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Justice John Marshall Harlan and Birth Tourism
Justice Harlan provides a middle ground for the Supreme Court on the question of birthright citizenship.
One of the more unexpected aspects of the Birthright Citizenship case was the return of Justice John Marshall Harlan. But I think a more careful study of Harlan's lectures suggests that at least part of Trump's order may survive: specifically, the status of children whose mother is in the United States on a tourist or other limited visa. I discuss this question in a new Civitas Outlook essay. Here is the introduction:
The conventional wisdom is that the Supreme Court will strike down President Trump's entire birthright citizenship order. In 2018, I wrote that children of illegal aliens are citizens at birth. I'll admit that recent scholarship has made this question much closer than I had realized, but on balance, Trump's order should not stand for the children of illegal aliens who are domiciled in the United States. The analysis, however, differs for the second part of Trump's order, which applies to children of mothers on tourist or other temporary visas. And for authority, the Supreme Court can rely on an unexpected source who came up at oral argument: Justice John Marshall Harlan.
In a 1898 constitutional law lecture, which I analyzed more than a decade ago, Justice Harlan told his students that the children of tourists, "who cannot under the law become naturalized in the United States," would not be birthright citizens. During oral argument at the Supreme Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch and counsel for the ACLU dismissed Harlan's views because he dissented in the landmark case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark. But that decision did not set a binding precedent on the status of temporary sojourners. More importantly, the views of the Great Dissenter, whose dissents were often vindicated by history, should not be dismissed so casually. If Harlan was right, then the Supreme Court could split the difference on Trump's order: the children of illegal aliens who intend to stay in the United States would retain birthright citizenship, but pregnant women could no longer come to the United States on temporary visas for the purpose of giving birth to citizens.
Wong Kim Ark certainly addressed the issue of birth to a tourist, but I do not think a holding was set on that question. If so, the value of Wong Kim Ark is persuasive, and not binding. Here, the Harlan dissent should warrant a closer look. After all, Harlan's other dissents have come to be vindicated:
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. Wong Kim Ark, which was decided three decades later, should not be seen as a clear reflection of the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The justices in the majority and dissent, who all lived through the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, vigorously disagreed on that original meaning. The value of Wong Kim Ark lies in its status as a judicial decision. Wong Kim Ark set a precedent about the status of children born to aliens who are domiciled in the United States, but there is no similar holding about temporary sojourners who do not intend to stay in the United States.
Where there is not a binding precedent about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, I would line up behind Harlan over other members of the Court from the late nineteenth century. Consider Harlan's track record. In 1896, the Supreme Court decided the notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson by an 8-1 vote. The majority established the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine, which approved the Jim Crow regime. Justice Harlan was the only member who recognized that separate cannot be equal. Five members of the Wong Kim Ark majority also joined the Plessy majority. Harlan's dissents would also be vindicated in other landmark cases. In The Civil Rights Cases (1883), Harlan recognized that Congress had the power to eradicate the vestiges of slavery. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895), Harlan found that the federal income tax was constitutional. In United States v. E.C. Knight (1895), Harlan found that Congress could regulate manufacturing as a form of commerce. In Lochner v. New York (1905), Justice Harlan upheld a law regulating bakers' hours. And I could go on. The track record for Justice Horace Gray pales in comparison.
Very little of the briefing focused on the birth tourism issue, so Harlan's lecture notes warrant a closer look.
Facts Only
Justice John Marshall Harlan delivered a constitutional law lecture in 1898.
Harlan stated that children of tourists, who cannot naturalize, would not be birthright citizens.
The Supreme Court case *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* (1898) addressed citizenship for children of domiciled aliens.
*Wong Kim Ark* did not set a binding precedent on children born to temporary visitors.
Justice Harlan dissented in *Wong Kim Ark* and *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896).
Five justices who ruled in *Wong Kim Ark* also joined the *Plessy* majority.
Harlan's dissents in cases like *The Civil Rights Cases* (1883) and *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.* (1895) were later vindicated.
President Trump's 2018 order sought to deny birthright citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants and temporary visitors.
The article argues that children of undocumented immigrants domiciled in the U.S. should retain citizenship.
The status of children born to mothers on tourist visas remains legally unresolved.
Oral arguments at the Supreme Court referenced Harlan's views, though some justices dismissed them.
The article is based on a Civitas Outlook essay by the author.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative presents a nuanced legal argument, leveraging historical dissent to challenge contemporary assumptions about birthright citizenship. The strongest version of this argument is that Harlan's lectures and dissents provide a principled basis for distinguishing between domiciled and temporary visitors—a distinction *Wong Kim Ark* left unresolved. The analysis avoids emotional exploitation but employs a form of authority games by invoking Harlan's vindicated dissents to bolster credibility. The root cause appears to be a tension between originalist interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment and evolving judicial precedents. The implications are significant: if the Court adopts this distinction, it could reshape immigration policy by discouraging "birth tourism" while preserving rights for undocumented immigrants with deeper ties to the U.S. However, the argument hinges on the assumption that Harlan's views reflect the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment—a claim that remains contested.
Bridge questions: How would a strict originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment address temporary visitors? What evidence exists that the ratifiers intended to exclude children of tourists? Would this distinction create administrative challenges in determining parental intent?
Counterstrike scan: A coordinated influence campaign might amplify Harlan's dissent to undermine *Wong Kim Ark* while framing the issue as a matter of judicial consistency. The actual content, however, engages with legal scholarship rather than deploying manipulative tactics. No structural alignment with a hypothetical attack playbook is detected.
Patterns detected: ARC-0024 Ambiguity (in the unresolved legal status of temporary visitors), ARC-0043 Motte-and-Bailey (potential retreat to "Harlan was vindicated" if challenged on specifics).
Sentinel — Human
This text displays the characteristics of a human academic or legal writer developing a specific, complex argument based on historical analysis, rather than generic, synthetic content.
