Drones are everywhere in the news and on the frontlines of the Iran-U.S. War and the Russia-Ukraine War, but their most recent use on a battlefield in Central Asia represents a long-term issue – continued dependency on foreign suppliers. The Central Asian states may just be replacing their long-term Russian security dependency with a Turkish one.
Central Asian leaders risk deepening this dependency and worsening security vulnerabilities as they announce deals with foreign suppliers that are often headquartered in a single state – Turkiye. However, developments in 2026 show that opportunities for local development and production that would benefit regional economies without offloading security responsibilities exist. Local politicians just need to invest locally.
In the 2022 border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Turkiye’s Baykar Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) played a well-publicized role. After that conflict, Bishkek decided to deepen its Turkish dependency, ordering Aksungur and Akinci platforms, both from Turkish manufacturers, TAI and Baykar, respectively. It had already ordered additional TB2s and Anka (from TAI) as well.
Drones are certainly cheaper than manned aircraft, but these imported platforms weren’t without cost. Civil servants took a pay hit to fund the purchase of the new systems. And this doesn’t factor in the cost of operations and maintenance. To keep these aircraft flying with spare parts, ammunition, and sensors will require continual funding. When buying any big-ticket item, that platform is committing the state to long-term sustainment with certain suppliers.
Given Turkiye’s mercurial defense policy in recent years, can Bishkek rely on adequate sustainment in the event of another conflict? Turkiye, a NATO ally, hoped to procure F-35s, but acquired Russian S-400s, and is reportedly trying to resell those air defense system to the UAE, before aiming to rejoin F-35 talks. In addition to the initial procurement, depending on a foreign supplier means worrying about receiving additional parts and frames to replace losses from wear and tear or combat operations.
Russia and Ukraine initially looked to foreign support for their attritive war. Tehran supplied Moscow with propeller-driven one-way attack Shahed-136 drones within the first year of the conflict. Yet, Moscow soon realized that the battlefield demanded the systems evolve. Manufacturing facilities were set up inside Russia and improvements were applied to the platform including jet power, anti-radar materials, and better guidance (the latest Russian-made version is dubbed the Geran-4/5).
A similar learning process happened on Kyiv’s side. Chinese-made DJI Mavics, Turkish TB2s, and American Switchblades provided early inventory for Ukrainian forces. Yet, soon manufacturing was moved in country and development processes brought closer to the frontlines, to incorporate the daily lessons of countermeasures, deception, and the realities of a non-permissive battlespace.
While the support systems needed to keep UAVs aloft are simpler than those required for fighters, the current Iran-U.S. War – a much more permissive environment than that in eastern Ukraine – has shown how vulnerable drones are to anti-air capabilities. The U.S. has lost 45 MQ-9 Reaper tactical UAVs, 25 percent of its fleet, since the start of the campaign. Given the years and cost to replace its vehicles, the Pentagon may just switch over to different systems altogether.
Perhaps as a response to its competition and conflict with Bishkek, Dushanbe turned to its own foreign partner to develop a UAV capability. Around the same time, in 2022, it was reported that a program to produce, likely assemble, Iranian Ababil-2s in Tajikistan, was reached. At the signing were Iranian Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo. Bagheri was killed in Israeli air strikes in 2025 and Mirzo was shuffled out of office the same year.
It is unclear how much progress has been made with this facility, or if this was all just a smoke screen. Yet, even if this project had gotten off the ground, it is hard to see how that would not have resulted in significant risk. Manufacturing drones for Tehran could very quickly bring banking and dollar restrictions from Washington, making such a venture a real security risk and potential big money-loser. Ultimately, this appears to be four years with only minimal progress on UAV capabilities for Tajikistan.
Given the pitfalls of foreign dependency, Central Asia may look to develop its own systems, or at the very least license the full production process for its own domestically manufactured unmanned systems. First off, the costs are not prohibitive, unlike, say, developing an armored vehicle, ship, or manned aircraft. Second, the scale and security needs in the region are sufficient to support domestic UAV production.
Third, regional states already have a start on the research, development, and manufacturing needed to make such cooperation a success. Finally, the opportunities of joint drone research and production could lead to increased security cooperation along borders and against transnational threats. Doing so will help to escape the pitfalls of learned incapacity. What’s key though is that local leaders invest in R&D domestically – not outsource solutions.
