The new Mecca joint defence pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey has triggered questions in India, particularly over what it could mean for Pakistan’s military capabilities and for New Delhi’s strategic interests in the region.
The concern is understandable. The three countries are strategically important, have military links with the United States, and the pact includes language that 'an attack on one would be considered an attack on the others'. Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, immediately after the pact was signed spoke about the need for an ‘Islamic NATO’ to counter perceived threats from India and Israel.
According to former Indian Ambassador to the European Union (EU) and India’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Manjeev Singh Puri, India has reasons to remain alert and closely watch the developments, particularly military hardware, training and technology cooperation. But he argues that there is little reason for panic. History, he says, shows that defence agreements on paper do not automatically mean countries will fight each other’s wars.
The immediate concern is not that Saudi Arabia or Turkey would automatically enter a war with India on Pakistan’s side.
The bigger concern is what the new partnership could mean for Pakistan’s military capabilities.
Puri said India should be conscious of the possibility of increased "military support, hardware support and training support" flowing to Pakistan. That makes the defence relationship something New Delhi needs to monitor carefully.
At the same time, he cautioned against assuming that this support would translate into Saudi Arabia or Turkey backing Pakistani military adventurism against India.
“There is reason to be conscious” about Pakistan’s adventurism, Puri said, but he does not believe India needs to conclude that the pact gives Pakistan a free hand.
This is perhaps the most politically sensitive part of the pact for India. At first glance, such language can sound similar to the collective-defence principle associated with NATO. The obvious question is: if Pakistan were to come under attack, would Saudi Arabia and Turkey then be bound to fight on its behalf?
Puri’s answer is no-not necessarily.
He points to the experience of earlier military groupings involving Pakistan, particularly CENTO- the Central Treaty Organization and SEATO- the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Pakistan was a member of both organisations, yet those arrangements did not automatically translate into military intervention on Pakistan’s behalf during its conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971.
The same historical lesson, he argues, applies here. Words in a defence agreement do not operate in isolation from a country's wider strategic and economic interests.
“These kinds of wordings were there in the CENTO, in the SEATO and all those pacts. Nothing happened,” Puri said.
That does not mean India should ignore the clause. Rather, it means New Delhi should distinguish between a 'political commitment on paper' and an automatic decision to enter another country’s war.
The timing has inevitably attracted attention. The pact comes against the backdrop of heightened tensions in West Asia, with the war between Iran and the US and Israel, concerns around the security of the region and continuing uncertainty over the movement of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
Puri believes the immediate circumstances are more closely connected to Saudi Arabia’s own security concerns than to South Asian politics.
Saudi Arabia, he said, has developed a greater sense of vulnerability following Iranian and Houthi attacks and is looking for additional security comfort despite its long-standing military relationship with the United States.
That is important for understanding the pact.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan are all friendly towards the United States, although their relationships with Washington are different. Turkey is a NATO member, Saudi Arabia has longstanding US military ties, while Pakistan has historically been part of US-backed security arrangements.
So, Puri argues, the pact should first be viewed through the security concerns of the region rather than automatically interpreted as a move designed against India.
Pakistan’s calls for an ‘Islamic NATO’ have added another layer to the debate.
Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has spoken about Islamic countries coming together to counter threats from India and Israel. Coming immediately after the Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey defence understanding, should such remarks raise concerns in India?
Puri believes these statements should not be treated as evidence that such a military bloc is actually emerging.
He points out that similar ideas have been discussed in Pakistan for decades. Yet historical experience shows that countries have generally pursued their own national interests rather than automatically joining Pakistan in conflicts with India.
His broader argument is that India should not allow itself to be drawn into the religious framing of the issue.
West Asia has its own complex history, including long-running political, sectarian and strategic tensions. India, Puri argues, should not get embroiled in those disputes.
“India should not get embroiled and is not embroiled in any of the Abrahamic issues,” he said, stressing that these are separate issues that countries in the region must deal with themselves.
This is where India’s concerns become much more practical.
For New Delhi, the most important issue is not the political symbolism of the pact. It is 'energy security'.
India has a major interest in ensuring that oil continues to flow through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is also an important partner for India; both countries, under the Delhi Declaration (2006) and the Riyadh Declaration (2010), transformed their diplomatic ties into a comprehensive strategic partnership, while New Delhi also has established relationships with the UAE, Oman and Qatar.
India also has a large diaspora in Saudi Arabia and broad economic and strategic interests across the Gulf.
That means instability in the region can directly affect India—through energy supplies, shipping, trade and the safety of Indian citizens.
Puri therefore says India’s fundamental interest is straightforward: "the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and oil should continue to flow."
This also explains why New Delhi cannot afford to view the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan arrangement only through the India-Pakistan lens.
India has relationships with virtually every major country involved in the region. Its stated approach of "multi-alignment" allows it to maintain ties with countries that may themselves have difficult relationships with one another.
Puri argues that India’s strength lies precisely in maintaining these multiple relationships rather than choosing one regional camp.
One possible response would be for New Delhi to seek an explicit assurance from Riyadh that the new defence arrangement will not be used against India.
Puri, however, does not believe India needs to publicly seek such reassurance.
He says India has a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and that discussions between the two sides are likely to continue. If Saudi Arabia provides such clarity, it would certainly be welcome. But, in his view, India should not approach the relationship from a position of insecurity.
“We're too big, we're too massive,” he said, arguing that India’s strategic weight and its extensive relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey give New Delhi considerable room to manoeuvre.
That makes the situation more complicated than a simple Pakistan-versus-India alliance.
History offers perhaps the strongest reason for caution without panic.
Pakistan was part of CENTO and SEATO during earlier periods of tension with India. Yet those memberships did not result in automatic military intervention on Pakistan’s behalf.
The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War is an important example raised in the discussion. The existence of Pakistan’s earlier security relationships did not mean its partners automatically entered the war on its side.
The lesson, according to Puri, is that countries ultimately act according to their own interests.
That is why the new pact should not be dismissed—but neither should it be interpreted as an automatic military guarantee for Pakistan.
Pakistan should not interpret it as encouragement for adventurism against India, and other countries should not encourage such an interpretation either.
Yes. India needs to closely track military technology, hardware and training cooperation involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Is there reason to panic? No. History shows that paper alliances do not automatically translate into military intervention. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have their own interests, including substantial stakes in their relationship with India.
For New Delhi, the smarter response is therefore neither complacency nor alarm. It is ‘strategic vigilance, continued engagement and confidence in India’s own weight.’
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