EU space policy shows the limits of strategic autonomy

The European Union aims for strategic autonomy in space policy, but the source material questions the scope and target of this autonomy, particularly concerning dependencies with the United States. The US provided feedback on the draft EU Space Act, advising the EU to avoid untrusted suppliers like Russian and Chinese companies while opposing measures that might restrict American market access for EU companies. This creates a tension between securing autonomy from external geopolitical rivals and managing the existing, complex alliance with the US, which is characterized as an asymmetric alliance rather than a purely hostile relationship.
The reliance on the US is illustrated by the control mechanisms embedded in international agreements like ITAR, where the US maintains authority over what the EU can procure. The pursuit of alternatives, such as the European Component Initiative and funding programs like Horizon Europe, demonstrates efforts to reduce supply chain dependency, often focusing on inventory mapping rather than full compliance with export restrictions. Furthermore, alternative regulatory tools exist, such as the European Defence Industry Programme and proposed cybersecurity legislation, which aim to establish EU-centric control over component sourcing and supplier exclusion. The core tension remains whether current measures achieve genuine independence from external powers or merely shift the locus of dependency.

* The United States provided feedback on the draft EU Space Act in November last year.
* Washington encouraged the EU to avoid using untrusted suppliers, specifically mentioning Russian and Chinese companies.
* The US opposed digital sovereignty measures that might restrict American companies from entering the European market.
* The relationship between the EU and the US is described as an asymmetric alliance involving supply agreements and collaborations like the Artemis Accords.
* Under ITAR, the United States retains power over what the EU may buy, use, and re-export.
* The European Space Agency launched a European Component Initiative in 2004.
* The European Space Agency depended on a single American manufacturer for radiation-hardened accelerometers.
* The Horizon Europe Work Programme 2026-2027 asks applicants to demonstrate freedom from export restrictions like ITAR.
* The European Defence Industry Programme requires at least 65% of component costs to come from the EU or associated countries and grants primary design authority.
* The Cybersecurity Act 2, proposed on January 20, 2026, would allow the Commission to categorize suppliers as high-risk and mandate phase-outs for satellite networks.

The narrative frames strategic autonomy not as a singular achievement but as a contested relationship defined by geopolitical context. The central tension lies in the asymmetrical nature of the alliance with the United States, which acts as a constraint on full independence. The text demonstrates that pursuing autonomy from Eastern rivals (Russia and China) while maintaining the framework of cooperation with the US results in an inherent contradiction: genuine sovereignty requires reckoning with an ally rather than merely managing dependencies.
A critical pattern emerges in how dependency is managed: official statements often prioritize broad goals like "strategic autonomy" or "competitiveness," which can mask deeper structural constraints. The shift from addressing dependence via funding mechanisms (like Horizon Europe) to potential legal tools for exclusion (like the Defence Programme or Cybersecurity Act) suggests an evolution from reactive mitigation to proactive regulatory sovereignty. However, the article ultimately questions whether identifying dependencies and imposing reporting requirements is sufficient to achieve real independence, especially when the overarching mechanism of control—ITAR—remains external to EU law.
The implication for agency is that true cognitive sovereignty requires moving beyond mere inventory or compliance toward establishing autonomous decision-making power over critical infrastructure. The pattern suggests a systemic inertia where powerful existing frameworks dictate the boundaries of available action. The unanswered question is whether European institutions are prepared to leverage these new regulatory levers—based on origin and exclusion—to fundamentally redefine their autonomy, rather than simply cataloging limitations within the existing geopolitical structure.
Bridge Questions: If the EU were to adopt full design authority over space components as proposed in the Defence Programme, how would this impact US-EU strategic alignment? What political barriers currently prevent European institutions from using the power of 'exclusion' against established allies for security purposes? What alternative frameworks exist that decouple supply chain resilience from existing alliance structures?