Christian Smith: The far right is on the march in Western Europe over the weekend. The Alternative für Deutschland party won its first ever state election in Germany. Whether it’ll be able to form a coalition government is another question. But the fact is that a party which considers Russia a friend won about 44% of the vote, which more than double the party coming in second and far ahead of its previous best result. At the same time in France, Marine Le Pen is currently top of the polls for that country’s presidential election in seven months time, while in Britain, support for Nigel Farage’s Reform UK Party is neck and neck with the governing Labour Party. Right-wing populists have been, well, popular for quite a while now in Europe. So is this a significant moment for the continent and its geopolitics, or are we all getting just a wee bit ahead of ourselves? I’m Christian Smith. Welcome to this podcast from Geopolitical Futures. I’m joined of course by Geopolitical Futures chairman and founder George Friedman as we dive into what is going on with the far right, right-wing populists, the radical right, whatever you want to call it in Europe at the moment. George, before we come to you though, just a note to say thank you to all of you out there for subscribing. We just hit 80,000 subscribers on YouTube. We’re really, really. Well, we couldn’t be more pleased about that, really. Thank you for giving us your time. We hope we can keep bringing you much, much more. George, you join us from a hotel in New York today. You’re about to jet off to meetings. You’re actually at JFK. You’re about to jet off to meetings in Poland. I imagine they’ll be talking about the AfD result there over the coming days. Let’s just start with that election result for the AfD in Germany. George, it wasn’t long ago that the rise of a far right party in Europe after World War II was, was frankly unthinkable. What’s, what’s going on there?
George Friedman: Well, the unthinkable is now thinkable. There’s been dramatic change in Germany and in Europe as well. Okay. The period in which Europe was identified by NATO, which means a very small part of Europe was defined by NATO because Europe is a very large place and that NATO itself would have a single military understanding of nature things. There was also the European Union, which they joined in which they tried to create structure where there was a European, at least the members of the year of the EU, a European economy. Okay. The reality was that these were all nations, they were separate nations with different languages, different histories, and long memories of animosity amidst other nations. So this was an attempt by the Europeans to both maintain nations as independent and simultaneously overcome the inherent hostility between many of these nations by creating a pseudo state that operated, and the United States was involved that in the NATO issue after World War II to block the Russians. Well, at this point, we’ve reached a situation in which, regardless of the various threats that the Russians are posing at the moment, okay, they’ve not been able to defeat Ukraine. They’re not able to invade Poland, of course. Therefore, there is a kind of freedom now that wasn’t there for a long time. Now the questions that emerge are what are the nature of English interests and how are they related to Irish interests that we already had? Okay, there’s a question of what is France’s interest and relative to Germany’s interest? Now, for a very long time, the Germans have not been allowed to have an interest because of their savagery in World War II. Not only the Holocaust, but their vicious occupation of various countries, the wars they made, and all of that. We have come to a very important point in our history. It is now 81 years since the end of World War II. Those who participated in that war were in their very late teens or 20s, and that generation, except for very few, is gone. It’s inevitable that with their leaving the scene of history, the people who follow them had no part in Nazi Germany, had no part in the occupation of France, no part in the Holocaust, would say to themselves, we are not responsible for what our grandfathers did, our great grandfathers, perhaps. We are by nature Germans. Our language is German. We have a common interest, as France and Britain and Poland have, and we have the right to exercise it all. Right now, how they exercise it, they’re claiming, is what is in the national interest. And the Germans are saying that where we consistently subordinated the German national interest to the general European national interest, and there was no single national interest in Europe. What is happening with this generation, as happened after all wars and all such periods, is that they no longer take responsibility for what happened, and they want to claim their place as a nation state having its own interests at heart. It should be noted, however, that the AfD did not have a majority in this election. It was only a regional election, and they did not carry it all the way. That they were able to come out on top, okay, is significant, but it does not mean a fundamental shift in the nature of Germany. Now, for many in Europe also who were not alive during Then. But remember from their parents and grandparents what Germany was like. This seems to be a terrifying evolution, an unjust one, an action of the rise of the criminals again, okay? And that’s natural because their grandparents and parents told them all the bad things about the Germans always were true. But it is inevitable that as generations go away, new generations emerge who feel that they were not responsible for what did, that Germany paid the price for what it did. And that now Germany is a nation like any other, has a right to its own national interest. This creates a crisis inside of Europe that culturally continues to maintain idea of Germany being, because of what it did, a lesser nation, but creates a force inside of Germany that disagrees at the same time. Do not overstate what happened. This is one region of what was formerly eastern Germany that voted for this. Okay? They did not have a majority even in this region, although they had the largest numbers. There are several parties competing, but that certainly Germany is now going to evolve with its own national interest. And this is one of the things that