Tehran has threatened Bulgaria, home to a US air base, but how credible is that threat?
London, United Kingdom – The United States and Israel’s war on Iran was largely unexpected, given the repeated warnings from most US allies, as well as their lack of enthusiasm for a potential conflict.
Iran’s retaliation, too, has been unexpected, particularly Iranian missile strikes on several countries not party to the conflict, in the Gulf, and more recently, Jordan.
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Beyond the immediate regional sphere, the Iranian military has reportedly attempted to hit targets as far as the joint US-UK military base on the island of Diego Garcia, 2,350 miles (3,780 kilometres) away from Iran.
And Tehran has recently threatened southeastern Europe – in particular, Bulgaria.
Bulgaria’s Bezmer airfield
In July, Bulgaria’s parliament approved the use of its Bezmer Air Base for refuelling US military aircraft, an agreement that functions as a support mechanism for the US military operations in the Middle East and against Iran.
Speaking to his Bulgarian counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that any country aiding US “aggression” against Iran would be considered a legitimate target of retaliatory attack by Tehran.
According to a recent report in the Financial Times, citing unnamed Iranian sources, Tehran will consider attacking Europe if Washington escalates the conflict.
According to Armida van Rij, a senior fellow at the Centre for European Reform, southeastern Europe could be seen as an attractive target.
“[The region] is the soft underbelly of Europe as it is strategically important, hosting a number of NATO bases and key supplies to Ukraine and being on the Black Sea”.
In Bulgaria, the Iran war is perceived as something “remote”, Angel Petrov, a Sofia-based journalist who covers southeast Europe and the Middle East for the news website, Dnevnik.bg, told Al Jazeera.
Bulgarians do not view the Iran war “as important as Ukraine, and whose implications in terms of oil prices seem bearable, given general inflation”.
According to Petrov, Sofia lacks the institutional capacity to defy a brash administration in Washington while managing the war in Ukraine and an increasingly active Russia. So it was not surprising when Bulgarian leaders obliged the Trump administration’s request for the use of the Bezmer Air Base.
By firing missiles at Bezmer Air Base, Iran might hope to raise the costs of that cooperation and possibly drive a wedge between Bulgaria and the US. Bulgarians would find themselves under threat from the Iran war, to which they are indifferent, at the behest of a US ally that has shown increasing reluctance to support them in the war in Ukraine that they consider more important.
Could Iranian missiles reach Europe?
While Iranian missiles could indisputably reach parts of Europe, whether those attacks would further Iranian goals is less clear.
Ali Bakir, a senior non-resident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, said an Iranian attack on Europe would play into Trump’s hands and intensify Iran’s isolation.
In the event of an attack on countries such as Bulgaria, Iran would effectively force an additional front on Europe to a conflict that many European leaders have resisted joining, much to the irritation of the US leader.
According to Bakir, engaging Europe in the Iran conflict would likely benefit Russia’s war in Ukraine, aided by further straining Europe militarily, “potentially triggering a much wider and more dangerous war with serious international economic and security consequences”.
It may be that, for Tehran, the threat of an attack on a less powerful European country is worth more than missiles actually fired towards Europe.
The threat could shape domestic politics in Europe, keeping focus alive on a conflict that is farther than the immediate war in Ukraine and making European leaders and populations more hesitant to give passive support to the US military effort against Iran.
Iran’s declared aim is to prise Europe away from the US campaign.
However, an actual strike on a member of both the European Union and NATO would turn Europe from a hedging bystander into a belligerent party, trigger Article 4 – which quite possibly results in military retaliation, and hand Washington the European coalition it has so far failed to assemble.
For now, a reasonable conclusion is that Iran has held back by calculating that an Iranian missile attack on Europe could hand Washington a strategic victory.
However, several factors keep the risk of an attack on Europe above zero.
The first is the credibility trap. Having declared that any base used to attack Iranian territory is a legitimate target, Tehran has threatened to extend its retaliation beyond the Middle East if pressed further by the US, but that threat will only remain effective as long as US allies believe Iran is actually willing to do so.
