This article was originally written in Thai.
A dream that is yet to arrive. That is how rail technician Komcharn Kaewprasert describes his experience under the tech transfer platform of the Thai-Chinese high-speed rail project. The 28-year-old finds his once-bright career prospects dimmed by ground realities.
A decade ago, Komcharn enrolled in a new rail transport systems course at Banphai College in Khon Kaen province, north-eastern Thailand.
“I dreamt of not having to worry about unemployment, having a high salary, and enjoying numerous rail technician job offers,” he told Dialogue Earth.
“We spent four months learning Chinese language and another four months studying basic maintenance of suspension systems and rail tracks alongside Chinese students,” Komcharn recalled.
The course had been jointly developed by Thailand’s Office of the Vocational Education Commission and China’s Wuhan Railway Vocational College of Technology.
It was among several initiatives to formalise the transfer of Chinese technology to the Thai workforce as part of the USD 15 billion high-speed rail project to connect Bangkok with Kunming in southern China via the existing rail network in Laos. Such transfer was a requirement under a deal signed by the Thai and Chinese governments in 2014.
The project, part of China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative, is funded by Thai taxpayers and uses Chinese construction technologies and high-speed rail systems.
Reality bites
Initially, the government predicted the first half of the 609 km line would open to the public in 2023 but that milestone has since been pushed to 2030. Current activities mainly involve civil engineering works, such as building foundations.
This means Komcharn’s dream of having a highly paid job in a new industry has yet to become reality.
After graduating from the programme, he found work at existing rail networks and Bangkok’s electrified mass rail transit systems. But his salary was lower than he had expected because his credentials were not highly valued. His employers told him others could pick up his knowledge through on-the-job learning, he shared.
“Less than half of my classmates who joined the course in China have worked in rail transport systems,” said Komcharn.
He eventually decided to take a job at a postal service provider and later at a construction company. Komcharn continues to hope that once the high-speed rail project begins, he will find a job in the field he trained for.
‘Basic’ level of technology transfer
So far, tech transfer efforts have centred on joint high-speed train courses among Thai and Chinese educational institutions, the provision of training in China, and field trips for Thai students and personnel.
Based on a Dialogue Earth review of university announcements and news reports, at least 10 Thai universities have jointly developed high-speed rail curricula with Chinese counterparts. Among them is Kasetsart University, which partnered with China’s Southwest Jiaotong University in 2024.
Kasetsart’s engineering lecturer Wichai Siwakosit told Dialogue Earththat the tech transfer has centred on maintaining trains and rail systems, work that mainly involves technicians rather than engineers.
“At present, knowledge transfer is still at the basic level. We may have to wait until there are actual train procurements [from China] to have additional knowledge transfer,” said Wichai.
That “basic level” of knowledge transfer appears incomparable to the depth of the tech transfer contracts signed by Beijing with multinational firms in the mid-2000s, when they procured high-speed trains from French, German, Canadian and Japanese companies.
According to a 2015 study by researchers Yatang Lin, Yu Qin and Zhuan Xie of the London School of Economics (LSE), those contracts required train models to be co-designed with Chinese engineers, access to train blueprints, instructions on manufacturing procedures, and engineering training. The study found that this tech transfer spurred knowledge spillovers to universities’ research activities, fostering indigenous technological innovation in China.
Pramual Suteecharuwat is an opposition MP with the People’s Party and former engineering lecturer at Chulalongkorn University. He told Dialogue Earth that tech transfer must go beyond providing technology like trains and training and field trips. It should focus on building human resources that will play a role in advancing Thailand’s development, he said.
“For the high-speed rail project, we must set a five- or 10-year plan for what kind of expertise will be developed. It doesn’t necessarily have to be the capability to produce high-speed trains in their entirety, but some parts of them. We can set other goals such as making Thailand a supply chain that provides parts to China or requiring that every Chinese-built train uses Thailand-made glass components,” said Pramual.