Trump, I think, or Saul, as he’s backed away from NATO, the United States had been the one that opposed a common NATO principle. Okay? But we have to remember NATO is far from Europe. It is a few countries, but there’s much more to Europe. And that the evolution of. Of geopolitics as well meant that NATO had become obsolete. Therefore, it follows that a vote that nobody thought would be taken ever for some reason that said that Germany had its own national interest in, would pursue it, one in a important area, regent of, but not a 50% right vote even. Okay? So it is both significant and not as significant as people say, this is not the return of the Nazis, okay? It is the sort of insistence on this generation of Germans that they are as free as other Europeans are of guilt from the past and have the right to. To have their own national interest in foreign policy. So whereas I certainly am not a friend of the Nazis, my parents having both experienced the Holocaust in concentration camps, I certainly understand that these were not the people who put them into camps and that in the end there is going to be a German state and it will pursue its own interests. Now, if Europe were actually able to get its act together and say, look, we cannot be a nation of an entity of 44 nations or whatever, it is constantly at war with each other because the Chinese are very powerful, so are the Americans, the Russians are out there, but that’s not going to happen. These are going to still be there. So it’s significant in a sense that Germany is a major economic power, somewhat of a military power, not most powerful in the region. And that Germany would arise again raises all the tales that grandparents told their grandchildren in the other countries.
Christian Smith: Want actionable insight from Geopolitical Futures? Introducing GeoEconomic Lens, helping you understand not just what is happening, but how global power dynamics shape economic stability, dependency and opportunity. Explore the first issue for free at geopoliticalfutures.com/lens. It’s interesting, isn’t it? I think, I think it will be fascinating to see. There’s, there are other elections coming up in the next couple of weeks. There’s one in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the state there where the AfD is also leading in the polls, that is also part of East Germany or was part of East Germany. And that’s traditionally, as you say, George, where they’ve done. Where the AfD have done well, much more than so than, than West Germany. So it’ll be interesting to see what happens there. I want to come on to the geopolitical significance in just a moment. But, but sticking with, with Germany and perhaps across the, across Europe as well, in your view, what’s behind this rise in the AfD there? Perhaps you could perhaps as well in the UK and then, and then to an extent in France. Well, of course, the Marine Le Pen has been around for quite a long time.
George Friedman: Well, one of the forces was uncontrolled migration. These are relatively small countries. They have, for a global point of view, limited populations. The policy of the European states really forged by the European Union was the wealth of migrations. When migrants come into countries, there’s always social tension. In the United States, there was social tension always with migration. You see it now as well. Okay. But in Europe, it got to the point where the internal culture of the nation itself was not polluted or anything like that. It simply was. Other cultures were now there. So what had been the norm in these countries became, in some people’s eyes, illegitimate forms of imposing yourself on the new immigrants and certainly made people feel strangers in a strange way in their own countries. Okay, so the AfD is anti-immigration and that’s one of the things that holds together this movement. French interests and German interests are very much apart. They’ll be very different. But I think the experience which the United States also experienced of the destabilization of massive migration is tying them together in some way. Okay, so this is where the right emerges internally saying, I’m a German, I speak German, you’re not a German. What are you doing here? So many of you. And this is something that happens in countries. The foundation, or what we call the European right, has a great deal to do with the migration policies that were imposed on them. And one of the most important dimensions of this, which is seen by some as racist or so on and so forth, is that they want to retain German culture, such it is. Or French culture or British culture. We’re seeing as well today, okay, that has been taken down to some degree by the massive numbers of immigrants that have come in with their own culture. This is in. In human nature, we form communities, we have practices, the nation. Sometimes in these communities, we have customs. And these people don’t share our customs, don’t behave as we do. They’re foreigners. In the United States, there’s a process in which I, born in Hungary, was allowed to become an American by adhering to American norms of culture. But with their very large numbers of foreign people for the same country, their ability maintain their culture, seemingly not to want to integrate into the country terms, becomes an issue. And the Europeans did have this migration issue. So when I look at this and all the other things that are said, when they talk about national interest, they do mean German national interests, but it’s not necessarily one that violates the norms of liberal democracy or so on and so forth. Safe to say that the migration processes have taken a toll on these people.
Christian Smith: Well, look, let’s talk about the sort of more immediate geopolitics of this as well. Now, the AfD, as we’ve already spoken about, very popular in East Germany. East Germany, of course, itself is historically close to Russia during the Cold War. Perhaps no surprise then, in some respects that the AfD is much friendlier towards Russia than other parties in Germany right now. And that’s. That’s not an unfamiliar trend across the populist Right. Populist right in Europe. The AfD, for example, wants to end sanctions on Russia and have closer ties. George, what’s the geopolitical significance of a rising AfD in Germany, perhaps for the relations with Russia, but also for European efforts at unity?
