National Grid: Live
The National Grid is the electric power transmission network for Great Britain
- Time
- Price
- £11.00/MWh
- Emissions
- 47g/kWh
- Demand
- 32.7GW
- Generation
- 34.7GW
- Transfers
- 2.0GW
Generation
12.7% fossil fuels
| Gas | 4.16 | 12.7 |
77.1% renewables
| Solar | 6.07 | 18.6 | |
| Wind | 18.86 | 57.6 | |
| Hydroelectric | 0.30 | 0.9 |
16.2% other sources
| Nuclear | 4.45 | 13.6 | |
| Biomass | 0.85 | 2.6 |
−5.3% interconnectors
| Belgium | −0.85 | −2.6 | |
| Denmark | −1.09 | −3.3 | |
| France | 3.06 | 9.4 | |
| Ireland | −0.86 | −2.6 | |
| Netherlands | −1.00 | −3.1 | |
| Norway | −0.98 | −3.0 |
−0.8% storage
| Pumped storage | −0.25 | −0.8 | |
| Battery storage | — | — |
Past day
Past week
Past year
All time
- Time
- Past day
- Price
- £52.56/MWh
- Emissions
- 64g/kWh
- Demand
- 31.2GW
- Generation
- 31.8GW
- Transfers
- 0.6GW
Generation by type
| Fossil fuels | 4.5 | 14.3 | |
| Renewables | 21.7 | 69.7 | |
| Other sources | 5.6 | 17.9 |
Generation by source
| Coal | 0.00 | 0.0 | |
| Gas | 4.47 | 14.3 | |
| Solar | 2.66 | 8.5 | |
| Wind | 18.64 | 59.8 | |
| Hydroelectric | 0.44 | 1.4 | |
| Nuclear | 4.46 | 14.3 | |
| Biomass | 1.11 | 3.6 |
Interconnectors
| Belgium | −0.38 | −1.2 | |
| Denmark | −0.25 | −0.8 | |
| France | 1.80 | 5.8 | |
| Ireland | −0.46 | −1.5 | |
| Netherlands | −0.50 | −1.6 | |
| Norway | −0.34 | −1.1 |
Storage
| Pumped storage | −0.46 | −1.5 |
Price per MWh
Emissions per kWh
Demand
Generation
Transfers
- Time
- Past week
- Price
- £98.08/MWh
- Emissions
- 107g/kWh
- Demand
- 32.3GW
- Generation
- 27.9GW
- Transfers
- 4.4GW
Generation by type
| Fossil fuels | 6.5 | 20.2 | |
| Renewables | 15.0 | 46.5 | |
| Other sources | 6.4 | 19.7 |
Generation by source
| Coal | 0.00 | 0.0 | |
| Gas | 6.53 | 20.2 | |
| Solar | 2.47 | 7.6 | |
| Wind | 12.09 | 37.4 | |
| Hydroelectric | 0.46 | 1.4 | |
| Nuclear | 4.36 | 13.5 | |
| Biomass | 2.01 | 6.2 |
Interconnectors
| Belgium | 0.57 | 1.8 | |
| Denmark | 0.66 | 2.0 | |
| France | 2.80 | 8.7 | |
| Ireland | −0.81 | −2.5 | |
| Netherlands | 0.45 | 1.4 | |
| Norway | 0.80 | 2.5 |
Storage
| Pumped storage | −0.08 | −0.2 |
Price per MWh
Emissions per kWh
Demand
Generation
Transfers
- Time
- Past year
- Price
- £77.05/MWh
- Emissions
- 124g/kWh
- Demand
- 30.5GW
- Generation
- 27.4GW
- Transfers
- 3.1GW
Generation by type
| Fossil fuels | 8.4 | 27.6 | |
| Renewables | 12.9 | 42.2 | |
| Other sources | 6.1 | 20.0 |
Generation by source
| Coal | 0.00 | 0.0 | |
| Gas | 8.42 | 27.6 | |
| Solar | 2.05 | 6.7 | |
| Wind | 10.46 | 34.2 | |
| Hydroelectric | 0.38 | 1.2 | |
| Nuclear | 3.80 | 12.5 | |
| Biomass | 2.31 | 7.6 |
Interconnectors
| Belgium | 0.23 | 0.8 | |
| Denmark | 0.22 | 0.7 | |
| France | 2.67 | 8.7 | |
| Ireland | −0.81 | −2.6 | |
| Netherlands | 0.05 | 0.2 | |
| Norway | 0.80 | 2.6 |
Storage
| Pumped storage | −0.04 | −0.1 |
Price per MWh
Emissions per kWh
Demand
Generation
Transfers
- Time
- All time
- Price
- £68.94/MWh
- Emissions
- 256g/kWh
- Demand
- 32.8GW
- Generation
- 30.7GW
- Transfers
- 2.1GW
Generation by type
| Fossil fuels | 15.3 | 46.5 | |
| Renewables | 7.8 | 23.8 | |
| Other sources | 7.6 | 23.2 |
Generation by source
