After launching its 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) in March, the Chinese government has been publishing sectoral plans, including the 15th Five-Year Plan for Building a Beautiful China and the 15th Five-Year Plan for a New-type Energy System by the end of June. Apart from the domestic build-out of nuclear energy, both plans demonstrate China’s ambition to become a global leader in nuclear energy governance and reactor exports.
Almost simultaneously, the United States, Japan, and South Korea announced a new Memorandum of Cooperation at the NATO Summit to accelerate the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, beginning with the Indo-Pacific.
These parallel developments signal that nuclear reactor exports are becoming an increasingly important arena of strategic competition. Since the Trump administration took office, the United States has linked the deployment of nuclear reactors, both domestically and internationally, to national security. The “123 Agreement” for peaceful cooperation has been the key indicator of U.S. nuclear energy diplomacy. In recent years, new signatories to the 123 Agreements and countries expressing interest in them have concentrated in Southeast Asia – the same region where China is focusing its civil nuclear engagement.
Southeast Asia’s Energy Security and Nuclear Energy Challenges
Energy security is a major vulnerability for Southeast Asia, as highlighted by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 60 percent of Southeast Asia’s crude oil passes. To cope with the disruptions, some Southeast Asian governments rolled out short-term measures to curb energy demand. However, any such efforts will be short-lived.
Southeast Asia’s electricity demand is projected to grow by more than 100 TWh by 2030, driven by data centers, electric vehicles (EVs), and industrial needs. That will necessitate enhanced energy supply and security. With that in mind, some countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam have demonstrated a strong interest in nuclear energy by setting national targets to operate their first nuclear reactors before 2035. Some other countries, including Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand, are actively considering nuclear energy as part of their energy mix. These interests focus specifically on SMRs.
Nuclear reactors are often viewed as having high upfront costs and long construction schedules. In the United States and Europe, new-built reactors have been rare in recent years, and the licensing process and loss of construction expertise have prolonged project timelines and further elevated costs. In contrast, most newly built reactors are built by Asian countries, mainly China and South Korea, which have proven their ability to build reactors on time and on budget.
For new nuclear energy countries, operating nuclear power plants means not only building reactors but also developing the entire infrastructure, including the regulatory framework, human resources, safety culture, and more. The process, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), takes around 10 to 15 years. As the life of a reactor has been extended to 60 to 80 years, and decommissioning takes another 10 to 25 years, importing a reactor from another country means 100 years of political, logistical, educational, and legal alignment.
Russia, China, and the United States are the major nuclear reactor exporters worldwide. Russia leads in the number of reactors exported with state-owned Rosatom. Its ability to cover the entire fuel cycle and its build-own-operate model are attractive to new nuclear energy countries. Still, sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine have significantly affected its financing and logistical capabilities, resulting in construction delays.
China also adopts a state-owned company approach, with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) as the main players. Although China was once set to build 30 reactors in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries by 2030, it has so far built reactors only in Pakistan. Chinese companies don’t own or operate the reactors in Pakistan, but the fuel supply is dependent on China.
The private sector has driven U.S. nuclear energy exports, but the government supports potential importing countries through multiple programs. Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) builds capacity for countries with a strong focus on nuclear security, safety, and nonproliferation. Both the SMR Financing Toolkit by Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) and loans, guaranties, and investments by the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) are meant to support the high upfront investment of nuclear reactors that would cause a financial burden for countries. The United States does not take back spent fuel for export, but more and more policy discussions favor fuel recycling to boost its fuel capacity.
In Southeast Asia, when deciding which country to import nuclear reactors from, countries consider multiple factors simultaneously. On the one hand, they value U.S. leadership in technology, regulatory framework, nonproliferation, and safety culture. Among Southeast Asian countries exploring nuclear energy, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand have all signed 123 Agreements with the United States, while Malaysia has secured a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to begin negotiations. On the other hand, China’s cost advantage and ability to finish on time are attractive, given these countries’ national targets on the horizon.
