Ethnic Unity Law Codifies ‘Chinese’ Identity
Executive Summary:
- A new ethnic unity law frames assimilation under a narrow definition of Chinese identity as central to achieving the principal goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): national rejuvenation.
- Assimilation is to be effected by eliminating non-Mandarin languages and sinicizing religion, as well as by forging a national consciousness that demands identification with the CCP, socialism, and the “Chinese [Zhonghua] nation.”
- The law responds to Party theorists’ critiques of the Soviet Union’s failures and codifies their policy recommendations, such as “diluting” ethnic consciousness or “culturalizing” ethnicity.
On March 12, the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress Law (民族团结进步促进法) (Xinhua, March 13). The law mandates patriotic education, the use of Mandarin language in schools and media, and historical preservation in order to promote a unitary “Chinese” national identity. In doing so, it seeks to eliminate alternative identities and assimilate all Chinese citizens to conform with a vision of Chineseness that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sanctions.
As its preamble makes clear, the law’s ultimate purpose is to advance the Party’s principal goal: national rejuvenation. The dominance of a single “Chinese” identity is critical to this project, as General Secretary Xi Jinping has noted repeatedly. At the Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs in 2021, he said that forging a strong sense of a Chinese community is an “inevitable requirement” (必然要求) for achieving national rejuvenation (Xinhua, August 28, 2021). The ethnic unity law follows this language closely. Its first article states its purpose as “to forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, advance the building of a community for the Chinese nation, and advance national rejuvenation” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识，推进中华民族共同体建设，推动实现中华民族伟大复兴) (Xinhua, March 13).
Historical Foundations Underpin Unity Promotion
Reducing the salience of ethnic identity is central to the goal of national rejuvenation, even as other forms of identity fall victim to the same logic. Party leaders and theorists, including Xi Jinping, see the Soviet Union’s collapse as a “cautionary tale” (前车之鉴), and attribute it in part to lack of social cohesion. They believe that the PRC can avoid the same fate by restricting diverse forms of identity (Party Building Online, January 8, 2018). Ma Rong (马戎), who later led a Ministry of Education-funded project on Soviet nationalities policy, wrote in 2004 that the Soviet Union collapsed because “the overlap between ethnic boundaries and administrative boundaries created the politicization of ethnicity and nationalism” (民族界线与行政界线的重合导致了民族性政治化和民族主义的产生) (Ma, 2004; Baidu/马戎, accessed March 24, 2021). [1] Ma advocated for the “culturalization” (文化化) of ethnicity, which would strip tangible cultural identifiers from ethnic groups while retaining the appearance of pluralism (Ma, 2004). This would entail eliminating non-Mandarin languages and sinicizing religions (宗教中国化), two key elements of PRC policy now formalized in the ethnic unity law. The scholars Hu Angang (胡鞍钢) and Hu Lianhe (胡联合) saw similar issues in 2011, blaming Stalin’s continuation of what should have been a transitory nationalities policy as the source of failure. They recommended that the PRC “dilute citizens’ ethnic consciousness” (淡化公民的族群意识) to avoid a similar fate (Hu and Hu, 2011). [2]
Xi has translated these perspectives into official policy, but he also carries a unique view of Soviet failure. Highlighting weak political loyalty caused by “historical nihilism” (历史虚无主义), he sees the “repudiation” (否定) of Soviet history and the history of the Soviet Communist Party as “a major cause” (一个重要原因) of its collapse (Party Building Online, January 8, 2018; China Brief, May 28, 2025). Xi has fused his analysis of historical nihilism with that of scholars who pinpoint the threat of ethnic autonomy through the passage of the ethnic unity law, as in the 2025 white paper titled “Guidelines for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era” (China Brief, October 5, 2025). The ethnic unity law acts as a conduit to further center the CCP, thereby addressing concerns around both historical nihilism and ethnic autonomy.
Resisting Alternative Identities
The Party believes that opposing historical nihilism and suppressing ethnic identity both contribute to achieving national rejuvenation. Enshrining these policies in law raises their issue salience for policymakers and Party officials.
