During Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s official visit to China in June, the two countries agreed to deepen cooperation on the long-discussed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. China said it would support the project within its capacity and help expedite its feasibility study, raising fresh hopes for progress on one of Bangladesh’s most politically sensitive infrastructure initiatives.
China may be able to help Bangladesh reshape the banks of the Teesta. It can finance dredging, construct embankments and help create reservoirs to store monsoon water.
But can it guarantee that enough water will cross the border into Bangladesh during the dry season?
That depends largely on upstream water availability, releases, and cooperation from India.
The Teesta is central to agriculture and livelihoods across Bangladesh’s northern districts, but it behaves like two different rivers. During the dry season, its channels shrink and irrigation becomes difficult. During the monsoon, sudden surges cause floods, erosion and displacement.
The proposed Chinese-backed project is intended to address both problems.
An earlier proposal from state-owned PowerChina, developed from studies beginning in 2019 and subsequently revised, envisaged dredging a 102-km stretch of the river, repairing nearly 80 km of existing embankments and constructing more than 124 km of new ones.
It also proposed new groynes, roads, agricultural and industrial zones, settlements and the reclamation of more than 170 sq km of land during the first phase. However, Bangladesh and China have since agreed to conduct a new joint feasibility study, meaning the project’s final design, cost and scope could still change.
These measures could bring clear benefits. Stronger embankments may reduce erosion, while dredging and reservoirs could improve monsoon-water management and preserve some water for later use. Roads and reclaimed land could also support economic activity in northern Bangladesh.
Sreeradha Datta of the New Delhi-based Jindal School of International Affairs told The Diplomat that the proposed project could help Bangladesh control floods and store monsoon water for agriculture. But its impact would ultimately depend on the amount of water available in the river during the dry season.
“If the river does not have an adequate flow, no project can artificially increase it,” Datta said. Bangladesh needs water in the Teesta during the lean season, and that “requires discussions between India and Bangladesh.”
Her warning highlights the project’s main limitation: It cannot produce more water.
The Teesta begins in the Indian state of Sikkim, flows through West Bengal and enters Bangladesh’s Nilphamari district before joining the Brahmaputra river. Bangladesh therefore receives what remains after upstream use, diversion, and regulation. The Gajoldoba Barrage in West Bengal plays a central role in controlling the river’s flow before it reaches the border.
The consequences are most visible between December and March. According to the Bangladesh Water Development Board, the Teesta’s natural dry season flow should be about 5,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs). Recent measurements have fallen to around 400 cusecs. The shortage has disrupted the production of agricultural products worth more than 10 billion taka (about $81 million) each year.
Bangladesh can dredge the riverbed, but it cannot fill it if upstream flows remain this low. It can construct canals, but those canals will have little value without a predictable supply of water. It can reclaim land, but agriculture on that land will still depend on water.
This is why the Teesta project and a water-sharing agreement with India should not be treated as alternatives. They address separate but interconnected parts of the same crisis. The Chinese-backed project focuses on managing the river inside Bangladesh. An agreement with India would help determine how much water Bangladesh receives and when it receives it.
Sheikh Rokon, an activist and secretary general of Riverine People, an NGO that works to protect rivers, told The Diplomat that the master plan was necessary for managing the Teesta within Bangladesh. But its effectiveness, he argued, would depend on reliable information about upstream flows and water availability.
“We need hydrological data from India during both the dry season and the monsoon,” Rokon said. Even if Bangladesh stores or redistributes the water available within its territory, it cannot manage the river sustainably without knowing how much water is coming from upstream, he said.
Rokon also argued that a formal agreement was essential to establish Bangladesh’s rights over the transboundary river. “The Teesta is not exclusively an Indian river,” he said. “Bangladesh is a downstream country and has riparian rights over its water.”
He warned that implementing the master plan while abandoning efforts to reach an agreement would effectively mean giving up those rights. China may provide the project’s technical expertise and financing, but India’s participation remains indispensable for ensuring upstream water, sharing hydrological information and recognizing Bangladesh’s rights over the river, Rokon pointed out.
Bangladesh and India came close to reaching an agreement in 2011. A draft formula reportedly proposed that India receive 42.5 percent of the dry-season flow and Bangladesh 37.5 percent, with the remaining 20 percent left for the river.
The agreement was to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka. But it did not happen. Opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, who argued that the proposed arrangement would harm farmers in her state, stalled the signing of the agreement.
Since then, the water-sharing dispute has remained unresolved, even during periods of close political relations between Dhaka and New Delhi. That failure partly explains why Bangladesh began looking to China for a different kind of solution.
Datta said that any renewed negotiations would need to go beyond deciding what percentage of the Teesta’s water each country should receive. They would also need to consider the farming systems and livelihood needs of communities on both sides of the border.
Bangladesh’s concern over the lack of dry-season water was understandable, she said, particularly because of its impact on agriculture and livelihoods. But farming communities in North Bengal in West Bengal also depend heavily on the river.
“The two countries should move beyond accusations and discuss their respective needs, agricultural systems and available technologies,” Datta said. She added that water sharing should be considered within a broader and more cooperative framework of sustainable development.
The Chinese proposal does not directly challenge India’s control over upstream flows. Instead, it attempts to make better use of whatever water reaches Bangladesh. This may improve conditions during some seasons, but it cannot remove the fundamental asymmetry between an upstream and a downstream country.
India has also expressed interest in the river-management project. In 2024, New Delhi offered to send a technical team to Bangladesh to discuss the conservation and management of the Teesta. Indian officials later said the proposal remained open for discussion.
The offer was widely interpreted as reflecting India’s concern about a major Chinese role in a project close to the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow land route connecting mainland India with its northeastern states.
This geopolitical competition can, however, distract attention from the practical question facing Bangladesh. The issue is not simply whether China or India should implement the project. The more important question is whether any project can meet its objectives without cooperation from the upstream country.
Large-scale water storage would also have limits. The Teesta carries around 49 million tons of sediment through the river each year. Keeping reservoirs and dredged channels clear would therefore require regular maintenance and continued spending. Sudden releases of water during the monsoon could also put pressure on new embankments and other river-control structures.
Climate change makes the situation more uncertain. The Teesta basin has already faced severe floods caused by extreme rainfall and glacial events in India. In the future, the river may experience stronger monsoon flows alongside deeper water shortages during the dry season.
These risks cannot be addressed through engineering work alone. The project would remain dependent on the river’s natural flow, as well as information and coordination between Bangladesh and India.
The Chinese-backed project could still bring important benefits. It may improve river management, reduce erosion and flooding, and support development in northern Bangladesh.
But the project should not be judged only by how many embankments are built, how much sediment is removed or how much land is reclaimed. The main question is whether farmers receive enough water during the dry season.
Without a Bangladesh-India agreement, Dhaka may be able to manage its part of the Teesta more effectively, but the dry-season water shortage is likely to continue. Chinese support could improve the river’s infrastructure, while the question of upstream flow would remain tied to relations with India.