Roughly 37,000–40,000 Americans die in auto accidents every year. We now have large‑scale, real‑world evidence—from Waymo and a joint analysis with Swiss Re—that driverless operations can be substantially safer than matched human driving within their current operating domains. The latest data show that over 220 million miles driven, Waymo vehicles–in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Phoenix, Austin and Atlanta–have 94% fewer serious injuries, 82% fewer air bag deployments, and 93% fewer pedestrian injuries. The evidence is not fully independent, but it is unusually transparent, large‑scale evidence.
So with thousands of lives annually in the balance who is against autonomous vehicles (AVs)? Trial lawyers. Remarkably the trial lawyers saw the writing on the wall very early and the have been lobbying against AVs for nearly a decade! The American Association for Justice, the trial lawyers’ lobby, has been a prominent opponent to AV legislation (see also reports here). (They have been joined by Democrats worried about labor and demanding that heavy trucks be excluded).
The trial lawyers earn a huge amount litigating ordinary auto accidents–Annual U.S. auto insurance payouts (liability + PIP/MedPay) are on the order of $180–220B and trial lawyers are very eager to retain the right to sue car manufacturers for product liability. In my view, product liability isn’t useful as a safety device in this field. Instead, the solution is simple. Every car should be required to be insured, regardless of driver. Indeed, Waymo vehicles are already insured at $5 million liability coverage per vehicle, far higher levels than most human drivers are covered.
The UK’s Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 does basically this–a single insurer covers the vehicle whether the human or the automated system is driving; the victim is compensated directly by the insurer, no need to establish product defect; the insurer then subrogates against the manufacturer if the software was at fault. Victims get paid fast, manufacturers face the cost of their defects through recoveries and premiums, and the high-transaction costs (i.e. lawyer fees!) and messy manufacturer-versus-victim litigation is replaced by insurer-versus-manufacturer bargaining between repeat players who settle efficiently.
The great thing about this system is that insurance almost certainly deters better than tort: fleets generate data that makes experience rating precise, so insurers become continuous safety regulators, whereas litigation delivers a noisy, lagged, lottery like signal depending on safety-irrelevant factors of the jury and the locale.
We have the best data on Waymo, Tesla data is murkier but note how well this works with the insurance system. Let the insurers decide how much to charge Tesla robotaxis and FSD drivers–they will internalize the externality far better than tort lawyers. In short, insurance works great for accident victims but not for trial lawyers. Indeed, if the trial lawyers have their way accident victims will continue to be buried in an invisible graveyard.
Hat tip: Andy Hall and Jon Slotkin.
Facts Only
* Approximately 37,000–40,000 Americans die in auto accidents annually.
* Waymo vehicles in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Phoenix, Austin, and Atlanta have 94% fewer serious injuries compared to matched human driving over 220 million miles driven.
* Waymo vehicles showed 82% fewer airbag deployments over 220 million miles driven.
* Waymo vehicles showed 93% fewer pedestrian injuries over 220 million miles driven.
* Trial lawyers have lobbied against AV legislation for nearly a decade.
* Trial lawyers earn significant amounts litigating auto accidents, estimated at $180–$220B in annual U.S. auto insurance payouts (liability + PIP/MedPay).
* Waymo vehicles are insured at $5 million liability coverage per vehicle.
* The UK’s Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 has a single insurer covering the vehicle, allowing direct compensation to victims and subrogation against manufacturers if software is at fault.
* Insurers generate data for experience rating, potentially serving as continuous safety regulators.
Executive Summary
Trial lawyers lobby against autonomous vehicles, citing the need for product liability and a system where every vehicle is insured regardless of the driver. This perspective argues that current litigation models are inefficient compared to an insurance-based framework, drawing a parallel to the UK's Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018. Proponents suggest that insurers can serve as continuous safety regulators by internalizing externalities through risk assessment, which would be more effective than tort litigation for accident victims seeking compensation. The argument posits that insurance systems handle liability efficiently, allowing manufacturers to manage defects through premiums rather than protracted litigation between victims and manufacturers.
The factual basis for this position is supported by data suggesting that driverless operations can result in fewer serious injuries and less airbag deployment compared to human driving in specific domains. This evidence is presented as large-scale but noted as not fully independent. The proposed solution favors a system where insurance dictates liability, aiming to replace complex litigation with efficient bargaining between insurers and manufacturers.
Full Take
The core tension in this argument lies between the demonstrable reduction in physical harm achieved by autonomous systems and the legal/economic structures currently governing liability. The narrative suggests that an alternative system—one centered on insurance and risk pooling—is superior because it handles data generation and cost allocation more effectively than tort litigation. This re-frames safety regulation from an adversarial, often unpredictable judicial process (the "lottery like signal" of juries) to a continuous, data-driven regulatory function managed by financial entities.
A critical consideration is the shift in locus of control: moving responsibility from individual drivers or manufacturers facing direct lawsuits to insurance mechanisms that manage shared risk across fleets. This suggests a deep skepticism toward adversarial legal systems when dealing with complex technological externalities. The implication for human agency is whether efficiency and safety can be achieved by outsourcing accountability to an opaque, albeit data-rich, regulatory body (insurers) rather than maintaining the current structure where accident victims rely on lengthy, often inconclusive, litigation outcomes. The pattern suggests a resistance to legal frameworks that permit direct product liability suits in favor of systemic risk management structures.
Bridge Questions: If insurers are indeed the superior regulators, what mechanisms must be established to ensure their incentive structure aligns perfectly with public safety goals rather than purely financial solvency? How does the current emphasis on 'product liability' inherently fail to account for emergent machine learning failures that are opaque to legal discovery? What happens to the role of juries and public accountability when safety decisions become entirely internalized within actuarial science?
Sentinel — Human
This text reads like an informed, opinionated analysis written by someone familiar with both legal/insurance structures and technological data, focusing on applying systemic solutions rather than just reporting the facts.