Azerbaijan–Israel Relations Represent Middle Power Consolidation
Executive Summary:
- Azerbaijan and Israel have deepened their longstanding partnership through energy exports, arms deals, and new agreements in artificial intelligence cooperation over the last year, with Azerbaijan supplying 40–60 percent of Israel’s oil and importing up to 69 percent of its “major weapons” from Israel.
- Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar visited Baku in January, continuing to expand relations with Azerbaijan, which has become overt in recent years, with Azerbaijan opening a trade and tourism office in Israel in 2021 and establishing an embassy in Israel in 2023.
- Azerbaijan is leveraging its ties with both Israel and the United States to consolidate middle power status, including potentially positioning itself within Abraham Accords expansion efforts.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov in Baku on January 26 (President of Azerbaijan; Anadolu Ajansı, January 26). The two states have had active bilateral relations for more than 30 years, largely based on Azerbaijan’s export of oil to Israel—which has accounted for between 40 and 60 percent of Israel’s total in recent years—and import of Israeli weapons (OC Media, November 20, 2025; Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed March 26). This cooperation has become more overt in recent years, with Azerbaijan opening a trade and tourism office in Israel in 2021 and establishing an embassy in Israel in 2023 (The Times of Israel, August 2, 2021; APA, March 30, 2023).
Israel has sought to expand ties with countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus as part of its peripheral diplomacy amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza and mounting international pressure against Israeli actions (The Caspian Post, January 26). The inclusion of Israeli business leaders in the January delegation to Baku underscored Israel’s intent to expand economic cooperation with Azerbaijan (Aze.Media, January 26). Between 2023 and the first half of 2024, Azerbaijan increased oil exports to Israel by 55 percent, demonstrating increased engagement (Musavat, July 23, 2024).
From 2016–2020, Azerbaijan imported 69 percent of its “major weapons” from Israel, compared to just 17 percent from Russia during the same period (APA, March 15, 2021). The import of Israeli arms has strengthened Azerbaijan’s military power and reduced its reliance on Russian security guarantees (BESA Center, February 25, 2025).
Diplomatic and technological cooperation between the two countries has also increased over the past few years. Commentators and political figures in Azerbaijan, the United States, and Israel have promoted Azerbaijan’s addition to the Abraham Accords as part of an effort to extend the accord’s security and diplomatic reach beyond the Middle East (BESA Center, March 15, 2025; Azon Global, April 28, 2025; OC Media, August 4, 2025). On February 7, Israel and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding in the field of artificial intelligence. The two countries “intend to deepen their ongoing alliance through artificial intelligence” (Times of Israel, February 3).
Azerbaijan’s enduring partnership with Israel has played a pivotal role in securing political support from some members of the Israeli Knesset. This support includes some members’ public stance against Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, passed in 1992, which restricts U.S. military assistance to Baku until the U.S. president determines that Baku is taking steps to peacefully settle the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Caucasus Watch, March 11, 2025). Though U.S. presidents have routinely issued waivers to get around this, it remains a diplomatic thorn for Baku. In August 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump suspended the enforcement of Section 907 following the trilateral U.S.–Armenia–Azerbaijan peace summit at the White House, but Baku continues to advocate for the U.S. Congress to fully repeal the legislation (Caliber, January 30).
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s February and Saar’s January visit to Baku coincided with heightened volatility in Iran amid mass protests against the ruling government and a brutal crackdown that left hundreds of casualties among both civilians and law enforcement (BNE Intellinews, 2026). Baku has firmly rejected claims that it might breach its neutrality during the ongoing conflict between the United States and Israel against Iran, which began on February 28 with large-scale U.S.–Israeli aerial strikes. Tehran has repeatedly accused Baku of allowing the United States and Israel to use its territory to facilitate intelligence and military operations against Iran (Russian Council, July 21, 2025). Aliyev responded to a March 5 drone attack on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave by saying, “Today, a terrorist act was committed by Iran against the territory of Azerbaijan and the state of Azerbaijan” (President of Azerbaijan, March 5; see EDM, March 11). Iran–Azerbaijan relations de-escalated in subsequent weeks.
For Azerbaijan, conflict in and around Iran is particularly sensitive due to its geographic proximity and infrastructural interdependence (Think Tanks; The Caspian Post, January 28). Prolonged conflict could increase Azerbaijan’s oil profits but could also delay implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Property (TRIPP, formerly known in Azerbaijan as the Zangezur Corridor), which would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan via Armenia. A 765-kilometer (475-mile) shared border with Iran forms a dense zone of economic exchange, transportation connectivity, and social interaction. Additionally, 16 percent of Iran’s population is estimated to be ethnically Azeri, which would be about three times the population of Azerbaijan itself (Minority Rights Group, updated December 2017; see EDM, April 20, 2023).
The Israeli foreign minister’s visit, followed by Vance’s trip to Azerbaijan, highlighted Azerbaijan’s moves to consolidate its position as a middle power in the evolving regional order. The deepening Azerbaijan–Israel partnership reflects a pragmatic convergence of interests in energy, security, and technological innovation. Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Israel in critical fields has enabled it to maneuver effectively among competing powers, leveraging diverse partnerships to enhance its military, economic, and diplomatic standing.