Computer Science > Multiagent Systems
[Submitted on 1 Sep 2026]
Title:Differential Games for Compositional Handling of Competing Control Tasks
View PDF HTML (experimental)Abstract:We introduce a novel Divide and Conquer control design methodology leveraging differential games in single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems. The proposed framework associates each control objective with a virtual input and establishes a non-cooperative, finite or infinite horizon differential game among representative players. Each player optimizes a distinct virtual cost function tailored to its specific goal, the full system state, and the other virtual inputs, while accounting for the remaining players' optimal policies. By establishing a Nash Equilibrium for this game, we synthesize a composite controller that achieves a stable balance across competing objectives, providing control engineers with an intuitive and modular framework for parameter re-tuning throughout the design cycle. We provide formal mathematical derivations for both continuous-time and discrete-time dynamical systems, targeting large-scale single-agent applications where complex, dynamically conflicting control objectives make global weighting intractable. To demonstrate the methodology, we developed an open-source Python package implementing a novel numerical algorithm for solving Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations arising in infinite-horizon differential games. We evaluate the approach on two benchmark case studies: an inverted pendulum on a cart and a non-linear hierarchically controlled quadrotor. The resulting closed-loop performance is compared against the classical Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) across various transient and steady-state control metrics, demonstrating superior trajectory tracking and robust multi-objective regulation.
Submission history
From: Joshua Shay Kricheli [view email][v1] Tue, 1 Sep 2026 20:14:40 UTC (3,536 KB)
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Facts Only
* The methodology uses differential games for single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems.
* Control objectives are associated with virtual inputs in the framework.
* A non-cooperative differential game is established among representative players.
* Each player optimizes a distinct virtual cost function based on its goal, system state, and other virtual inputs.
* The objective is to find a Nash Equilibrium for the game to synthesize a composite controller.
* Formal mathematical derivations are provided for continuous-time and discrete-time systems.
* A numerical algorithm for solving Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations in infinite-horizon differential games was implemented in Python.
* Benchmarks included an inverted pendulum on a cart and a non-linear hierarchically controlled quadrotor.
* Closed-loop performance was compared against the Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR).
Executive Summary
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Sentinel — Human
The text exhibits the highly structured and formal characteristics of a peer-reviewed academic abstract, strongly suggesting human authorship within the field of control theory.
