With Abelardo de la Espriella set to become Colombia’s new president on Friday, his relationship with neighboring Venezuela is increasingly under scrutiny.
Colombia shares a more than 1300 mile land border with Venezuela, which is undergoing a complex political shift after Nicolás Maduro’s capture by the United States in January.
Latin America Reports spoke with analysts to understand what relations between the two nations may look like in the months and years to come.
Deputy director of the School of International Studies at the Central University of Venezuela, Maiger Dalay Urbina Romero, identified three key areas of focus for de la Espriella with regards to Venezuela: border security, investment, and the energy sector.
Border security has become a key issue due to the presence of armed groups along the border, in particular the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Maduro’s arrest has also ushered in a new interest in the Venezuelan market among Colombian business leaders; at least 17 companies in sectors such as energy, commerce, and aviation have sought to participate in recent months in the economic recovery underway in Venezuela.
Urbina Romero believes that Washington will play a fundamental role in bilateral relations due to its influence on the government of Delcy Rodríguez and close ties with de la Espriella.
“The backbone of these issues stems not only from the interests of both countries but also from the clear presence and influence of the United States of America in both administrations. It is foreseeable that this will be the focus of attention and that, based on these issues, pragmatic political relations will be built,” he said.
This analysis aligns with that of the consulting firm Colombia Risk Analysis, which reported a few days ago that de la Espriella will not have much autonomy in his relations with Caracas, which will instead be coordinated by the Donald Trump administration.
“Colombia’s room to maneuver in influencing Venezuela’s political developments will remain limited, and bilateral cooperation will depend primarily on the agreements the United States deems compatible with its priorities regarding security, energy, and migration,” said a report by the consultancy. “Consequently, Bogotá will likely act as a facilitator of an agenda defined by third parties,” it added.
Migrants at risk
Another key issue is migration; Colombia is home to the largest number of Venezuelan migrants; of the nearly 7 million citizens who emigrated as a result of the Venezuelan crisis, some 2.8 million are in Colombia.
Urbina Romero warns that de la Espriella pledged crackdown on insecurity and criminal groups could infringe on the rights of Venezuelan migrants. there will be a trend toward a more restrictive approach to public policy, which has an impact on Venezuelan migrants.
“There is a high risk that migrants will be criminalized,” said the academic.
He explained that de la Espriella may link the issue of armed groups – “natural rivals of Abelardo’s administration”– to Venezuelan migrants.
Colombia Risk Analysis predicted that under de la Espriella’s administration, migration is likely to be treated as an issue of border control, internal security, and transnational crime.
It added that de la Espriella will likely pander to the U.S. agenda of border externalization, curtailing asylum, deportations, and route control.
Venezuelans in Colombia will also be more vulnerable, according to Colombia Risk Analysis, due to last year’s shuttering of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which funded programs supporting migrants. The report added that the Colombian state has a limited capacity to fill the gap left behind by USAID.
“Without a sustained immigration policy, irregular migration will increase costs in health care and education, limit tax revenue, exacerbate labor vulnerabilities, and make it easier for illegal economies to exploit migrants,” it warned.
The report added that in border areas, the lack of institutional support for migrants could enable armed groups to recruit, extort, and control movement at informal crossing points.
What about the economy?
Colombia and Venezuela have historically enjoyed close economic ties but in recent years, bilateral trade has been strained by border closures, sanctions, and Venezuela’s economic decline.
There are signs, however, that Colombian companies are betting on a return to prosperous relations.
Several companies spy opportunity in Venezuela following Maduro’s arrest. Airlines like Avianca and Wingo have already expanded operations while the D1 supermarket chain plans to expand its presence in the country.
Another major investment comes from the Nutresa food multinational which, according to reports by the newspaper El Colombiano, has authorized a tripling of its monthly exports to Venezuela.
Yet experts say that economic relations will not be normalized overnight.
“From a communications standpoint, it is foreseeable that there will be some distance and caution on the part of [Colombian] spokespersons – not only from the Foreign Ministry but also from national government officials,” said Urbina Romero. This is due to the threat of U.S. intervention, which the expert believes will loom over the relationship.
However he believes the opportunity spied by the private sector will eventually encourage the pro-business de la Espriella administration to improve economic ties with Venezuela.
“Given the pragmatism of certain sectors—especially the private sector, both in Colombia and Venezuela—it is quite likely that closer cooperation will emerge,” said the international relations expert.
Featured image description: Split image of Delcy Rodrigues (L) and Abelardo de la Espriella (R).
Featured image credit: Delcy Rodriguez via Estanislao Santos / Instituto PATRIA. Abelardo de la Espriella via @ABDELAESPRIELLA on X.
Facts Only
* Abelardo de la Espriella is set to become Colombia’s new president on Friday.
* Colombia shares a land border exceeding 1300 miles with Venezuela.
* Maiger Dalay Urbina Romero identified three focus areas for de la Espriella regarding Venezuela: border security, investment, and the energy sector.
* Border security is an issue due to armed groups like the ELN and FARC dissidents along the border.
* Seventeen companies in sectors such as energy, commerce, and aviation have sought participation in the Venezuelan economic recovery.
* The United States influence is expected to play a fundamental role in bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela.
* Colombian autonomy in influencing Venezuela is expected to be limited, with cooperation dependent on U.S. priorities regarding security, energy, and migration.
* Colombia is home to approximately 2.8 million Venezuelan migrants from the crisis.
* De la Espriella’s pledge to crack down on insecurity may infringe on the rights of Venezuelan migrants.
* Migration under de la Espriella might be treated as border control and internal security, likely aligning with U.S. border externalization agendas.
* Lack of a sustained immigration policy risks increasing costs related to migration for Colombian society.
* Private sector investment exists in Venezuela, including airlines like Avianca, Wingo, D1 supermarket chain, and Nutresa, which has tripled monthly exports.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative suggests that future relations between Colombia and Venezuela will be less defined by bilateral interests and more dictated by external geopolitical forces, specifically the United States. The analysis reveals a tension between private sector economic opportunity and public policy concerns regarding security and migration. While private entities show a pragmatic willingness to engage with the Venezuelan market, expert commentary points toward caution among Colombian officials due to the looming threat of U.S. intervention, suggesting that official cooperation will be channeled through external priorities rather than autonomous negotiation. The issue of migration presents a critical inflection point: any security measures enacted by the new administration risk criminalizing vulnerable populations, creating potential friction between domestic security goals and international human rights obligations for migrants. Furthermore, the systemic vulnerability exposed to actors like armed groups along the border suggests that policy implementation may unintentionally empower non-state actors. The implication is that political leadership in this context operates within a constrained space where agency is mediated by external powers, which forces internal negotiations toward externally defined parameters concerning security, energy, and migration management.
Bridge Questions: If U.S. priorities shift significantly, how might the private sector's pragmatic engagement be altered? What specific mechanisms could Colombia employ to ensure that border security policies do not result in the criminalization or increased vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants? How does the potential for external mediation fundamentally change the calculus for Colombian political actors seeking bilateral cooperation?
Sentinel — Human
This text reads like a professionally synthesized journalistic analysis, weaving together expert opinions and specific data points regarding Colombian-Venezuelan relations.
