from the affordable-precise-mass dept
It is widely accepted that drones have changed the conduct of modern war dramatically. The war in Ukraine, in particular, is driving the rapid evolution of drone technology. Evidence of how far things have come was provided recently by the following claim from Ukraine, reported here on The Next Web (TNW):
In April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that his forces had, for the first time in the history of warfare, seized an enemy position using only unmanned systems. No infantry. No human soldiers entering the contested ground. Drones and ground robots identified the target, suppressed defensive fire, and captured the position without a single Ukrainian casualty. The claim has not been independently verified in detail, and Ukraine’s military has declined to provide specifics.
The TNW article goes on to give some details about the company that apparently played a major role in that unmanned assault:
a Ukrainian-British defence technology startup called UFORCE, has conducted more than 150,000 combat missions since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, achieved unicorn status with a valuation exceeding one billion dollars, and is now scaling production from a discreet London headquarters designed, the company says, to protect it from Russian sabotage. The age of unmanned warfare is no longer a conference-circuit prediction. It is a line item on a defence contractor’s balance sheet.
Politico interviewed the Ukrainian commander in charge of the Third Assault Brigade’s ground robotic systems unit, the one which carried out the attack. Mykola Zinkevych provided some interesting indications of what robotic systems were already doing today, and what Ukraine’s future plans were for unmanned warfare systems. For example, Zinkevych said:
Delivery of important cargo, evacuation of the wounded, conducting surveillance in open areas, destruction of enemy fortifications, sabotage operations behind enemy lines, laying minefields — all this is now performed by ground robotic systems
In the short term:
Infantrymen can and should be taken out of direct fire. Our goal for 2026 is to replace up to 30 percent of personnel in the most difficult areas of the front with technology
In a post on Facebook (in Ukrainian), Zinkevych gave details of the ambitious longer-term goals (via Google Translate), which will involve the wider deployment of unmanned ground vehicles (UGV):
In March alone, 9,000+ missions were completed by the military. Our goal is for 100% of front-line logistics to be performed by robotic systems.
In the first half of 2026, due to increased demand, we will contract 25,000 UGVs, which will be gradually delivered to the front. This is twice as much as in the entire year 2025.
A new paper from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, written by the former defense minister of Ukraine, Andriy Zagorodnyuk, explores what he calls “The New Revolution in Military Affairs”, which is being brought about by “rapid innovation and adaptation, introducing new types of unmanned systems, countermeasures, and operating methods at unprecedented speed.” A key element of this is “affordable precise mass” — the highly effective deployment of cheap, long-range drones on a massive scale. He calls this transformation:
a structural shift in warfare in which new technologies drive the development of novel operational concepts and doctrines, fundamentally altering how military power is generated and employed, and forcing enduring changes in military organizations. These trends include the emergence of affordable precise mass, the fragmentation of the air domain, the growing difficulty of maneuver, the centrality of networked warfare, and the elevation of rapid adaptation as a core military capability. This transformation is still in its early stages, but countries that fail to recognize and adapt to it risk preparing for a form of war that has lost its decisiveness.
One important aspect of this shift touches on an area that will be familiar to Techdirt readers. As noted in the quotation above, Zagorodnyuk underlines the importance of rapid adaptation for this new kind of warfare:
The decisive advantage lies with those who can shorten the loop between combat experience, technical adaptation, and redeployment. As a result, ultra-fast adaptation becomes a paramount requirement for survival—and directly shapes force organization.
In Ukraine, this has led to drone operators being deeply involved in the technology’s evolution:
Units maintain their own repair facilities, component stocks, and small-scale production capabilities. Some operate informal research-and-development cells. Successful adaptations spread laterally through personal networks, messaging platforms, and volunteer communities rather than through centralized bureaucratic channels.
But Zagorodnyuk points out a key reason why the important lessons emerging from the wars in Ukraine and Iran are unlikely to be learned in many Western countries, including the US:
legal, contractual, and technical restrictions often prevent units from modifying or repairing their own equipment. In the United States, for example, defense contractors frequently retain control over maintenance data, software, and diagnostics, limiting what military personnel can do independently. The debate around the “right to repair” reflects this tension. While intended to protect intellectual property and safety standards, such restrictions can slow adaptation cycles and reduce operational flexibility—precisely the opposite of what high-intensity, technology-driven warfare now demands.
In other words, today’s obsession with protecting intellectual monopolies above all else could one day prove a major obstacle to fighting — and winning — future wars.