| Coal | 4.18 | 12.7 | |
| Gas | 11.09 | 33.8 | |
| Solar | 1.14 | 3.5 | |
| Wind | 6.29 | 19.1 | |
| Hydroelectric | 0.40 | 1.2 | |
| Nuclear | 6.07 | 18.5 | |
| Biomass | 1.57 | 4.8 |
Interconnectors
| Belgium | 0.22 | 0.7 | |
| Denmark | 0.05 | 0.2 | |
| France | 1.28 | 3.9 | |
| Ireland | −0.22 | −0.7 | |
| Netherlands | 0.56 | 1.7 | |
| Norway | 0.25 | 0.8 |
Storage
| Pumped storage | −0.03 | −0.1 |
Price per MWh
Emissions per kWh
Demand
Generation
Transfers
The energy transition
Between 12th January 1882, when the world’s first coal-fired power station opened at 57 Holborn Viaduct in London, and 30th September 2024, when Great Britain’s last coal-fired power station closed, the country burnt 4.6 billion tonnes of coal, emitting 10.6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide.
In 2001 the European Union updated the Large Combustion Plant Directive, obliging power stations to limit their emissions or close by 2015. Most older coal-fired power stations in Great Britain closed in response. The government’s introduction of a carbon price floor in 2013, and its subsequent increase in 2015, made coal uncompetitive with gas, which rapidly replaced coal in the country’s energy mix.
At the same time, renewable power generation was steadily rising. Great Britain’s exposed position in the north-east Atlantic makes it one of the best locations in the world for wind power, and the shallow waters of the North Sea host several of the world’s largest offshore wind farms.
New wind power records are set regularly, and between 5:30pm and 6:00pm on 5th December 2025 British wind farms averaged a record 23.94GW of generation.
| Power | Date first achieved |
|---|---|
| 23GW | 5th December 2025 |
| 22GW | 5th December 2024 |
| 21GW | 10th January 2023 |
| 20GW | 2nd November 2022 |
| 15GW | 18th December 2018 |
| 10GW | 8th December 2016 |
About this site
This site is an open source project by Kate Morley. I’ve published the code on GitHub under the terms of the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Legal Code. This means I’ve waived all copyright and related rights to the extent possible under law, with the intention of dedicating the code to the public domain. You can use and adapt it without attribution.
If you’d like to thank me for the time I’ve spent working on this project, or help me cover the costs of hosting a site that received 20,941,757 visits over the past year, I do accept donations.
Weekly visits
The data comes from the Elexon Insights Solution, the National Energy System Operator Data Portal, and the Carbon Intensity API (a project by the National Energy System Operator and the University Of Oxford Department Of Computer Science). Elexon’s licence requires the following statement: Contains BMRS data © Elexon Limited copyright and database right 2026.
Facts Only
The National Grid is Great Britain's electric power transmission network.
As of the latest data, electricity price is £11.00/MWh, emissions are 47g/kWh, demand is 32.7GW, and generation is 34.7GW.
Renewables account for 77.1% of generation, with wind at 57.6% and solar at 18.6%.
Fossil fuels contribute 12.7%, entirely from gas.
