Senator Lindsey Graham made the last foreign trip of his life to a nation he never gave up on.
Ukraine had few, if any, friends in Washington more devoted than Senator Lindsey Graham, who visited Kyiv at the end of last week. His sudden death over the weekend left the Ukrainian leadership wondering who might fill the role he played: someone who had the rare ability to talk tough with Volodymyr Zelensky, to reason with Donald Trump, and to show both presidents how their interests could align.
“His soft Carolina accent delivering tough decisions will be missed,” Serhii Kyslytsia, the deputy head of Zelensky’s administration, told me today. He saw Graham twice in the week before his death, once at the NATO summit in Ankara, and again in Kyiv. “I hope there are people up to his level to pick up and bring to conclusion his ideas and initiatives.”
Graham’s most recent visit with Zelensky marked at least the tenth trip he had made to Ukraine since the Russian invasion in 2022. The state railway company usually provided a special train for his delegation, and the senator would get a private cabin with two narrow beds for the overnight journey. During the first of these trips, in July 2022, Graham went to the town of Bucha, a suburb of the capital that Russian forces occupied for about a month that spring. In the town’s churchyard, he saw evidence of a mass grave for civilians killed during the occupation, and he later described it as “hallowed ground.”
But his stated reasons for supporting Ukraine had more to do with U.S. interests than any appeals to human sympathy or international justice. As he told Zelensky during another visit, in May 2023, U.S. aid to Ukraine during the war had been “the best money we’ve ever spent.” He argued that the U.S. should not miss its chance to weaken Russia, a strategic adversary, without risking the lives of American troops. “We’ve reduced the combat power of the Russian army by 50 percent. Not one of us has died in that endeavor,” he told 60 Minutes in an interview filmed on Kyiv’s main square around that time. “This is a great deal for America.”
The comments infuriated the regime in Moscow, which responded by issuing a warrant for Graham’s arrest. “It’s hard to imagine a greater shame for the country than having such senators,” the Kremlin’s chief spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said at the time. Some of Graham’s critics in the U.S. accused him of cynicism for admitting, in essence, that the U.S. wanted not to help Ukraine but to exploit it for the sake of geopolitical advantage. But Zelensky never found fault with Graham’s logic. On the contrary, the Ukrainian leader has used similar arguments to persuade his European allies to increase their support for his country.
“He was a real guide for Ukraine on Capitol Hill,” Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s longtime chief of staff, wrote me today in a text message. “For him, our war was not a point on the agenda. He took it personally. He came here under the air raid sirens not out of protocol. He wanted to see it all with his own eyes.”
Graham sponsored a bill last year that would impose severe economic sanctions on Russia. At a party in honor of his 70th birthday last summer, he told me that the bill would pass within days and that President Trump had agreed to sign it. “We’re going to get this done for Ukraine,” Graham said at the event, which was attended by Stephen Miller, a senior aide to the president. But the legislation never came up for a vote, and Graham struggled to convince the White House of its necessity. Only last week, during his visit to Kyiv, Graham and several of his colleagues in the Senate announced that a revised version of the sanctions bill had won the approval of the Trump administration. They promised to move the legislation forward “very soon.”
If passed, it would serve as a crowning example of Graham’s commitment to helping Zelensky, who did not always heed the senator’s counsel or warn him of Ukraine’s military plans. In August 2024, the armed forces of Ukraine launched an incursion across the border into the region of Kursk, the first foreign invasion of Russian territory since the Second World War. Graham visited Kyiv as the battle in Kursk unfolded, and he seemed impressed with the Ukrainian attempt to turn the tables in the war. “Well, you’re in Russia. Glad you didn’t tell us in advance,” Graham said to Zelensky with a smile, according to the then–foreign minister of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, who attended the meeting.
Zelensky chuckled in response, Kuleba told me. They then spent an hour discussing U.S. support for Ukraine and how it would change if Trump won the presidential race that November. After Trump’s victory, Graham worked behind the scenes to ensure that the incoming administration would not pull the plug on Ukraine or hand it over to the Russians. As part of that effort, he came up with a plan for the U.S. to take the bulk of any profits from the extraction of rare earth minerals and other natural resources in Ukraine. Graham hoped such an arrangement would appeal to Trump’s instincts as a businessman and keep U.S. support flowing.
Ahead of a planned signing ceremony for the minerals deal, in February 2025, Graham coached Zelensky on how to behave toward Trump, urging him to be respectful and not “take the bait.” The senator then watched in dismay as the meeting devolved into a shouting match. “Complete and utter disaster,” he told reporters afterward on the White House lawn, his voice shaking with emotion. “I don’t know if we can ever do business with Zelensky again.”