Fear of historical nihilism is most clear in the law’s provisions on education. Curriculum reform in May 2024 required Chinese university students to study a new textbook titled An Introduction to the Community of the Zhonghua Race (中华民族共同体概论), which shifted ethnic discourse from “Communist multiculturalism” toward Han nationalism (China Brief, May 24, 2024). The ethnic unity law expands this discourse and introduces it to students at all levels. Article 11 establishes that forging a national consciousness demands identification with the CCP and socialism, in addition to the “Chinese nation” (中华民族). Article 12 then specifies that “correct” (正确) views of the nation can only be achieved through Party-focused education; and Article 16 mandates that this framework must shape all curricula (Xinhua, March 13). Through these three articles, Xi seeks to inoculate the PRC against his diagnosis of the Soviet Union’s fatal flaw.
Measures governing language, religious practices, and historical preservation align with Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe’s recommendation to “dilute” ethnic consciousness. The law demands that all schools teach in Mandarin (普通话) and that the state prioritize Mandarin for all official communications, eliminating any remaining linguistic symbols of ethnic identity. [3] It also frames the sinicization of religion as a goal to be accomplished by encouraging patriotism among religious communities, incorporating CCP efforts against historical nihilism as a means to counter distinct ethnic identities (Xinhua, March 13). Provisions on historical preservation, while less overt, follow the same logic. They call on local governments to protect “cultural relics and historical sites” (文物古迹), but only those that advance state or Party goals (Xinhua, January 25, 2017; ASPI, September 25, 2020; Xinhua, March 13).
The law, despite its name, appears to advance more than just ethnic unity, as it includes provisions on Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Beijing’s recent white paper on “Realizing National Security Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Hong Kong” (“一国两制”下香港维护国家安全的实践) indicates that the central government continues to feel insecure about alternative identities, which can be represented by regional pride, non-Mandarin languages, or histories that do not align with official narratives (China Brief, March 6). The new law’s section on Taiwan is relatively vague, but it serves as a reminder that the CCP intends to enforce its own laws in Taiwan in a post-unification scenario, just as it has done in recent years in Hong Kong, even under “one country, two systems.” Article 20, for instance, states that “parents or guardians shall … educate and guide children to love the CCP” (父母或者其他监护人应当 … 教育和引导未成年人热爱中国共产党) (Xinhua, March 13). Should the CCP govern Taiwan, parents could face legal consequences if their children expressed Taiwanese identity.
Conclusion
The PRC’s new ethnic unity law codifies the state’s suppression of ethnic and religious identity in the pursuit of national rejuvenation. Xi clearly sees ethnic unity as a precondition for national rejuvenation, stating at a 2019 ethnic affairs conference that “the people of all ethnic groups being like one family is a fundamental guarantee that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be realized” (各族人民亲如一家，是中华民族伟大复兴必定要实现的根本保证) (Xinhua, August 25, 2021).
By enshrining these policies in law, Xi Jinping is taking another step toward combating historical nihilism and achieving his ideological ambitions. In doing so, he continues to ensure that unity in the PRC can only come from one source—the Party.
Notes
[1] Ma Rong [马戎], “Understanding New Thinking on Ethnic Relations: The ‘De-Politicization’ of Ethnic Minority Problems [理解民族关系的新思路——少数族群问题的’去政治化’],” Journal of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences) [北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)], no. 6 (2004): 122–133.
[2] Hu Angang [胡鞍钢] and Hu Lianhe [胡联合], “Second Generation Ethnic Policy: Promoting Ethnic Integration and Shared Prosperity [第二代民族政策：促进民族交融一体和繁荣一体],” Xinjiang Normal University Journal (Humanities and Social Sciences) [新疆师范大学学报 (哲学社会科学版)], no. 5 (2011).
[3] The law calls on all schools to use Mandarin in classroom instruction and for educational materials, but this has been the official policy in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2010, and in Inner Mongolia since 2020 (CECC, May 10, 2011; Human Rights Watch, March 4, 2020, September 4, 2020). Renewed efforts are likely intended to standardize enforcement within and across regions and provinces.