Death of Caspian Sea Affecting More Than Just Littoral Countries
Executive Summary:
- Similar to the Aral Sea before it, the Caspian Sea is dying and at an ever more rapid rate, shrinking in size and depth, leaving ports far from former coastlines, and rendering sea lanes incapable of handling larger vessels or supporting offshore wells and pipelines.
- The five littoral states are being hit the hardest, but other countries that use or hope to use the Caspian are also being negatively affected. As a result, the impact of the Caspian’s decline is likely to be broader and unfold more quickly than that of the Aral.
- Some of the reasons for this decline lie beyond human control. Even those steps that could slow the Caspian’s death are currently unlikely to be taken, as there is little willingness among the littoral states—let alone outside powers—to come together and cooperate.
For decades, observers of Central Asia have warned about the looming demise of the Aral Sea, driven by climate change and growing human use of the water from the rivers that feed it. They argue that this trend will restrict economic growth, reduce food production, spread disease, and trigger massive population outflows as Central Asians search for reliable water supplies (see EDM, April 9, June 16). Despite these warnings, remarkably little has been achieved, and the Aral Sea has become so degraded that its recovery as a whole is all but impossible—Kazakhstan, however, may succeed in saving part of it in the north (Spik.kz, April 14).
Now, the Caspian Sea, a much larger and more important body of water, is following a similar trajectory at an even faster rate. Its surface area has already declined by an area larger than that of Sicily over the last three decades, and it is currently falling by as much as 30 centimeters—approximately one foot—each year. Current projections indicate that it could shrink by another third by the end of this century. Water levels have fallen enough in many areas that large ships can no longer ply sea lanes, use ports that are now miles from the shoreline, or service offshore oil and gas platforms (Kedr.media, July 14).
The five littoral states–Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan–are being hit the hardest by this development. The ports and territorial waters are becoming silted, fishing harvests are declining, and diseases are spreading as winds carry toxic materials from the newly exposed seabed, much as they do around the Aral Sea. Despite facing the consequences, these countries have made little progress toward cooperating to slow the Caspian’s decline. Disagreements persist over the severity of the crisis. Until recently, Russian officials denied the problem (see EDM, September 26, 2017; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 15). The littoral states also remain divided over how efforts to save the Caspian could change the regional balance of power, how much mitigation measures will cost, how those costs should be shared, and who should bear the expense of dredging, particularly because the littoral states, including Russia lack sufficient domestic dredging capacity (see EDM, June 24, 2021, November 16, 2023; Window on Eurasia, May 25, June 14, October 10, 2025, April 7; Spik.kz, October 7, 2025; Caspian Herald, July 21).
One example is Moscow’s use of the Caspian to support its arms trade with Iran. That activity has already crowded commercial shipping into narrow and shallow sea lanes, prompting complaints from other littoral countries (Minval Politika, January 17). It has also led Moscow to reconsider plans to rely on the Caspian as the principal corridor for the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), shifting its focus to rail routes west and east of the sea (Fond Strategicheskiy Kul’tury, July 9, 2025).
A key distinction separates developments in the Caspian from those in the Aral. Unlike the Aral Sea, the Caspian directly affects a far wider range of countries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), Türkiye, EU member states, and other Western countries all have important economic and strategic interests in the Caspian. Declining water levels are already making shipping more difficult, increasing risks to pipelines, and isolating offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Despite these shared interests, outside actors have yet to adopt a common position and often face opposition from Moscow and Tehran (Ulysmedia.kz, March 3).
As a result, the effect of the demise of the Caspian is certain to be larger and occur more quickly than the death of the Aral Sea. Many of the underlying causes, particularly global warming, lie beyond the ability of any single country to address. Effective action would require sustained international cooperation. Even more practical measures, such as improving water-use efficiency, sharing the costs of dredging, or relocating ports, remain unlikely since neither the littoral states nor outside powers have demonstrated a willingness to take the difficult steps needed (see EDM, March 26).
Instead of cooperating to address this growing problem, both the littoral states and the outside powers are becoming increasingly divided. Kazakhstan and Russia, for example, are currently at odds over Astana’s demand that Moscow consult it regarding the flow of the Volga River into the Caspian. Kazakhstan argues that the Volga, which supplies most of the Caspian’s inflow, is essential to slowing the sea’s declining water levels. Despite a long and generally successful history of resolving transboundary river disputes, Russian commentators have responded with outrage, portraying Kazakhstan’s request as a challenge to Russian sovereignty (Versiya, April 8, 2025; Svobodnaya Pressa, July 21). Tension over this issue is limiting prospects for rapprochement between the two countries and leading Kazakhstan to distance itself further from Moscow.
At the same time, the declining Caspian water levels are contributing to greater geopolitical fragmentation across the region. Subgroups of littoral states are forming new alliances, while many are seeking closer ties with outside powers. One Kazakhstani commentator has suggested that three competing blocs have emerged, each with its own regional leader and external supporters. According to this assessment, these alignments could transform the Caspian from a zone of relative stability into one marked by conflicts and potential military tensions (The Times of Central Asia, July 24, 2025; see EDM, June 1, July 6).
Declining Caspian water levels are far from the only factor driving these geopolitical shifts. They have, however, become a serious concern for all involved and have made it even more difficult for the littoral states, let alone outsiders, to cooperate in addressing the water crisis, especially as these blocs attract support from competing outside countries such as Türkiye, on the one hand, and the PRC, on the other (Eurasia Today, July 25, 2025).
Given these trends, and the hostility of some countries toward efforts to combat climate change, the prospects for progress in the short term seem minimal. As a result, the Caspian water crisis is likely to intensify, producing images of large ships stranded on dry land as the shoreline continues to recede, as well as humanitarian tragedies across the region and, ultimately, geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences for countries far beyond the Caspian littoral.