Another factor is that Iran would not consider itself to be attacking Europe at all, but US assets that happen to stand on European soil. Tehran has used a similar distinction in missile attacks against other countries in the region, such as GCC countries. Gulf nations have rejected that notion, saying their countries, populations and infrastructure should not be assaulted amid a war they did not launch, but have not thus far retaliated against Iran directly.
Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, the cohesion of the command and control mechanisms in Iran matters deeply. If the decision to attack is not made by those who devise political strategy, retaliation could be unpredictable. The desire to respond to renewed US attacks by attacking a perceived weak point could result in disastrous overreach.
The longevity of the conflict is arguably a greater threat to Europe than Iranian missile capabilities that NATO defences over Europe could well protect against.
As the war drags on, the real danger for Europe is a prolonged US-Iran war that Washington treats as dormant, with financial effects being felt in European streets and support diverted away from Russia and the Ukraine war.
Facts Only
* Iran has launched missile strikes against several countries in the Gulf and Jordan.
* The Iranian military attempted to hit a joint US-UK base on Diego Garcia, 2,350 miles from Iran.
* In July, the Bulgarian parliament approved the use of Bezmer Air Base for refueling US military aircraft.
* Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that any country aiding US aggression against Iran is a legitimate target for retaliation.
* Iran has threatened to attack Europe if the US escalates the conflict.
* Bulgaria is a member of the European Union and NATO.
* Iranian missiles possess the capability to reach parts of Europe.
* NATO maintains defenses over Europe.
Executive Summary
Tensions between Iran and the United States have expanded into a broader geopolitical risk, with Tehran threatening retaliatory strikes against European territories, specifically Bulgaria. This threat stems from Bulgaria's agreement to allow the US military to use the Bezmer Air Base for refueling operations supporting Middle East missions. Iran views such support as "aggression," while Bulgarian leadership has obliged US requests despite a domestic preference to prioritize the conflict in Ukraine.
There is significant uncertainty regarding whether Iran will execute these threats. While technically capable of striking Europe, doing so could strategically backfire by forcing European nations into a direct conflict they have sought to avoid, potentially triggering NATO's Article 4 and granting the US a broader coalition. Conversely, the risk remains non-zero due to the need for Iran to maintain the credibility of its warnings and the possibility of unpredictable decision-making within Iran's command structure. The long-term danger for Europe may be less about immediate missile strikes and more about the economic instability and diverted military resources resulting from a prolonged US-Iran war.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative suggests that Iran is utilizing asymmetric psychological warfare to create a "credibility trap" for US allies. By targeting the "soft underbelly" of Europe, Tehran aims to decouple European security interests from US strategic goals, leveraging the exhaustion of EU nations already strained by the war in Ukraine.
The narrative relies heavily on a pattern of speculative forecasting, weaving together the opinions of geopolitical fellows and journalists to build a bridge from a diplomatic threat to a potential military reality. However, it avoids load-bearing manipulation; the tensions presented are based on documented diplomatic statements and known military capabilities.
Patterns detected: none
The driving paradigm here is the "Proxy-to-Pivot" shift: the assumption that regional conflicts can no longer be contained and will inevitably pivot to global theaters via strategic chokepoints or logistics hubs. This echoes the Cold War logic of "spheres of influence" where secondary powers (like Bulgaria) become bargaining chips for primary antagonists.
The second-order consequence is the erosion of European strategic autonomy. If Europe is forced to choose between US alignment and Iranian threats, the agency of smaller EU states is diminished, subordinating their local security to the volatility of a Middle Eastern conflict they view as remote.
Bridge Questions:
1. If Iran distinguishes between "European soil" and "US assets," how does that change the legal and military trigger for a NATO response?
2. To what extent does the perceived indifference of the Bulgarian public toward the Iran war influence the risk calculations of both Washington and Tehran?
3. What specific evidence would indicate that Iran has moved from "threat as deterrence" to "threat as preparation"?
Counterstrike Scan: A coordinated influence campaign would use this narrative to instill panic in Eastern Europe to force a rapid military buildup or to create anti-US sentiment by framing US bases as "magnets" for Iranian missiles. The current content remains an analytical exploration of risk rather than a call to action or an effort to incite fear.