The Engagement China and the U.S.-led Alliance Have Made in the Region
China began civil nuclear cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2015 through its state-owned nuclear energy companies to build capacity in the nuclear energy workforce. After China’s Linglong One became the world’s first IAEA-approved land-based SMR model, it has demonstrated its ability to serve the needs of BRI countries, which include all ASEAN countries.
However, despite leading the world in SMR progress, the commercial operation timeline for China’s first Linglong One has not been met. Due to the opacity of information, whether the first Linglong One can operate successfully remains a key question for countries considering nuclear energy options.
The United States has made some regulatory breakthroughs in Southeast Asia. In 2025, U.S. nuclear company Thorcon International received a first stage license from the Indonesian nuclear regulator, BAPETEN, for its molten salt reactor. Various government agencies have also stepped in to accelerate regulatory alignment to favor the adoption of U.S. technology in the region. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) funded the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) in the Philippines to conduct a study on integrating U.S. SMRs. The U.S. Department of Commerce set up an SMRs export working group to assist the industry’s communications with Southeast Asian governments. These steps signal U.S. efforts to unify the private sector to form an export strategy.
Despite the regulatory integration, the United States still has to overcome the construction bottleneck to appeal to Southeast Asian countries, and that’s where South Korea and Japan play key roles.
South Korea is an emerging nuclear reactor construction power with its state-owned Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), which has successfully built four large reactors in the UAE on schedule. The success has won them further deals with Egypt and Czechia, and KHNP has signed SMR cooperation MOUs with Singapore, the Philippines (Meralco), and Thailand.
Japan is a key supplier to the nuclear energy industry, with leading capabilities in heavy manufacturing: Japan Steel Works (JSW) supplies the world with 80 percent of the large forged components for nuclear reactors. In the 2025 trade deal between the U.S. and Japan, leveraging Japan’s capabilities to rebuild the U.S. nuclear energy industry was a key focus.
The Next Chapter of Nuclear Energy Geopolitics
While the move to integrate the capacities of the United States, South Korea, and Japan to create synergies and accelerate SMR exports has received positive feedback from the region, China is also continuing its efforts. Since the release of the 15 FYP, CNNC has signed new cooperation agreements with China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC), TBEA, and Bank of China, citing international market expansion in all of them. CEEC is one of China’s largest overseas energy project developers, operating in 140 countries and regions, while TBEA focuses on providing total solutions for renewable energy and transmission. CNNC has demonstrated the intention to integrate itself in other countries’ energy systems first and then work on the nuclear development agenda; these partnerships will strengthen its capabilities to do so.
Southeast Asia has historically cooperated with China on economic agendas and collaborated with the United States on security. The region has been navigating nuclear energy cooperation with both sides. Amid the heightened geopolitical competition in nuclear energy exports, a global energy crisis, and rapid energy demand growth domestically, the region must find a way to maintain this balanced position while serving its own needs.
Facts Only
* China launched its 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) in March.
* China published the 15th Five-Year Plan for Building a Beautiful China and the 15th Five-Year Plan for a New-type Energy System by the end of June.
* The plans demonstrate China’s ambition to lead in nuclear energy governance and reactor exports.
* The United States, Japan, and South Korea announced a new Memorandum of Cooperation at the NATO Summit to accelerate SMR deployment in third countries, starting in the Indo-Pacific.
* The United States linked the deployment of nuclear reactors to national security since the Trump administration.
* The "123 Agreement" is a key indicator of U.S. nuclear energy diplomacy.
* New signatories and interested countries for 123 Agreements have concentrated in Southeast Asia, where China focuses its civil nuclear engagement.
* Southeast Asia’s electricity demand is projected to grow by more than 100 TWh by 2030, driven by data centers, EVs, and industrial needs.
* Some Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam) have set national targets to operate first nuclear reactors before 2035.
* Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand are considering nuclear energy as part of their energy mix, focusing on SMRs.
* Operating a nuclear power plant involves developing infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, human resources, and safety culture over 10 to 15 years, plus 10 to 25 years for decommissioning.
* Russia leads reactor exports with Rosatom's build-own-operate model but faces financing/logistical delays due to sanctions.