George Friedman: Well, first, I want to take issue with what you said, that being in the Eastern bloc occupied by the Russians made them friendly to Russia. These Germans were very much aware of how West Germany had evolved economically, socially, and they were very aware that they were not permitted to evolve. The Russians exploited them, fear them, occupied them. So it is not the occupation that has made them friendly to the Russians. What has made them more friendly to the Russians is the fall of communism, the withdrawal of Russia from these regions, and the emergence of an ideology inside of Russia. Where the state is powerfully acting in its own interest, as these people see, there is a desire in Europe to return to the way it was before World War I wrecked everything. That is to say that these nations have their own interests, they want to pursue them and so forth. That we take Ukraine, it was once part of Russia, although not a happy part, necessarily, but that the Russians want to reclaim this as part of their nation state, they see as legitimate. They see the post World War II situation as obsolete. They’re also seeing the Cold War as obsolete. So where many in the west, in Europe, United States, look at this attack on Ukraine as an act of war against a sovereign nation, the right is taking the view. This is simply, well, what the United States did with the South left the United States, they had a civil war. They took it back. Whether this is a legitimate view or not a legitimate view doesn’t much matter. This is the view. And they also see themselves as respecting the Russians for taking this stand. The French leadership on the right always took this stance toward France even when there was retreating from their global empires. Okay. And as for the Germans, this is coming back to what they always were, a nation that had been divided until the late 19th century, when it finally united and is battling for unification itself. It got its unification. And then in the process of unification, being very much subject to the other European nations. And so there is this process going on. Nationalism is reassuring itself. And for some who see Putin not as a communist or an imperialist, but simply as a man who is trying to retain the structure of his country as it was, that fits into what they see. So there’s a move here to go back to the way it was before everything fell apart, both in World War II and the Soviet Union. And on the right, there is this sense.
Christian Smith: I think, would a Marine Le Pen victory and then combined with a rising AfD in Germany, would that or could that fundamentally change Europe’s geopolitics? I mean, these are the two powerhouses of Europe.
George Friedman: If we return it back to the reality before the war, European geopolitics were submerged under the American national interest. There was an American national interest when the Soviet Union was powerfully emerging to hold on to Western Europe. Why? Because this was Atlantic Europe. Atlantic Europe had conquered much of the world. It was the first global system. The Netherlands controlled vast areas of Asia, so they lost those empires the most. One of the most important things about 1945 was not the end of the war, but the collapse of the European imperial system. Okay. And these nations, then when the United States looked at the map, they said, if the Russians come and take the ports on the Atlantic in Hamburg, Bremen, in Calais, they will be able to afford to put forward a fleet into the Atlantic. Now, the fundamental American national strategy was framed in, in the late 19th century by Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote that the command of the sea was the fundamental interest of the United States, meaning the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. They had experienced during World War II. The German U-boats challenging us. We didn’t come into First World War until the German U-boats started sinking ships. We did not come into World War II until the Germans declared war on us. We simply gave them Lend Lease. Now, remember that Lend Lease had a clause in it that was secret, that if the British had to surrender to the Germans, the British fleet, the naval fleet, would sail to Canada and not be taken. Now, it’s very important to understand that American strategy in the Cold War as well was based on control of the Atlantic. If the Russians cut the Atlantic pipeline, our troops in Europe could not be given logistics support, reinforced or anything like that. So the United States presented this as a moral action to block German communism from oppressing Europe. It was that. It was surely that. It was also a necessary strategic move on the United States, because if the Russians built a navy which they could have on these ports, they could challenge us at sea. And we didn’t want a third round with them. Once the Russians were incapable of carrying it forward, okay, once they collapsed, the Americans inevitably lost profound interest in being in command of this part of Europe, of paying a great deal amount of money, sending generations of troops to stand guard there. And they inevitably, they may have not done it, Trump did it. But they would have done it. Reduce this. This left Europe in a position of the Americans are not going to organize us, we have to organize ourselves. And suddenly each of these nations are saying, my goodness, we’re not Europeans, we’re French. The French always knew that. The English learned they’re not Europeans, they want the pound back. Now the Germans are saying, we’re German, not European. The Russians are saying, we don’t want to conquer Europe, we want to hold on to what we had. So in a certain way, and I don’t agree with the things I’m saying, in many ways, I’m trying to map out what’s happening inside of Europe. It’s the reemergence of the prior norm, before the Cold War, before the World War II. And remember, before the Europeans were ruthlessly fighting each other with their national interest. So the vision here is that there will be national interests without conflicting national interests, that France will have its national interest, the Germans theirs. And the last time this was the case, it didn’t work out so well. So that’s where it becomes problematic. But the logic of it stands to some extent.
