Defectors from the Myanmar military told The Diplomat that the regime will intensify its airstrikes on the civilian population in the country’s Rakhine State.
In an interview in Myanmar’s Arakan region on February 25 this year, two military defectors – Major Myint Zaw Than and Sergeant Kyaw Han Toe – told this correspondent that the military will increase its air raids in the Arakan region.
“There will be more airstrikes on the civilians in Arakan in the coming months because the military has to defend the three townships [Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung] still under its control,” Myint Zaw Than said.
Despite this, Kyaw Han Toe predicted that the military would eventually be defeated by the Arakan Army (AA) and will lose control of the three townships.
Of all the ethnic armed organizations operating in Myanmar, the AA has wrested control of the largest expanse of territory.
The defectors identified the “support of the people” for the AA as the outfit’s biggest strength, which has enabled it to stage a series of spectacular victories against the military over the past decade.
An annual report issued by the United Nations Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) that covers the period from July 2025 to June 2026 also pointed to a marked escalation in aerial attacks across the country in the months preceding the elections. Aerial attacks have continued unabated since the elections as well.
The IIMM report pointed out the Myanmar military was increasingly using motorized paragliders, gyrocopters, and drones to carry out low-altitude airstrikes with unguided explosives.
An estimated 228 civilian casualties, including 89 deaths and 139 injuries, have been reported as a result of airstrikes in Rakhine State from January 1 to August 13 this year.
On the resistance movement in other regions of Myanmar, Kyaw Han Toe said that “the resistance groups will emerge victorious if they are able to work together.” If they do, “the junta will collapse within three years,” he said.
About the recent success of the military in regaining territories from the resistance groups, he said that lack of coordination among the groups has been a fundamental drawback that has contributed to the military’s success in some zones. This, he added, stands in sharp contrast to the situation in Arakan, where “there is only one organization [opposed to the military] and so only one chain of command.”
The two military defectors clarified that they had received salaries and health care regularly when they were in service, as did other personnel in the military. Echoing accusations made previously by other defectors and some functionaries of resistance groups, Myint Zaw Than alleged that a small section of military personnel is involved in drug trafficking.
Facts Only
* Major Myint Zaw Than and Sergeant Kyaw Han Toe were military defectors.
* The military will increase airstrikes on civilians in Arakan in the coming months.
* This is because the military must defend the townships of Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung.
* Kyaw Han Toe predicted the military would be defeated by the Arakan Army (AA) and lose control of the three townships.
* The AA controls the largest expanse of territory among ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar.
* Defectors identified the "support of the people" as the AA's biggest strength.
* A United Nations report covering July 2025 to June 2026 pointed to an escalation in aerial attacks before and after elections.
* The military used motorized paragliders, gyrocopters, and drones for low-altitude airstrikes with unguided explosives.
* Between January 1 and August 13 of this year, 228 civilian casualties (89 deaths and 139 injuries) were reported from airstrikes in Rakhine State.
* Kyaw Han Toe stated resistance groups would win if they worked together, predicting the junta collapse within three years under coordinated action.
* Defectors alleged that a small section of military personnel is involved in drug trafficking.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative presents a stark contrast between localized fragmentation and unified resistance regarding territorial control. The defectors' perspective highlights a divergence in strategic assessment: the junta faces immediate defensive challenges over specific local areas, while organized resistance groups see a long-term pathway to collapse predicated on internal cohesion. This tension is amplified by the observation that military success in reclaiming territory appears linked to a failure of coordination among resistance factions, setting Arakan apart as an exception where there is a single opposing entity and singular command structure. The escalation of aerial attacks, documented by UN mechanisms, suggests a pattern of tactics used by the military to assert control over civilian populations and contested territories. Furthermore, the introduction of sophisticated aerial weaponry indicates an adaptation in conflict methodology beyond traditional means. The juxtaposition of internal illicit activities, such as drug trafficking among some military personnel, with large-scale civilian casualties frames the conflict not just as a struggle for territory but as a complex interplay between state control, non-state actor dynamics, and human cost. This suggests that understanding the sustainability of resistance relies on analyzing the coherence—or lack thereof—in internal political arrangements rather than solely focusing on kinetic outcomes.
Bridge Questions: How does the differing operational environments in Arakan versus other regions affect the viability of unified resistance strategies? What are the observable consequences for civilian populations when regional command structures remain fractured during periods of escalation? If coordinated action is necessary for collapse, what specific institutional or social mechanisms must be established to ensure that future coordination efforts translate into lasting political control rather than temporary tactical alignment?