Trump Has Good Reason to Reduce U.S.–South Korea Defense Ties
The critics miss the big picture.
On the 2024 campaign trail, Donald Trump’s surrogates often highlighted the importance of revamping U.S. foreign policy to focus on the threat of a rising China. After decades of failed nation-building operations in the Middle East, figures like J.D. Vance argued, it was time to shift priorities and secure America’s actual interests. Yet less than a year into Trump’s second term, another war in the Middle East is pulling attention and resources away from the Asia-Pacific region.
Trump’s recent decision substantially to reduce joint military exercises with South Korea marks another shift away from the “pivot to Asia” strategy. Trump presented the decision as punishment for Seoul’s refusal to aid the U.S. war against Iran, and that seems to be the impression of South Korea’s Foreign Minister Cho Hyun. The order surprised officials in both Seoul and Washington and met significant criticism from opponents of the Iran War and supporters of strong U.S.–South Korea ties. While many of these criticisms are fair, the panic surrounding the move doesn’t capture the full picture.
Following Trump’s announcement, the office of South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung actually welcomed friendlier U.S. relations with North Korea as offering a possible pathway to stability in the Korean peninsula. Long before the Iran War began, Trump had complained about the cost of America’s overseas alliances, including the one with South Korea, and showed interest in a rapprochement with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. The Iran War thus provided an immediate justification for a move that Trump was already inclined to make.
The joint military exercises have not been without downsides. While they have some value for South Korea’s military readiness, their utility must be considered in light of the current geopolitical environment. North Korea is more capable today than it was in Trump’s first term, having expanded its nuclear and missile capabilities while solidifying its relationship with Moscow and Beijing. This doesn’t mean Pyongyang is more eager to start a war, but it is better positioned to deter and intimidate its southern neighbor. Under these new circumstances, reducing exercises that the Kim regime has long viewed as rehearsals for an invasion brings diplomatic benefits that plausibly outweigh the military costs.
Trump’s decision creates room for diplomacy. The failure of negotiations with Kim in Trump’s first term doesn’t prove that constructive diplomacy is impossible. The Trump–Kim summit in Hanoi collapsed largely over disagreements about the scale of sanctions relief that the U.S. should trade for limits on North Korea’s program. Pyongyang appeared willing to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear complex, but Washington demanded more on the nuclear front before it would grant sanctions relief. This disagreement exposes a real problem at the heart of American relations with North Korea. While American officials continue to treat the North Koreans like irrational actors, Pyongyang has little rational incentive to surrender the weapons that ensure the survival of their regime. For that reason, it opposes complete denuclearization—a longstanding U.S. demand that North Korea wants dropped before diplomacy resumes.
Whatever one thinks of Kim, his reasoning on this matter is easy to grasp. After watching the U.S. wage war on several states that lacked a nuclear deterrent—Iraq, Libya, and now Iran—Kim has good reason to believe that North Korea would become much more vulnerable if it dismantled its nuclear weapons program. Similar to America’s insistence that Iran stop enriching uranium for nuclear fuel, demanding North Korean denuclearization obstructs diplomacy. Instead, officials in Washington and Seoul should focus on finding room for agreement to avoid conflict with an increasingly well-armed state. This is hardly an alien concept in the history of inter-Korean relations. From Kim Jong Il’s Sunshine-era summits to Kim Jong Un’s more recent acceptance of South Korea’s statehood, Pyongyang has sometimes shown a willingness to find a workable modus vivendi between North and South.
The Hanoi summit demonstrated not that constructive diplomacy with Pyongyang is a fool’s errand, but that Washington’s goals were unrealistic. Nearly eight years later, with even less leverage, continuing to insist on denuclearization is foolish. Pyongyang’s initial response to Trump’s reduction of joint military exercises has been less than warm. Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, insisted the reduction does not change the exercises’ inherently hostile posture, though she also maintained that her brother’s relationship with Trump is “excellent.” Trump, for his part, has complimented Kim, teased a possible meeting between the two leaders sometime this year, and even appeared to treat North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as an inconvenient but inalterable fact. “If I were president, I wouldn’t have allowed it,” Trump said Wednesday. “But he’s got them. I get along with him very well.”
While coaxing Pyongyang into a diplomatic process remains challenging, at least Trump wouldn’t be negotiating over the head of an unwilling Seoul. Lee has made détente a central goal of his presidency while emphasizing the importance of greater South Korean control over its own defense. Seoul’s frustration with Trump’s announcement was less about substance than the fact that Washington once again made a major decision concerning the peninsula without first consulting South Korean leadership.
Lee continues to support the alliance, but has demonstrated a willingness to distinguish between South Korean and American interests in an unprecedented way. Deterring North Korean aggression is obviously a national interest of Seoul, while a Mideast war simply is not. For decades, American politicians, including Trump specifically, have rightfully encouraged wealthy allies to take greater responsibility for their own security. Those same officials shouldn’t act surprised when that independence naturally results in said allies deciding for themselves what their interests require.
After all, Washington often pursues its own foreign policy objectives at the expense of its allies. Earlier this year, Washington shifted THAAD munitions and radar assets from South Korea to the Middle East and discussed doing the same with Patriot missile-defense systems. Politicians in Washington continue to insist that China is America’s defining strategic competitor, yet resources in Asia are consistently redeployed elsewhere. Just this month, the Navy ordered the USS George Washington out of the western Pacific and sent it to the Middle East, leaving Asia without a single American aircraft carrier. Lee, rather than treating the redeployments as a crisis, has admirably emphasized the importance of South Korea shouldering more of its own defense.
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Meanwhile, Lee has been settling on a friendlier approach to China. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit this week, his first to South Korea in five years, comes as Lee seeks China’s help to reopen dialogue with Pyongyang. Beijing reaffirmed its pledge to play a “constructive role”in promoting peace on the peninsula.
None of this means Seoul is becoming a Chinese ally. Rather, South Korea, which endured considerable Chinese retaliation for accepting THAAD in the first place, has been reminded that Washington’s priorities often shift without warning. South Korea is simply demonstrating that it is an independent nation with a strong interest in avoiding an unduly antagonistic relationship with its powerful neighbor.
Trump’s decision to reduce joint military exercises with South Korea should be viewed with this broader diplomatic context in mind. Of course, his overall foreign policy does not reflect any principled commitment to military non-intervention, as the Iran War demonstrates. Regardless, in Korea, he is right to challenge the assumption that permanent military pressure and impossible demands are prerequisites for peace. Securing peace in Asia may require America to do less, not more, so the region can chart its own course and find a stable equilibrium.