“The government must find a way to impose conditions that will transform technology transfer into an industry that will create jobs and increase the incomes of Thai people,” Pramual added.
A subject-matter mismatch
For the development of the first stretch of the rail line,Thai companies have mainly secured “civil works” contracts for building tracks and passenger terminals. While China Railway International Co and China Railway Design Corporation have been awarded contracts in signalling works and rolling stock, meaning trains and carriages.
Pramual revealed that training courses provided for Thai professionals and lecturers in 2020 only involved civil works, and suggested that this is a mismatch.
He said the government should demand technology transfer in rolling stock manufacturing first, as it is where Thailand currently has the least expertise. The second and third priorities should go to signalling works and electrical systems, again based on the levels of domestic capacity. And the least important priority is civil works, where Thailand already has strong expertise, he added.
“Civil works is where Thailand’s expertise lies. Many Thai companies have engaged in the construction of high-speed rail projects overseas,” he said.
“It demonstrates a lack of understanding [of policymakers]. There has been a high turnover of decision-makers at the Ministry of Transport, leading to policy discontinuity,” MP Pramual added.
The deputy minister of transport, Siripong Angkasakulkiat, told Dialogue Earth that he has set a goal for the high-speed rail project to use at least 40% locally manufactured parts, with plans to gradually increase that share to 100%.
Though he provided no timeline, the deputy minister believes the goal will pave the way for Thailand to capitalise on its existing knowledge to further develop other rail systems, ultimately becoming a parts exporter; in a similar manner to how Thailand has become a base for manufacturing and exporting electric vehicle parts.
‘Better than nothing’
In 2019, a Chinese company supplied Banphai College with a train driver simulator, as part of the Lu Ban High-Speed Railway Institute, a joint effort of Banphai and Wuhan Railway Vocational College of Technology.
Chotchai Charoenngam, chair of the RTRDA, the agency tasked with leading the tech transfer effort, told a seminar last year that the simulator was an example of how China overstated the extent of its tech transfer to Thailand.
He said that once students had tried it and pictures had been taken, knowledge transfer could be reported as complete. Under the contracts between Thai and Chinese training institutions, knowledge transfer had been “paltry” and “the bare minimum.”
Thampaphol Ketnok, a division head at Banphai college, said the number of student enrolments in its rail transport course has dropped from its peak of 30 to 6. The delays in the high-speed rail project have diminished job prospects in the field, Thampaphol added.
Leadership of the tech transfer program was originally assigned to the National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA). But in 2021 that role fell to the newly established RTRDA (Rail Technology Research and Development Agency). For Chotchai, lack of clarity on RTRDA’s mandate has made it challenging for the agency to take initiative.
According to Ekkarut Viyanit, director of the NSTDA’s rail and modern transport research group, the agency has focused on research and development. It has been running a joint lab with rail systems manufacturer CRRC Qingdao Sifang Co and, since 2024, sending participants annually to an intensive two-week training in China.
“This training has equipped Thailand with knowledge [in theory] that we can further apply. But successful technology transfer would require actual practices in real-world settings, and this is yet to be fulfilled,” Ekkarut said.
A former executive of a technical college involved in the joint curriculum development told Dialogue Earth the basic level of China’s tech transfer is “better than nothing”.
A lesson learnt for future negotiations?
Construction of the second and last stretch of the high-speed rail line is expected to start later this year with the aim of opening to the public in 2032.
Ekkarut believes that Thailand should learn from the first phase to ensure better tech transfer efforts are made under the second phase.
“We were inexperienced then. Whatever they [Chinese counterparts] told us to accept, we just followed suit. From now on, we must be more strategic with our technology transfer demands, such as ensuring that it covers signalling works and rolling stock,” he said.
The Thai-Chinese high-speed rail project plays a key role in fulfilling Beijing’s aspiration for rail connectivity from Kunming down to Singapore. Pramual, the opposition MP, pointed out that Thailand should use this leverage to negotiate higher-value tech transfer.
