Shocking conclusions from the report. "Russian bots and the GRU have a silent ally"

* Krzysztof Gawkowski requested the liquidation of fictitious appeal procedures and immediate removal of identified bot networks.
* He stated that any unfulfilled demands by platforms would result in financial penalties of tens of millions of PLN or euros.
* The report analyzed reactions to 65,220 disinformation materials reported in the first six months of 2026.
* Of these reports, only 17.3% (11,270) underwent moderation, and 76% (49,570) remained without reaction.
* Only 4,380 out of the reported materials were removed across all platforms.
* X removed 1,438 publications (2.4%) and rejected 47,464 reports (78.9%).
* Facebook removed 2,150 publications (63.6%) and rejected 1,194 reports (35.3%).
* TikTok removed 618 publications (55.7%) and rejected 488 reports (44%).
* The majority of reported material (62,137 items, 95.3%) contained manipulations.
* Platform reactions focused on incidents involving impersonation of an institution or person, where 78.6% of these were removed.
* Of manipulated content, 3,021 items (4.9%) were removed and 47,991 incidents (77.2%) received no reaction.
* The most limited reaction concerned false information, with 9.4% of submissions removed across platforms.

The data reveals a structural disparity in platform governance regarding disinformation, where the mechanisms for addressing malicious content are heavily skewed toward inaction rather than proactive defense against state-sponsored influence. The vast majority of reported manipulative content was categorized as bot activity, yet the reaction mechanism prioritized superficial removals over systemic accountability, as evidenced by the 77.2% of manipulated content incidents receiving no response. This points to a system where identifying actors (bots) is easier than enforcing substantive behavioral change or transparency. The fact that large-scale disinformation campaigns targeting national security and public discourse are permitted to operate with minimal consequence suggests a fundamental misalignment between platform operations and the stated necessity for digital sovereignty. The threat of financial sanctions, while presented as leverage, must be examined in light of whether these penalties create an incentive for genuine structural overhaul or merely serve as reactive measures against specific violations. Furthermore, the emphasis on reactions to impersonation versus generalized false information highlights a selective focus in moderation efforts. The call for external, direct coordination between Polish entities and platforms suggests that self-regulation is insufficient, pushing the responsibility toward external enforcement, which necessitates questioning who ultimately defines the parameters of this "reaction."
Patterns detected: ARC-0021 Correlation Causation, ARC-0043 Motte-and-Bailey, ARC-0038 Burden of Proof Shift