In the aftermath, the U.S. cut off all aid to Ukraine for about 10 days, and Graham insisted that Ukraine needed to hold presidential elections. Zelensky took that advice as a call for his ouster. In an interview last year, Zelensky told me that the push for a presidential ballot in the middle of the war had been a Russian position that U.S. officials “picked up” to get rid of him.
Despite these ups and downs in their relationship, Graham was back in Zelensky’s office at the end of last week. According to the official readout of their meeting, they discussed the sanctions package against Russia, which will remain, from the Ukrainian perspective, Graham’s most important piece of unfinished business. Kyslytsia, the senior official in Kyiv, expressed hope that Graham’s colleagues in the Senate would “celebrate his life” by passing the bill. “That would be the right way to pay him tribute,” he told me.
Facts Only
* Senator Lindsey Graham made a visit to Kyiv at the end of last week.
* Serhii Kyslytsia, deputy head of Zelensky’s administration, stated that Graham’s "soft Carolina accent delivering tough decisions will be missed."
* Graham visited Ukraine at least ten times since the Russian invasion in 2022.
* During a visit to Bucha in July 2022, Graham saw evidence of a mass grave for civilians killed during the occupation.
* Graham stated that U.S. aid to Ukraine during the war was "the best money we’ve ever spent."
* Graham argued the U.S. should weaken Russia without risking American troops by reducing Russian combat power by 50 percent.
* The Kremlin issued a warrant for Graham’s arrest in response to his comments.
* Graham sponsored a bill to impose severe economic sanctions on Russia, which did not pass on the initial attempt.
* A revised version of the sanctions bill gained approval from the Trump administration during Graham's visit.
* Graham and colleagues announced an approval for a revised sanctions bill during their visit to Kyiv.
* Graham visited Kyiv when the incursion into the Kursk region occurred in August 2024.
Executive Summary
Senator Lindsey Graham made a recent visit to Kyiv, where he met with Ukrainian leadership, including Volodymyr Zelensky. The timing coincided with the recent death of Graham, which left questions about his role in supporting Ukraine. Graham had previously visited Ukraine multiple times since the 2022 invasion, including a trip to Bucha where he observed evidence of mass graves for civilians. Graham argued that U.S. aid to Ukraine during the war was a strategic benefit, stating it was the "best money we’ve ever spent" and that reducing Russian combat power was beneficial for America without risking American troops.
The arguments Graham presented regarding U.S. support were met with strong reactions from Moscow, which issued an arrest warrant for him, and criticism from some in the U.S. accusing him of cynicism. Conversely, Ukrainian leaders viewed Graham as a guide on Capitol Hill who took the war personally. Later interactions involved discussions about U.S. support contingent on the potential outcome of the presidential race, including proposals for U.S. control over resource profits from Ukraine. In a subsequent interaction regarding a minerals deal, Graham faced difficulty in securing legislative approval for sanctions, though he and colleagues managed to secure revised approval with the Trump administration.
Full Take
The narrative presents a complex interplay between personal diplomatic maneuvering, geopolitical strategy, and the shifting dynamics of international alliances. The core tension lies in the dissonance between public statements about supporting Ukraine and the subsequent tactical negotiations concerning U.S. interests. Graham's actions suggest a prioritization of perceived strategic advantage over purely humanitarian concerns, a framework that was accepted by Zelensky but provoked backlash from Moscow and internal critics in Washington. The pattern here involves using high-level diplomatic engagement—visiting conflict zones, framing aid as a transactional benefit, and brokering economic deals—to project an image of indispensable influence.
The shift from advocating for broad support to focusing on specific, self-interested mechanisms, such as resource extraction deals intended to secure continued U.S. backing, reveals a pattern where advocacy is subtly channeled into instrumental outcomes. This process, particularly in the context of shifting presidential politics, demonstrates how transactional relationships can supersede principled alignment. The ultimate implication for human agency rests on whether these pragmatic calculations can successfully integrate with long-term moral objectives without sacrificing the foundational commitment to shared values.
What happens when pragmatic leverage becomes the primary driver of policy advocacy? If the calculus shifts entirely toward maximizing immediate geopolitical advantage, what safeguards remain for those advocating based on principles separate from immediate transactional gain? How do societies balance the necessity of external support against the internal consistency required for sustained moral authority? What mechanisms must be established to ensure that strategic alignment does not erode the foundational purpose behind international cooperation?
Sentinel — Human
The text reads like a feature or investigative piece heavily reliant on retrospective accounts and quotes regarding the personal dynamics between US political figures and Ukraine's leadership, suggesting human editorial intervention.