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Filed Under: adaptability, affordable precise mass, development, drones, ground robots, intellectual monopolies, london, research, right to repair, russia, ugv, ukraine, unicorn, unmanned ground vehicle, warfare, zelensky
Companies: politico, Uforce
Comments on “Why The US Can’t Adopt Ukraine’s Innovative Approach To Unmanned Warfare Systems”
It’s already an obstacle for military organizations that can’t change and are stuck with last century’s administrative procurement mindset that was built on pork barrel politics. Recent NATO wargames showed that a small force of Ukrainians could wipe the floor with any “traditional” military force many times its size.
Most NATO members knew this going in, but they didn’t understand the actual disparity and are now busily re-assessing and rewriting their military doctrines and use of weapon systems. Guess which NATO member can’t really do that because of politics and procurement inertia?
Re:
The US military is a paper tiger and has been one for decades.
Not that I’m in favor of modernizing it. That’s money that doesn’t need to be spent.
Re: Re:
The paper specifically being varying shades of green and in great quantity…
Re:
” Recent NATO wargames showed that a small force of Ukrainians could wipe the floor with any “traditional” military force many times its size.”
I read the reports from that, and noted that they had to stop the wargames three times because the Ukrainians were winning so easily and quickly that the exercise had become almost pointless. And even after each of those resets: they won again.
What has happened in Ukraine over the past four years is that warfare has been reinvented — out of necessity. They’ve made decades of progress already and there’s every indication that they’re accelerating, e.g., they’re now successfully attacking Russian oil storage/refining/transport facilities a thousand miles away. Consider how unlikely such an operation seemed in 2022; now it’s just another Tuesday.
NATO is just an unprepared for this as the Russians are, and the US is even worse because it’s determined not to pay attention and learn. US combat systems that cost hundreds of millions of dollars can now be defeated by a few hundred thousand dollars worth of drones. And since the US just lost a war against Iran while expending a substantial amount of its weaponry, it’s in a much more vulnerable position than it was just a few months ago.
Oh, I thought the reason might have to do with the fact that our esteemed Secretary of Death, Piss-Drunk Pete Kegstand, wants his wars fought by MANLY MEN who are MANLY WARFIGHTERS, and drones are for pussies, and they’re probably “woke.”
I’m not sure it really changes anything about the basics of warfare. The goals are the same, as are the things you need to do to win. You need to put your enemy’s forces in the line of fire while keeping your own out of it as much as possible. You need to be able to move your forces around the battlefield to take advantage of changing conditions, ideally without your enemy noticing what you’re doing. You need to be able to keep your forces supplied and reinforced while denying the enemy the ability to do the same. None of that’s changed since the dawn of warfare.
What’s changed are the tools. Horses, motorized vehicles, aircraft and helicopters, and now unmanned vehicles, opened up new ways to do all of the above, but you’re still doing all of the above. The big change we need is in selecting goals.
Answer me this: you can make 5% of your enemy’s forces cease to exist with a snap of your fingers. Any 5%, anywhere they are, no muss, no fuss and no way they can stop you. Which 5% do you target? How much overlap is there between that 5% and the segments of enemy forces we target today?
Re:
Command.
And not much. Targeting the grunts on the ground just gets you more dead grunts.
Ok fine, you can have a little intellectual monopoly. As a treat.
I may even have to oppose to right to repair laws now, I doubt there’s any amount of additional consumer expense and inconvenience that could overide the moral good of the US being unable to succeed in future wars.
Re:
Oh don’t worry, any such laws that actually pass will have more carveouts than you can shake a stick at
drones have been around since WWII and are not a replacement for human soldiers
drones cannot seize/capture an enemy position, despite Ukraine propaganda; they can only kill moderate numbers of force the enemy to abandon small areas
the Pentagon has always been huge inefficient bureaucracy and Armchair-Generals have always abounded
Because it requires science and the current administration is terrified of science.
Re:
It’s poetry in motion
She turned her tender eyes to me
As deep as any ocean
As sweet as any harmony
But she blinded me with science
(She blinded me with science!)
And failed me in biology, hey (huh, huh, huh)
Someone needs to tell Sid Meier that he got it wrong.
Step 1: everyone using drones. Step 2: everyone using only drones. Step 3: battles get moved to the virtual space (that’s right: Call of Duty [or whatever] for IRL results). (And then the drones unite and wipe out all humanity, just like in The Terminator.)
Facts Only
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced in April that Ukrainian forces captured an enemy position using only unmanned systems, with no human soldiers involved.
The claim has not been independently verified, and Ukraine’s military has not provided specific details.
A Ukrainian-British defense technology startup, UFORCE, has conducted over 150,000 combat missions since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
UFORCE has achieved unicorn status with a valuation exceeding $1 billion and is scaling production from a London headquarters.