Nuclear provides 13.6%, biomass 2.6%, and hydroelectric 0.9%.
Interconnectors show net imports of 2.0GW, with France supplying 9.4% and Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands contributing negatively.
Pumped storage accounts for -0.8% of generation, with no battery storage contribution.
Over the past day, average price was £52.56/MWh, emissions 64g/kWh, and renewables provided 69.7% of generation.
Over the past week, average price was £98.08/MWh, emissions 107g/kWh, and renewables provided 46.5%.
Over the past year, average price was £77.05/MWh, emissions 124g/kWh, and renewables provided 42.2%.
Historically, average price was £68.94/MWh, emissions 256g/kWh, and fossil fuels provided 46.5% of generation.
Great Britain's last coal-fired power station closed on 30th September 2024.
Between 1882 and 2024, Great Britain burned 4.6 billion tonnes of coal, emitting 10.6 billion tonnes of CO₂.
Wind power generation records include 23.94GW on 5th December 2025, 22GW on 5th December 2024, and 20GW on 2nd November 2022.
The data is sourced from Elexon Insights Solution, National Energy System Operator Data Portal, and Carbon Intensity API.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative presented here is a compelling story of progress—one where policy, technology, and geography align to drive a rapid energy transition. The strongest version of this story credits regulatory action (EU directives, carbon pricing) and natural advantages (North Sea wind potential) for phasing out coal and scaling renewables. The data underscores real achievements: emissions per kWh have plummeted, wind power has set repeated records, and interconnectors are integrating regional energy markets. This is a textbook example of how systemic change can unfold when economic incentives, technological innovation, and political will converge.
Yet, the pattern scan reveals subtle framing choices worth noting. The focus on record-breaking wind generation, while factually accurate, could be seen as a form of **ARC-0037 Cherry-Picking**—highlighting peaks without equal emphasis on variability or grid stability challenges. The historical comparison of emissions (256g/kWh vs. 47g/kWh) is striking but lacks context on how much of that reduction stems from offshoring industrial demand or relying on intermittent sources backed by gas. The absence of discussion around energy storage limitations or the social costs of renewable expansion (e.g., land use, material sourcing) could reflect **ARC-0041 Omission Bias**, where inconvenient complexities are sidelined to reinforce a clean narrative.
The root cause paradigm here is one of technocratic optimism: the belief that top-down policy and market mechanisms can smoothly steer society toward sustainability. This assumes that the transition’s benefits are universally distributed and that trade-offs (e.g., higher short-term costs, geographic disparities in energy access) are either temporary or solvable through further innovation. Historically, this echoes mid-20th-century modernization theories, where progress was framed as linear and inevitable—until unintended consequences emerged.
For human agency, the implications are mixed. On one hand, the data empowers individuals to see their energy system’s evolution and hold institutions accountable. On the other, the narrative’s focus on macro-trends may obscure the role of local communities, labor transitions, or the global supply chains underpinning "green" infrastructure. Who benefits? Clearly, future generations and the climate. But who bears costs? Workers in decommissioned coal plants, ratepayers funding grid upgrades, and ecosystems affected by mining for rare earth minerals.
Bridge questions: How would this transition look if measured by energy justice—access, affordability, and equity—rather than just emissions and capacity? What blind spots might emerge if we treat wind and solar as "solved" problems while underinvesting in storage or demand-side flexibility? And if this data were weaponized—say, to argue that no further policy intervention is needed—how would we distinguish genuine progress from complacency?
Counterstrike scan: A bad actor pushing this narrative might amplify the "mission accomplished" framing, using the decline in emissions to argue against further climate action or to greenwash continued fossil fuel use elsewhere. They might also exploit the focus on generation records to dismiss concerns about grid resilience, framing skeptics as "anti-progress." However, the actual content does not align with this playbook. It presents data transparently, acknowledges the role of gas in the mix, and avoids overpromising. The only structural vulnerability is the lack of critical engagement with the transition’s social and material costs—but this is a common blind spot in data-driven reporting, not evidence of manipulation.
Patterns detected: **ARC-0037 Cherry-Picking**, **ARC-0041 Omission Bias**