July 23, 2026 | FDD's Long War Journal
Ukraine’s defense leadership crisis becomes blessing in disguise
July 23, 2026 | FDD's Long War Journal
Ukraine’s defense leadership crisis becomes blessing in disguise
“You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing after they’ve tried everything else,” goes an aphorism often apocryphally attributed to Winston Churchill. Much the same can be said for the latest shakeup in Ukraine’s defense leadership.
Bowing to a demand from protests unleashed by his short-sighted decision to fire Ukraine’s defense minister, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has appointed Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, 43, to replace the controversial General Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief.
Drapatyi is widely respected and part of a new generation of officers molded by war with Russia rather than the Soviet system. However, he enters his new role with a long list of challenges ahead, including the daunting task of mobilization reform.
Roots of the crisis
Drapatyi’s appointment, announced on July 21, followed nearly a week of mass protests sparked by Zelenskyy’s dismissal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, a longtime ally who had been on the job for just six months. The protesters demanded that Zelenskyy reinstate Fedorov and fire Syrskyi, who is loathed within much of the Ukrainian military and civil society. Some demonstrators chanted Drapatyi’s name.
Zelenskyy had attributed Fedorov’s firing to what the president portrayed as an irreconcilable conflict between the minister and Syrskyi. But Ukrainian officials and journalists described the crisis as resulting from not just a personal feud but a generational clash between competing cultures and visions for the war.
Syrskyi, appointed in February 2024 after Zelenskyy ousted his popular predecessor, is seen by many in Ukraine as a “butcher” who was willing to sacrifice troops and resources for questionable objectives. A product of the Soviet military, the 60-year-old general was accused of fueling a micromanaging, top-down command culture that incentivized dishonesty and rewarded fealty over competence. He was also criticized for pouring resources into scandal-plagued assault regiments and the continual formation of new, underperforming brigades at the expense of other units.
By contrast, the 35-year-old Fedorov had achieved popularity — perhaps too much for Zelenskyy’s liking — by pushing reforms and technological innovation, applying a data-driven approach and PR skills honed in his previous job as minister of digital transformation. Fedorov’s efforts were perceived as helping Ukraine begin to regain some momentum in the war. But he also angered entrenched interests, including within the military leadership, who often worked at cross purposes with his team. After his firing, the minister excoriated Syrskyi in an extraordinary press conference detailing what he views as endemic problems in the Ukrainian military.
Ukrainian servicemembers and commentators, as well as Western officials, have welcomed the appointment of Drapatyi. The saga echoes a mid-2025 imbroglio in which Zelenskyy, seemingly oblivious to the consequences, tried to neuter critical anti-corruption institutions before an ensuing uproar forced him to reverse course.
New leadership
Drapatyi is the youngest officer ever appointed as Ukraine’s commander-in-chief. He is seen as an able commander who is well schooled in the current character of war and embraces unmanned systems and other technology. He has a reputation as a soldier-centered leader who emphasizes accountability, encourages honest reporting up the chain, and listens to and empowers subordinates.
After graduating from the Kharkiv Institute of Tank Troops in 2004, Drapatyi earned renown as a battalion commander during the Donbas war that began in 2014 and quickly rose up the ranks. Following the 2022 invasion, he was credited with halting Russia’s advance toward Kryvyi Rih and later helped liberate Kherson in fall 2022. He has developed a reputation for coming in to stabilize difficult situations, most famously during Russia’s offensive north of Kharkiv in May 2024. He later served in various command roles in eastern Ukraine, most recently as head of the operational task force responsible for the northeast.
Drapatyi also has first-hand experience with longstanding problems related to force generation, with stints as General Staff deputy chief for training and as commander of the Ground Forces. He entered the latter role calling for technological innovation and reforms, and he helped oversee the expansion of high-performing unmanned systems units under the “Drone Line” initiative. But the general resigned after just six months, taking personal responsibility for a deadly Russian strike on a training center. Amid reported tensions with Syrskyi, Drapatyi lamented that he had been unable to eradicate a culture of unaccountability from the army.
When Fedorov was fired, Drapatyi defended the minister, endorsing his critiques of the Ukrainian military’s command culture. “When the right decision has to be made against the system, rather than because of it, it means the system itself needs to change,” the general wrote on Facebook.
In addition to Syrskyi, Zelenskyy dismissed Lieutenant General Andrii Hnatov, chief of the General Staff and a close ally of Syrskyi. His replacement is Major General Ihor Skybiuk, 49, who began the full-scale war as a brigade commander and worked with Drapatyi in the Kherson region in 2022. He most recently served as commander of the Air Assault Forces and then as a deputy chief of the General Staff.
Zelenskyy, however, has given no indication he will reinstate Fedorov, who reportedly has refused other positions offered to him. The president has instead appointed Major General Yevhenii Khmara, former head of the domestic security service (SBU), as acting defense minister pending parliament’s approval. Khmara is well respected for his war record, including as head of the SBU’s elite Alpha unit. But how he will fare managing the much larger Defense Ministry bureaucracy is an open question. Protest organizers have vowed to continue demonstrations indefinitely until Fedorov returns, though the energy for this effort seems to be dwindling.
Challenges for new team
After announcing Drapatyi’s appointment, Zelenskyy laid out various priorities that “must be carried out in the near future and over the medium term.” The immediate priority is to ensure a smooth handover and avoid disruptions to ongoing operations, including mid- and long-range strike campaigns that have found growing success in recent months. The new team will need to accomplish this even as it will likely look to install new faces in key positions and reconfigure the structure and responsibilities of certain bodies.
Looking a little further ahead, Zelenskyy stated that “Mykhailo Drapatyi, Yevhenii Khmara, and other commanders whom we will determine together must prepare and submit for approval an updated strategy for our defense.” He added that they must resolve issues related to supplies of drones and other arms discussed during recent meetings with Ukrainian commanders. Zelenskyy also highlighted air defense as a top priority, including the development of the Freya ballistic missile defense system in collaboration with European partners.
In addition, Zelenskyy emphasized the need for further progress in the Ukrainian military’s transition to a corps-based structure. The president also called for strengthening unit capabilities (with a likely emphasis on unmanned systems and long-range artillery) and moving forward with establishing the new Cyber Forces.
Importantly, Zelenskyy also said that he, Drapatyi, and Khmara had discussed unspecified “organizational decisions” related to mobilization and training. These areas were also priorities for Drapatyi during his brief tenure as Ground Forces commander. In recent days, Zelenskyy has particularly stressed the need for reforms to mobilization, which has become politically toxic due to the practice of “basification,” in which men are rounded up on the street. The new team may draw on Fedorov-era proposals — which Kyiv had promised to roll out later this year — to revamp draft offices and humanize the mobilization process.
However, this will not be a quick or easy process. Nor is it solely in the hands of Drapatyi or any other official. Whereas opponents of Fedorov had criticized him for failing to reform mobilization, this responsibility is in fact shared between the Defense Ministry and the commander-in-chief, General Staff, Ground Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and parliament. It remains to be seen whether Zelenskyy will provide sufficient political backing to overcome internal resistance.
Still, Drapatyi’s appointment will likely boost morale among the rank and file. That, plus his emphasis on improving training and force management and husbanding manpower, could help improve retention by discouraging mobilized troops from going absent without leave (AWOL) — a major problem for Ukraine.
Likewise, problems with the Ukrainian military’s command culture will not be fixed overnight. But having a commander-in-chief who empowers task force and corps commanders and emphasizes honesty and accountability could be a start.
John Hardie is the deputy director of FDD’s Russia Program and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal.