Saudi Participation in U.S. Airstrikes on Iraq Signals Impatience With Baghdad’s Inability To Control Armed Factions

July 30, 2026 | Policy Brief
Saudi Participation in U.S. Airstrikes on Iraq Signals Impatience With Baghdad’s Inability To Control Armed Factions
July 30, 2026 | Policy Brief
Saudi Participation in U.S. Airstrikes on Iraq Signals Impatience With Baghdad’s Inability To Control Armed Factions
Baghdad’s failure to address drone attacks from Iran-backed Iraqi militias is forcing other countries to act. American and Saudi forces, in a first for the ongoing war with Iran, launched joint overnight airstrikes against Iran-backed militias in Iraq on July 28. The operation killed more than 20 militiamen alongside five advisers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) described the operation as “a strong response to over 30 IRGC-directed aerial drone attacks in the last 72 hours,” referring to Iraqi militia attacks on U.S. forces and Saudi energy facilities. During this period, the Houthi militia in Yemen claimed an attack on Abqaiq — the world’s largest oil processing and stabilization facility — in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. However, the Saudi statement attributed attacks on its energy facilities — without naming Abqaiq — to Iran-backed militias in Iraq, without mentioning the Houthis. Reuters reported on July 30 that the Houthis are operating in Iraq alongside Iraqi militias.
The strikes came less than two weeks after Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, visited Washington. Zaidi touted promises from Iran-backed militias to disarm, which would enable the U.S.-Iraq relationship to shift from a security focus to economic partnership. Yet Sabah al-Numan, Zaidi’s spokesman, issued a statement denouncing the U.S.-Saudi operation. He rejected “all acts of aggression” without identifying the perpetrators of attacks from Iraq. Despite Zaidi’s claims that militia promises to disarm constitute progress — statements that have not been backed up with action — Tehran’s proxies threaten Iraq’s internal stability and its relationships with neighbors and the United States.
Iraqi Militia Attacks During the Conflict
A Saudi assessment in late April determined that Iraqi militias conducted “up to half of the nearly 1,000 drone attacks on the kingdom.” The recent CENTCOM statement blamed Iran-backed militias in Iraq for over 600 attacks against U.S. forces and interests in the country between February and April.
In April, the United Arab Emirates summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires to deliver a note of protest over attacks from Iran-backed militias, as did Bahrain. Likewise in April, tensions between Iraq and Kuwait escalated when protesters in southern Iraq attacked the Kuwaiti consulate over recent rocket attacks on southern Iraq. Despite weeks of Iran-backed militia attacks on Kuwait, an Iraqi official blamed the attacks on the emirate.
Iran’s Influence in Iraq Imperils Baghdad’s Relationships
Saudi Arabia is responding more vocally after suffering attacks from multiple directions by Iran and its regional stooges. During the initial round of fighting in the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, Riyadh reportedly struck Iran-backed militias in Iraq after weathering hundreds of drone attacks, doing so without fanfare. Now, the rupture between Iraq and its neighbors is growing. Zaidi was scheduled for his first official visit to Riyadh on July 28 but canceled the trip after the U.S.-Saudi airstrikes.
While the Iraqi government professes neutrality in the regional conflict, Iranian militias have backed the government in Baghdad into a corner. Tehran’s network in Iraq is centered on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an official Iraqi security institution composed largely of Iran-backed militias. While the prime minister, as commander-in-chief, is the head of the PMF, in reality, these groups answer to an Iranian chain of command. This positions the Iraqi government uncomfortably between its own forces and its partners — both regional and global.
Pulling Iraq Out of Iran’s Orbit Doesn’t Benefit Only Baghdad
Washington should press Zaidi to demonstrate concrete progress on disarmament. The Trump administration should sanction the militias’ political and financial backers in Iraq if Baghdad fails to follow through. Washington has held back on penalizing Iraqi officials to give Zaidi room to reform.
Washington should also encourage Baghdad to repair relations with Iraq’s neighbors and seek greater partnership with Arab countries. One important area of cooperation is electricity. Iraq relies on gas imports from Iran to power its grid — despite Iran’s inability to meet its own needs during extreme weather and therefore cutting exports to Iraq. The United States provides Iraq with a sanctions waiver for these imports. Washington should support Baghdad’s shift toward energy independence and partnership with Gulf neighbors to deny Iran a revenue stream and provide more consistent electricity in Iraq.
Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Bridget and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Facts Only

* U.S. and Saudi forces launched joint overnight airstrikes against Iran-backed militias in Iraq on July 28.
* The operation resulted in the killing of more than 20 militiamen and five advisers from the IRGC.
* CENTCOM described the operation as a response to over 30 IRGC-directed aerial drone attacks in the last 72 hours.
* During this period, the Houthi militia claimed an attack on Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.
* The Saudi statement attributed attacks on its energy facilities to Iran-backed militias in Iraq without naming the Houthis.
* The Houthis are reported to be operating in Iraq alongside Iraqi militias.
* Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, visited Washington and touted promises of disarmament from Iran-backed militias.
* A Saudi spokesman denounced the U.S.-Saudi operation without identifying perpetrators of attacks from Iraq.
* A Saudi assessment in late April determined Iraqi militias conducted "up to half" of nearly 1,000 drone attacks on the kingdom.
* The Iranian network in Iraq is centered on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), composed largely of Iran-backed militias answering to an Iranian chain of command.

Executive Summary

American and Saudi forces launched joint overnight airstrikes against Iran-backed militias in Iraq on July 28, killing more than 20 militiamen and five advisers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This action was described by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as a strong response to over 30 IRGC-directed aerial drone attacks in the preceding 72 hours, which included attacks on Iraqi militia forces and Saudi energy facilities. While the Saudi statement attributed attacks on its energy facilities to Iran-backed militias in Iraq, it did not name the Houthis. This occurred less than two weeks after Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi visited Washington, where promises were made by some militias regarding disarmament to shift relations to an economic partnership. However, a spokesman for Zaidi rejected the operation without identifying perpetrators. The situation involves Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq, centered around the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are influenced by an Iranian chain of command, placing the Iraqi government in a complex position between its partners and global powers.

Full Take

The narrative presents a dynamic where regional conflict and external power projection intersect, demonstrating a strategic push by external actors—the U.S. and Saudi Arabia—to intervene in internal Iraqi dynamics concerning Iranian influence. The core tension lies between the central Iraqi government’s positioning of neutrality and the reality that Iranian proxies control significant internal security apparatuses like the PMF. This structure allows Tehran to exert leverage by destabilizing Baghdad’s relationships with its neighbors and global allies, effectively cornering the Iraqi state in a balancing act between regional powers. The call for the U.S. to press for concrete disarmament efforts is framed as a pathway to achieving genuine autonomy, suggesting that diplomatic promises, absent tangible action, are insufficient against established power structures. Furthermore, the push for energy independence and cooperation with Gulf neighbors introduces an economic dimension to the security dilemma; dependence on Iranian energy supplies creates vulnerability that can be exploited by external actors. The pattern suggests that kinetic action by external powers is leveraged not just to address immediate threats but to compel shifts in internal political dynamics and resource allocation away from entrenched, non-state security forces toward internationally recognized partnerships. What questions remain about the sustainability of any negotiated outcome when underlying power structures remain fundamentally aligned with external patrons?

Sentinel — Human

Confidence

This text reads like a policy brief synthesized from news reporting, characterized by an analytical focus on cause-and-effect relationships rather than simple factual recitation.

Signals Detected

Moderate sentence length variance; vocabulary is formal but narrative flow is driven by specific policy context.

Strong logical thread connecting disparate events (drone strikes, political maneuvering, energy dependence) into a cohesive argument about regional dynamics.

References to specific statements (Zaidi, Sabah al-Numan) and documented historical events suggest grounding in source reporting, not pure template matching.

The complexity of the narrative involving multiple, sometimes contradictory, regional claims (Houthi vs. militia attribution) suggests complex synthesis rather than simple fabrication.

Human Indicators

The structure demonstrates an attempt to synthesize competing geopolitical narratives, including citing official statements and historical assessments from various sources.

The argument transitions smoothly between immediate conflict reporting and deeper structural analysis of Iranian influence in Iraq.