* China’s state-owned entities, CNNC and CGN, are main players; Chinese companies do not own or operate reactors in Pakistan, though fuel supply is dependent on China.
* The U.S. supports importing countries via programs like FIRST, the SMR Financing Toolkit, and DFC loans to support upfront investment.
* Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand have signed 123 Agreements with the United States; Malaysia has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
* China began civil nuclear cooperation with ASEAN in 2015 through state-owned nuclear energy companies.
* Thorcon International received a first stage license from Indonesia’s BAPETEN for its molten salt reactor in 2025.
* The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) funded Meralco in the Philippines to study SMR integration.
* South Korea's KHNP has built four large reactors in the UAE on schedule and signed SMR cooperation MOUs with Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand.
* Japan’s JSW supplies 80 percent of large forged components for nuclear reactors.
* China's CNNC signed new cooperation agreements with CEEC, TBEA, and the Bank of China regarding international market expansion.
Executive Summary
China is advancing its nuclear energy agenda through its 15th Five-Year Plans, focusing on building a beautiful China and establishing a new-type energy system, aiming for global leadership in nuclear governance and reactor exports. Simultaneously, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are cooperating to accelerate the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, starting in the Indo-Pacific. This dynamic places nuclear reactor exports at the center of strategic competition, reinforced by U.S. linking nuclear deployment to national security via agreements like the "123 Agreement."
Southeast Asia faces significant energy security challenges, with electricity demand projected to grow substantially by 2030 due to factors like data centers and electric vehicles. In response, several Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand, are showing strong interest in nuclear energy, particularly SMRs, setting targets to operate first reactors before 2035. Reactor deployment involves a long process, requiring significant time for infrastructure development, regulation, and human resource cultivation.
The primary exporters of nuclear reactors are Russia, China, and the United States. While China leverages state-owned entities and cost advantages, and Russia offers a build-own-operate model, sanctions have created logistical delays. The United States supports importing countries through financial tools like the SMR Financing Toolkit to address high upfront costs. In Southeast Asia, nations balance valuing U.S. leadership in technology and safety with China's cost-competitiveness as deciding factors for reactor sourcing.
Full Take
The narrative establishes a tension between competing geopolitical interests—China’s capacity and cost advantage versus the U.S.-led alliance’s emphasis on regulatory alignment, technology leadership, and nonproliferation standards in nuclear energy deployment. The dynamic shifts from simple competition over exports to a complex negotiation involving long-term infrastructure alignment, trust-building, and risk management across Southeast Asia.
The process of establishing nuclear capability for new nations reveals a systemic constraint: the importing countries must navigate a 100-year alignment involving political, logistical, legal, and educational frameworks simply to manage an imported reactor lifecycle. This inherent timescale places immense pressure on all negotiating parties to demonstrate reliability and long-term commitment rather than short-term transactional wins.
The pattern emerging is one of layered engagement: the U.S. uses regulatory integration and financial tools (like DFC/EXIM) to secure alignment, while China employs infrastructural capacity and cost leverage. The focus on SMRs serves as an effective focal point because it attempts to compress the multi-decade timeline into a more manageable, exportable unit. However, the opacity surrounding China's first SMR operational status introduces critical ambiguity that can derail cooperative momentum. Furthermore, the necessity for Southeast Asian nations to balance valuing U.S. nonproliferation frameworks against China’s immediate cost appeal suggests a reflection of inherent power asymmetry in global energy governance.
What structural assumptions underpin the push for technology transfer versus capacity building? If export success is contingent on reliable long-term alignment rather than just immediate deployment figures, how do the established protocols of the 123 Agreements and the evolving SMR framework account for evolving geopolitical fault lines that are not codified in those agreements? What happens when regional energy security demands force states to choose between aligning with established security partners or optimizing immediate economic viability?
Sentinel — Human
The article presents a nuanced geopolitical analysis of nuclear energy exports, effectively synthesizing competing interests in Southeast Asia regarding technology, financing, and strategic alignment.