“But the technology transfer negotiation for the second phase is still in doubt. We need visionary negotiators who have strong political will. So far, I haven’t seen anyone trying to use the leverage of this project to advance Thailand’s technological capability,” he said.
Translation and additional reporting by Surasak Glahan.
Facts Only
* Komcharn Kaewprasert is a 28-year-old rail technician.
* He enrolled in a rail transport systems course at Banphai College in Khon Kaen province a decade ago.
* The training involved four months of Chinese language study and four months of basic maintenance of suspension systems and rail tracks with Chinese students.
* The course was jointly developed by Thailand’s Office of the Vocational Education Commission and China’s Wuhan Railway Vocational College of Technology.
* The technology transfer is part of the USD 15 billion high-speed rail project connecting Bangkok to Kunming via Laos.
* Initial public opening for the first half of the 609 km line was predicted for 2023 but pushed to 2030, focusing on civil engineering works like building foundations.
* Post-graduation, Komcharn worked in existing rail networks and Bangkok's mass rail transit systems with lower salaries due to credential valuation.
* Fewer than half of his classmates who studied in China have worked in rail transport systems.
* Tech transfer efforts have focused on joint high-speed train courses, training in China, and field trips.
* At least 10 Thai universities have jointly developed high-speed rail curricula with Chinese counterparts, including Kasetsart University and Southwest Jiaotong University in 2024.
* Knowledge transfer has been at a basic level concerning the maintenance of trains and rail systems.
* A 2015 study by LSE researchers found that technology transfer contracts involved co-designing train models with Chinese engineers, access to blueprints, manufacturing instructions, and engineering training.
* Thai companies primarily secured "civil works" contracts for the first stretch of the line; China Railway International Co and China Railway Design Corporation were awarded contracts in signalling works and rolling stock.
* A deputy minister of transport set a goal for using at least 40% locally manufactured parts for the high-speed rail project, aiming to increase this share to 100%.
* A Chinese company supplied a train driver simulator to Banphai College in 2019.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative reveals a significant divergence between stated technological transfer goals and the actual delivery of knowledge, highlighting structural imbalances within large infrastructure partnerships. The fact that technology transfer has remained at a "basic level," focusing on maintenance rather than deep engineering co-design involving blueprints or manufacturing processes, suggests an incomplete execution of agreements. This limited scope contrasts sharply with historical examples, such as those involving French or German procurement in the mid-2000s, where deeper mechanisms for knowledge spillover into indigenous innovation were present. The proposed solution articulated by opposition figures—demanding expertise in rolling stock manufacturing first, then signalling, and finally civil works, based on domestic capacity—points toward a demand for shifting technology transfer from mere training to industrial capability building.
The shift in focus from curriculum development (civil works) to physical realization (infrastructure) appears to create an opportunity for leveraging existing Thai expertise as a means of control over future knowledge flows. The concern about policy discontinuity and high turnover among decision-makers suggests that the framework for technology transfer is vulnerable to shifting political priorities rather than being rigidly tied to technical mandates. The experience of Komcharn, who found his specialized training devalued in the job market despite participation, illustrates how institutional frameworks fail to translate academic collaboration into tangible socioeconomic benefits for the participating workforce. True technological sovereignty requires moving beyond basic training demonstrations to mandate contractual conditions that enforce knowledge internalization and industrial capacity building across all phases of a multi-billion dollar project.
Bridge Questions: If technology transfer negotiations are based on balancing domestic capacity, what specific metrics should be established in future agreements to measure the depth of human capital development versus physical asset delivery? How can accountability mechanisms be established to ensure that publicly funded infrastructure projects mandate tangible industrial outcomes rather than simply documenting educational exchanges? What strategies exist for ensuring that technological leverage gained from large infrastructure deals translates into sustained national developmental capacity rather than temporary project deliverables?
Sentinel — Human
The article effectively synthesizes personal impact with structural analysis of a large infrastructure project, exhibiting the nuanced argumentation characteristic of human investigative reporting.