July 15, 2026 | The Washington Times
What would Joe Biden do?
Vis-à-vis Moscow and Tehran, Trump should do the opposite
July 15, 2026 | The Washington Times
What would Joe Biden do?
Vis-à-vis Moscow and Tehran, Trump should do the opposite
President Joe Biden tried to talk wars down. For example, on Jan. 19, 2022, he suggested – hopefully, it seemed to me – that Russia’s coming invasion of Ukraine would be only a “minor incursion.”
No such luck. Just over a month later, President Vladimir Putin’s tanks rolled toward Kyiv on a mission to drag Ukraine back under the Kremlin jackboot.
Similarly, Mr. Biden offered Iran’s rulers sanctions relief and diplomatic engagement even as they enriched uranium, stockpiling enough by 2025 for multiple nuclear weapons.
The theocrats were not interested in rapprochement. For 47 years they’ve stated their goals with crystalline clarity: “Death to America!” and “Death to Israel!”
The latter is meant literally: the extermination of the Jewish state and its citizens from the river to the sea. The former may imply a more modest objective: collaborating with Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang to relegate the United States to the margins of global power along with such formerly great nations as Britain, France, and Spain.
Has President Trump now recognized these realities?
Last week, he backed Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia, authorized an emergency Patriot missile package, gave Kyiv the right to co-produce the interceptors, and agreed to a bipartisan bill that adds tougher sanctions on Moscow.
Over recent days also, he ordered U.S. forces to strike more than 300 Iranian targets in response to continuing attacks on commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, issued new sanctions on Iran’s financial sector, revoked the sanctions waiver letting Iran sell oil under the ceasefire, and began reinstating a blockade on Tehran.
No one can say that President Trump didn’t give diplomacy a chance. He offered Iran’s rulers multiple off-ramps, including a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that, in my view, conceded way too much.
But Iran’s rulers were not appeased as they made apparent during last week’s funeral for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for 37 years the country’s clerical dictator. In January he ordered his troops to crush protesters “by any means necessary,” resulting in the slaughter of tens of thousands for the “crime” of seeking relief from oppression and immiseration.
Mourners carried banners reading: “We Will Kill Trump.” New Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued a statement on Saturday saying that revenge for his father’s assassination “is the demand of our nation, and it will most certainly be carried out.”
Israel reportedly shared intelligence with the U.S. indicating a plot to assassinate Mr. Trump.
There’s more: New analysis of satellite imagery released last week shows Tehran continuing construction at twonuclear facilities – egregious violations of the MOU.
President Trump doesn’t need my advice, but I need to offer it: He should double down on this un-Bidenesque approach, raising the price Moscow and Tehran must pay for their bellicosity and terrorism.
Both regimes are down but neither is out – which is exactly the right time to hit them harder. Miss Manners wouldn’t approve but she’s not a geopolitical strategist.
Russian casualties in Ukraine are shockingly high with negligible territorial gains to show for it. Russia’s economy suffers from high inflation, acute labor shortages, and fuel scarcity.
As for Iran, twelve days of Israeli airstrikes last year, capped by American B-2 bunker-busters hitting subterranean nuclear sites, followed by 38 days of what the Pentagon called major combat operations this year, did not achieve everything Mr. Trump hoped.
But Iran’s rulers are now years – no longer weeks or months – from developing nukes. Most – maybe all – of their enriched uranium lies beneath tons of rubble. Their centrifuges aren’t spinning. Their missile and drone arsenal is nowhere near as large as it would have been by now had Washington and Jerusalem held their fire.
Iran’s rulers have lost their hold on Syria. Their proxies in Gaza and Lebanon have been decimated. They’re losing power in Iraq. And in Yemen the Houthis have been curiously quiet.
Iran’s economy, feeble prior to 2025, is barely breathing. President Trump could shut it down completely but, I surmise, would rather not because he knows most Iranians are not America’s enemies.
Despite all this, if Iran’s rulers continue to believe Mr. Trump is constrained by “pain at the pump” and midterm elections, they’ll tough it out.
If, on the other hand, they are persuaded that every drone attack on a container ship will result in the loss of assets they value – both military and personal – they may recalculate.
On Friday, President Trump posted on Truth Social that the “Islamic Republic of Iran has asked us to continue ‘talks.’ We have agreed to do so, but the United States has stated to them, in no uncertain terms, that the cease fire is OVER.”
A spokesman for Iran’s rulers responded by saying that talks will not resume until and unless Washington fulfills its responsibilities under the MOU as interpreted by Tehran.
President Trump should remember that there’s no need to choose between diplomacy and force. “Negotiations without arms is like music without instruments,” as Frederick the Great may have said.
Coercive negotiations may not bring regime change or even regime collapse. But crippling the regime – severely limiting its ability to project power – will make it much less of a threat to America, American interests, and American allies.
Similarly, while increasing pressure on Mr. Putin will not make him peace-loving, it may lead him to accept a ceasefire.
It’s lovely to think – as I believe President Biden did and many in the foreign policy establishment still do – that wars end when both sides compromise in the interest of “conflict resolution.”
In the modern world, however, most wars don’t end, they merely abate. Achieving even that becomes possible only if our enemies conclude that their goals are unreachable and more pain would be unbearable.
Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a columnist for the Washington Times, and host of the “Foreign Podicy” podcast.
Facts Only
* January 19, 2022: President Biden suggested Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would be a "minor incursion."
* Russia advanced its tanks toward Kyiv over a month after the suggestion.
* President Biden offered Iran sanctions relief and diplomatic engagement despite Iran enriching uranium.
* Theocrats stated goals of "Death to America!" and "Death to Israel."
* President Trump backed Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia.
* Trump authorized an emergency Patriot missile package for Ukraine and agreed to a bipartisan bill adding tougher sanctions on Moscow.
* Trump ordered U.S. forces to strike over 300 Iranian targets in response to attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
* New sanctions were issued on Iran’s financial sector, and the sanctions waiver allowing oil sales was revoked.
* Iran's rulers responded that talks would not resume until Washington fulfilled responsibilities under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
* Satellite imagery shows Tehran continuing construction at twonuclear facilities.
* Russian casualties in Ukraine are reported as high with negligible territorial gains.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative presents a stark contrast between diplomatic de-escalation pursued by one administration and a more coercive, forceful approach adopted by the other regarding Moscow and Tehran. The core dynamic observed is that measured diplomacy appears insufficient when faced with entrenched extremist goals, leading to a focus on demonstrating tangible pain. This forces a re-evaluation of the cost-benefit analysis for adversaries: whether the pain inflicted, through military or economic pressure, will outweigh the immediate costs of resistance. A significant pattern emerges regarding regime behavior: while leaders may tolerate some external pressures (like pursuing talks), fundamental objectives remain fixed, suggesting that leverage must be applied to alter calculations rather than merely achieve temporary cessation of hostilities. The potential for deterrence hinges on whether adversaries calculate that their goals are unreachable and that further pain is intolerable, which might lead to a recalculation toward compromise or collapse. This suggests that the efficacy of policy may depend less on adherence to a single strategy (diplomacy vs. force) and more on the calculated leverage applied to the adversary's structure.
Bridge Questions: What are the long-term consequences for US alliances if this coercive approach becomes the established norm? How does the concept of "pain at the pump" manifest differently across varied geopolitical actors? If leaders find that outcomes remain fixed despite increased pressure, what alternative mechanisms exist for achieving strategic goals?
Sentinel — Human
This text reads like a high-opinion editorial synthesizing current geopolitical events with a specific policy argument regarding US foreign relations, delivered through a highly charged and personal lens.