Christian Smith: Take a moment to follow and rate us on your preferred podcast platform. If you’re already watching on YouTube. Don’t forget to like and subscribe. I want to get into the. The more immediate aspect of Russia as well because. Because I think a number, well, many people who kind of anti Russia and Europe are concerned that what this says about, about Europe, about, about the way that, that Europeans or some Europeans that might vote for these parties are viewing the war in Ukraine and the relationship with Russia and, and that sort of thing. Do you think that this national interest change, this pursuit of national interest, could that lead to a, a more friendly relationship with Russia? Or is that just perhaps not really the point? The point is it depends on what’s in the national interest.
George Friedman: Exactly. Well, remember the United States forced Europe to give up its national interest to parts it occupied. And the Europeans gladly did because they remembered how they behaved toward each other. Remember the Germans bombing London, the French resisting and killing Germans? It was war constantly. First World War, this Second World War. So the way an artificial entity was created, NATO, which bound together all these nations that had not only fought each other, but sought to occupy the rest of Europe and much of the world. Okay, so when you pull away the reason that the United States really cared about this region, which was Russia as an aggressive, capable military power, and it was at the end of World War II, just that. And the United States realizing that Russia is not capable of even taking Ukraine, let alone all of Europe, the Americans now have a different view of the situation. And as the American bottle, if you will, is raised off of Europe, okay, these things are evolving. They’re looking around and saying, I don’t even speak French. Why am I aligning my foreign, foreign policy with France? So what is happening here is that with the end of the Cold War, a different Europe is a non ideological Europe in the sense that Russia is no longer seen as an ideological monster, but as a potential ally. And so, and so on. And so if the Americans go away, what is left? The old European countries with the old European habits and therefore they start worrying about each other and go their own separate ways. Can the EU hold them together? It is a term that I laugh at in Europe. A coalition of the willing. A coalition of the willing is not a coalition only if they show up for the game. So the Europeans have introduced this concept of the coalition of the willing to hide the fact that there is no coalition. So what is NATO going to be without the Americans? Will the Europeans, the British, the French, the Germans pull together for a common foreign policy? Well, that’s not going to be the case, the AfD says. But the French have said that before because they’ve always been obstreperous when it came to NATO, not quite liking it. The British said when they did Brexit, well, I’m not really there. And the Poles are looking at the Germans and they’re looking at the Russians on both sides and saying, my goodness, is this happening again? As well as the Russians saying, Ukraine was part of holy Mother Russia, we want it back. Not just the communist part. But, you know, this whole thing in a certain way is a move backward to the past, with the past being actually more real in Europe than the past 80 years was. This was kind of sleepwalking. So now we see Europe coming back.
Christian Smith: Interestingly, Sleepwalkers, the name of an excellent book on how the great powers slept, walk into the First World War as well. So not a term that I think a lot of Europeans want to hear. Speaking of which, as well, though, Europe is going through an extensive rearmament at the moment. Perhaps not as fast and as extensive as some in the States might like, but certainly going through. Our colleague Kamran Bokhari wrote a good piece for Geopolitical Futures on the earlier this week about, about that, you know, nations like Poland, Germany as well, are spending hundreds of billions more on. On their arms. And I suppose how reliant is this approach on European unity, on NATO unity? And does the rise of the far right in Europe or the populist right, does that threaten that?
George Friedman: Well, you have to take a look at the question of German-French relations at this point, German-Polish relations just under this government, British relations, and stop talking about Europe. It’s a continent, okay? Now, one of the interesting things that you will see happening in Poland is the United States now wants to station troops permanently in Poland and are looking for places to build bases on which their families could move and so on, as we did in Germany. So the American view of the situation is it does not trust the Russians. It’s not ideological, just doesn’t, doesn’t see a need or the ability of people west of Poland to deal with the Russians. Poland is the eastern edge of this coalition facing the Russians. And the United States just promised a very large infusion of money into Poland to build weapons. So the Americans are still there, but they’re no longer there. Simply trying to organize Europe into something that is not going to be at war with itself and capable of resisting to some extent. It is focusing in on its own concerns about Russia that is based on Poland. Reason I’m going there, see this? And the Polish American relationship is evolving magnificently. Okay, this is not making the Germans happy, okay? They got the French to their left, the Poles to their right. The Poles are no longer weak. So a new geopolitics is emerging. But remember, when we talk about Europe, as Henry Kissinger said, we talk about Europe, there’s no phone number for Europe. Who do I call when I want to talk to Europe? There are simply nation states. And what the AfD did is not whether I like it or not, it is that it is moving toward the idea that there is a Germany, that Germany is not France, it is not Britain, it is not Poland, it is Germany. And that this idea of Europe as an entity, well, it’s the coalition of the willing, which is what the EU is. So long as everybody’s profiting, they’ll stay in there. Otherwise, not the British left.