Take for example the Kyrgyz company Nanospace that announced in May 2026 plans to open a UAV institute in Tash-Dobo, just outside Bishkek. This plan is still in its infancy, but training operators and developing technologies to network numerous small drones is an important step in developing domestic air defense, research, and surveillance, capabilities that are not dependent on foreign assistance.
Central Asia is already a regional education destination. This will continue, unless domestic actors eliminate academic freedom and quell basic research. Eurasian students have long come to Kyrgyzstan for higher education, whether at the University of Central Asia or the American University of Central Asia. Kazakhstan is a major international academic hub now as well, with some 30,000-plus foreign students attending branch institutions of Cardiff and Woosong, as well as attending homegrown universities like Al Farabi and Eurasian National. So, there are major opportunities to network skills and technologies that could benefit human capital and defense development for the entire region.
Meanwhile, an exhibit in the late summer of 2026 in Uzbekistan highlighted a new Shunqor-8 drone interceptor from the Center for Innovative Technologies that could serve as a cheap alternative to traditional missile defense. Usually, Russian exports have provided most of the region’s air defense. In recent years, for example, even amid a war that is demanding major stocks of air defenses, Kyrgyzstan demonstrated S-300PS and Tor-M2KM (long- and short-range) SAMs and Tajikistan took deliveries from Russia.
The region still connects to legacy CIS Joint Air Defense System (ADS), so this is another important step in terms of Central Asia states providing for their own defense. Boilerplate statements suggested “modernizing” the ADS and advancing cooperation in 2026, though there was a mention of AI being integrated. In addition, the quantities being delivered to the region are likely insufficient for any prolonged conflict. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan already have experience with joint venture manufacturing lines. There’s no reason for Central Asian states to continue to procure UAVs from abroad rather than building them (even with licenses) at home.
Now, clearly the region won’t replace every imported component with a domestic analogue. Local manufacturers, for example, are unlikely to compete in the international market for electro-optical/infrared sensors. Yet, for smaller first-person view UAVs, and tactical UAVs, there’s plenty of room for choices in terms of cameras for reconnaissance or navigation systems that are mapped to the local environment and do not depend on one satellite network. Anticipating such payload flexibility can help Central Asian states avoid getting “locked in” to one new partner that just supplants the old one.
One-way attack (OWA) drones are another opportunity for Central Asian states to better, more effectively, target security threats. One of the issues in recent combat operations has been an employment of seemingly indiscriminate or inaccurate artillery fire and combat aircraft strikes. OWA drones offer a way to address this and safeguard civilian lives. For example, during the 2022 Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict, indiscriminate artillery shelling and automatic weapons fire contributed to significant civilian casualties in Khistevarz, Ovchi Kalacha, Ak-Sai, and Margun, among other locations.
In much earlier conflicts, manned aircraft with unguided weapons were ineffective, or suffered significant casualties, including in Rasht and the Ferghana Valley region. The cost of manned combat aircraft is such that most states in the region cannot afford such a fleet. And in any case, even if affordable, this still leads to foreign dependency. Training and education, parts and repairs, and operations even depended in large part on Russia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not unique in this, but surely this is an opportunity to reduce civilian casualties in conflict zones and limit reliance on a foreign power.
Finally, there are a host of interconnected challenges that drones can help the region address. Everything from detecting smuggling and trafficking across remote borders; to monitoring water flow from glaciers and water use downstream; or securing international events like the Nomad Games, there are huge opportunities for cooperative monitoring and security efforts with shared drone capabilities.
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan don’t need Russia or China to address these challenges. They don’t need to depend on a foreign manufacturer for drones or the capabilities to produce many of the UAVs that have wide-ranging applications for the economy, environment, and defense of the region. And, to paraphrase some advice from Kenneth Waltz: they should be considering how to counterbalance new hegemonic threats, not swapping one vulnerability for another. Indeed, Astana is already headed in this direction.
The international order is being remade in real time, so regional governments need to look to their own security. Great powers might “ignore” their smaller neighbors for a time, but who’s to say when that benign neglect will come to an end. Investment in joint education, training, and production today can enable these states to address problems regionally, and sever dependencies at the same time, and make the whole region more secure from external threats over the long run. If they wait until the next regional conflict, it may be too late.