day, Kavelashvili met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and both sides expressed their commitment to expanding bilateral ties in trade, culture, and science. Kavelashvili noted in a statement that during his meeting with Pezeshkian he “once again extended condolences over the tragic events that took place in Iran and paid respect to the memory of the deceased” (Facebook/MikheilKavelashvili, July 3). Kavelashvili also thanked Pezeshkian for supporting Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Interpressnews; Sovanews, July 3).
Kavelashvili’s participation in the mourning ceremonies has sparked heated debate in Georgia. Politicians and experts are divided over the appropriateness of the visit at a time when the United States and Israel have not yet concluded a final peace agreement with Tehran. Georgia, according to its constitution, considers itself part of the Euro-Atlantic community, aspires to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and retains its status as a candidate for EU membership (Matsne, August 24, 1995).
Opposition parties, including former President Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM), Lelo, Akhali, and others, accused the ruling Georgian Dream party of aligning Georgia with an anti-Western regime hostile to the United States (Democracy & Freedom Watch, July 4). Tengiz Sharmanashvili, a member of parliament and one of Georgian Dream’s most influential voices, stated that delegations from all countries of the region, including Armenia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, had visited Tehran in recent days, asking opponents whether those countries are “enemies of the United States and Israel” (Interpressnews, July 3).
Valeri Chechelashvili, co-founder of the political party Georgia First!, director of geopolitical studies at the Georgian Strategic Analysis Center, and former ambassador to Ukraine, argues that high-level attendance at the funeral was a mistake. He asserted that if Georgia had to be represented at all, a deputy foreign minister would have sufficed (Interpressnews, July 6). Tbilisi, however, did have a precedent to point to. In May 2024, after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze traveled to Iran for the funeral ceremony (JAMnews, May 5, 2024). Chechelashvili contends that the precedent no longer applies. Raisi’s death was a tragic accident, whereas Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the airstrikes of the United States and Israel, raising the stakes of any high-level Georgian presence in Tehran. Given that Georgia’s main priority is its strategic partnership with Western countries, above all the United States, Chechelashvili argued it was a mistake to attend a funeral procession where crowds chanted “death to America” and “death to Israel.” He therefore considers Kobakhidze’s decision to stay home a good one but sending Kavelashvili in his place an error. Under the Georgian constitution, the president is a largely ceremonial figure, while the prime minister wields real power, meaning Kobakhidze’s absence could be read as a deliberate gesture toward the United States and Israel (YouTube/@PalitraNews, July 6).
Many Georgian Dream supporters argue that Tbilisi must maintain a “balanced policy” to survive in a complicated regional situation, given the wars in the Gulf and Ukraine. In an interview with this author, political analyst Ghia Abashidze stated that Georgia–Iran relations “are cooperative but not allied,” arguing that the “Georgian government has numerously reiterated that it follows a multi-vectoral political and economic policy and it is not going to affiliate with any opposing camp or bloc.” Abashidze concluded that “Kavelashvili’s visit was officially a condolence funeral visit, but politically also served to reaffirm Georgia–Iran ties and demonstrate Tbilisi’s willingness to maintain balanced relations with regional powers” (Author’s interview, July 7).
Other Georgian politicians and experts contend that the problem is not Georgia’s participation in Khamenei’s funeral itself. The problem is the political context in which it took place. Giorgi Shaishmelashvili, co-founder of the political party Freedom Square, in an interview with this author, argued that under normal circumstances, no one would expect Georgia to pursue an ideologically driven foreign policy, and Western partners would likely have accepted such a visit as a matter of pragmatic diplomacy. In the current political environment, however, it could instead be perceived as a political gesture directed against Georgia’s Western partners. “Together with a series of other developments, this decision will have serious long-term consequences for Georgia’s security, leaving the country increasingly isolated in a region where it must confront Russia and other authoritarian regimes,” Shaishmelashvili emphasized (Author’s interview, July 7). He fears that closer business and trade cooperation with the Iranian regime will “inevitably create obligations that could become a serious challenge for Georgia,” including “the potential spread of violent extremist ideas” as well as the “creation of channels for money laundering and sanctions evasion” that could “seriously damage Georgia’s international reputation.”
Zaal Anjaparidze, a Georgian political analyst and civil society development expert, identified three distinct viewpoints in the debate, centering on political prudence, moral legitimacy, and realpolitik. “I think that the attendance was rather a recognition of the Iranian state than an endorsement of its political system,” Anjaparidze contends, pointing out that Georgia “has practical interests in maintaining stable relations with neighboring regional powers” and that Georgia, “as a small state, often hedges its diplomacy with regional geopolitical realities in mind.” He concluded that Kavelashvili’s trip to Tehran will not by itself shape Georgia–West relations, as the “policies of the United States and the European Union regarding Georgia are influenced by a range of strategic considerations.” He underscored, “Nevertheless, symbolic diplomatic actions play a role in shaping the overall perception of the Georgian government’s foreign policy direction” (Author’s interview, July 7).
The visit also took place against the backdrop of explicit Iranian pressure on Tbilisi. Davit Avalishvili of the Georgian outlet Nation.ge noted that several months before Kavelashvili’s visit, Iranian Ambassador to Georgia Seyed Ali Mojani warned the Georgian government against ceding territory or airspace to U.S. or allied military operations. Following the landing of a U.S. military transport aircraft at Tbilisi International Airport and a security call between Kobakhidze and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the ambassador stated that countries supporting U.S. “adventurism” will ultimately “pay the price” at home (Civil.ge, March 31). “Georgia is a small and weak country. It does not have an ally like Türkiye is for Azerbaijan, and Georgia is not a member of any collective security organization,” Avalishvili observed, adding that “a small and weak country must be very careful during the clash between geopolitical titans” (Author’s interview, July 7). It appears that no one in Georgia’s political elite or expert community doubts that Tbilisi’s future policy toward Iran will depend on the regional configuration that emerges after the conflict in the Middle East ends.