Christian Smith: I suppose the AfD sort of reflects that view, as you’re saying, George, that view that things can be different to how many in Germany. Many in the sort of ruling classes in Germany have traditionally thought they are since. Particularly since the end of the Cold War. George, to finish, I want to look at somewhere where something quite different is happening in some ways, which is Hungary, of course. Since the new government there took over from Orban, the relations with Russia have been deteriorating. About 10 diplomats were expelled from there this week. Russian diplomats, that is. What’s the significance of the souring of this relationship for both Russia and for. For Hungary and for other countries in Europe.
George Friedman: But Orban had a policy that was anti-European in one sense. It did not trust the other European countries. It never lost its trust of Germany, so on and so forth. Okay? So Orban based his policy on saying one, we can’t trust our European partners. They’re not partners, they’re working for themselves. Second, the Americans are not crazy, are not going to throw themselves into wars. We cannot defeat Russia if they choose to come in after 1956 revolution. Let’s have an understanding with the Russians. They are not the communists. They’re different and work that way. In this way, they were excluded from Europe. They were seemed to violate the fundamental principles of Europe. Now, late in the game, Orban lost the election and a Europeanist, as they say, got into it. Who wants to be one of the willing? That’s perfectly legitimate, but it’s sort of Hungary tracking back way where the other countries are now emerging as Orban was in terms of the Hungarian national interest and its relationship to Russia and so on and so forth. Now Hungary is going another way, embracing the Europeanist concept at a time when it’s becoming to some extent obsolescent.
Christian Smith: And what’s the impact of that then do you think, George? How’s that going to play out?
George Friedman: Well, the impact of Hungary on Europe has been profoundly limited in terms of the fact that Hungary is a country with 9 million people, which is not much, was historically part of the Austro-Hungarian empire and other empires conquered by the Turks and only on certain occasions was an independent country, but with a profoundly different population speaking non-Indo-European language more related to Mongolian in some ways than anything else. So Hungary was always the outlier, okay? And I grew up in a Hungarian household, so my first language was Hungarian and I still speak it fluently. And it’s a very different place. Its history has been unique. It has been a nation that’s won many Nobel Prizes for the brilliance of their population and is never quite comfortable with anyone. So watching Hungary does not point in any direction that anyone else will follow. It is a unique nation. It’s one I have no commitment to except by past. And I look at Hungary as a profoundly interesting outlier of unfortunately very little significance in that region.
Christian Smith: I was going to say, do you think that it’s prominence in geopolitical discussion in the last 10, 15 years has been a result of Orban kind of rowing against the general tide as it was in Europe?
George Friedman: Sure, there was a tide in Europe which was the reality the Americans imposed on Europe was the permanent nature of Europe and the only possible one a united Europe saved that it was never united. Each country going its own way, but with very small maneuvers. And while the communists were there, that anti Communism tied them together, two things happened. The communists fell and the Russians failed to defeat Ukraine. Ukraine, for God’s sakes. After five years, okay, so the threat of Russia to Europe, which is always magnified. This notion of hybrid war. I don’t know what hybrid war is. It’s called sabotage and propaganda. And their ability to be afraid of Russia is built in. And it’s the one thing that ties them still together. So when you take a look at the evolution of German-French relations, which have been increasingly tense, you see the old Europe returning. It never went away. It was just shut down for a while. And what the AfD is saying, right or wrong, is that whether you like it or not, Russia is part of Europe. It’s not a communist country. It’s a little weak now. It’ll get stronger in the future. Let’s see if we can find a different relationship with them. And the Poles look at them and say, their next door neighbors, are you crazy? These are Russians. And the Americans say, and we’ll fund you, Poland. Enjoy yourself.
Christian Smith: Well, speaking of enjoy yourself in Poland, George, I hope you have a good time. Look forward to hearing the stories about that when you’re back. Thanks very much for today. Thanks out there for listening. We’ll be back again soon with another podcast from Geopolitical Futures. Bye. Bye.
George Friedman: Bye.
Christian Smith: Find all of our expert geopolitical analysis at geopoliticalfutures.com.