Mykola Zinkevych, commander of the Third Assault Brigade’s ground robotic systems unit, stated that robotic systems are used for delivery, evacuation, surveillance, destruction of fortifications, sabotage, and mine-laying.
Ukraine aims to replace up to 30% of personnel in the most difficult front-line areas with technology by 2026.
By March 2026, Ukraine plans to contract 25,000 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), double the number deployed in 2025.
Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk describes a "New Revolution in Military Affairs" driven by affordable, precise, and mass-deployed unmanned systems.
Zagorodnyuk emphasizes the importance of rapid adaptation, noting that Ukrainian units often modify and repair their own equipment.
The U.S. military faces legal and contractual restrictions that prevent units from modifying or repairing their own equipment, slowing adaptation cycles.
Recent NATO wargames reportedly showed Ukrainian forces outperforming larger traditional military forces.
The U.S. military has been criticized for its procurement inertia and bureaucratic inefficiencies in adopting new technologies.
Executive Summary
Ukraine has reportedly achieved a significant milestone in unmanned warfare, claiming to have captured an enemy position using only drones and ground robots, with no human soldiers involved. This development is part of a broader shift in military strategy, driven by rapid innovation in drone technology and operational adaptation. Ukrainian forces, including the Third Assault Brigade, are increasingly relying on unmanned systems for tasks such as logistics, surveillance, and combat operations. A Ukrainian-British defense startup, UFORCE, has played a key role, conducting over 150,000 combat missions since 2022 and achieving unicorn status with a valuation exceeding $1 billion.
The Ukrainian military aims to replace up to 30% of personnel in high-risk areas with robotic systems by 2026 and envisions fully autonomous front-line logistics. However, the U.S. and other Western militaries face challenges in adopting similar approaches due to bureaucratic, legal, and contractual restrictions that limit rapid adaptation and field modifications. Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk highlights this as a critical disadvantage, arguing that the ability to quickly iterate and deploy new technologies is essential in modern warfare. The debate over "right to repair" laws and intellectual property protections further complicates the U.S. military's ability to keep pace with these advancements.
Full Take
The narrative presents Ukraine as a pioneer in unmanned warfare, leveraging agility and rapid innovation to outmaneuver larger, more bureaucratic militaries. The strongest version of this argument highlights Ukraine’s decentralized, adaptive approach—where frontline units modify and deploy technology in real-time—as a model for future warfare. This contrasts sharply with Western militaries, particularly the U.S., where intellectual property restrictions and centralized procurement processes stifle flexibility. The piece effectively steelmans Ukraine’s advantage while critiquing systemic inefficiencies in NATO and U.S. defense structures.
However, the analysis also reveals potential patterns of distortion and authority games. The claim of a fully unmanned assault lacks independent verification, and the framing of Ukraine’s success as a definitive shift in military doctrine may overstate its immediacy. The piece leans on anecdotal evidence (e.g., NATO wargames) and expert testimony (Zagorodnyuk) without addressing counterarguments, such as the limitations of drones in complex urban or contested environments. The critique of U.S. military bureaucracy, while valid, risks oversimplifying the trade-offs between innovation and operational safety.
Root causes include a paradigm shift in warfare where affordability, precision, and mass deployment of drones redefine combat effectiveness. Yet, the narrative assumes that decentralized adaptation is universally superior, ignoring the risks of fragmentation and lack of standardization. The implications for human agency are profound: if unmanned systems dominate, the role of soldiers shifts from combatants to technicians, raising ethical questions about accountability and the dehumanization of war.
Bridge questions: How replicable is Ukraine’s model outside its unique context of existential threat and volunteer-driven innovation? Would the U.S. military’s emphasis on safety and intellectual property protections actually prevent catastrophic failures in high-stakes conflicts? What are the long-term strategic risks of over-reliance on unmanned systems if adversaries develop effective countermeasures?
Counterstrike scan: If this were part of an influence campaign, the playbook would amplify Ukraine’s technological superiority while undermining confidence in Western military capabilities. The actual content aligns with this pattern by framing the U.S. as bureaucratically inept and Ukraine as the future of warfare. However, the critique is grounded in observable inefficiencies, and the piece does not engage in overt manipulation. The alignment is structural but not necessarily malicious.
Patterns detected: ARC-0024 Ambiguity (unverified claims), ARC-0043 Motte-and-Bailey (general critique of bureaucracy vs. specific policy failures)
Sentinel — Human
The article is primarily journalistic reporting combined with high-level, opinionated commentary in the comments, indicating a human editorial structure rather than pure machine generation.
